New Army untried on the Somme.

[armourersergeant]

Arm - please see relevant comment in my post at 9:49pm.

Regards,

Jon

I will try to keep up in future!

Arm

[Robert Dunlop]

A couple of interesting quotes from Seely ('Adventure'), who had been Secretary of State for War prior to his resignation at the time of the Curragh Incident. He commanded a Canadian cavalry brigade and was involved in the Battle of the Somme. Just after the war started, Seely served on Sir John French's Staff. Just prior to the First Battle of Ypres:

'French sent me to Foch almost daily, on my way up to the front line. Foch said to me one day "Frappez! Frappez Frappez! C'est mon idée." He asked me what I thought about it, and I said it was all very well to bang at the Germans, providing you lost fewer men than the enemy in the process, because I was sure we could not push them back very far. Nearly two years afterwards, on the Somme, Foch, who was commanding the French Army on our right, reminded me of our conversation. He said: "You were right then, but I have learnt my lesson. Attack is impossible, except with a force of artillery, which it must take months to collect, and even then you must have railway sidings and special roads to feed the shells to the guns".

During the leadup to the Somme, Seely 'had permission frequently to see my great friend, Foch. He was to command the French part of the attack - a comparatively narrow sector south of the Somme. Although their front was narrow, the preparations were on a most elaborate scale. A whole network of special railway sidings had been built a few miles south-east of Amiens, and a vast reserve of shells had been accumulated. Foch insisted upon an artillery concentration of an unprecedented kind. He told me at the time, and Sir Douglas Haig afterwards verified it in conversation with me, that he had more than three times as many guns per yard of front as we had for our more ambitious attack on his left.'

Seely mentions that he prompted Haldane to reconnoitre the battlefield prior to July 1. Haldane's division's attack 'was a complete success. Foch described it to me as "a blessing and a miracle." It certainly made an immense difference.'

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Before considering the French involvement in the ongoing Somme campaign, I want to revisit the evolution of French military strategy during the preceding months. The Military Conference held in Chantilly, 6th December, 1915, set the agenda prior to the Battle of Verdun. GQG published a 'Plan d'action' that was presented to the conference. This document set out the French view of German war aims and then recommended:

'To oppose Germany's aims we consider that the Coalition ought :

1. Pursue its principal objective: the destruction of the German and Austrian Armies.

2. Foil Germany's attempt at imperial domination in the East.'

With repect to the first objective, GQG strongly recommended:

'The Allied armies ought to resume the general offensive on the Franco-British, Italian, and Russian fronts as soon as they are in a state to do so..

All the efforts of the Coalition must be exerted in the preparation and execution of this decisive action, which will only produce its full effect as a co-ordination of offensives.

In conclusion, so far as the principal theatres of war are concerned, the Allies must adopt the following policy until such time as it is possible to launch the combined offensive.

Great Britain, Italy and Russia should use every endeavour to wear down their opponents. France will co-operate so far as her resources in man power permit.'

Doughty provides an alternate translation of the last two sentences:

'Britain, Italy, Russia will intensify their efforts, and do everything they can to attrit the adversary. France will collaborate in this attrition as much as its resources in men will permit.'

GQG was clearly seeking to downplay French involvement in the process of attrition. This is no surprise, given the losses in 1914 and 1915. It should also be noted that the reference to attrition refers to the interim period before the launching of the Combined allied offensive later in 1916.

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

A couple of interesting quotes from Seely ('Adventure') ...

Robert,

Thanks for providing these quotes as they seem to corroborate my views on Foch and how he was dismayed by how the British fought the opening Somme battles.

Regards,

Jon

[Robert Dunlop]

Doughty ('Pyrrhic Victory: French strategy and operations in the Great War') went on to note:

'Coordinated offensives, [Joffre] believed, would eventually yield a "strategic rupture" of enemy lines. Unlike a narrow penetration or a breakthrough in the manner of 1940, a strategic rupture would occur suddenly when the enemy could no longer endure losses and his defenses crumbled much like the collapse of a building or bridge after the weakening of its load-bearing structure. Joffre thought achieving a rupture would be "easier" on the Eastern than the Western Front.

