New Army untried on the Somme.

[squirrel]

Jonathan & Des,

excellent contributions. Thank you.

[Old Tom]

Hello,

I would agree that 18 Div had the advantage of having French artillery operating on their right on 1 July 1916 but I doubt they were 75mms.

It is recorded that a round from a heavy French piece destroyed a German artillery command post and that would have helped.

Old Tom

[Jonathan Saunders]

Jonathan & Des,

excellent contributions. Thank you.

Mine is badly worded as I did not have time to re-read or correct in my haste to get something posted in reply, and I apologise to all.

[Jonathan Saunders]

With regards to high rates of misdemeanours ... aside from some issues with the Belfast Brigade which was sent 'on attachment' to, I think, ?4th Division? to 'tighten them up' , I would honestly say that I have read of very few misdemeanours.

Des - my only source for this is my memory of a talk given by an Irish historian on the Great War that I attended at Kent U last summer. I am sure he said that prior to Nugent taking over, the Division had been troublesome and actually gave figures of crimes of all nature committed to illustrate his point. I did take notes but could not find them when frantically searching this morning before leaving for work (as I knew I would be using this point), otherwise I would provide further details. Your findings might well be right.

[Jonathan Saunders]

Hello,

I would agree that 18 Div had the advantage of having French artillery operating on their right on 1 July 1916 but I doubt they were 75mms.

It is recorded that a round from a heavy French piece destroyed a German artillery command post and that would have helped.

Old Tom

Tom I expect your right. Almost certainly there would have been heavier artillery pieces used. I am sure the 75s were just the predominant artillery piece in the sector at the time, or rather I hope so or I have errored - not for the first time, but I think my sentiments are correct in that the experienced French artillery gave 18 Div a distinct advantage.

[Desmond7]

Jonathan - I think the book is 'Irish Regiments in the Great War - Discipline and Morale'.

Sadly I don't have it cos it costs a bleedin' fortune .. well £40!

However, forum member Rob Elliott provided these quotes from the book in another debate. I realise this is just a sample.

Don't get me wrong, I believe the Division (or certain units within it) had poor officers until Nugent cleared them out. I think you are correct to point that out in the context of the overall debate on the new armies issue.

Some facts regarding the sobrierty of Members of the 36th, in comparison of Courts Marshalls for drunkenness between Battalions of the Division and other Irish units.

1st October 1916 to 28th February 1918.Tried for drunkenness.Total courts martial offences in brackets.

REGULARS

1st Inniskilling Fusiliers - 15 [total offences for this period-63]

2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers-19 [93]

36th DIVISION

10th Inniskillings-4 [24]

14th Royal Irish Rifles -4 [18]

9th Royal irish rifles-9 [19]

The three Battalions combined compare with one battalion of regulars. With the 9th rifles supposedly being the most undisciplined of the 36th coming from the Industrial heart of West Belfast [shankill Road].

Quote from the 'IRISH REGIMENTS IN THE GREAT WAR-DISCIPLINE AND MORALE'.

'A final point worth stressing in regard to courts martial figures is that battalions of the 36th [uLSTER] Division generally had fewer men tried by courts martial than their counterparts in the 16th [iRISH] Division'.

[Robert Dunlop]

Jonathan, you describe the achievements on the British right flank of the July 1 offensive as 'perceived success'. Do you mean that these achievements were really failures? I don't think you mean that. As we have discussed before, the artillery support made a big difference, both in the build up to the assault in this sector, as well as on the day. It is not appropriate to say that the French were the key, though it is appropriate to acknowledge that French artillery played a role in supporting the British artillery, which was handled differently from their counterparts in other areas of the battlefield. Which brings me to my next point.

It was not, in my opinion, an infantry training issue (or lack thereof) that was significant on July 1. Even highly trained troops cannot sustain an advance into killing zones where machine guns are unsuppressed and enemy artillery is not subdued - whether the advance be conducted at the run, at the walk, in waves or in blobs.

Robert

[Desmond7]

And in the last paragraph there is a great deal of truth.

[Jonathan Saunders]

Jonathan, you describe the achievements on the British right flank of the July 1 offensive as 'perceived success'. Do you mean that these achievements were really failures? I don't think you mean that. As we have discussed before, the artillery support made a big difference, both in the build up to the assault in this sector, as well as on the day. It is not appropriate to say that the French were the key, though it is appropriate to acknowledge that French artillery played a role in supporting the British artillery, which was handled differently from their counterparts in other areas of the battlefield. Which brings me to my next point.

