Evolution of French infantry tactics

[Gibbo]

There are a few copies of Pascal Lucas's book in libraries. According to this Worldcat search, there are six copies of the English language edition in the USA, four of them in miitary libraries. Two British libraries have the French edition; Oxford University (no. 5 in the search) and the British Library (no. 10). Different editions and minor differences in capitalisation of the title explain the appearance of several entries for the same book in the search.

This search on Copac, which searches academic libraries in the British Isles, says that King's College, London also has the French edition.

[Latze]

Hi Robert,

Latze, there wasn't any difference in the idea of gaining fire superiority in support of infantry attacks before the war. There were differences of opinion, both between France and Germany as well as within both countries, about the how.

I read a paper by Matthew Buck (French Artillery Doctrine before the First World War) and the Ardennes book by Terence Zuber. Both said that French army stressed the idea of fixing the enemy and subsequent breakthrough. I thought that this concept implies small unit tactics that are somewhat more 'moving to close'-oriented than German usage. So, you would say that this impression is wrong and that on the tactical level (companies) it was all the same?

And: wasn't it the case that French troops tried to dominate their front mainly by fire power later in the war and that that was one of the reasons British troops thought their trench lines not well developed (relying more on physical occupation of the ground)?

regards

Matthias

[Latze]

Hello Gibbo,

There are a few copies of Pascal Lucas's book in libraries.

(Un)fortunately I am living in Germany. There is no inter-library loan crossing borders - afaik. I search all available book-sellers. But there is no copy to be had. Maybe I have to go to London...

Thanks for looking that up!

Latze

[Latze]

Hi salesie,

That's my whole point, Latze - any tactical edge for any side was never decisive throughout the whole of the war in the west. The learning-curve (evolution in tactics) was equal and opposite for both sides, and the end-result of any "edge" in tactics was always the same - the trading of huge casualties in return for relatively small gains in real-estate and thus a bloody stalemate. And this stalemate, because both sides quickly learnt to counter each others tactical innovations, existed right up until the summer of 1918 when slow to act but powerful strategic forces broke the stalemate (not the evolved tactics employed by that time).

I hope you find the time to read this after your travelling and that we may continue that discussion... You said that I made your point when in fact I think I didn't. I said that the idea that looking at end-states of the frontier battles and the Marne does not allow us to come easily to conclusions regarding tactical efficiency. I read your former post as saying that there was no tactical edge anywhere. Now you talk about the edge but consider it un-decisive. Or did I misinterpreted what you said?

regards

Latze

[Robert Dunlop]

Hi Matthias. I can't speak to Matthew Buck's paper. Zuber's analysis of French doctrine has to be taken with significant caution. His book on the Battle of the Ardennes reviews the encounter battle between French and German forces in late August 1914. The French forces were advancing but not to fix and then breakthrough the German armies in the Ardennes. The French were trying to get behind the German right wing armies. Joffre anticipated that the Germans must have left the Ardennes weakly held. He was wrong, but the error was only discovered when the battle took place.

Robert

[SteveMarsdin]

Good evening Robert and All,

You say "French offensive doctrine (and definitely the regulations on tactics) DID NOT prescribe the behaviour you have described. In other words, there was a major difference between what was taught/expected and what actually happened." These battles were among the first of the war and it is perhaps not surprising that some commanders were found to be better than others; as other contributors have noted, one reason for the subsequent French improvement were the far-reaching changes in command that Joffre made.

I would wholeheartedly agree when you also highlight that there were many reasons for the significant defeats in August 1914, giving the example of the lack of effective reconnaissance, which I would suggest is the most telling; it seems incredulous that in the previous 2 weeks (and particularly the 20 and 21 August) that French aerial or cavalry/cycle patrols were so ineffective. Encountering the Germans more quickly and in greater strength than expected in the restrictive terrain of the Ardennes greatly contributed to their calamity.

[SteveMarsdin]

Continuing from my previous post.

