"Australians at Suvla Bay"

[Mat McLachlan]

An interesting topic. I've always assumed that Eric Bogle's reference to Suvla Bay (which is probably most responsible for promoting the Suvla myth, at least to the 'general public') was simply because there's a loose rhyme between 'Suvla' and 'Australia'.

Cheers,

Mat

[armidale]

In an old Australian homestead

With the roses 'round the door

A girl received a letter

'Twas a message from the war

With her mother's arms around her

She gave way to sobs and sighs

And as she read this letter

The tears came to her eyes

Why do I weep, why do I pray

My love's asleep so far away

He played his part that April day

And now he sleeps... on Suvla Bay

Oh-de-lo-oh-de-oh-de-oh-lady-de-de-oh-de-oh-oh-oh...

She joined a band of sisters

On the little cross of red

To do her noble duty

To her love who now lay dead

Many others came to woo her

But was sadly turned away

As she told them her sad story

Of her love on Suvla Bay

Why do I weep, why do I pray

My love's asleep so far away

He played his part that April day

And now he sleeps... on Suvla Bay...

G'day Matt

With all due respect, Eric Bogle is a long way down the list. This is a version by Tex Willaims. There have been may others which I suspect date from the time of WW1.

I certainly remember it as a child in the 1940's.

Interestingly, during WW2 there was an adaptation substituting Suda Bay for Suvla Bay. This became topical after the AIF was involved in the defence of Crete based around Suda Bay. In some versions of both 'places', there is a reference to an AGH in Gaza, which was was certainly feasible.

When this topic first came up, I 'suspected' that Ashmead-Bartlett's despatch, published in Aussie papers on 8-9 May used the heading "Suvla Bay". It was actually Gaba Tepe, but Suvla would be easier to find when looking at a current map of Turkey.

http://www.nla.gov.au/gallipolidespatches/...3126315-4x.html

[bluedog]

Armidale

You are showing your age mate , I also remember "Suvla Bay" in the

late 40's

Peter

[judy7007]

Armidale

You are showing your age mate , I also remember "Suvla Bay" in the

late 40's

Peter

Armidale and Peter

I remember "Suvla Bay" from the early to mid fifties and can still remember every single word - (although I'd forgotten all the oh de loh de oh de loh de oh oh). Oh that my memory was as good in more pressing matters!

Judy

[judy7007]

An interesting topic. I've always assumed that Eric Bogle's reference to Suvla Bay (which is probably most responsible for promoting the Suvla myth, at least to the 'general public') was simply because there's a loose rhyme between 'Suvla' and 'Australia'.

Cheers,

Mat

Mat

It may be so. Clearly Suvla Bay rhymes with 'pray' and 'far away' and 'April Day and I find it easier to allow for the "geographical drift" mentioned earlier with such an early song.

I just find it a bit hard to listen to words about Australians being slaughtered at Suvla Bay, especially after having spent time recently reflecting at the Nek. I would have found it easier had he used words such as slaughtered at Gallipoli (if one doesn't want to get too geographically specific).

Cheers

Judy

[armidale]

Hey Jude

(although I'd forgotten all the oh de loh de oh de loh de oh oh).

You can be forgiven. The 'yodel' was not common to all versions. Strangely enough Slim Dusty is on record [pun definitely intended] as saying that Regal zonaphone would not accept his first song until he had included the obligatory yodel.

These may be of interest: He discusses “And the Band Played Waltzing Matilda” at :-

http://www.smh.com.au/cgi-bin/common/print...9020705613.html

 

If you prefer "Gallipoli" there is always the song by Ted Egan OAM, former Administrator of the Northern Territory.

GALLIPOLI

TED EGAN OAM

The word's on every soldier's lips - GALLIPOLI

The landing boats leave the ships - GALLIPOLI

Rifles held in nervous grips

Eerie gleam of bayonet tips

The Anzacs hit the coastal strips - GALLIPOLI

Atop the cliffs is Johnny Turk - GALLIPOLI

Peering through the mist and murk - GALLIPOLI

Human nature goes berserk

When soldiers know they mustn't shirk

Killing's just a job of work - GALLIPOLI

CHORUS

Boys, boys, warlords' toys

Pawns in the war-games of history

But they're bold, bold,

They'll do as they're told

A legend's in the making at Gallipoli.

