New Army untried on the Somme.

[Jonathan Saunders]

Even if you regard the British 'success' on the right as minor, it must be seen in the context of the very significant French advance that took place on the shoulder of the British right flank. Writers too often ignore this achievement, which is not to say that the British losses should be ignored.

Robert - sorry not trying to catch you out at all but is the French attack that started around 11am and got significantly further than the British attack? Or was that component much further to the south of the French sector?

[Robert Dunlop]

Jon, 'shoulder' refers to geographic location, not timing. It is a reference to the French advance astride the Somme. Sorry about the lack of clarity.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

If Haig had not concerned himself as closely as he did with Rawlinson's plan and had not insisted on changes to the overall plan of attack as I believe he did (I know your opinion differs), I might sympathise with your view.

Jon, I included the quotes about the preparatory bombardment because they further illustrate the point that I made about Haig's 'interference'. It was Rawlinson who insisted on the longer bombardment, against Haig's initial advice which was given in response to Rawlinson's first plan. Rawlinson did suggest 'an intense bombardment of some 5-6 hours duration... immediately prior' but this was to be preceded by 'a more methodical, but less intense bombardment of 48-72 hours duration'. Even after Haig's reply, Fourth Army went with an even longer bombardment. As you know from our previous discussion, this was not an isolated instance.

From my reading it appears clear that no direct instructions were given concerning counter-battery work other than some effort should be made.

Do you agree that direct instructions were given to engage in counter-battery fire? What I am unclear about is what else you would have expected Haig or Rawlinson to have written. Why would either of these two commanders specify how many guns should be used or how much ammunition be allocated to individual batteries or how accurate the fire should be?

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

Jon, I included the quotes about the preparatory bombardment because they further illustrate the point that I made about Haig's 'interference'. It was Rawlinson who insisted on the longer bombardment, against Haig's initial advice which was given in response to Rawlinson's first plan. Rawlinson did suggest 'an intense bombardment of some 5-6 hours duration... immediately prior' but this was to be preceded by 'a more methodical, but less intense bombardment of 48-72 hours duration'. Even after Haig's reply, Fourth Army went with an even longer bombardment. As you know from our previous discussion, this was not an isolated instance.

Do you agree that direct instructions were given to engage in counter-battery fire? What I am unclear about is what else you would have expected Haig or Rawlinson to have written. Why would either of these two commanders specify how many guns should be used or how much ammunition be allocated to individual batteries or how accurate the fire should be?

Robert

Robert - I realise Haig initially wanted a much shorther period of bombardment, however he did subsequently agree to this part of Rawlinson's plan, IMHO it is a shame he did not agree to other parts of Rawlinson's plan but that is outside this particualr remit.

The overall bombardment was to concentrate on three areas - cut the wire, destroy German defences, silence German guns. For the counter battery work there were too few long range guns, too few heavy shells, inexperienced gun crews etc and these factors were obviously known to Haig. Hence I think it fair to expect that prior to sending approximately 110,000+ men across NML, that Haig would have wanted to ensure what could have been achieved in counter-battery work with the resources available was indeed achieved.

If there were clear and direct instructions regarding the counter-battery work, then these were not carried out. What questions was Haig asking Birch during these days? What questions should Haig have been asking Birch? What reports were going back to Haig? Presumably Haig would want to concern himself with the extent of the counter-battery work. IMHO the buck still stops with Haig.

[Robert Dunlop]

IMHO it is a shame he did not agree to other parts of Rawlinson's plan but that is outside this particualr remit.

Jon, this issue is relevant to the discussion about the C-in-C's responsibility for the poor counter-battery performance. The only point I would make is that Haig did not substantially change any of the proposals that Rawlinson made for the area that Rawlinson proposed to attack. What Haig did was to take the decision, which only a C-in-C could, to extend the attack laterally in both directions. In the south, the attack would link with the French, who were to provide the extra artillery resource to the British units that were now going to be involved. In the north, the responsibility for planning the attack fell outside Rawlinson's remit.

For the counter battery work there were too few long range guns, too few heavy shells, inexperienced gun crews etc and these factors were obviously known to Haig.