(Robert, in response to the point you make about the avant-garde)

The divisional commanders at Neufchateau, Rossignol, Bellefontaine and Ethe travelled with the avant-garde. In the first three cases the approach routes consisted of substantial stretches where the French units were strung out in linear formation due to the restrictions of the terrain. The Germans were thought to be 10-15 miles further East - NorthEast than they actually were (roughly where the E411 runs today). When they were encountered in such strength unexpectedly there were crucial delays in communication from the avant-garde which in the case of the Colonial Corps meant that the 3 Div artillery was partly caught on the road from Breuvanne to Rossignol (which resembled a causeway at times) and that that deployed at Saint Vincent (on the hills to the south of the Semois valley) only did so on the orders of a passing officer who overturned their given orders. The 2 Div (held in reserve at Jamoigne) wasn't deployed in support of 3 Div (Rossignol) or 5 Brig (Neufchateau) until it was too late because the Corps commanders were at Rossignol. Ethe is diferent in that the avant-garde was effectively cut-off in Ethe by the German artillery.

Robert, I think a large factor in why the French didn't maneouvre to deploy effectively was the restrictions of the terrain, it wasn't where they would have chosen to have fought. The artillery could only cross the Semois by bridge and even for the cavalry it wasn't that easy to ford. The trajectory of the French 75 wasn't suited to the Ardennes either There are only three bridges in the sector and two routes North from France through the forested hills to the South of the valley available to the Colonial Corps. This constricted them to column where, according to records, they kept to the regulation separations between units but from which it was diificult to deploy to provide the necessary critical firepower.

[Robert Dunlop]

Steve, I agree with your analyses. With respect to your last point about chosen terrain, the only additional comment is that if the French had known that Germans were so close then they would have deployed differently. There would still have been problems, however, given the difficulties communicating across the whole region. More fundamentally, the French were not as well practised at larger scale manoeuvres. This issue caught them out in regions where the geography was more favourable.

Basically, the failures in the Ardennes were not due to masses of French infantry throwing themselves against machine guns and barbed wire with only bayonets. As you point out, the French forces were caught in formations designed to advance quickly towards an enemy that was deemed to be much further away. This was not due to the mantra of "l'offensive à outrance" but a relative lack of skill and training.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

I hope you find the time to read this after your travelling and that we may continue that discussion...

Matthias, salesie has re-raised a discussion that took place in another thread. It arises from this comment that I made. The surrounding posts will make the issues clearer for you.

So, you would say that this impression is wrong and that on the tactical level (companies) it was all the same?

And: wasn't it the case that French troops tried to dominate their front mainly by fire power later in the war and that that was one of the reasons British troops thought their trench lines not well developed (relying more on physical occupation of the ground)?

I will try and pull together some material on these questions for you.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Some background information on the lead up to 1914. This material is taken from Joffre's memoirs. Upon taking office, Joffre knew he had "to create a solid doctrine, impose it upon officers and men alike, and form an instrument capable of being used in the application of what appeared to me the sanest system. To this urgent task I now applied myself.

The first thing to be done was to establish an offensive doctrine upon a reasonable basis and to see that it penetrated every echelon, from the War Board, the General Staff and War College down to the men of the ranks. To accomplish this I had recourse to the only practical method at my disposal, namely, map and ground exercises. As I have already related, when the War Board was re-organized, each of its members was given a small body of officers that constituted the nucleus of the staff which would be assigned to him in case of mobilization, and more especially the chief of this staff. The whole body of these chiefs of staff constituted the Staff Committee."

The exercises involved the officers from the Centre of Higher Military Studies and the War College. A cascade system of training was used. Map exercises started with the armies. One group of armies was pitted against another. The general officers then took the exercises to their respective army corps. Where possible, manoeuvres were held later in the year on the same ground as the map exercises.

Joffre noted that "in this way a multitude of ideas, conceptions, audacities and timidities met each other; little by little a doctrine emerged, and very slowly there came to light the conditions under which an offensive might be energetically and yet prudently conducted.

