Evolution of French infantry tactics

[Latze]

Hi all,

there is quite a lot of literature about the evolution of German (eg Gudmundssons 'Stormtroop Tactics') and British tactics (eg Paddy Griffith 'Battle Tactics of the Western Front'). Discussion about the real or imagined edge one side possibly had over the other is often heated. What I am missing is a thorough discussion of the evolution of French tactics. In the literature I have the French are only mentioned in passing (André Lafargue book). Does anybody know of a book/website/study about the French infantry in the Great War that offers a detailed discussion?

thanx in advance

Latze

[JimSmithson]

Hi Latze

Welcome to the Forum. An interesting comparison between the British and the French in the run up to the Somme battles can be found in Bill Philpott's excellent 'Bloody Victory' if you can get hold of a copy.

You are right, literature in English on this topic is hard to come by. Maybe some of our French members know some works in their own language.

Jim

[truthergw]

I have also searched in vain for an English or French work. I have a theory. Dons dark glasses and looks all round. When the French entered the war, their tactical doctrine was well nigh suicidal. This was changed on the hoof during and after the Battles of the Frontiers. I imagine this would have been done through instructions and lectures similar to the training schools for the British. Any books with pre-war doctrine or tactical instruction would be quickly disposed of. Any book on French tactics would therefore be a fairly thorny subject. The French military sat on information about the mutinies for decades. They also suppressed information on casualties and summary executions for quite a long time. It may be that the required information to write a book on the evolution of French tactics through the war is not readily available.

[bmac]

I have a feeling that GQG issued infantry/artillery tactical instructions at various times, e.g. at the beginning of 1916 which was a direct response to the 1915 experiences and which set out to limit the scope of French attacks to those areas directly under fire of the available artillery and with a defined ratio of heavy guns to yards/metres of front. Certainly Fayolle in the early part of the Somme was determined that the artillery prepared a set position properly and this was then 'occupied' by the infantry so as to preserve the poilus. After the experience of the Somme these were, I believe, revised because it was thought that they had been too prescriptive in limiting the initiative of the infantry in circumstances where a greater advance might have been possible. Whether this helped lead to the Nivelle debacles I cannot say. If I am right then these documents are almost certainly contained in the annexes to the French official history, Les Armees Francaises dans la Grande Guerre, which contains, to my eyes, anything and everything that was issued from GQG down to Divisions and sometimes beyond throughout the war.

[Robert Dunlop]

Philpott's book offers a point-in-time view of French tactics. Jack Sheldon's books offer a German perspective on French tactics, which is very useful as they were on the receiving end. 'The German Army at Vimy Ridge' is probably the best, up to early 1917. 'The German Army on the Somme' is also useful, especially in conjunction with Ralph Whitehead's book 'The Other Side of the Wire'. Both only cover from the start of the war to 1916. Spear's book 'Prelude to Victory' gives some useful information about the period from the end of the Battle of the Somme to the start of the Chemin des Dames offensive in 1917.

In French, it is still possible to get various monographs on tactics. The problem with these documents, as with the British and German equivalents, it is not appropriate to assume that the practice matched the theory and vice versa.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

When the French entered the war, their tactical doctrine was well nigh suicidal.

Tom, it is important to distinguish execution from tactical doctrine. At the start of the war, French tactical doctrine was very sophisticated - at least as good as the British and German doctrines. The best book on this, which explodes several of the myths surrounding l'offensive à outrance, is Dimitry Queloz's book:

"De la manoeuvre napoléonienne à l'offensive à outrance" (2009).

Queloz deals with the evolution of tactical doctrine up till 1914.

Robert

[truthergw]

Hi Robert. I had reservations about just how enthusiastic the average French poilu would be when exposed to Col Foch's ideas and having read a few memoirs and carnets, I detected a divergence in approach. What I was thinking of, not too seriously, was where an intending author would look for sources and how easy or otherwise it might be for him to access the teaching material of the time. That book sounds interesting. I'll have a look at the French sector of the Matto Grosso.

[Robert Dunlop]

Hi Tom. What aspect of Foch's ideas are you referring to? I presume that the reference to 'Colonel' relates to the time when he wrote "Des Principes de la Guerre" and "De la Conduite de la Guerre", prior to becoming Commandant of the Staff College.