Herein lies a very key issue. Did the decision to extend the width of the attack dilute the artillery assets so much that the counter-battery work could not be effective? I want to come back to this issue. At this time, I would simply reiterate my previous point that 'too few' is one way to look at the issue. As with the timing of the protective barrage, the alternative way to look at this is not from the number of guns/number of shells perspective but from the 'how were the assets actually used' perspective - maybe there were 'enough guns and shells but they were not used in the most appropriate way. This viewpoint raises a different set of questions. The two viewpoints are by no means exclusive. As you know, I have questioned many of the assumptions that Prior and Wilson have made - this is but one of them. For sure, the timings of the lifts of the protective barrages was just as serious, if not more so, than the lack of effective CB. This was definitely not a question of too few guns and too few shells. Maybe the CB problem was also not related to the number of guns and shells?

Hence I think it fair to expect that prior to sending approximately 110,000+ men across NML, that Haig would have wanted to ensure what could have been achieved in counter-battery work with the resources available was indeed achieved.

How would Haig do this? He would have to micro-manage the issue - look at lots of details, etc. This turns him into the very type of commander that 'meddles' with detail, which you have expressed concern about in the context of Rawlinson's plan. If Haig had to look very closely at CB PIs ('performance indicators', aka 'perverse incentives'), then he would have to do the same for wire cutting by field guns, as well as details about how the trench mortars were doing, as well as details about how much ammo the men were carrying, etc, etc, etc. CB was one of a huge number of interdependencies.

At this point, I would reiterate that widening the attack did have a sound tactical basis and, IMHO, could have contributed very significantly to the successes of the British in the south, as well as the French.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

If there were clear and direct instructions regarding the counter-battery work, then these were not carried out.

Jon, when you say 'if', it suggests that the instructions that I quoted about were not clear and were not direct. Is this correct? I would respectively submit that Fourth Army issued clear and direct instructions (see post above), and these were not carried out effectively (by most but not all of the corps).

In not carrying out the instructions effectively, it is very significant that there were wide variations at the corps level. This suggests to me that there was a more fundamental problem. What constituted the best means and process by which effective CB work could be carried out? Why was there not consensus on this? There was consensus that it should be carried out. Maybe it wasn't clear precisely how? Maybe this lack of clarity was a systemic problem? I don't have the answer.

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

Robert - thanks for the trouble you have taken to provide a lengthy reply.

The only point I would make is that Haig did not substantially change any of the proposals that Rawlinson made for the area that Rawlinson proposed to attack. What Haig did was to take the decision, which only a C-in-C could, to extend the attack laterally in both directions. In the south, the attack would link with the French, who were to provide the extra artillery resource to the British units that were now going to be involved. In the north, the responsibility for planning the attack fell outside Rawlinson's remit.

Whilst I am aware of your views in how Haig changed Rawlinson's battle plan and whilst I agree you put forward a very good argument, it contradicts the view of every acknowledged historian that I am aware of. As I have said before you need to put forward your findings and evidence to the likes of Peter Simkins, Ian Beckett, Gary Sheffield etc for it to be critiqued at the correct level. As you will recall, I am vehemently opposed to the extension of the infantry attack in the north.

Herein lies a very key issue. Did the decision to extend the width of the attack dilute the artillery assets so much that the counter-battery work could not be effective? I want to come back to this issue. At this time, I would simply reiterate my previous point that 'too few' is one way to look at the issue. As with the timing of the protective barrage, the alternative way to look at this is not from the number of guns/number of shells perspective but from the 'how were the assets actually used' perspective - maybe there were 'enough guns and shells but they were not used in the most appropriate way. This viewpoint raises a different set of questions. The two viewpoints are by no means exclusive. As you know, I have questioned many of the assumptions that Prior and Wilson have made - this is but one of them. For sure, the timings of the lifts of the protective barrages was just as serious, if not more so, than the lack of effective CB. This was definitely not a question of too few guns and too few shells. Maybe the CB problem was also not related to the number of guns and shells?

Focusing on the counter-battery work then yes the decision to extend the frontage of attack will dilute the effectiveness of the artillery assets, although by shelling the German positions around Gommecourt Haig had effectively achieved his feint without having the 46 and 56 Divs attack on the morning of 1 July. If you want to extend the attack laterally then you need to consider the available guns and how many more are needed, if any, and an increase in available shells of the correct calibres.