Hit the beach, the rising sun - GALLIPOLI

This is real, the talking's done - GALLIPOLI

Every man a mother's son

But give each one a bloody gun

They'll kill each other just for fun - GALLIPOLI

Scale the cliffs, pounding hearts - GALLIPOLI

The shelling and the slaughter starts - GALLIPOLI

Crazy feats of derring-do

Out of all the madness grew

The story of the Anzacs at Gallipoli

CHORUS

And on the 24th of May - GALLIPOLI

Postpone the killing for a day - GALLIPOLI

Bury the dead: Let us pray

Bid young Johnny Turk " G'day "

Termorrer he's the one you'll slay - GALLIPOLI

They say old soldiers never die - GALLIPOLI

But young ones do, and I ask why - GALLIPOLI

With this battle finally done

Not an inch of ground was won

And bones lie bleaching in the sun - GALLIPOLI

CHORUS

The lords have played the game before - MONOPOLY

Scan the maps, keep the score - CATASTROPHE

Cognac and cigars galore

If they were made to fight the war

They'd very quickly call "Withdraw!" - IMMEDIATELY

And when the silence comes again - GALLIPOLI

Pity those who are insane - GALLIPOLI

Count the wounded, treat the pain

A hundred and forty thousand slain

Heroes all, but dead in vain - GALLIPOLI

CHORUS

G'day Pete

I have nothing else to brag about, and getting old sure beats the alternative.

[bluedog]

Armidale

Your not wrong about the alternative mate , as I often tell groups after

a tour of Anzac and the cemeteries.

"Never regret growing old,

Some of us never had the chance"

Peter

[judy7007]

Hey Jude

These may be of interest: He discusses “And the Band Played Waltzing Matilda” at :-

http://www.smh.com.au/cgi-bin/common/print...9020705613.html

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...howtopic=121467

Armidale

Many thanks for these and for the words of Gallipoli by Ted Egan. I downloaded it and another couple of his and am very pleased to have heard them. I do like Eric Bogle's song - I just found that after going to Gallipoli the Suvla Bay bit felt very wrong. "Felt" is the operative word here. His explanations made lots of sense.

I was reading John Masefield's Gallipoli the other day (1916 version) and see that ANZAC is used in the relevant photo captions.

Judy

[armidale]

DIGGER SMITH by C.J. Dennis

I. BEFORE THE WAR

"Before the war," she sighs. "Before the war." Then blinks 'er eyes, an' tries to work a smile."Ole scenes," she sez, "don't look the same no more. Ole ways," she sez, "seems to 'ave changed their style. The pleasures that we had don't seem worth while --Them simple joys that passed an hour away -- An' troubles, that we used to so revile,'Ow small they look", she sez. "'Ow small today."This war!" sighs ole Mar Flood. An' when I seen The ole girl sittin' in our parlour there,Tellin' 'er troubles to my wife Doreen. As though the talkin' eased 'er load 'uv care, I thinks uv mothers, 'ere and everywhere,Smilin' a bit while they are grievin' sore For grown-up babies, fightin' Over There;An' then I 'ears 'em sigh, "Before the war."My wife 'as took the social 'abit bad. I ain't averse -- one more new word I've learned --Averse to tea, when tea is to be 'ad; An' when it comes I reckon that it's earned. It's jist a drink, as fur as I'm concerned,Good for a bloke that toilin' on the land; But when a caller comes, 'ere am I turnedInto a social butterfly, off-'and. Then drinkin' tea becomes a 'oly rite. So's I won't bring the family to disgraceI guts a bit 'uv coachin' overnight On ridin' winners in this bun-fed race. I 'ave to change me shirt, an' wash me face,An' look reel neat, from me waist up at least, An sling remarks in at the proper place,An' not makes noises drinkin', like a beast."'Ave some more cake. Another slice, now do. An' won't yeh 'ave a second cup uv tea?'Ow is the children?" Ar, it makes me blue! This boodoor 'abit ain't no good to me. I likes to take me tucker plain an' free:Tea an' a chunk out on the job for choice, So I can stoke with no one there to see.Besides, I 'aven't got no comp'ny voice.Uv course, I've 'ad it all out with the wife. I argues that there's work that must be done.An' tells 'er that I 'ates this tony life. She sez there's jooties that we must not shun. You bet that ends it; so I joins the fun,An' puts 'em all at ease with silly grins - Slings bits uv repartee like "'Ave a bun,"An' passes bread an' butter, for my sins.Since I've been marri'd, say, I've chucked some things, An' learned a whole lot more to fill the space.I've slung all slang; crook words 'ave taken wings, An' I 'ave learned to entertain with grace. But when ole Missus Flood comes round our placeI don't object to 'er, for all 'er sighs; Becos I likes 'er ways, I likes 'er face,An', most uv all, she 'as them mother's eyes."Before the war," she sighs, the poor ole girl. 'Er talk it gets me thinkin' in between,While I'm assistin' at this social whirl. . . . She comes across for comfort to Doreen, To talk about the things that might 'ave been