Robert

[truthergw]

I was thinking of him as an ardent sponsor of l'audace, toujours l'audace in his pre-war days at St. Cyr rather than towards the latter part of the war and later as the great Marshall Foch who was feted as having won the war, especially by DLG.

[SteveMarsdin]

Good evening Tom, Robert and All,

Having read a lot over the last 6 months about the Battle of the Frontiers, I always feel that the doctrine of "offensive a outrance" is often over-simplified as the reason for the defeats as "attack, attack attack" or "baionette et clairon" whereas in reality it was more complex than that and the reasons for its failure were deeper; a doctrine ahead of the battlefield communications of the time. The divisional commander riding with the avant-garde, finding and "fixing" the enemy, whilst the bulk of the divisional forces manoeuvred to engage and defeat that enemy.

Unfortunately in August 1914 when they, in echelon formation, met the German Army who had turned to meet them on territory well reconnoitred over the previous two weeks, it didn't allow them the luxury of manoeuvre. Many commanders were killed and forces caught and destroyed in column formation before orders could be given to deploy and engage as intended. Perhaps the turnaround in fortunes over the following few weeks was as much as a result of fighting a defensive retreat as of a change in tactics. In the First Battle of the Marne the French and British knew where the Germans were, the concept behind the "offensive a outrance" wasn't that relevant.

The French infantry tactics undoubtedly evolved but that was perhaps also due to the type of encounter that was changing, from one of movement.

[Robert Dunlop]

Steve, I heartily agree with you with respect to the perceptions around 'l'offensive à outrance'. Perhaps this thread will allow us to correct this myth once and for all?

Tom, Foch's writings of the 1903/04 period were addressing a very specific context. In 'Principles of War', he introduced his reason for emphasizing moral factors. He wrote:

"...it was not before 1882-3 that war was taught in France on a rational and practical basis, and this, although our school had been founded in 1876. The different causes which contribute towards determining the result of war were enumerated well enough: moral superiority, superiority in instruction, command, armament, supply of supply, of fortification, etc. It is rightly pointed out that this result is a function of all these variables:

f(a, b, c....k, l, m)

These variables were, however, divided into two groups:

1. In the first group were placed the moral factors... These factors were systematically set aside from a rational study and from a theory of war which was intended to be accurate; or rather, they were supposed to be equal on each side. [Thus] the first set, a, b, c... were given a constant value, and the function of variables there became:

f(k, l, m)

It only included a small number of variables.

2. These latter variables were the material factors which of course exert an influence upon the result: armament, supply, ground, numerical superiority, etc... but which are far from being everything.

At the same time, while the moral factors were suppressed as causes, they were also suppressed as effects. Defeat thus came to appear in the eyes of this school as a product of material factors, though we shall see later on that it is in fact a purely moral result, that of a mood of discouragement, of terror, wrought in the soul of the conquered by the combined use of moral and material factors simultaneously resorted to by the victor.

The conclusion of the old theory, then, was: in order to conquer, you must have superior numbers, better rifles, better guns, more skilfully chosen positions. But the French Revolution, Napoleon above all, would have answered: 'We are not more numerous, we are not better armed; but we will beat you all the same, because, thanks to our plans, we will manage to have superiority in number at the decisive point; because by our energy, our instruction, the use of our arms, fire and bayonet, we will succeed in stimulating our own spirit to a maximum and in breaking yours.'

These theories, which men had believed to be accurate because they had been entirely based on certain and mathematical data, had in fact the misfortune of being radically wrong; for they had left aside the most important factor of the problem, whether in command or execution, namely that factor which animates the subject, which gives it life: man with his moral and physical faculties."

From this material, it is evident that Foch perceived a problem with previous teachings. He did not negate the importance of physical factors. Foch wanted to restore a sense of balance, re-emphasizing moral factors as well.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Throughout the remainder of his book, Foch discusses a variety of principles of war. From all that is typically said of Foch, one might expect that Foch's principles related to 'attack, attack, attack'. Tom, I noted your very careful use of the word 'audace', which need not be translated as 'all out attack' but is consistent with the moral factors point that is made in my previous thread.