How would Haig do this? He would have to micro-manage the issue - look at lots of details, etc. This turns him into the very type of commander that 'meddles' with detail, which you have expressed concern about in the context of Rawlinson's plan. If Haig had to look very closely at CB PIs ('performance indicators', aka 'perverse incentives'), then he would have to do the same for wire cutting by field guns, as well as details about how the trench mortars were doing, as well as details about how much ammo the men were carrying, etc, etc, etc. CB was one of a huge number of interdependencies.

My firm belief is that in 1916 Haig was a commander that meddled and it is on the basis of that type of commander that I am judging him. As I said earlier if Haig had allowed Rawlinson to get on with it, as I believe he should have done, then I would have more sympathy with the view you are putting forward. We know that Haig was seeing Birch and his Corps Commanders regularly in the build up to 1 July, surely a macro level report asking for numbers of guns/shells and calibres etc employed on counter-battery work, progress reports from RFC etc, would not have been too onerous a task, in fact bearing in mind what Haig was staking on 1 July, such a question might have been a comfort to him.

At this point, I would reiterate that widening the attack did have a sound tactical basis and, IMHO, could have contributed very significantly to the successes of the British in the south, as well as the French.

I am not really sure I agree that this was important. The ground that needed to be captured ran from Serre to Pozieres. In this regard the attack failed. Whilst I believe there were command decisions taken in the south that with the exception of 36 Div do not appear to have been replicated in the north, any achievements in the south were basically worthless IMHO until Thiepval and Pozieres was taken in the north.

Jon, when you say 'if', it suggests that the instructions that I quoted about were not clear and were not direct. Is this correct? I would respectively submit that Fourth Army issued clear and direct instructions (see post above), and these were not carried out effectively (by most but not all of the corps).

In not carrying out the instructions effectively, it is very significant that there were wide variations at the corps level. This suggests to me that there was a more fundamental problem. What constituted the best means and process by which effective CB work could be carried out? Why was there not consensus on this? There was consensus that it should be carried out. Maybe it wasn't clear precisely how? Maybe this lack of clarity was a systemic problem? I don't have the answer.

I disagree that the instructions were clear and direct because 1) obviously they were not clear to the Corps commanders and 2) neither Haig nor Rawlinson appear to have followed them through to ensure the Corps commanders knew what was expected of them. Unless someone can provide strong evidence that Haig was interesting himself in the effectiveness of the counter-battery work then I dont see my opinion changing at any time in the future. Yes there was a fundamental problem and IMHO the blame remains with Haig.

Regards,

Jon

[Justin Moretti]

But does the blame lie in HIM not knowing what to do when others at the time might have, or in NOBODY really knowing what was necessary to achieve the goals?

In other words, was he culpable, or simply wrong?

It's "Harry Potter's" Albus Dumbledore who said, I believe, something along the lines of "Being wiser than the rest of you, my mistakes, when they occur, are proportionally more catastrophic."

[PhilB]

It's "Harry Potter's" Albus Dumbledore who said, I believe, something along the lines of "Being wiser than the rest of you, my mistakes, when they occur, are proportionally more catastrophic."

Not quite the same in the BEF though, Justin. The commanders can`t be taken as necessarily wiser, just higher in rank. Would that they had been the wisest men available! Phil B

[Robert Dunlop]

But does the blame lie in HIM not knowing what to do when others at the time might have, or in NOBODY really knowing what was necessary to achieve the goals?

Justin, this is the key question, IMHO. Thank you for rephrasing it in this way.

Jon, you are quite right to point out that my hypotheses go against the mainstream. It is helpful that you remain sceptical and don't agree. Who knows whether my analyses will ever come to the attention of historians such as you listed. Meanwhile, I will not stop re-examining issues, as you can tell. Your scepticism is helpful because your questions and responses push me to read further. Its great. One of the real benefits of a forum like this. I certainly won't shed any tears if my thoughts end up on the scrap heap after more expert analysis .

The thing that bothers me most about the 'Haig is to blame' approach of some historians is that it is too easy. I think the reasons are much much more complex, just an instinct. Did Haig carry the ultimate accountability? Absolutely, definitely, could not agree more. At least for the military execution. He was not responsible for the decision to wage a campaign on the Somme before he thought the BEF was ready.

Coming back to Justin's point. I have never seen evidence that any commander, artillery or otherwise, thought that counter-battery fire was not necessary at all. The significant variation in implementation by the specialists, corps' artillery commanders, strongly suggests to me that there was no consensus on how to do it. I have been examining the artillery performances in the lead-up to the Somme - Le Cateau, the Aisne, First Ypres, Neuve Chapelle, Aubers Ridge, Festubert, Loos as examples. I don't have enough information about the CB fire yet but the process, including the means for assessing where the German batteries were located, was still evolving.