Joffre worked to improve the operational methods of the French army. In essence, he shifted the French doctrine from a battle seeking penetration and breakthrough to a battle seeking attrition and then rupture. By abandoning hopes for a breakthrough and accepting battles of attrition, Joffre rendered moot his previous reservations that the methodical battle was too slow and incapable of breaking through an enemy's defenses.'

The British Official History noted that Haig 'having received a hint of the French plans, at once directed the Third Army to prepare schemes for an offensive; (1) on a 10-mile front, reporting what number of troops were required; and (2), with 20 divisions, reporting which part of the enemy front and what length of it should be attacked. On the 9th January 1916 he assembled the first of the "Army Commanders' Conferences" which henceforth took place weekly. These meetings provided not only an occasion for the discussion of plans and interchange of experience as regards systems of offence and defence, but gave opportunity for the establishment of closer touch and the development of mutual understanding between the Commander-in-Chief and his Army commanders, and between their respective staffs.'

At the same time, Joffre began planning for the Allied offensive on the Western Front. On 30th December 1915, Joffre sent the following letter to Haig, immediately after their meeting in Chantilly on the previous day:

'I have directed the General Commanding the Group of Armies of the North [General Foch] to make a study of a powerful offensive south of the Somme in the region comprised between that river and Lassigny.

It is part of a scheme of preparation of a great number of different areas of intended sectors of attack, some to be utilized in the general offensive, others designed for the purpose of holding the enemy in uncertainty...

Without prejudice to the area where our principal attack will be made, the French offensive would be greatly aided by a simultaneous offensive of the British forces between the Somme and Arras.'

Following this letter, Haig agreed to the BEF extending their line south, taking over from the French Tenth Army.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Doughty noted that 'on October 27 Joffre directed his army-group commanders to examine the possibility of an offensive, either alone or in conjunction with another army group, but he did not indicate any strategic goals. The memorandum said, "The scale of the envisaged offensive will be at least equal to that of the last offensive in Champagne." Foch wrote on the memorandum, " An offensive to do what?" After the Chantilly conference in early December, Joffre sent his army-group commanders the results of their analysis, including a list of the regions deemed most appropriate for an offensive. The area identified in the Northern Army Group's sector was south of the Somme River. Joffre expected an offensive to occur in the spring, but he included no strategic goals. A few days later [Joffre's] staff completed another assessment, this time analyzing alternatives for a British offensive. The study, which asserted that the British could attack only on a narrow front, considered the three British armies' sectors and concluded that the British Third Army's sector north of the Somme provided the best opportunity for a successful attack.

Though such an offensive made sense to Joffre and his staff, Foch, who would direct the combined offensive on the Somme, believed an offensive in that region would not yield important strategic results. An attack into compartmented terrain and numerous villages in the region, Foch argued, would require enormous amounts of heavy artillery, and an advance of ten to fifteen kilometers would bring the attackers to a new and difficult line of obstacles. The commander of the Northern Army Group favoured a demonstration south of the Somme and a larger operation elsewhere. Foch's objections were not short-lived; as late as May 31 he advised against an offensive on the Somme in 1916.

Despite Foch's reservations, Joffre decided to launch a combined offensive on both banks of the river. He doubted that the British would launch a major offensive without French participation... Thus the choice of the Somme was driven primarily by Joffre's desire to shift the burden of the war to France's allies and by the coincidence of where the British and French forces were.'

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Doughty continues:

'[F]or the Franco-British offensive on the Somme, French planning for the operation had begun in mid-February, when Joffre sent his concept for the attack to Foch... When Foch submitted his proposal on March 16 for the French portion of the offensive, he anticipated employing three armies on a fifty-kilometre front south of the Somme. Second Army, however, was now deeply involved in the Verdun battle, as were many of the corps and divisions earmarked for the operation.

Despite the diversion of French forces, Joffre thought that French and British forces could make significant gains on the Somme. On March 27 he wrote to Haig about his intentions to "rupture" the enemy front between Hebuterne (twenty-five kilometres north of the Somme) and Lassigny (forty kilometres south) and then drive east. The French would be responsible for two-thirds of the sixty-five kilometre [~forty mile] front. [T]he offensive, Joffre told Haig, could overwhelm the German defenders and achieve "important strategic results."'