This was the first time such exercises had been organized on so wide a scale. I attached great importance to them. They served to bring to light the realities of war as clearly as is possible in time of peace, and this was accomplished in spite of the crippling effect which a long period of inaction had inevitably produced in the military mind. Another important result sprang from the continual relations thus established between the members of the War Board and their staffs. Indeed, the daily contact between officers of the Staff Committee, the General Staff of the Army, the Centre of Higher Studies, and the War College, were the most fruitful in good results, for it contributed to create amongst these various organs an indispensible unity of ideas. More important than all, this work was a preparation for the proper functioning of the staffs of armies at the outbreak of hostilities; for it should not be forgotten that if at the start the commanders proved themselves unequal to their tasks, if weakness of character was occasionally displayed by men who in time of peace had appeared fully equal to the command of an army, on the other hand, the staffs of our armies and army corps never failed fully to meet the situation, and it was often most difficult. It is to the careful preparation of these staffs and their duties that we owe the fact that our lack of success during the first days of the war was not transformed into disaster."

In the first six months of 1914 alone, the French army commanders (Generals de Castenau, Langle, Lanrezac, Ruffey, Dubail and Bordet) were involved in seventy map exercises involving army versus army.

Joffre also instituted Grand Manoeuvres, starting in 1912. The first one involved two armies, four army corps, two cavalry divisions, one reserve division and supporting units. The conclusions of British observers have been posted previously in this thread. Joffre agreed. Although Generals Gallieni and Marion gave a good account of themselves, in Joffre's opinion, he was concerned that "from a tactical point of view, much was clearly wanting. Although tactical questions were not the essential object of these manoeuvres the various actions were not coordinated; protection was badly carried out, imprudences in manoeuvre led to surprises, and there were grave errors in the use of artillery." In 1913, the Grand Manoeuvres 'brought to light the same defects". Indeed, the same pattern would manifest itself during the Battle of the Frontiers.

As the military consensus emerged in the higher echelons of the French army, in Joffre's opinion, so efforts were made to codify the lessons and opinions in written form. 'Regulations for the Conduct of Large Units' was ratified in October 1913, followed by 'Regulations for Armies in the Field' in December 1913. A new set of infantry regulations was published in April 1914, which "introduced profound modifications in those dating from December 30, 1908." Joffre made the point, later echoed by Terence Zuber, that "unfortunately these regulations were still being studied by the troops when war broke out. It takes a long time for a doctrine to reach the lower grades, above all after a period of moral inertia such as our Army had experienced. Therefore, when August 1914 arrived, the situation was as follows: in the echelons of the High Command, many minds were still paralysed by habits of routine, and above all by the almost entire absence of any strategic education. The staffs, as a rule, were well trained with good ideas and they had succeeded in freeing themselves from any exaggerations which had prevailed when the offensive began to be preached. From a tactical point of view officers had not yet come to understand fully all the offensive entailed. There existed, especially, a too great tendency to take little account of the conditions of modern war, which no longer permitted an attack to tbe made as it was in the days of muzzle-loading cannon and muskets."

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Whatever may have been written in the English literature about the concepts espoused by Grandmaison, etc, it was still a question of what the troops were actually taught that mattered. Military thought and doctrine do not necessarily equate with behaviours on the battlefield.

Given the serious setbacks suffered by the French army in the opening battles, many commentators have deemed that the doctrine of all-out attack to the limit, come what may, was indeed implemented at the tactical level. Just to recapitulate on this issue, here is a quote from Colonel de Grandmaison, published in Ian Ousby's book "The Road to Verdun":

"There exists no other means but attack, immediate and total... Our conclusion will be that we must prepare ourselves and others by encouraging with enthusiasm, with exaggeration and in all the infinite details of training everything that bears - however little - the mark of the offensive spirit. Let us go as far as excess and this will perhaps be far enough."

Ousby interprets Grandmaision's conclusions thus:

"So military training consisted less in advocating strategy and tactics than in inculcating and celebrating a warrior code. Commanders must be inspiring in their leadership, capable both of inculcating ideals and of rousing the beast with the men they ordered to attack. For their part the troops must be taught how to believe, how to obey, how to kill with passion and how to look calmly, even proudly, on the prospect of their own death.