If Syd 'ad not been killed at Suvla Bay,

Or Jim had not done a bunk at seventeen,An' not been heard uv since 'e went away.They 'ave a little farm right next to us -- 'Er and 'er husband - where they live alone.Spite uv 'er cares, she ain't the sort to fuss Or serve up sudden tears an' sob an' moan, An' since I've known 'er some'ow I 'ave grownTo see in 'er, an' all the grief she's bore, A million brave ole mothers 'oo 'ave knownDeep sorrer since them days before the war."Before the war," she sez. "Yeh mind our Syd? Poor lad. . . . But then, yeh never met young Jim --'Im 'oo was charged with things 'e never did. Ah, both uv you'd 'ave been reel chums with 'im. 'Igh-spirited 'e was, a perfect limb.It's six long years now since 'e went away -- Ay, drove away." 'Er poor ole eyes git dim."That was," she sighs, "that was me blackest day."Me blackest day! Wot am I sayin' now? That was the day the parson came to tellThe news about our Syd. . . . An', yet, some'ow . . . . My little Jim!" She pauses for a spell. . . . "Your 'olly'ocks is doin' reely well,"She sez, an' battles 'ard to brighten up. "An' them there pinks uv yours, 'ow sweet they smell.An' - Thanks! I think I will 'ave one more cup."As fur as I can get the strength uv it, Them Floods 'ave 'ad a reel tough row to how.First off, young Jim, 'oo plays it high a bit, Narks the ole man a treat, an' slings the show.

Then come the war, an' Syd 'e 'as to go.'E run 'is final up at Suvla Bay -- One uv the Aussies I was proud to know.

An' Jim's cracked 'ardy since 'e went away.'Er Jim! These mothers! Lord, they're all the same. I wonders if Doreen will be that kind.Syd was the son 'oo played the reel man's game; But Jim 'oo sloped an' left no word be'ind, His is the picter shinin' in 'er mind.'Igh-spirited! I've 'eard that tale before. I sometimes think she'd take it rather kindTo 'ear that 'is 'igh spirits run to war."Before the war," she sez. "Ah, times was good. The little farm out there, an' jist us fourWorkin' to make a decent liveli'ood. Our Syd an' Jim! . . . Poor Jim! I grieves me sore; For Dad won't 'ave 'im mentioned 'ome no more.'E's 'urt, I know, cos 'e thinks Jim 'urt me. As if 'e could, the bonny boy I bore. . . .But I must off 'ome now, an' git Dad's tea."I seen 'er to the gate. (Take it frum me, I'm some perlite.) She sez, "Yeh mustn't mindMe talkin' uv Jim, but when I see Your face it brings 'im back; 'e's jist your kind. Not quite so 'an'some, p'r'aps, nor so refined.I've got some toys uv 'is," she sez. "But there -- This is ole woman's talk, an' you be'indWith all yer work, an' little time to spare.She gives me 'and a squeeze an' turns away, Sobbin', I thort; but then she looks be'ind,Smilin', an' wavin', like she felt reel gay, I wonders 'ow the women work that blind, An' jist waves back; then goes inside to findA lookin'-glass, an' takes a reel good look. . . . "'Not quite so 'an'some, p'r'aps, nor so refined!'Gawd 'elp yeh, Jim," I thinks. "Yeh must be crook."

[armidale]

a rose by any other name ...........

