New Army untried on the Somme.

[Robert Dunlop]

Jon, I don't have clear information about the relationship between Joffre and Foch during the planning of the Somme offensive. I do have information about how Joffre worked in previous battles, including the use of GQG Liaison Officers and personal visits to HQs. The most notable example of the latter was Joffre's visit to Lanrezac's Fifth Army HQ during the Battle of Guise, 1914. Spears' discusses this in his look Liaison 1914. I don't think there was a direct equivalent of the GQG Liaison Officers in the British Army command structure.

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

A complete breakthrough and a resultant initiation of open warfare formed no part of my plans. Our projected offensive was not to assume a form of strategic envelopment...

Robert - Many thanks for this. I have to say Wilhelm's recollections contradict my previously impression, most likely gleaned from a combination of tv documentaries and academic lectures. Also possibly Price of Glory, which is about the only book I have read on Verdun (apart from Christina's excellent BE guide on Fort Douamont).

Interesting to note that the Crown Prince mentions EvF holding back some divisions to deal with a resultant British counter-attack elsewhere.

Once again many thanks,

Jon

[Jonathan Saunders]

Joffre involved himself as you might expect of a C-in-C. He overruled Foch's objections to even launching the attack at all, as evidenced in the quote: 'privately with Joffre and Castelnau... [Foch] continued to express reservations about sending French troops into another large offensive or getting the British to cooperate. [Joffre] insisted that planning continue for the Somme offensive.' Joffre pushed Haig into launching the attack sooner that Haig thought was ideal, and then Joffre tried to get Haig to reinforce failure, not success.

Robert - these are all valid points that you make. However I am still of the opinion that Joffre did not involve himself on the same scale as Haig. Regarding your last two points I continue to have some sympathy with Joffre's views.

Jon

[Robert Dunlop]

However I am still of the opinion that Joffre did not involve himself on the same scale as Haig.

Jon, it is very important to understand how the GQG Liaison Officers worked. I don't have any evidence that the relevant officer was active in monitoring Foch's planning during 1916. There is evidence that liaison officers were actively reporting to Joffre throughout the Artois and Champagne offensives in 1915. I will look this out and post the material. My guess, and it is only a guess at this stage but based on Joffre's style, is that a liaison officer was constantly monitoring Foch.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Here is Spears' description of the GQG liaison officers, as he observed their role in 1914:

'Probably the officers who, without having any direct responsibility themselves, most powerfully influenced decisions, were the GQG liaison officers. They were often relatively junior in rank, but belonged to the 3ème Bureau of the Supreme Staff, and reported personally to the Commander-in-Chief. They were invariably able men, and generally tactful. But whoever they might be, their arrival was an event, and they were treated with the respect due to minor saints, who, having access to the Supreme Presence, could intercede for or damn their respective congregations. I am convinced that in all cases they did their duty according to their lights, and reported as to whether the Commander-in-Chief's orders were being carried out in the letter and in the spirit. Knowing the Commander-in-Chief's intentions, they were able to interpret them; being young and agile they would go and see for themselves up to the very picquet line if necessary, and no one dared say them nay. They were the Commander-in-Chief's eyes and ears, and very useful they proved to be.

Throughout the war, the French liaison officer, flitting backwards and forwards with great if undefined powers, was an important figure. The junior officer in whom these powers were vested generally kept them carefully concealed behind the respectful mask of discipline when dealing with the Generals to whom he was sent, but all knew, and all bowed low, for even in the early days of 1914 it was realized that he would have the scalps of many wearers of gold-braided caps, since his comments would be of much weight in quarters where an opinion could make or break a man.'

I have found evidence of liaison officers feeding information back to Joffre in late 1915.

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

Robert - thanks. An interesting account. As I think I said some time ago it is really annoying that there is an absence of really good English language books on the French army in the Great War. I wish Philpot or one of the others would hurry up and publish one.

Jon

[Jack Sheldon]

Jonathan

I have been thinking about your question regarding my opinion of Falkenhayn and have decided that I really do not have a well-formed opinion of my own; instead I tend to bow towards the views of men who were close to him and knew him well. Crown Prince Rupprecht, whose opinions I tend to trust, condemned him roundly and reported in his diaries that his negative view was shared by many prominent military and political actors. Von Moltke, hardly likely to be the most unbiased witness, condemned him in forthright terms in a letter to the Kaiser dated 17 January 1915. Perhaps the most measured assessment is that of von Kuhl, who begins by stating that , 'he was a brilliant soldier'. He then first expands on this remark and goes on to qualify it. As a result, although it would be too much to say that he damns him with faint praise, the reader is left in no doubt that for all his talent, he really did not 'cut it' at the highest level - but perhaps the problems were so great that they were beyond the capacity of any one individual to master them.