Just how thoroughly these injunctions had permeated the army by the eve of the war can be judged from a speech made to incoming conscripts in 1913. By then the offensive spirit had become identified above all with the savage romanticism of the bayonet charge and by then, too, it could be openly taken for granted that the enemy on the receiving end of the bayonets would be Germans. The speaker was Charles de Gaule, fresh from his officer training at Saint-Cyr and still highly orthodox:

'Everywhere, always, one should have a single idea: to advance. As soon as the fighting begins, every body in the French army, the general in command, the officers and the troops have only one thing in their heads - advancing, advancing to the attack, reaching the Germans, and running them through or making them run away.'

It was single-mindedness of this sort that generals and officers of the First World War had in mind when they judged their troops' morale."

General Joffre was not as single-minded as Ousby makes out. Furthermore, Ousby attributes Grandmaison's conclusions to Foch's teachings. I have previously indicated that Foch was far more sophisticated and broad in his views. Foch certainly was not single-minded about all-out attack in his pre-war writings. Some of the quotes from Joffre also indicate that he was not entirely enamoured with Grandmaison's style and content. And the cult of the offensive/offensive spirit was not unique to the French; it was an issue for both the British and German armies as well.

The next post will provide some information about how conscripts were actually trained before the war.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

The training of conscripts should be considered at two levels: basic training; and training within larger formations. It was not enough to teach infantry how to shoot at an individual target or to bayonet a straw dummy. Performance on the battlefield involves the inter-relationship between various groups of individuals - sections within platoons; platoons within companies; companies within battalions; etc, etc. Just as important for the modern battlefield was the inter-relationship between the infantry and the other arms, particularly the artillery.

One of the most interesting books to re-emerge is 'The French Army from Within (1914)', written by 'Ex-Trooper'. The book was probably based on the author's experiences in the period around 1912/13, ie after manoeuvres were introduced but before 3 year conscription was re-introduced. It gives a concise overview of the training given to French infantry, artillery and cavalry. There is an authenticity apparent in the content, which is supported by the various anecdotal accounts that I have read from individual French NCOs, infantry, gunners and cavalrymen.

Several things come through loud and clear. Firstly, the major influence on a conscript's training was not the officer, like de Gaulle, who gave the motivational(?) speech when the conscript first stood on the parade ground. It was the NCO, who lived in the same accommodation as his men (and who had a lesser status in the French army than his British equivalent):

"Arrived at his station, the conscript finds his room, and is allocated a bed. He finds himself placed under a corporal who will teach him all about his rifle, manifest an interest in the cleanliness of his linen [reflecting the fact that many conscripts came from peasant backgrounds where such an interest was not necessary], sees that he gets his hair cut, instruct him in drill, turn him out of bed in the morning, and see that he is in, or accounted for, when the roll is called at night".

The length of training did not permit, in the view of Ex-Trooper, much more than the acquisition of the basics. "Like the British infantryman, the conscript is concerned principally in learning to march and shoot, and use his bayonet".

With respect to marching, there is an interesting description of the French style of marching. Very different from the British approach, and easy to see why the regular British soldiers regarded many French units as slovenly. In fact, the style was very efficient, though it took some time to learn. Rifle training took some time. Many conscripts had never seen rifles, and they had to be taught the basics. Target shooting was used predominantly, both to refine aim and to teach aspects of fire discipline as well. "Instruction in the use of the bayonet is very largely a similar sort of business, a matter of perpetual care on the part of instructors and of gradually increasing efficiency on the part of the conscript. Then there is the gymnastic class, by means of which limbs are made supple, and muscles strengthened - it is only by continuous training that the marvellous efficiency to which the French conscript attains in the short space of two years is compassed. There is no "furlough season" as British troops know it; the conscript goes up to work all the time, and in that brief period he is transformed from hobble-de-hoy to man".