The first principle set out by Foch is 'economy of forces'. He went on to illustrate the concept. Significantly, however, the first example related not to all-out attack but to defense:

"There are many fine generals, but they try to keep an eye on too many things; they try to see, to keep, to defend everything..." (emphasis in the original).

Foch detailed an example involving the use of defensive outposts. A friendly force (equivalent to a British brigade, ie four battalions) is encamped to the south. The enemy has been detected to the north. The friendly force sets up a line of outposts (line D-E) stretching east-west.

"The first idea might be to extend the troop in a uniform fashion along D E. If D E is 4000 yards long, this repartition will give one man per yard; this would provide some power of resistance, but a weak one."

Foch then goes on to describe an alternative. Outposts would be organised into all-around defensive strong points, with a mobile reserve placed in the rear. This would enable rapid deployment of the reserve to any point that was attacked, enabling a more decisive defence to be mounted.

This is but one of many examples involving defensive tactics, not typical of the extreme offensive. This suggests that 'audace' is a useful descriptor, so long as we bear in mind that Foch was not applying the concept of boldness and audacity merely to the offensive.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

...whereas in reality [the reason for the early defeats] was more complex than that and the reasons for its failure were deeper; a doctrine ahead of the battlefield communications of the time. The divisional commander riding with the avant-garde, finding and "fixing" the enemy, whilst the bulk of the divisional forces manoeuvred to engage and defeat that enemy.

Steve, I respectfully suggest that the reasons for the early defeats were much more complex than this. On this issue of the divisional commander riding with the advance guard, then a much more serious problem becomes evident when this is analysed further. Assuming that all French divisional commanders rode with their advance guards (which wasn't the case), then it should have been possible to have manoeuvred the main force if the Germans had been detected early enough. Obviously it would have been best if the German forces in the Ardennes (which was the region of the heaviest defeats) had been detected by aerial reconnaissance. As seen with the BEF, this would have given ample time for the French dispositions to have been changed fundamentally. But the Ardennes did not permit adequate aerial reconnaissance.

Ground-based reconnaissance should have detected the Germans earlier. Again, the BEF's Cavalry Division illustrated how cavalry reconnaissance could give at least 24 hours notice of the enemy's approach.

Many commanders were killed and forces caught and destroyed in column formation before orders could be given to deploy and engage as intended. Perhaps the turnaround in fortunes over the following few weeks was as much as a result of fighting a defensive retreat as of a change in tactics.

French offensive doctrine (and definitely the regulations on tactics) DID NOT prescribe the behaviour you have described. In other words, there was a major difference between what was taught/expected and what actually happened.

Robert

[bmac]

Somewhat off the subject but I hear that the planned DVD of the AFGG is:

1. Not yet finished; and

2. Is likely to be initially only made available at Vincennes on PC and, if popular, then it might be made available commercially.

Quite why they have bothered to digitise the thing only to restrict its access is beyond me. And why only on one site? Barking and frustrating. So, access to tactical documents will still be very difficult.

[salesie]

On the face of it, there appears to be a degradation of German tactics and/or an improvement in French tactics between the German "victories" of the Frontiers and Allied success on the Marne (right up to the Aisne where stalemate set in). But how can such a tactical turnaround be a reality? Were just two short weeks, between the frontiers and the Marne, enough time for the French to "teach" their armies new tactics (especially seeing as the French army was being seriously assaulted on all fronts), and/or for the Germans to virtually forget "how to do it" at the tactical level? Is it possible that in just two short weeks the whole pre-war tactical training of the French and German armies could be turned on its head? I would say no - I would say, despite a few highly localised examples, that there was neither degradation nor improvement in the potential performance per se of the prescribed tactics of either army. I would say the real difference in performance between the Frontiers and the Marne was leadership.

Joffre in this period replaced over thirty divisional commanders, several corps commanders, and three (?) army commanders. These were massive changes at the top - these commanders had no time to re-train their men, so could it just be that an almost complete change in attitude and/or ability of these generals had an almost immediate impact on the performance of their charges?

After all, a similar situation appeared to be the case in the east at this stage of the war - was not the appearance of Hindenburg and Ludendorff the main factor in turning around the fortunes of the German army on this front? And although the BEF stayed under the command of Sir John French, his "attitude" would appear to have been "improved" somewhat by Kitchener's "pep-talk"?