The other pointer is the variation that occurred in the protective barrages. If 50% of casualties were caused by shellfire, and I have no reason to doubt this, then the other 50% of casualties direct attention at the protective barrages. Here we see the notion of smash the trenches, then, when the infantry leave their positions, move the barrage on. In fact, the better method was to move the barrage just ahead of the infantry, and not just with respect to the trenchlines as MG teams would often position themselves outside the trenches. So July 1916 sees most artillery plans seemingly based on the notion of destroying rather than suppressing. If the same general principles were being applied to CB fire, then destruction of enemy artillery is not an easy task. It took many more HE shells than gas, which was the area effect weapon. From the general instructions quoted above, Fourth Army understood the significance of gas shells, at least for 'Z' Day.

Robert

[Bernard_Lewis]

Great stuff, guys.

Bernard

[Robert Dunlop]

We know that Haig was seeing Birch and his Corps Commanders regularly in the build up to 1 July, surely a macro level report asking for numbers of guns/shells and calibres etc employed on counter-battery work, progress reports from RFC etc, would not have been too onerous a task, in fact bearing in mind what Haig was staking on 1 July, such a question might have been a comfort to him.

Jon, I don't know what the daily reports comprised. I don't know who sat at high table on these occasions. A couple of things come to mind though. Firstly, if too many details were presented at the highest level of command, then the meeting could not focus on its proper tasks. It would by overwhelmed with detail, especially if similar amounts of information were required for everything that was as crucial to the outcome as CB fire. Second, as we know, weight/number of shells fired, number and calibre of guns firing, etc is no guarantee of outcome, which is the true test. Reporting on these statistics would have been unhelpful, IMHO, for the same reason that, as with Prior and Wilson's analysis, it leads to wrong conclusions. Process and outcome are not necessarily synonymous. Obviously, the outcome can only be fully evaluated after the event, given that CB fire was meant to reduce the enemy artillery fire at the time of the assault. It was possible to get some real-time feedback on the activity and location of non-suppressed German batteries, typically via aerial observation with captive balloons or aircraft.

The whole process of tracking German batteries and assessing the effectiveness of CB fire was highly complex. It involved multiple sources of input (observation, sound-ranging, flash-spotting, etc), and retasking of batteries, especially as German batteries would move location once engaged. It was after July 1 that a specific Staff Officer post was created for Counter-battery work, the CBSO. This post would have been occupied by a Lt-Col RA, attached. This is the level at which CB fire should be carefully monitored and co-ordinated, not the C-in-C.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

The ground that needed to be captured ran from Serre to Pozieres. In this regard the attack failed. Whilst I believe there were command decisions taken in the south that with the exception of 36 Div do not appear to have been replicated in the north, any achievements in the south were basically worthless IMHO until Thiepval and Pozieres was taken in the north.

Jon, let's consider for a moment that the ground from Serre to Pozieres was the objective. By this I mean the only objective; that no objectives were relevant or needed in the south. The attack on July 1 would have been fundamentally different, which I think is what you are alluding to. All of the BEF artillery would have been focused on this one area. Given the way the artillery was used, I still think it highly unlikely that the British would have reached Serre and Pozieres on July 1. Any further attacks would have been uphill into the narrow salient captured on day 1, assuming that the outcome was different from July 1. The Germans could have concentrated resources on smashing the salient, just as the British concentrated resources on trying to create it.

Just suppose the BEF did finally manage to reach Serre and Pozieres, possibly not on day 1 but not almost 6 months later. What then? If Serre <-> Pozieres was the only objective, then the BEF would have stopped and consolidated the gains. But that isn't what was needed. The Germans had taken the initiative at Verdun. The BEF had to play its role in retaking the initiative. A few weeks battle for a narrow segment of high ground on the Somme would not have achieved this, IMHO. No, the combined Anglo-French forces had to create a really serious dent in the German lines. The British advance in the south is only worthless if you see it as an isolated advance on July 1, which is not connected, tactically and strategically, to the even more significant advance by the French astride the Somme. Ultimately, the British and French advance meant that the Germans were then placed at a disadvantage. They could not divert a minimal number of reinforcements to shore up a small break-in around the Serre-Pozieres area, nor even Montauban for that matter. There was a direct threat along miles of front. Furthermore, the BEF pressure on the Serre-Pozieres area was not going to go away, so the Germans could not relax their attention there either. In the end, the 'southern' break-in provided the lever whereby the high ground around Serre-Pozieres was taken, Bapaume was reached, and the Germans were forced to retreat to the Hindenberg Line. And, not forgetting, that the French went on to recapture all of the lost ground around Verdun.