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

As mentioned previously, the German attacks around Verdun drew in more and more French divisions. By April, the number of French divisions proposed for the Somme had been reduced from 39 to 30. On May 22, Joffre reported the number to be only 22. GQG's paper for the May 26 Franco-British conference even suggested that the British might have to attack alone. It was during this conference that Haig suggested a delay in the British attack until August 15, at which point 'Joffre lost his composure and shouted that the French army would "cease to exist"' (Doughty).

On June 6, Joffre sent Haig a copy of 'the instructions Foch had given to the Sixth Army commander, General Fayolle. Written on May 25, before the key meetings with Haig, those instructions stated: "The principal offensive will be executed by the British armies; the task of Sixth Army is to support them in this offensive."' Foch's document also indicated that there would only be 11 divisions available for the attack.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Doughty goes on to mention 'of France's most senior military leaders, Foch remained the main critic of an attack on the Somme.' In May 31, Foch attended a high level meeting and was asked by Poincare for his advice. Foch 'responded by saying that France should concentrate on rebuilding its forces and should wait until the following year to attack. Castelnau disagreed and responded sharply, "That's an option when there is no opponent. You must suppress the enemy! He will continue to operate and will not leave you free until the coming year." In response to pressure from Roques, Foch relented and agreed to support an offensive designed to assist Verdun but not to break through enemy lines. Privately with Joffre and Castelnau, however, he continued to express reservations about sending French troops into another large offensive or getting the British to cooperate. [Joffre] insisted that planning continue for the Somme offensive.'

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

'On June 21 Joffre sent Haig instructions for the attack on the Somme. The objective of the attack, he explained, was to place allied forces on the junction of the enemy's lines of communication in the area between Cambrai and Maubeuge. To accomplish this, the British would advance along an axis extending from Bapaume toward Cambrai. Joffre offered two hypotheses about the campaign: first, the enemy would yield after an attack of a "few days" and pull back along the entire breadth of the allied attack; or second, the allies would rupture the enemy front quickly. Though Joffre did not acknowledge the possibility of failure, he did say the allies would have to fight a "long and hard battle" on the Somme.' (Doughty)

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

I have tried to illustrate that the French thinking around the Somme was quite complex. Certainly, Foch's comments, or the interpretations about his comments, cannot be read as indicative of the French High Command, nor their political masters. The situation becomes even more complex when you consider how Foch managed the battle going forward.

Before looking at this in more detail, I want to note the proposed use of cavalry. We all know that the British cavalry were readied for the "G" in "Gap". This is often construed as an indication that the primary objective on day one was a breakthrough. It is even more interesting to examine the use of French cavalry, particularly in light of the idea that Foch did not comtemplate a breakthrough battle. I have several French sources, which I have pieced together. Firstly, Gazin's 'La Cavalerie Française dans la Guerre Mondiale (1914-1918)':

'Initially envisaged as an attempt at a decisive breakthrough of the front, the battle of the Somme had to be reconsidered by the French command, after the attack of Verdun, as a relieving operation, intended to increase the attrition of enemy manpower thereafter.

The principal mission was entrusted to the British acting on the Bapaume-Cambrai axis and supported to the South by the French VIe Army. The intervention of our great cavalry units was thus not envisaged in the first days of the attack. Nevertheless, from June 20 [my emphasis] to July 9 supplies were built up near the battle field and a camp was created near Crèvecoeur.'

Note that these preparations were specifically for the cavalry. This is confirmed in Général Bouillaire's 'Historique de 2e Corps du Cavalerie du 1er Octobre 1914 au 1er Janvier 1919':

'Arriving in Conty (headquarters), Breteuil and Gannes (7th Cavalry Division) on July 9 [1916], the 2nd Cavalry Corps found the 4th Cavalry Division stationed around Froissy [south of Amiens, near Crèvecoeur], where it had been stationed for about eight days, and the 2nd Cavalry Division (General Varin), which had fulfilled its orders to replace the 5th Cavalry Division, still in the Livry sector.'