Ex-Trooper went on to note that "marching, the use of rifle and bayonet, and gymnastic classes do not by any means exhaust the schedule of conscript training". Far from inculcating Grandmaison's "mark of the offensive spirit", "there is all the business of barrack-room life, the cleaning of equipment, in which the corporal is ever at hand to instruct, and men in their second year are also at hand to advise and give hints; there are fatigues, white-washing, trench-digging [my emphasis], and all sorts of things of which in pre-military days, probably, the conscript never dreamed. There are route marches with the battalion, the commanding officer and band at the head. There is always something to do, always something waiting to be done, and in looking forward there is an endless succession of busy days to contemplate".

It should be noted that there was a regular army in France too. Many conscripts went on to become longer-term professional soldiers after their training.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Apart from battalion route marches, larger unit and inter-disciplinary exercises took place during the annual manoeuvres. Infantry, artillery, and cavalry took part in the mock battles. As noted above, Joffre tried to ensure that the manoeuvres played out scenarios that had been tested as map exercises. From an infantry training perspective, the 'manoeuvres' involved marching and/or staying in one place. Ex-Trooper records one wag who noted he 'stood for three weeks on that flank, waiting for the outer flank to come round...' .

As Joffre pointed out, the main purpose of manoeuvres was to train commanders and staff. Ex-Trooper wrote:

"Commanding officers learn the amount of strain which they can impose on their men; the conditions under which transport can and must be brought up for the use of the troops may be studied with almost as much accuracy as in warfare; the cavalry commander learns the value, from a war point of view, of his men as scouts and on detached duties, while the artillery officer finds out, as he never could without manoeuvre experience, the possibilities of gun transport, and the business of ranging positions..."

Importantly, Ex-Trooper goes on to comment that the:

"...average conscript is troubled little about such matters as these. As an infantryman, his business is to entrench himself when ordered to do so; to advance by short rushes, squad alternating with squad, during the work of getting nearer to the enemy; to charge if bidden, or to retreat as he advanced, in the way that would produce least damage to the force of which he is a member if that force was exposed to actual fire." [my emphasis]

This is the clearest evidence that infantry were not just trained to rush the enemy with bayonets. Ex-Trooper describes the sophisticated forms of movement that were needed, which were taught in the British and German armies. Furthermore, in keeping with the earlier quote about trench digging, infantrymen were trained to entrench - hardly consistent with a doctrine of total all-out attack. Even more interesting is the training in being able to retreat. In keeping with the field service regulations, and the wide-ranging reviews of doctrine and tactics published before the war, the French army had a much more sophisticated approach that is described in the post-war English literature.

Robert

[SteveMarsdin]

Good morning Robert and All,

Some excellent points made. "Baionette et Clairon" charges were rightly debunked by Zuber and I think their idea that they occurred on a large scale was down to French propaganda of the time, making the most out of those initial "gallant" defeats; a myth perpetuated after the end of the conflict.

One of the points Zuber stresses is the large scale manoeuvres that the German Army was able hold on their vast training grounds, regulars and reserves. The liberal democracy of France (and mindsey), I would suggest, ensured similar facilities weren't available to the French and the participation of reserves hardly ever occurred. In this context I feel Zuber was wrong when he says that the early German victories weren't due to German (militaristic) culture but their better training, one facilitated the other.

Another important contributing factor to the Frontiers defeat that I forgot to raise was the French advance in echelon formation. This required all divisions to advance on schedule or risk creating the opportunity for a flank attack from the East, as happened at Tintigny and Houdrugny/Robelmont/Meix-devant-Virton, exascerbated by the linear passages from the Chiers to Semois valleys through the forested hills between. The route through Meix - Lahage - Bellefontaine becoming a particular bottleneck and retarding the advance considerably.

[Robert Dunlop]

Steve, you have picked up on this issue of training grounds, which is very important.

Given that the French Grand Manoeuvres only occurred once a year (and only on two occasions before the outbreak of war), there were very few opportunities for larger units to work together. The problem was even worse. There were limited numbers of areas that could be used, even for division-level training. Only a minority of French forces could participate in this type of training. In 1911, there was only 4 divisional training grounds. Eight training camps had not been completed and only one-third of troops could carry out the 15 day annual course. Some units couldn't even get to training camps at all. This was in sharp contrast to Germany, where significant training camps were widely available. Zuber draws out this distinction very clearly in his book "The Battle of the Frontiers: Ardennes 1914".