"The Play" by C J Dennis

What's in a name she sez

N then she sighs

n clasps er little anz

n rolls er eyes

A rose she sez

be any other name

wood smell the same

Wherefore art you Romeo young sir

Chuck yore ole pot n change yer monikerr

Doreen n me

We been to see a show

THe swell two dollar touch

bong ton yeh now

A chair apiece

wiv velvet on the seat

a slap up treat

The dramers writ by Shakespeare years ago

about this barmy goat called Romeo.

Judy

I cannot share your aversion to the use of Suvla. I consider that it is 'technically' correct in that it was common usage at the time that the dreaded "message from the war" was received. THat was the point of greatest, and therefore lasting impact on THAT generation of Australians.

C J Dennis, as you would know, published 'trench versions' of his works which had incredible circulation numbers. I cannot remember reading any criticism of his use of Suvla, even from an audience to whom Anzac & Gallipoli were extremely iconic. I have not done a study, but consider that Suvla was used in many newspaper articles of that period.

[judy7007]

Judy

I cannot share your aversion to the use of Suvla. I consider that it is 'technically' correct in that it was common usage at the time that the dreaded "message from the war" was received. THat was the point of greatest, and therefore lasting impact on THAT generation of Australians.

C J Dennis, as you would know, published 'trench versions' of his works which had incredible circulation numbers. I cannot remember reading any criticism of his use of Suvla, even from an audience to whom Anzac & Gallipoli were extremely iconic. I have not done a study, but consider that Suvla was used in many newspaper articles of that period.

Armidale

Thank you for the important reminder about CJ Dennis - it is ages since I read that. I have been much more involved in Australians at the Western Front than at Gallipoli which is a recently revived interest of mine (after having been there and now going back and am sure I will go back again....)

Aversion to the use of Suvla is much too strong - maybe it has come over like that but it's been more of an unravelling of a mystery for me. I tried to convey that it was an emotion, a feeling, most definitely heightened (or perhaps even aroused for the first time) after sitting at the Nek cemetery and contemplating the terrible slaughter there. I felt that talking about Australians being slaughtered at Suvla Bay was almost a betrayal of our soldiers lying there at the Nek.

But I know this is all emotional stuff - and personal - and I have gained so much perspective through contributions to this thread.

Judy

[SiegeGunner]

On the Western Front, it's not unusual to hear of events 'in France' that actually took place in Belgium, and it's amazing what a huge area 'the Somme' apparently was.

[muzza]

Personally not sure what the concern is, next we'll be hearing about the myth of the Australians at Cape Helles!

By the way...the Australians died in droves at Cape Helles as well which is oft thought of as a British and French affair...by Cape Helles I am referring to the general area...the actual battle was at Krithia, a few miles inland.

Now we know the Australians were at Suvla Bay....the Navy in fact...but don't forget the horrible slaughter at Hill 60 which technically is in the Suvla region and was fought to support the Suvla campaign. Hill 60 is not near ANZAC Cove. The Australian Light Horse suffered terrible casualties there.

Having walked Kiretch Tepe it is hard to comprehend the terrible casulaties at Suvla or why the campaign failed. The British Officers stopping for a day to have a cup of tea couldn't have helped. The next day the Turks were there in force. War is a farce sometimes, A farce with terrible consequences for the poor lads who were sacrificed to the altar of class consciousness.

Murray

www.ozebook.com

[Jack Sheldon]

Murray

I wonder if you would care to expand on your final sentence, which you rather left hanging in the air? Are you referring to this battle, this war, or all war? I have always thought in terms of towering incompetence, rather than class consciousness when trying to get to grips with the disaster that was Suvla, but am always ready to listen to other explanations.

Jack

[judy7007]

Hi Brian

Going way back to the photo, the State Library in question emailed me some time ago to say they had changed their title of the photo - it was their reference, not anything printed on the photo and it was very clearly the landing at Anzac Cove. They said they were pleased to know - I don't usually have time to do such things - just occasionally!

cheers and good wishes from here

Judy

[muzza]

Hi

Kiretch Tepe is the ridge along the northern flank of the Suvla bay area. Seddulbhar is of course a long way a way at Cape Helles.

One can walk from the gendamerie monument to the point quite easily...(it is a long rough hike though) and still see trenches and stone revetments, the odd bone and large pieces of shrapnel. To your right it is fair drop to the sea...Gulf of Saros and to your left you ahve a wonderful view across the battlefield of Suvla and along the coast to the ANZAC beaches.