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Several French cavalry regimental histories mention that the units were not transferred to the Somme area until after July 1. Some were transferred before the beginning of the battle. For example, the history of the 21e Régiment de Dragons records:

'On June 20 [1916], the 3rd D.C. [3rd Cavalry Division], which had been placed under the command of General de Boissieu on April 14, was transferred with the other elements of the cavalry corps to carry out manoeuvres and training in the camp at Crèvecoeur, under the direction of the General d'Urbal, Inspector of Cavalry.'

The purpose of the training was clear:

'This return to the saddle, coming after a long period of service in trenches during which the practice of horsemanship consisted of little more than walking the horses, was savoured by the squadrons, who regained the lance in hand...'

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

'On June 21 Joffre sent Haig instructions for the attack on the Somme. The objective of the attack, he explained, was to place allied forces on the junction of the enemy's lines of communication in the area between Cambrai and Maubeuge. To accomplish this, the British would advance along an axis extending from Bapaume toward Cambrai. Joffre offered two hypotheses about the campaign: first, the enemy would yield after an attack of a "few days" and pull back along the entire breadth of the allied attack; or second, the allies would rupture the enemy front quickly. Though Joffre did not acknowledge the possibility of failure, he did say the allies would have to fight a "long and hard battle" on the Somme.' (Doughty)

Robert

Robert - it was shortly after this event that my sources indicate Joffre practically washed his hands of any further involvement in the Somme offensive on a personal level. The reason being that Haig refused to carry out the objective to the Cambrai - Mauberge axis but instead intended to roll up from Bapaume to Arras. Joffre was fairly livid apparently.

Regards,

Jon

[Jonathan Saunders]

I have tried to illustrate that the French thinking around the Somme was quite complex. Certainly, Foch's comments, or the interpretations about his comments, cannot be read as indicative of the French High Command, nor their political masters. The situation becomes even more complex when you consider how Foch managed the battle going forward.

I am not sure I really agree that the French plan was that complex. As i see it, the only complexity was Verdun and the necessary scaling down of the French operations.

I still feel, and indeed think that the Doughty quotes confirm that Foch 1) intended to destroy German lines with artillery prior to 2) infantry securing German line (and repell subsequent German counter-attacks). Unless I have missed something (and I will read your Doughty quotes again) Foch never really deviated from this attack philosophy.

The inference I have taken from my sources is that Joffre did not greatly involve himself in the planning of the Somme - it would be interesting to know the content of discussions between Joffre and Foch. However it remains that I view the French ideal of "rupture" to be conducted over a period of time (which Foch planned for) and that Haig expected a "breakthrough" on the first day.

Regards,

Jon

[Jack Sheldon]

I am not sure if this has become a private thread; it is certainly one of the most interesting currently, so I thought I would drop in my two penn'orth. In no particular order:

The French used a great deal of gas in support of the attack. They used cloud gas, released from cylinders and also had sufficient quantities of gas shell (referred to in correspondence and orders as obus speciaux to be able to lend the British six batteries to fire them on the British front.

The French regarded artillery as the key to the entire project, both to preserve their infantry and to support their attack (which specifically was launched in pursuit of limited objectives). Unlike the British the length of the frontage to be attacked was determined entirely by the number of artillery pieces (especially the short barrelled heavy guns). 120 were available as at 24 May 16 in support of the bombardment and attack, so at an agreed 8 tubes per kilometre, a frontage of 15 km was agreed on. In the event there were 180 short- and 150 long- barrelled heavies in support, not to mention masses of lighter guns - all calibres had access to plenty of ammunition.

Falkenhayn would not make any reinforcements worth the name available to the German Second Army, despite repeated requests by von Below during the late spring/early summer 16. That being the case, it hardly seems likely that any feint further north would have brought about the move of any major reserves.

Faced with difficult choices, von Below ordered re-deployments within 2nd Army in June 16. The threat was judged to be most acute north of the river, so 10th Bavarian Reserve Division was withdrawn from the line south of the river and used in the north, regiment by regiment, as reinforcements. Thus when the French attacked, the German defence was chronically overstretched. That fact, coupled with overwhelming artillery goes along way to explain the initial success south of the river. On the other hand, there was never any chance of assaulting across the river unless and until advances to the north around Sailly and St Pierre Vaast had begun to outflank Peronne, so perhaps this risk was well judged.