Joffre tried to establish at least 1 training camp per army corps. The huge expenditure (132 million francs over 7 years) was approved by the War Minister, Messimy. His successor, along with the Minister of Finance, refused to ratify the plan [another example of how the frequent changes in government or ministers had a detrimental effect]. Subsequently it was watered down to enable the building of 1 new divisional camp, with the promise of some additional money in the following year. Meanwhile, speculators caught wind of the proposals and when land was purchased, the government had to pay an exorbitant price.

Robert

PS: despite the relative differences in German versus French training areas, there was significant discontent within the German Army about the perceived inadequate investment in all things military. Not surprisingly, this formed a major part in Ludendorff's excuses for losing, published in English as "The General Staff and Its Problems". The two volumes are a good sedative for anyone who has insomnia.

[Robert Dunlop]

Another important contributing factor to the Frontiers defeat that I forgot to raise was the French advance in echelon formation.

Steve, this is one area that the French would have handled differently with better reconnaissiance, IMHO. It was not necessarily a fault if the German forces had been disposed as expected. It was a fault if inadequate means were not put in place to pick up exactly what the Germans were doing, which we have touched on already.

Robert

[SteveMarsdin]

Good afternoon Robert,

We keep coming back to reconnaissance. Tactics and training were largely decide elsewhere, previously, by others. The terrain and weather, which both played a part, were beyond their control. They had no say in the German preparation. Reconnaissance, or rather the lack of effective reconnaissance, was in the sphere of influence of the French army on the ground at the time and it is that factor, above all others, which I feel they must shoulder responsibility for.

On a separate point, from a research perspective (as well), it is a shame that Grandmaison didn't survive the war; his thoughts on what effectively was Foch's doctrine (but carries his name), in practice, would have been illuminating.

[truthergw]

Good afternoon Robert,

We keep coming back to reconnaissance. Tactics and training were largely decide elsewhere, previously, by others. The terrain and weather, which both played a part, were beyond their control. They had no say in the German preparation. Reconnaissance, or rather the lack of effective reconnaissance, was in the sphere of influence of the French army on the ground at the time and it is that factor, above all others, which I feel they must shoulder responsibility for.

On a separate point, from a research perspective (as well), it is a shame that Grandmaison didn't survive the war; his thoughts on what effectively was Foch's doctrine (but carries his name), in practice, would have been illuminating.

According to Jack Snyder, " The Ideology of the Offensive", among others, Grandmaison picked up on Foch's doctrine but added his own gloss to it. The offensive a outrance seems to date back to Du Picq. The lack of reconnaissance is not an error, it was required by the offensive doctrine. To become bogged down on the material distributions of men and material was likely to result in losing the initiative. There could only be one victor and that was the one who attacked successfully, therefore at some point in the advance, the maneouvring had to come to an end and the last charge pressed home, regardless of casualties. The niceties of when the last charge should be made and how to decide that maneouvring had achieved all it could, may have been clear on the blackboards of St Cyr but less obvious to company commanders in Alsace or the Ardennes.

I have mentioned earlier that politics were a major component of this problem, I would like to try to show just how. There was an idealogical split reflected in the politics of the day. Left wing ideas sought an army designed for defence. This was seen as a duty for all citizens. The ideal then was an army formed with many reserves and requiring short term conscription. The regulars would be a cadre for training and leading these reserves. A militia then, rather than a professional army. Needless to say, the classes who provided the officers were against this idea and pressed for a full time professional army with long service regular soldiers supported in time of war by reserves who had served for several years. To bolster the requirement for this kind of army, the ability of reserves had to be diminished and a tactical doctrine adopted which emphasised the necessity of attack and the requirement of professional soldiers inured by long training to press that attack home. The rejection of the idea that reserves could serve in the front line meant that Plan 17 had to ignore the real threat, long recognised, of attack through Northern Belgium. This was mirrored by the French Staff refusal to accept the evidence of the German use of reserves in the front line alongside active units. It is not possible to develop my argument in a few lines but I hope I have shown how counting guns and bayonets on the field or decrying how the troops advanced is far from the whole story and may not even be the most important part.