Robert

[Old Tom]

Hello,

May I expand my ideas a little further? First I was not sufficiently clear that I was considering the Somme campaign as a whole, not just the first day but certainly not the whole war and second the choice of the term failure for staff work was too strong, ‘shortcoming’ would have been better.

While I stand to be corrected (my ideas are only based on authors presentation of what happened, not original documents, incidentally I find Prior and Wilson convincing albiet their work on the Somme is somewhat depressing) it seems to me that a summary of General Sir Martin Farndale’s History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery on the Western Front 1914-18 adds some weight to my statement that the artillery staff work was inadequate. General Farndale reviews the way the different Corps handled the fire support, the creeping barrage, to cover the infantry advance on the first day. (My notes I do not have a copy of the book):

In VIII Corps the barrage started 100 yds from the front line i.e. on the German trenches and as it lifted the advancing infantry were exposed to fire from those who had taken cover in the trenches.

In XIII Corps the concept was not accepted the artillery were ordered to left from trench to trench, but in 18 Div (the BMRA was Major Brook, Field Marshal in WW2) a creeping barrage was fired and a significant advance made.

.

XV Corps The three divisions adopted different versions. 7th Division was effective, 21st division artillery were instructed to search back and forward, not successful, 17th Division artillery were told to lift by 500 yds, the attack failed.

III Corps The guns made 6 major lifts but were ordered to ‘rake back’, hence the infantry could not stay close to the barrage; failure.

X Corps The technique was ignored.

In subsequent offensives progress was made when time was allowed for an artillery plan to be prepared and executed attacked launched without such time failed.

Later in the war it became possible to achieve effective counter battery fire in a short time thus allowing a measure of surprise. But in 1916 the techniques of effective shooting without registration had not been developed and the need for consistent ammunition and allowance for atmospheric effects had not been recognised.

Going back to the start of the tread, it seems to me that General Kiggel was about if his remarks referred to the whole army not just the officers and men in the divisons.

Old Tom

[armourersergeant]

Enjoying this development of the thread, however its passed long out of my expertise.

However, Old Tom, can I ask, who made the decisions of the divisions to choose different concepts of the artillery? The reason I ask is that I was under the impression from reading bits about Campbell (21st div co) that he was told what artillery 'pattern' to use and was not happy with the aorders. Your analysis would seem to say that corps left it up to the div commander to choose! Perhaps I had better re-evaluate my notes!

regards

Arm

[armourersergeant]

I see old Tom, we are 21st div against 18th, two of the better divsions on the western front

[Jonathan Saunders]

Firstly, if too many details were presented at the highest level of command, then the meeting could not focus on its proper tasks. It would by overwhelmed with detail, especially if similar amounts of information were required for everything that was as crucial to the outcome as CB fire.

That all depends on what you regard as “proper tasks”. All the 1915 attacks carried out by the British on the WF, incidently all of which involved Haig and I think Rawlinson too, were characterised by failure of the counter-battery work.

Process and outcome are not necessarily synonymous. Obviously, the outcome can only be fully evaluated after the event, given that CB fire was meant to reduce the enemy artillery fire at the time of the assault.

Absolutely. However evaluation of past experience (1915 again) suggested the counter-battery work required a higher profile, which is was not duly given in the preparation for the Somme offensive.

The whole process of tracking German batteries and assessing the effectiveness of CB fire was highly complex.

Again I totally agree. This is one of the reasons it required higher profile.

It was after July 1 that a specific Staff Officer post was created for Counter-battery work, the CBSO. This post would have been occupied by a Lt-Col RA, attached.

This post was created at least one battle to late IMHO.

This is the level at which CB fire should be carefully monitored and co-ordinated, not the C-in-C.

Again I agree with you but in 1916 Haig was very hands-on and despite the failures of counter-battery work in 1915 Haig still had not created a CBSO.