On Kiretch Tepe a few hundred turkish gendamerie held off the British and gave the regular Turkish army time to move up.

I have a slideshow of pics here if you would like to look (forgive the odd shot of a fat old ******* please)..

http://www.ozebook.com/ww1/anzac/documents/35.html

Some other shots around Suvla bay here..

http://www.ozebook.com/ww1/anzac/documents/34.html

Jack...it was late at night and a fancy of literary promise I imagine......my throwaway line is a general reference to all war......which in my estimation is generally about enrichening someone or some group of people at the expense of others. generally whoever is ruling or in power gets the benefits mostly without taking the risks. Best illustrated at Gallipoli I think by General Hunter-Weston who when questioned about the losses at Krithia was supposed to have said.. "casualties, what do I care about casualties" or words to that effect. Well, obviously nothing as long as it wasn't him and he went home with his medals and a nice pension and a life among the privileged elite. Hunter-Weston was also referred to as "The Butcher of Helles" for his utter disregard for the welfare of his troops and his incompetent battle plans. Hunter-Weston was an advocate of the broad frontal assault made in daylight. When his plan of attack for the Second Battle of Krithia failed on the first day, he proceeded to repeat the plan on the second and third days. He claimed he was "blooding the pups" when he made the inexperienced 156th Brigade of the Scottish 52nd (Lowland) Division attack without artillery support during the Battle of Gully Ravine. Half the brigade became casualties, of which over a third were killed.

and Brian, "Having walked Kiretch Tepe" pull this one it plays rock around the clock." ??

[Jack Sheldon]

Murray

Thanks for those additional thoughts, with which I cannot imagine many would even begin to disagree. I suppose many who reached high rank were a pretty hard-bitten lot and often seem to have displayed a callousness to loss of life more akin to their predecessors in the American Civil War, say, than the following generation - certainly amongst the Western Allies - who, armed with the experience of the Great War, tended to be much more careful with their soldiers' lives and very much more circumspect concerning what they said about the subject.

That said and of course you have drawn attention to a notorious example, I have often wondered about how the mind set came about. Was the personal courage of some of these commanders much higher than average, so they disregarded the possibility that others might be less well equipped? Did they feel that extreme risk taking and casualties were just the normal lot of the soldier? A great many officers of general rank were killed or wounded during the Great War. This reached such proportions that later in the war they were banned from on high from exposing themselves to the risk of severe artillery fire, for example.

In many cases these men had been COs and brigadiers during the 1914 campaign where they routinely exposed themselves to the precise same risks as their men - and paid the price, The 1914 cemeteries contain a large number of irreplaceable Lieutenant Colonels who could have gone on to achieve much more and, as a final thought, H-W as a brigadier from Mons to Ypres was demonstrably effective and almost recklessly brave at times. If good fortune had not been on his side when under fire at places such as Le Cateau he would not have survived to high rank and his reputation would have been quite different. Strange, is it not?

Jack

[regtcollector]

Hi, it is too easy to use terms like sacrificed in vain, uncaring generals etc when looking at the great war, and it is certainly a method adopted by historians and reporters who often rely on outdated archives and the words of bitter soldiers who years later and at the time were suffering mourning for lost friends and loved ones. It is natural to blame the men who ordered the attacks that killed friends and loved ones, especially if the outcome of the battle was not successful. theyre called battles for a reason, one side has its objectives and the other side has its objectives , the aim of both is to block the enemy obtaining its objectives while achieving their own. This leads to battle and casualties always occur in battle. If the generals did not want casualties they could have their troops do nothing, and they would then be on the defensive and suffer casualties anyway when attacked. I,m sure the Turks sent over the top to retake or gain ground would have felt they were sacrificed in vain had the campaign gone against them.

Some of these quotes used against the generals (casualties, what do I care about casualties) have to be taken with a pinch of salt as they are quite often hearsay or taken out of context by Authors with their own agendas. Many of these quotes were never defended by their supposed quoters and when they were , this defence is often overlooked by those using such quotes to further their own opinions.