[SteveMarsdin]

Good afternoon Tom,

I think the political impact is very important, for the reasons you mention and further exemplified as as already been stated, in the lack of will to provide large scale training areas/full scale manoeuvres prior to the war.

I would take issue with their lack of reconnaissance not been an error but a matter of doctrine. The French and German cavalry were operating in the Gaume region for 2 weeks prior to 22 August; the latter providing an effective screen in front of the massing German Army. In the few days before the French advanced, cavalry patrols from those armies had responsibility for scouting but didn't penetrate far enough and ignored the many reports of locals that the German army was there in greater presence than at first thought.

That earlier reconnaissance coupled with Joffre's underestimate of German strength generally led to the catastrophic false sense of security(your point about the French refusal to believe that reserve units were in the front line is an excellent one - at one point did Joffre realise the error ?)

(edit: i meant to say "at what point" not "at one point")

[phil andrade]

Forgive my failure to cite the source for this, but I remember reading something to the effect that much of the skillful infiltration tactics employed by German infantry at Riga, Caporetto, Cambrai and on the 21st March 1918 were inspired by a French colonel who had been advocating such tactics in 1915. The French, it seems, had no shortage of good ideas.

And neither, for that matter, were they short of firepower. I was astonished to learn how much more lavish the French artillery preparation was than that of their British allies on the Somme; this was to be repeated through 1917 : much is made of the fact that, for their Flanders offensive of July 1917, the British deployed three thousand guns....yet, in their notorious Nivelle offensive three months earlier, the French attack was supported by five thousand pieces. And at Third Ypres itself, the French troops under Anthoine's command were to enjoy a much more lavish heavy artillery support ( in relative terms) than that of the British. The ability of the French to manufacture and deploy such mighty ordnance, along with the requisite multi million shell stocks, is really amazing...especially given the fact that so much of their industrial potential was taken from them by German conquest in North East France. Given the size of their respective populations, the size of their steel and coal output and their general state of industrialisation, the armament production of Germany, Britain and France would make an interesting study for comparison. And I put it to you now - and I admit that I do not have the statistical knowledge to support this - that of all three, the French might have made the most spectacular effort.

Apart from these quantitative considerations, there is evidence that the Germans thought highly of French tactical prowess. As Colonel Wetzell (?) was charged with the duty of advising as to where the German offensive of 1918 should fall, he made observations that emphasised the strengths and weaknesses of the Entente forces. The French, he stressed, were more skillful than the British in both defensive and offensive fighting ; he was, however, keen to emphasise that the British, for all their rigidity, were very "tough" : a reckoning, Lloyd George delighted in pointing out, that was more flattering to the guts of the British troops than it was to the brains of their commanders !

The French army, it appears, learnt very quickly from its catastrophic bloodbath of 1914, and in virtually all the ensuing fighting, up until March 1918, it succeeeded in achieving a much better casualty exchange rate with the Germans than did the British. In 1917, for example, the French inflicted almost identical casualties on the Germans as did the British, at barely two thirds the cost in lives. Some claim that this was because the British took upon themselves the terrible Flanders burden that allowed the French to achieve spectacular success more cheaply along the Aisne, at Verdun and elswhere in the late summer and autumn, but that is, perhaps, rather unfair.

Phil

[truthergw]

Good afternoon Tom,

I think the political impact is very important, for the reasons you mention and further exemplified as as already been stated, in the lack of will to provide large scale training areas/full scale manoeuvres prior to the war.

I would take issue with their lack of reconnaissance not been an error but a matter of doctrine. The French and German cavalry were operating in the Gaume region for 2 weeks prior to 22 August; the latter providing an effective screen in front of the massing German Army. In the few days before the French advanced, cavalry patrols from those armies had responsibility for scouting but didn't penetrate far enough and ignored the many reports of locals that the German army was there in greater presence than at first thought.