Regards,

Jon

[Jonathan Saunders]

Jon, let's consider for a moment that the ground from Serre to Pozieres was the objective. By this I mean the only objective; that no objectives were relevant or needed in the south. The attack on July 1 would have been fundamentally different, which I think is what you are alluding to.

No I wasn’t alluding to that. We had to attack on a broad front and shoulder the French army to the south. I do not think we had to attack on as broad a front as Haig determined by the northern most boundary but thats another issue. The point I was making was that the high ground; Serre to Pozieres, was the key on 1 July. You can put what spin you like on it, and Haig and Rawly did, but it remains that failure to take the high ground was a failed first day fullstop.

Regards,

Jon

I see old Tom, we are 21st div against 18th, two of the better divsions on the western front

After the 12th of course

[Old Tom]

Hello,

I am making no claims for the 18th in comparison with other divisions. My father served in the 18th, RFA TM, as a Gunner. I believe the Corps HQs issued the artillery plan. I guess the BMRA for the 18th was sufficiently confident not to follow. On the other hand we are talking about the divisional artillery, perhaps the Corps plan left some lattitude for them.

Jon makes a point which has interested me. Why attack on a 25 mile front with more or less equal weight along the line? The Thiepval area was a very strong German position and although it could not be ouflanked an advance to the south with the advantage of the French to the right would have been wide enough not to be enfiladed and would have allowed a secondary attack on Thiepval, Schwaben redoubt etc from a more favourable direction.

Perhaps Robert with his grasp of the discussions between Haig and Rawlinson could express a more informed opinion. I suppose the basic question is 'were alternatives considered before the plan was made?'

Old Tom

[armourersergeant]

After the 12th of course

And there was me thinking you were starting to make some sense

[Robert Dunlop]

I believe the Corps HQs issued the artillery plan. I guess the BMRA for the 18th was sufficiently confident not to follow. On the other hand we are talking about the divisional artillery, perhaps the Corps plan left some lattitude for them.

Old Tom, Simpson presents some information on this in his book 'Directing Operations':

'Conferences were an essential part of the planning process [leading up to the Battle of the Somme]. The reason why X Corps began this early as early as 7th March [1916] is that the GOC was instructed to do so at an Army conference on that day. Indeed, he held his own conference on the same day, inviting schemes for the attack from 32nd and 36th Divisions. [A]t the beginning of his next conference, Morland made some general statements and then a wider discussion ensued, in which divisional dividing lines were agreed and the GOCs of the divisions and the BGRA outlined their plans.

At the [Fourth] Army conference of 16th April [1916], the same pattern emerged. Detailed planning was devolved to corps and divisions, especially the former. Obviously divisions were in a position to say how they intended to get to their objectives, but the framework within which they worked was the creation of corps. In fact, given the amount of discussion going on, the plan was more corps' overall responsibility than its sole creation, since it relied, to a far greater extent than Travers' view would allow, on the views of division.'

Simpson goes on to note that the degree of latitude extended to divisions varied by corps. Hunter-Weston's corps (VIII) 'retained overall control' and published more than 70 pages of detailed instructions in the 'scheme for the [somme] offensive'.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Old Tom said:

Jon makes a point which has interested me. Why attack on a 25 mile front with more or less equal weight along the line?

Old Tom, I know you tracked the discussion on attrition with interest. For those who did not, I published some diagrams illustrating why a broader attack had advantages. See

The key thing to notice is that in the 'centre' of the attack (ie away from the flanks), the density of the enemy's artillery and other flanking fire is reduced. The diagram assumes an even distribution of defenders but this is only for the sake of simplicity. It is the general concept that is important. Given the range of artillery, especially as the attacker penetrates into the salient, then the flanking fire can extend well into the flanks of the attack. Breadth of attack was a key lesson learned in the attacks of 1915.

You have, of course, asked a more subtle question. Why not vary the strength of the attack, concentrating on weak points rather than the strongest? This is a more difficult question to answer. On the one hand, the minute you do not exert pressure on a strong part of the line, then you free the supporting assets such as machine guns and artillery to fire on the flanks either side. In essence, you end up with two narrow frontage attacks instead of one wide attack. On the other hand, why waste men pushing at something that will not give? 36th Division showed that some success could be gained. They certainly concentrated the minds of the German commanders in this area.