Jack

[Jonathan Saunders]

Jonathan

I have been thinking about your question regarding my opinion of Falkenhayn and have decided that I really do not have a well-formed opinion of my own ...

Jack - thanks for considering the point. Your praise for CP Rupprecht is duly noted and no doubt with very good cause and i do appreciate the benefit of your thoughts.

My own leaning is that EvF was much maligned and just possibly viewed a slightly larger picture than many within the German High Command in that he realised Germany could not win the war outright after 1914, and fought a campaign to place Germany in the best possible position for peace negotiations. Possibly I am being naive!

I will google for the writings and opinions of von Kuhl, which you have made sound intriguing.

Thanks again,

Jon S

[Jack Sheldon]

Jonathan

Kuhl's assessment is contained in Der Weltkrieg 1914/18 Volume I pp 507-513. These pages combine a discussion of the change in command at the end of Aug 1916 with von Kuhl's judgement on falkenhayn.

Jack

[Robert Dunlop]

Jon, Volume II of Joffre's memoirs arrived two days ago. Here are the relevant quotes with regard to his intentions prior to the Somme:

"On February 14, 1916, Sir Douglas Haig and I at last came to an agreement regarding the general outlines of our plan. A contiguous attack by the French and British was to be undertaken on both sides of the Somme, commencing towards the end of June. As soon as the co-operation of the British was assured and the general plan of action was drawn up, I informed the commanders of Army Groups (February 18th) of my intention to endeavour to break through the enemy's line by a general offensive, to be executed by French and British forces along the front held by our Armies of the North."

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Joffre noted that the French forces for the Somme offensive had to be reduced in light of the Verdun offensive. He then goes on to say:

"On June 21st [1916] I sent Generals Haig and Foch each a copy of my instructions defining the object of the first operations [on the Somme] and explaining the methods to be pursued in exploiting the earliest successes. These Instructions began by stating my intention of engaging a battle of long duration, whose continuation was expected to wear down the forces of the enemy. This required a schedule to be carefully drawn up governing the arrival of fresh units and laying down a plan for reconstituting exhausted elements.

The strategic end I had in view was the directing of a mass of manoeuvre against the enemy's lines of communications running through Cambrai, Le Cateau and Maubeuge. The road Bapaume-Cambrai would thus represent the initial axis of our forward movement. The first line to be reached was marked by Miraumont, le Sars, Guinchy, Guillemont, Maurepas, Hem and the plateau of Flaucourt.

As a result of the reductions made in the forces assigned to the French offensive, the principal action was to fall to the British armies, the mission of the French Sixth Army being to support our Allies."

Robert

[armourersergeant]

Robert, Jon, A.N.Other,

I know this thread has been dormant for some time but I would like to follow up on some aspects of XV Corps counter battery and inter-Corps/French artillery fire.

Please excuse my ignorance that may become apparent here but I am trying to take 21st divisions attack apart and analyse it in detail. I am thus at the moment trying to evaluate the artillery plans, firstly at Corps then at Divisional level, of which the later seem to have varied according to divisional whim or interpretation.

Prior and Wilson indicate that XV Corps did little in the way of counter battery work and only by the actions of the XIII Corps to its right and the French further than this, were they able to advance relatively unmolested, from an artillery point of view, across the German front line.

The questions I have are these.

1..Did the French, XV and XIII co-operate in fire plans?

If so then it would have been fine surely for Horne to ignore those targets as he knew they would be saturated by XIII and the French.

2..Did XIII and the French hit these targets because they posed a threat to themselves?

3..Did these batteries actually lay under the area of artillery operation of XV, or in what may have been a combined corps area?

Thus as XV 'ignored' them they were taken up by XIII and the French

4..Were there any benefits of XV that helped the men of XIII to there right?

It all seems to push toward the actions of XIII helping XV and nothing going the other way. It seems to me that in some ways the plans helped each other. 7th division met 'little' resistance as it went, the result of this was that XIII corps's flank was not in the air. This of course may just have been a by product of the advance and what anyway would have been the desired effect of any advance. Of course 21st division to the left of 7th were not blessed with a covered flank and advanced with it in the air!

I find it very hard to believe that XV and XIII, at least, did not co-ordinate (cross reference etc) plans of artillery fire, if for no other reason than not to duplicate work.

Having re read this thread for some time this morning may I commend both Robert and Jon for a highly competent debate on the matter, though I would venture Gentlemen it is yet to be completed i think!

Any help from any quarters greatly received

regards

Arm