To call ww1 soldiers "sacrificed in vain" etc is an insult to the men themselves, many thought they were fighting for the greater good and volunteered to go overseas to fight in foreign lands for their respective countries. Their were many who were proud of their achievements in doing their bit to win the war. It is interesting to note that casualties in late 1918 when the allies were advancing and set to win the war were some of the worst seen during the entire war, but very little is said of men like Monash etc being butchers. Cheers Ian

[michaeldr]

Ian,

A couple of points

Some of these quotes used against the generals (casualties, what do I care about casualties) have to be taken with a pinch of salt as they are quite often hearsay or taken out of context by Authors with their own agendas.

casualties, what do I care about casualties – This was H-W's reply to an enquiry by the RND's commander Gen Sir Archibald Paris, who cut short the conversation at that point. The conversation was recorded by Lt Compton Mackenzie RMLI in his 'Gallipoli Memories'

It is interesting to note that casualties in late 1918 when the allies were advancing and set to win the war were some of the worst seen during the entire war, but very little is said of men like Monash etc being butchers.

In his writing (The Australian Victories in France in 1918, if I remember correctly) Monash refers to the advance from August to October that year and he mentions 21,243 men KiA, DoW, wounded or missing. He says that this was about 70 men for each of his five divisions, per day, and he claims it as the least costly period for Australia of all the fighting undertaken

Interestingly H-W and Monash were about the same age, but two very different characters, backgrounds and soldiers

Regards

Michael

[michaeldr]

H-W as a brigadier from Mons to Ypres was demonstrably effective and almost recklessly brave at times. If good fortune had not been on his side when under fire at places such as Le Cateau he would not have survived to high rank and his reputation would have been quite different. Strange, is it not?

Jack,

Thanks for that on H-W's earlier service with the BEF. I wonder if he qualifies as an example of the Peter Principle.

I understand this to mean that a person does very well all the way up the ladder until eventually they are given one step-up too far beyond their capabilities.

If I remember correctly, there is evidence from the RND that their night raids at Gallipoli were successful, and it was put to H-W that he should try his larger scale attacks at night instead of at mid-day, but the suggestion was ignored.

What little I know about the WF also leads me to believe that he was no more of a success there either when he returned in 1916

regards

Michael

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Michael

As a general statement of philosophy, I suspect that Ian has given a good summary.

In H-W's case, it is too easy, and hence glib, to dismiss the man as one of the donkeys leading the lions to slaughter. They are cheap points because the dismissals come without context while the actions of H-W occurred within a specific context. Reading this thread, I have not seen any analysis of H-W activities described in anything but the most facile terms and thus are meaningless.

When I see the usage to which the quote of H-W is exploited "casualties, what do I care about casualties", if placed in the context of the person, a different view might be obtained. One thing that psychology should have taught us is the things we dismiss to readily are the things we care about deeply. H-W was not a psychopath - there is nothing in his makeup that suggests the he was even remotely displaying psychopathic behaviour and yet this comment is only one which could be attributed to a psychopath if it is to believed as reflecting him personally. So if H-W were not a psychopath, then we must try to understand the context of the comment within his very complex personality. I would suggest that he cared very much about his casualties - so much so that he knew that if he visited the men in hospital and the like, he would crack. I would suggest that he felt the deaths of every man fully. Also I would suggest that he used terms like this to harden his resolve so he could perform the onerous duty of command in the Helles. If one looks at the behaviour of "Pompey" Elliott, another man who took his command to heart, we see the result of letting the losses take its toll personally. In the end, Elliott could not live with the ghosts of the men he ordered to bleed on the battlefield and committed suicide. H-W was similar in that he could no longer look into the faces of the men he was ordering to die. By this stage of the war, the only way he could continue with his command is to isolate himself from the slaughter taking place in front of him - not at his behest but at the calling of others in far off lands. He was the practitioner at the pointy end given poor resources and an impossible task. To to it, he needed to isolate himself, a response from a particularly sensitive type of person. This is his own way of managing the personal hurt he felt.

Then we look at your comment regarding the RND and small scale night raids. This is the conundrum of scale. Let me give you an example. If one person saves money, it is good for the household of that individual. When everyone within the economy does the same, then it is disaster for the economy. One only needs to look at the saving ratios of the Japanese and the ineffectiveness of their economic stimulus packages which failed to stimulate anything except an increase in public debt and higher private savings. The economy has floundered for 20 years as a consequence. So what might work on the micro level may not work on the macro level.