There are some other considerations. While it is appropriate in many cases to bypass points of resistance at the local level, such as strongpoints or bunkers, it is much more dangerous to do this at the level of a large-scale attack. There are many examples where this strategy was used, with disastrous consequences. The last abortive German attack in the Spring offensives, either side of Reims, comes immediately to mind.

Quote

The Thiepval area was a very strong German position and although it could not be ouflanked an advance to the south with the advantage of the French to the right would have been wide enough not to be enfiladed and would have allowed a secondary attack on Thiepval, Schwaben redoubt etc from a more favourable direction.

This is precisely what happened. When the outcomes of July 1 were analysed, it was recognised that the key to unlocking Thiepval was the exactly as you described. This became an explicit strategy, as Gough outlined in his book on Fifth Army.

Quote

Perhaps Robert with his grasp of the discussions between Haig and Rawlinson could express a more informed opinion. I suppose the basic question is 'were alternatives considered before the plan was made?'

Several alternatives were considered but I only have very limited information. Mostly, these focused on the sectors that were some distance from the Somme. Rawlinson's first draft, which he submitted on 3rd April 1916, already considered that the Thiepval ridge was the focal point of the attack, right up to Pozieres, ie almost up to but not including the German second line. As indicated in my previous post, there had been planning meetings prior to this but I do not have the details.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

You can put what spin you like on it, and Haig and Rawly did, but it remains that failure to take the high ground was a failed first day fullstop.

Jon, I wasn't trying to put spin on it. The failure to take the high ground was a failure. No debate there. But the whole day was not a failure, not in terms of the impact that it had on the German High Command. The combined (geographically) Anglo-French attack saw a successful advance across a frontage more than 10 miles wide on the 1st July. This aspect of the battle cannot be regarded as anything but a success. A very significant success, when compared with previous operations. It was definitely not a failure. Don't conflate the two things together and conclude that because the left wing of the attack was a failure, then the right was also.

Falkenhayn wrote:

'The French attacked with seven divisions in the first line and five in the second south of the Peronne-Albert road, on a front of about ten miles, the English with twelve divisions in the first line and four infantry, as well as several cavalry divisions behind, north of the road on a front of about fifteen miles. With this superiority it was inevitable that the enemy, when, on the 1st July, the storm at last broke, should score the usual initial successes.

The gains of the English were even less than usual. North of the Bapaume-Albert road they did not advance a yard, south of the road not appreciably beyond the first German line. The French gains were greater: the whole of the German first line from Fay to south of Hardecourt, north of the Somme, was lost. In several places the attack penetrated the second line. The position became more serious when the local command allowed itself to be pursuaded by the French successes to evacuate the German second-line between Estrees-Foucaucourt road and the Somme... This allowed the enemy during the first weeks of the battle to take us in the flank on the north bank, which was very serious for the German troops there, who were heavily engaged on their front, and was of great importance for the further advance of the enemy.'

Falkenhayn's comments cannot be disregarded as spin on the part of Haig and Rawlinson. If you want to understand the success of the Somme, you have to consider the action as a whole, not just those areas that failed. As I have said before, the success in the south depended on the actions taken in the north. Had the attack not been as wide, then the failures sustained by the French in the Chaulnes sector, on the southern flank of their attack, would have been mirrored by failures on the northernmost flank corresponding to what happened at Thiepval and Serre, with the consequence that the final salient would have been too narrow to apply pressure to the Germans north of the Somme river.

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

Robert - I think we are talking from two different angles. I am talking from prior to 7:30 on 1 July, that is to say when it was still perceived by some to be a break-through battle that might turn into attrition if things goes really badly, as they did.

Regards, Jon

And there was me thinking you were starting to make some sense

NEVER

[Jonathan Saunders]

Robert – apologies as I do not seem to have responded to your post adequately. Message to self – don’t log on and try and be smart immediately after the Xmas party.

You are quite right to say the French 1 July offensive on the Somme was a success. Annoyingly I have found it difficult in the past to find a great deal in English text on the French part of the battle. However I have always understood that the French successes were due in part to thorough preparation, including good counter-battery work and also surprise tactics ie staggered jumping off times. In many ways the French attack on 1 July was a model of what could be achieved although I assume no where near as difficult a task as capturing the high ground from Serre to Thiepval.

I do have some notes on the French battle that I made at a recent lecture I attended but they are temporarily missing somewhere in the NML that is my filing system.

Regards,

Jon