According to the French, the reason that Joffre, remained fairly 'hands-off' was purely because of the reduction in French involvement in the offensive. Quote: 'De plus, l'offensive de la Somme, concue, preparee et opiniatrement voulue par le commandant francais, sera, tout au moins a son debut, confiee pour sa partie la plus importante aux forces britanniques. Le general Joffre conserve la direction d'ensemble des operations, mais son action sur l'execution sera restrainte. Cette situation de fait, deja lourde de serieux inconvenients, se complique de l'incertitude touchant le resultat des attaques de grande envergure a conduire par une armee alliee comptant dans son sein une grande proportion d'elements recemment incorpores, donc sans experience de la bataille offensive.' (Sorry about the lack of accents).

Much of my information is drawn from that immense cure for insomnia Les Armees Francaises dans la Grande Guerre, of which I own about 80 volumes, including thousands of annexes. I have not attempted to reflect the voluminous material concerning French planning, preparation and execution of the Somme offensive, but if anybody has particular questions, look ups are always possible.

Jack

[Robert Dunlop]

I am not sure if this has become a private thread; it is certainly one of the most interesting currently, so I thought I would drop in my two penn'orth.

Many thanks, Jack. Great to have your input.

On the other hand, there was never any chance of assaulting across the river unless and until advances to the north around Sailly and St Pierre Vaast had begun to outflank Peronne, so perhaps this risk was well judged.

This is a very important point. FWIIW, I think that Von Below may well have made his decision based on the defensive barrier of the Somme, which meant (implicitly, if not explicitly) trading away some ground in the event of successful French offensive.

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

I am not sure if this has become a private thread; it is certainly one of the most interesting currently, so I thought I would drop in my two penn'orth.

Jack - certainly not! I have been hanging on by my finger tips and lack much necessary knowledge to fully debate Robert's points so welcome all additional input. Having been an active participant I dont want to let Robert down by bailing out now so keep on going - I apologise to all.

Falkenhayn would not make any reinforcements worth the name available to the German Second Army, despite repeated requests by von Below during the late spring/early summer 16. That being the case, it hardly seems likely that any feint further north would have brought about the move of any major reserves.

I would appreciate your comments on the British offensive being predicted by von Falkenhayn as a response to his own Verdun offensive. I think he expected the British to attack around Arras or possibly just north at Vimy. German lessons from 1915 suggested a much smaller but well organised and well armed (concealed MGs) force could resist a heavy offensive push, therefore von Falkenhayn was reinforcing the Sixth Army (I think) to the north, in the expectation that once the British offensive had fizzled out, the German Sixth Army could deliver a smashing blow. Can you comment on how important was this in von Falkenhayn's planning of Verdun and ultimately how this impacted the Somme battles ie. he wasnt necessarily trying to bleed France white but entice Britain into an offensive that would ultimately see the British army all but destroyed.

Thanks and regards,

Jon S

[Jack Sheldon]

I have just re-read Falkenhayn's Christmas 1915 report to the Kaiser. I have a feeling that doubt has been cast on the existence of such a documnet; that it was invented ex post facto by F. Be that as it may, even if we take it to be an attempt by F to justify his decisions, then the contents are still of interest. All he actually states on this subject is: 'For an operation limited to a narrow front [i.e. Verdun] Germany will not be compelled to spend herself so completely that all other fronts are practically drained. She can face with confidence the relief attacks to be expected on those fronts and indeed hope to have sufficient troops in hand to reply to them with counter-attacks. For she is perfectly free to accelerate or draw out her offensive, to intensify it or break it off from time to time, as suits her purpose.' It is widely believed that F hoped that success at Verdun, would get round the problem that Germany simply lacked the resources to inflict a complete defeat on the British Army on land, especially when it would have to be followed by further operations against France. Further proof that Britain was indeed his ultimate target in 1916 is the fact that prior to Verdun and later when Verdun started to unravel, F spent a great deal of time trying to convince his political masters to engage in unrestricted submarine warfare so as to bring intolerable pressure to bear. All it would probably have achieved would have been an earlier entry in to the war by the US.