In this case, the truth of the conundrum is highly evident. Again, context is required. Here we have to look at the training of the British soldiers at the time. Troop command was based upon line of site. The individual troops were not given the nature of the objectives as they were considered to be working hard just to get there without thinking of the additional complexities of the issue. So advances were done in lines so that the troop commanders could see what was happening and adopt changes if necessary. All done through line of site and voice command. If this was not maintained, then the advance would turn into a confused rabble with little direction or purpose.

Add to this the equipment carried by the soldier into battle. At the time it was thought necessary - and for good reason - that a soldier should march into battle with about 35kg of weight upon his back. This reduced the ability of the man to do anything but walk. So in an effort to provide the individual soldier with all the items he required to survive in battle, mobility was sacrificed.

In the context of the RND night raids, to apply it to the troops at the Helles would have meant pulling the troops out of the lines for a few months intensive training with a totally alien infantry doctrine, a change in equipment and the like - luxuries not possessed by H-W. IN addition, there was no space at the Helles to train brigades, let alone divisions in this style of fighting. It was only after the Somme that the British began to revise their training and trench warfare tactics. A night attack at brigade level would have just resulted in a confused rabble with little, if any, objectives being reached with no saving in casualties. The Turks tried night attacks and found this to be true. High risk, poor command and high casualties. As a method of mass attack at the brigade level, for the Turks night assaults proved to be an abject failure. To blame H-W for a mindset can only be seen as churlish and self serving.

So finally we get to the battles. He has difficult objectives and poorly trained men in trench warfare with a mindset of advancing in line of troop for command purposes. In that mindset, each man carries 35kg on his back into battle.

Imagine yourself as the commander with these circumstances and then tell me how you would perform better within the context of the time.

It is when you go through this exercise - see it from the point of view of the man commanding in the context of the command - that you begin to build an appreciation of the impossible task set for H-W. That he failed is available for all to see. Why he failed needs to be seen through the prism of his command, not through one or two glib quotes.

Anyone who wishes to deride H-W needs to put themselves in the situation and explain how they would do better and thus be qualified to pour the proverbial bucket on H-W. To date, I have not seen one critic of H-W actually describe in realistic terms of the circumstances at the Helles a way of doing better than H-W. Only after producing such a critical study which points out a better way would I bother giving credence to the critics. Until then, I look at H-W as a product of his time - possibly a highly sensitive fellow trying to do his best in a situation that was way beyond his understanding or control. The trouble was, no one else on the peninsular could have done better. They might have varied things here or there but the circumstances dictated the outcomes, not the personality of the General.

Cheers

Bill

[michaeldr]

Bill,

Many thanks for your thoughts on this.

Alas, H-W's remark on casualties was not a one-off, casual slip of the tongue on his part, but was in fact, one rather typical of him; see his remarks to Maj-Gen Egerton, etc.

Re your; "I would suggest that he cared very much about his casualties - so much so that he knew that if he visited the men in hospital and the like, he would crack. I would suggest that he felt the deaths of every man fully. Also I would suggest that he used terms like this to harden his resolve so he could perform the onerous duty of command in the Helles."

I regret that I have seen no evidence of this whatsoever.

On the contrary, see Col Michael Hickey in his 'Gallipoli 1915,' [John Murray (Publishers) Ltd., 1995, ISBN 0-7195-5550 7] where he states "Hunter-Weston had little knowledge of the ordeals through which the men under his command had passed."

Re your; "Here we have to look at the training of the British soldiers at the time. Troop command was based upon line of site. The individual troops were not given the nature of the objectives as they were considered to be working hard just to get there without thinking of the additional complexities of the issue. So advances were done in lines so that the troop commanders could see what was happening and adopt changes if necessary. All done through line of site and voice command. If this was not maintained, then the advance would turn into a confused rabble with little direction or purpose."

Again I refer you to Col Hickey's book, where he has this to say regarding H-W's negative attitude towards night actions,

"this was hardly a valid argument, as all regular officers and NCOs were capable of using prismatic compasses and marching on a given bearing."

H-W could perhaps be excused as you suggest, if he had not shown such inflexibility and such a closed mind. Not only did he ignore suggestions from below, but even those put to him by his C-i-C.