It seems to me that there was very little difference, in terms of potential effectiveness, between German and French tactics at the very start of the war - but there was, perhaps, a big difference in application; until Joffre had the bottle to make such draconian changes at the top?

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

I would say no - I would say, despite a few highly localised examples, that there was neither degradation nor improvement in the overall performance of the prescribed tactics of either army.

salesie, which highly localised examples have you studied in detail? Which other actions have you studied that demonstrate that there was neither degredation or improvement in tactics in these other actions, particularly using German and French primary sources?

Robert

[salesie]

salesie, which highly localised examples have you studied in detail? Which other actions have you studied that demonstrate that there was neither degredation or improvement in tactics in these other actions, particularly using German and French primary sources?

Robert

The highly localised tactical examples that you will probably post, Robert (as in other threads).

As you already know, I don't rely on such things to reach my conclusions about the tactics of this period - I look firstly at the end-result (the Marne and after), then at the earlier battles (what are referred to in other threads as great German successes), then I look at the time-scale between the two, and then I apply retrospective logic. In my opinion, it would have been impossible for the French to re-train their men and thus improve their tactics in what amounted to just a couple of weeks or so, and I don't believe for one minute that the Germans would have forgotten the tactics which gave them "great success" early on. So, the big question once more arises - why the dramatic turnaround in fortunes?

It takes a lot more than a couple weeks to tactically train and/or retrain an army, even in peace time let alone when your troops are fighting for their lives on virtually all fronts, and the Germans would not have put aside tactics which "worked" - so what training miracle did the French army perform to overcome its supposed tactical deficiencies? It seems to me, as a matter of logic, that the minutiae of tactical doctrine does not answer the big question, that such detailed tactical research, though interesting, is a dead-end in that it is not a means to an end but an end in itself.

I gave a possible answer i.e. that the main changes to the French army in this period occurred at the leadership level not the tactical one, and that these changes led to improved application of the already prescribed tactics not in wholesale changes to the French tactics themselves. And I used the eastern front to show a similar situation for the German army in this very period - did Hindenburg and Ludendorff on arrival re-train the German army in the east or just use what they already had in a better way?

I thought my post may broaden the debate, but if you wish to stay with the tactical minutiae, Robert, so be it.

Cheers-salesie.

[Latze]

Hi all,

I wish to thank everybody who commented so far, especially those who gave hints for further study. Still it seems to me that basically the subject was never really studied. What we do know is that generally French doctrine stressed firepower (possibly because casualties in 1914 were so high that this was inevitable). But then again at the end of the war German and British doctrine did that too (eg Bruchmüllers artillery planing as a key component of the spring offensives; very sophisticated artillery planing on the British side also). The French reorganized their company organisation twice in the war and somehow fought using lMG/rifle grenade/grenade squads. The question for me is - how exactly did they fight?

There is one book by a certain Pascal Lucas "The evolution of tactical ideas in France and Germany during the war of 1914-1918" written 1925 and translated into English. But this tome seems be absolutely unavailable...

My theory is that this mainly a function of the language barrier.

regards

Latze

[Robert Dunlop]

salesie, thank you for sharing the basis upon which you are seeking to broaden the debate.

Robert

[Latze]

Hi salesie,

I think one point we have to keep in mind is the fact that stuff that happens on the tactical level does not necessarily and immediately overrides factors that shape the operational level. It is perfectly possible that the German army had better doctrine/training/tactical practice than the French army and that this stayed this way well into 1916 while at the same time the tactical edge was not decisive. Possibly the French were able to win the Marne battles because they dramatically improved leadership at the divison level, maybe the outcome of that battle rested on strategic (read theater-wide, not politico-militaric) leadership. But I think it is impossible to conclude much about tactical proficiency just by looking at outcomes without going into tactical minutiae.

regards

Latze

[Robert Dunlop]

What we do know is that generally French doctrine stressed firepower (possibly because casualties in 1914 were so high that this was inevitable).

Latze, French doctrine stressed firepower before the war, not as a result of the casualties in 1914. The casualties, however, did reinforce the pre-war desire to get more heavy artillery in place. Joffre had been concerned about the relative lack of heavy guns and howitzers before the war.