That earlier reconnaissance coupled with Joffre's underestimate of German strength generally led to the catastrophic false sense of security(your point about the French refusal to believe that reserve units were in the front line is an excellent one - at one point did Joffre realise the error ?)

Hi Steve. Joffre was quite open about the errors he and his staff made in interpreting the intelligence they were receiving. His reasons for the errors are less than compelling. I believe that he would have first had doubts about the German advance around the 18th August at the Battle of Charleroi and then at Mons when large forces were being reported at Bruges and southwards. We know that he spent a day at General Lanrezac's HQ as the French 5th Army was forced back around 21-23 August. First hand intelligence may have forced him to recognise unwelcome facts. The fixing of the positions in the East and the transfer of active forces from East to West together with the commiting of reserves into the front line, show his acceptance of the real situation and his change of attitude as to how those reserves could and should be used. There was no real surprise here. Simply a refusal to accept intelligence which contradicted doctrine. General Lanrezac has had a bad press from British authors. He had warned for days of the forces gathering to the North while being ordered to attack toward the East. General Gallieni was appointed commander of the Paris Armed Camp. He was available for the post because he had resigned command of the 5th Army in protest at the refusal to recognise the danger from Belgium.

Phil. You seem to think that this thread is an attack on the French soldier or his ability to fight. That is not so. I have unbounded admiration for the French Armies who survived the terrible losses of the Battles of the Frontiers and still won at the Marne, in spite of a politically inspired doctrine which pushed France very close to defeat. It is that doctrine which I am criticising in my posts.

[phil andrade]

Phil. You seem to think that this thread is an attack on the French soldier or his ability to fight.

That comment baffles me.

Phil

[Latze]

Hi Robert, hi everybody else,

as it is a workday now I cannot keep up the pace as on weekends... Many new thoughts to be found. Everything thought-provoking.

I will try and pull together some material on these questions for you.

Special thumbs up for Robert posting lots of text about pre-war French practices. Puts a lot of things in perspective.

Unfortunatly we all (including me) seem to be stuck very much in August 1914. How French infantry was organized/trained/fought later on seens still to be an elusive topic. Which does not mean that I am unwilling to discussion the frontier battles for another 50 posts http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/s...efault/wink.gif

regards

Matthias

[Latze]

Hello Phil,

Forgive my failure to cite the source for this, but I remember reading something to the effect that much of the skillful infiltration tactics employed by German infantry at Riga, Caporetto, Cambrai and on the 21st March 1918 were inspired by a French colonel who had been advocating such tactics in 1915. The French, it seems, had no shortage of good ideas.

The "French colonel" is captain André Laffargue. He wrote "The attack in Trench Warfare". Bruce Gudmundsson has a whole appendix about him in his book 'Stormtroop tactics'. What Gudmundsson says is, that only one German source mention the French pamphlet (of which a copy was captured in 1916). There are two very detailed scientific books diskussion tactical evolution from a German perspective: Ralf Raths "Vom Massensturm zur Stoßtrupptaktik" (from massed assault to squad tactics) and Hans Linnenkohl "Vom Einzelschuss zur Feuerwalze" (From single shot to creeping barrage). I think these were never translated into English. Point is - these two do not even mention Laffargue. I think he was not that much of in influence.

Nonetheless, I think that the existence of that book shows that there was a significant tactical evolution in France.

regards

Latze

[Robert Dunlop]

Unfortunatly we all (including me) seem to be stuck very much in August 1914. How French infantry was organized/trained/fought later on seens still to be an elusive topic.

Matthias, all in good time It is important to start with pre-war and then review the first weeks. It makes more sense of the later developments. Unlike Tom, I do not feel that the doctrinal debates were major determinants of French tactics, FWIIW.

Before moving on too far in time, I want to review some of the pre-war equivalents of the British Field Service Regulations (akin to Exerzier-Reglement...). It cannot be assumed, however, that tactics in the field matched the regulations. It does help to show how sophisticated the French tactical thinking was, as published.

Robert