Hunter-Weston's VIII Corps' later performance on the WF is summed-up by Chris Baker on his LLT as

"Commanded by Lt-Gen Sir Aylmer Hunter-Weston. Moved to France in March 1916. Had major responsibility for failure of northern sector of British offensive on the Somme, 1 July 1916, and was never again responsible for a major offensive. Disbanded in June 1918.

This seems to be all too consistent with his 'achievement' on Gallipoli. Regretably his casualties on the 1916 occasion were also similarly high

Best regards

Michael

[regtcollector]

Hi All,

I don,t have Hickey,s book, His statements as used are merely his opinions, which are very hard to justify, he probably never knew HW or any officers who served with or under him having only written his book in the early 90s.Compton Mackenzie wrote his book 10years after the war ended and as he was only a subaltern it would not stretch the imagination too far that he was bitter with all the staff in general. I wonder if somewhere there exists an answer by Hunter-Weston to his accusation of lack of care, or did he just not feel it worthwhile to argue the point with such a junior officer, he did have his status to consider after all, and it would not have been good ettiquette to argue publicly with junior officers. As Hunter-Weston never seems to have defended the accusation its possible he never heard of it, why after all would he read a book by a subaltern. Egerton was also junior in rank to Hunter-Weston and was at the time extremely distressed after his divisions casualties, as he was divisional commander of 52nd div, as such he would have been closer to many of those lost in the battle, Hunter-Weston after all only dealt with his divisional officers as the chain of command would require. I have come accross opinions that Haig thought Egerton too highly strung, whether this was his opinion or not i cannot say.

What i am trying to point out is that it is important to consider motivations for comments by one officer about another or for that matter one soldier about another, motivations ranging between all the usual emotions, good and bad,these include Love, Hate , Jealousy, Anger, Retribution, Political, Racial ,Eonomical and many more. I am not saying i belive one party over the other in these matters and am loathe to say a bad word about participants in the war ,especially in the case of Compton Mackenzie as my father was a Light Infantry sergeant.

As to casualty figures Monash drew them out nicely but over 21000 in less than three months, considering the maximum strength of the five divisions was between 50000 to 70000 is a staggering number, the allies suffered somwhere around 350 to 360 thousand in the hundred days to armistice so i would still call these figures high. Yet again casualty figures were calculated by officers and nations to further there own theories or political ,national agendas, this is one of the reasons no two "authorities" will usually agree on one particular set of figures. I have seen some spouted here in Australia that certainly were calculated to further political or national agendas. Cheers Ian

[regtcollector]

Hi All, I failed to mention, i don,t think Hunter-Weston was the perfect general,but he was what was available at the time. He certainly had faults and made mistakes but if a general makes a mistake and it works out fine hes done his job, if it goes awry hes a villain. It is easy to look back in hindsight and say he stuffed this and that , but we need to remember the huge problems he had to deal with day to day both administratively and tactically in a war the like of which the world had never seen or many had predicted. I think there is little doubt that Hunter Weston didn,t trust the experience of the troops under him, especially the newly formed RND, Territorial and Service Battalions. Hunter Weston was after all an old regular and their prejudices against Territorials and new army are well documented. This lead him to try to oversimplify battle tasks for his command and daylight attacks is a fine example of this, both on Gallipoli and the western front, where his troops were mainly Pals battalions. There was no army during the first world war that didn,t have to learn how to fight the new type of war and sometimes at a very high cost in lives. Many of the first war Generals followed the outdated book and prior experience and lessons learnt in the great war took years to indoctrinate into the generals of future periods. Generals who learnt their trade in ww1 probably had an advantage over those who leant theirs in previous conflicts. Cheers Ian

[gilly100]

Hi All

Other Australians certainly did serve at Suvla during August, being detailed as scouts, guides and snipers, some of whom were attached to brigades of the 54th Division. From around 10-12 August from memory. NZ'ers and some Gurkhas too I think. The Australians returned to their units around the end of August and early September. One 8th Light Horseman lost his life there and is buried in Hill 10 Cemetery. No 433 HJ Peters his name. A small but worthy contribution to the Suvla fighting which of course was almost entirely British. Numerous Newfoundlanders buried at Suvla also.

Cheers

Ian