With respect to the changes in infantry tactics, are you interested to know about these tactics in both offensive and defensive operations?

Robert

[truthergw]

I believe the reasons for the French over emphasis on the offense are to be found in the political and social situation in the decades preceding the war. These forces led to a thoroughly distorted view of the Army, its purpose( strategy) and how it should be used ( tactics). We will not arrive at a true understanding of the French tactics at the outbreak of war without examining the politics of France. Once battle was joined, the realities of the battlefield concentrated commanders' ideas and rapidly cleansed their notions of idealogical bias. The prevalance of summary execution in the early days suggests that the attaque a outrance was not accepted blindly and universally by the poilus. The fact that Joffre was an engineer may have meant that he was not as thoroughly indoctrinated as the cavalry and infantry and helped him stick to the basics.

[salesie]

Hi salesie,

I think one point we have to keep in mind is the fact that stuff that happens on the tactical level does not necessarily and immediately overrides factors that shape the operational level. It is perfectly possible that the German army had better doctrine/training/tactical practice than the French army and that this stayed this way well into 1916 while at the same time the tactical edge was not decisive. Possibly the French were able to win the Marne battles because they dramatically improved leadership at the divison level, maybe the outcome of that battle rested on strategic (read theater-wide, not politico-militaric) leadership. But I think it is impossible to conclude much about tactical proficiency just by looking at outcomes without going into tactical minutiae.

regards

Latze

That's my whole point, Latze - any tactical edge for any side was never decisive throughout the whole of the war in the west. The learning-curve (evolution in tactics) was equal and opposite for both sides, and the end-result of any "edge" in tactics was always the same - the trading of huge casualties in return for relatively small gains in real-estate and thus a bloody stalemate. And this stalemate, because both sides quickly learnt to counter each others tactical innovations, existed right up until the summer of 1918 when slow to act but powerful strategic forces broke the stalemate (not the evolved tactics employed by that time).

On this forum, you can find many many threads delving into the evolution of tactics (some of mind-boggling detail) for all periods of the war - but, if you place each of them within the context of what actually happened, they all have one message in common i.e. whatever the tactics employed, whether new or old, the end-result was always stalemate (though some of the disseminators of such knowledge occasionally seem to be in denial about that). So, in my opinion, any detailed study of the evolution in French tactics can only give us the same message.

I'm not saying don't delve into the minutiae of tactics for any period and for any side, it is an interesting pastime after all - but what I am saying is don't let the conclusions of such research appear grossly at odds with the outcome - no tactics per se, whether old or new from any side, were ever decisive enough to end the war (unless, of course, you regard attrition, not just manpower but also political and socio-economic attrition, as a tactic - but I would argue that attrition in its many forms is a strategic factor).

Cheers-salesie.

PS. I'm on my travels again in a couple of hours - so this will probably be my last post for at least a week (do I hear sighs of relief?).

[Latze]

Hi Robert,

Latze, French doctrine stressed firepower before the war, not as a result of the casualties in 1914. The casualties, however, did reinforce the pre-war desire to get more heavy artillery in place. Joffre had been concerned about the relative lack of heavy guns and howitzers before the war.

Would you say that French doctrine was as firepower oriented as German or British doctrine? I think that it is a given that all major powers basically were professional enough to recognise that the war would be fought with technology that produced much more firepower that - say - the war of 1870. So there is no black and white. But I had (so far) the impression that in Germany the idea of first to gain fire superiority then advance was not as clearly formulated in France.

With respect to the changes in infantry tactics, are you interested to know about these tactics in both offensive and defensive operations?

Everything that happens on the level between squads and battalions (inclusive) interests me. Offensive and defensive.

regards

Latze

[Robert Dunlop]

Latze, there wasn't any difference in the idea of gaining fire superiority in support of infantry attacks before the war. There were differences of opinion, both between France and Germany as well as within both countries, about the how. There are writers who have summarised these differences, such as Gudmundsson (with respect to artillery) and Echevaria (infantry, artillery and cavalry tactical doctrine). Tom has mentioned the political problems in France, which had a significant influence. This wasn't surprising when you consider there were 42 different War Ministers between 1871-1914 (in 1898 alone, four War Ministers came and went).

You are quite right about the effects of the dearth of translated material.

Robert