As I hinted previously, I know of no attempt to direct reinforcements anywhere along the Western Front, whilst Verdun was in full swing. 1916 began with the Germans only having an uncommitted force of around 25 divisions, not all of whom were suitable to use in an offensive, so with the 'Mill on the Meuse' going at full pelt, there was not even the possibility of supporting a spoiling attack by 2nd Army on the Somme, or providing them with meaningful reserves before the blow fell. F does claim in his memoirs that, 'The requests of the commander of 2nd Army for reinforcements, made in the last weeks during which the attack was expected, had been met as fully as possible.' This can be dimissed as patent rubbish, as can the implication that von Below delayed requesting reinforcements until it was too late. Crown Prince Rupprecht's criticism in his diaries of F's failings were extremely harsh throughout this period.

General von Kuhl in Der Weltkrieg 1914 - 1918 certainly alludes to possible intended reinforcement of 6th Army in Artois, but the impression I get is that this was dependent upon how the British reacted to Verdun. They could have sent divisions south under command of the French, they could have launched an attack further north (in which case, I suppose, an attempt could have been made to find reserves for 6th Army). In fact, of course, the response was to extend the length of front they held, in order to free up French divisions. Yet another example of: 'The enemy has two choices. Of these, he will select a third...'

Jack

[Jonathan Saunders]

General von Kuhl in Der Weltkrieg 1914 - 1918 certainly alludes to possible intended reinforcement of 6th Army in Artois, but the impression I get is that this was dependent upon how the British reacted to Verdun. They could have sent divisions south under command of the French, they could have launched an attack further north (in which case, I suppose, an attempt could have been made to find reserves for 6th Army). In fact, of course, the response was to extend the length of front they held, in order to free up French divisions. Yet another example of: 'The enemy has two choices. Of these, he will select a third...'

Jack

Jack

Many thanks for your trouble and time. I have to say I am disappointed to note you havent located anything in your various research of German archives to confirm EvF was reinforcing to the north with the intent of delivering a smashing blow to the British army. I have recently found myself thinking that EvF has been harshly dealt with by history and that he was a much more capable strategist than he has been given credit for.

Regards,

Jon S

[Jack Sheldon]

Jonathan

Spurred on by your comments, I have dived into Vol X of the German Official History and Crown Prince Rupprecht's diaries. Unless someone can produce evidence to the contrary, I remain of the view that, regardless of what was debated between F and Sixth Army at the turn of 1915/16 and during the first few weeks of the year, no reinforcement took place. According to the history, F even refused to countenance the requests of his own chief of staff to arrange for the initial assault at Verdun to take place on both sides of the Meuse; citing lack of troops as the reason.

Sixth Army was certainly tasked to work out the forces required to deliver a crushing blow against the British in Artois, during a conference between F and von Kuhl in Berlin on 8 Jan 16. Kuhl (having been directed by Crown Prince Rupprecht) told him 'at least 12 corps with artillery to match' would be needed. F replied that he could only consider allocating 8 divisions and twenty heavy batteries [i.e. about one third of the assessed force requirement]. Not only that, but the troops would not be made available, until the British made an actual move. Sixth Army wanted them in position ahead of any such offensive, but it was not to be. As a result F was not at all happy with the negative response he was getting from Sixth Army, then gradually the whole proposal was overtaken by events.

As I say,someone may know better; in the meantimeI shall try to keep digging away at the issue. As far as F's ability is concerned, it is probably worth pointing out that Crown Prince Rupprecht was a constant sharp critic, one who manoeuvred constantly against F, until the latter was eventually moved out of his post at the end of August 1916. His diary is full of negative judgements through this period.

Jack

[Robert Dunlop]

Crown Prince Wilhelm's military account also makes very negative comments, with respect to the planning and execution of Verdun. I will look this out again.

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

Crown Prince Wilhelm's military account also makes very negative comments, with respect to the planning and execution of Verdun. I will look this out again.

Robert

But the Crown Prince thought he was fighting to take Verdun - it has always shocked me that EvF did not share his view with the Crown Prince or Knobelsdorf - the Chief of Staff - who I believe was the active/practical head of the German Fifth Army. But the point remains that the Crown Prince had an axe to grind against EvF and was not impartial.

Regards,

Jon

[Jonathan Saunders]

As far as F's ability is concerned, it is probably worth pointing out that Crown Prince Rupprecht was a constant sharp critic, one who manoeuvred constantly against F, until the latter was eventually moved out of his post at the end of August 1916. His diary is full of negative judgements through this period.

Jack

Thanks again Jack for giving this your further attention.

I am assuming, as with Crown Prince Wilhelm, that Rupprecht was not without bias in his views of EvF capabilities. Do you mind me asking for your own, brief, views of von Falkenhayn?

Jon

[Robert Dunlop]

But the Crown Prince thought he was fighting to take Verdun

Jon, Wilhelm wrote the following in his book, translated as 'My War Experiences':

'My Chief of Staff..., as well as the other Army leaders, had received instructions from Falkenhayn to draw up offensive projects for their respective sectors. So far as we were concerned, after considerable discussion we confined our considerations to two points, Verdun and Belfort. [After excluding Belfort] there only remained Verdun. The strategic value of this corner-stone of the enemy's line as a sally-port for an offensive against our rearward communications had often been emphasized, and I was most anxious to put an end once and for all to this ever-present menace by securing possession of the fortress. A complete breakthrough and a resultant initiation of open warfare formed no part of my plans. Our projected offensive was not to assume a form of strategic envelopment... but involved a simultaneous offensive from north to south on both banks of the Meuse with forces disposed in great depths, so as to be in a position to meet any hostile flanking movement and to deliver enveloping attacks if opportunity offered.

General von Falkenhayn, in a conference with my Chief of Staff in Berlin, resolved to adopt our proposals for the offensive against Verdun. I do not believe he was in any way induced to arrive at this decision by pressure on the part of General von Knobelsdorf; it was too much in correspondence with his own general trend of thought, which felt no inclination for a large scale strategic breakthrough, with a view to forcing a decision, but preferred a limited offensive with assured prospects of success. On one detail of the projected plan of attack Falkenhayn and Knobelsdorf from the first disagreed. The former considered that he had not at his disposal sufficient troops to furnish adequate reserves for an offensive on both banks of the Meuse, or sufficient artillery to prepare and cover it, in view of the need for guarding against an Allied attack on some other front. We insisted that Verdun was the corner-stone of the Western Front, and that it was a matter of honour for France to retain it, and that therefore nothing less than an attack on a broad front could prevail against the forces that the enemy would certainly utilize for its defence. Von Falkenhayn concurred in this view so far as the French were concerned, but feared that the British might attempt some diversion elsewhere, to deal with which he must keep some divisions in hand. Such action on the part of the British appeared to us at the moment as unlikely, as the organization of their new armies was still in course of completion. All our protests were in vain. Before Christmas we had, in strict secrecy, been given verbal orders by the High Command that the hostile positions north of Verdun on the right bank of the Meuse were to be the objectives of our attack, and that preparations to this end were to be taken in hand.

I was disquieted by the constantly repeated expression used by the Chief of the General Staff that the French Army must be "bled white" at Verdun, and by a doubt as to whether the fortress could, after all, be taken by such means. ...the limitation of the offensive to the right bank of the Meuse seemed to be motivated by a desire to engage as few troops as possible in the first stages, so as to ensure a continuous feeding of the front of the attack over a long period of fighting.'

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

I am not sure I really agree that the French plan was that complex.

Jon, apologies. 'Complex' did not convey the meaning I tended. 'Not straightforward' is more apt. The preparation of cavalry prior to July 1st is one example of how the attack on July 1st, and subsequently, was not as simple as first seems. The lack of adequate artillery support for some attacks after July 1 also points to this, but more on that anon.

The inference I have taken from my sources is that Joffre did not greatly involve himself in the planning of the Somme - it would be interesting to know the content of discussions between Joffre and Foch.

Joffre involved himself as you might expect of a C-in-C. He overruled Foch's objections to even launching the attack at all, as evidenced in the quote: 'privately with Joffre and Castelnau... [Foch] continued to express reservations about sending French troops into another large offensive or getting the British to cooperate. [Joffre] insisted that planning continue for the Somme offensive.' Joffre pushed Haig into launching the attack sooner that Haig thought was ideal, and then Joffre tried to get Haig to reinforce failure, not success.

Robert