It was not, in my opinion, an infantry training issue (or lack thereof) that was significant on July 1. Even highly trained troops cannot sustain an advance into killing zones where machine guns are unsuppressed and enemy artillery is not subdued - whether the advance be conducted at the run, at the walk, in waves or in blobs.

Robert

Robert - I meant by perceived success that very little was gained in the way of first day objectives as set by the authority of Haig. My comments are not meant to reflect badly in anyway on the PBI.

Re French artillery, I think I would have sooner been in 18 Div than say 29 Div.

On training, I agree with you that highly trained troops can do nothing against existing MG positions and enemy bombardment and I thought I had, in my own way, touched on that with my ending sentence. However I was tasked with agreeing or disagreeing with the comment that the comparative success (for want of a better expression in view if their high casualty figures) of 36, 21 and 18 Div was due, significantly, because of their training and preparation. I agree with this only to the extent of how they were led, and by whom they were led, and how training was conducted at the local level, not pre-embarkation training they received in the UK.

Regards,

Jon

[Jonathan Saunders]

Jonathan, you describe the achievements on the British right flank of the July 1 offensive as 'perceived success'. Do you mean that these achievements were really failures? I don't think you mean that. As we have discussed before, the artillery support made a big difference, both in the build up to the assault in this sector, as well as on the day. It is not appropriate to say that the French were the key, though it is appropriate to acknowledge that French artillery played a role in supporting the British artillery, which was handled differently from their counterparts in other areas of the battlefield. Which brings me to my next point.

It was not, in my opinion, an infantry training issue (or lack thereof) that was significant on July 1. Even highly trained troops cannot sustain an advance into killing zones where machine guns are unsuppressed and enemy artillery is not subdued - whether the advance be conducted at the run, at the walk, in waves or in blobs.

Robert

Robert - I am sorry I also meant to say that, and I think we have discussed this before, the consideration given to counter-battery work, or rather the lack of consideration, building up to 1 July still leaves me speechless.

[Jonathan Saunders]

Quote from the 'IRISH REGIMENTS IN THE GREAT WAR-DISCIPLINE AND MORALE'.

'A final point worth stressing in regard to courts martial figures is that battalions of the 36th [uLSTER] Division generally had fewer men tried by courts martial than their counterparts in the 16th [iRISH] Division'.

Des - many thanks for pointing this out. As you will be aware my intention was not to cast aspersion on the 36 Div but to use this example in good faith to help illustrate a point.

Regards,

Jon

[Desmond7]

Absolutely J - no problem on that score at all.

By the way, I was referring to Robert's last paragraph!

[PhilB]

It was not, in my opinion, an infantry training issue (or lack thereof) that was significant on July 1. Even highly trained troops cannot sustain an advance into killing zones where machine guns are unsuppressed and enemy artillery is not subdued - whether the advance be conducted at the run, at the walk, in waves or in blobs.

Robert

Except that if the instruction had been " Get across nomansland and into the German front line as quickly as possible - we`ll delegate particularly fast, lightly loaded men specifically to lead", the results could have been vastly different. Is that an infantry training issue? Well, partly, yes? Phil B

[Bernardlewis]

At a talk I attended given by Richard Holmes recently he emphasised that the troops went over heavily laden to reverse the trenches (digging a fire step that looked into the GERMAN lines rather than our own).

They took posts and wire to wire the new parapet etc. plus all the other bits and bobs they would need to repel what RH said was the determined counter attack that would soon come. Until that was done RH contended that the Germans would simply bomb down the trench from open ground as our holding troops would be largely below the level of the unadapted trench and unable to bring their fire to bear.

I recall John Terraine telling us that during the Somme battle (July - November 1916) he counted documentary evidence of over 300 local German counter attacks.

I'm not sure how this info balances against Phil B's option of 'fast lightly loaded men to lead'. How many and would it be enough is the question I guess?

Bernard

[PhilB]

Withe benefit of hindsight, which option would you take, Bernard? I`d be for letting the fast guys get in quickly and the heavy gang follow as they could. The chances of getting trench reversal material across must be hugely increased if the MGs are silenced. Phil B

[Old Tom]

Hello,

A lot of interesting points. I wonder if I may expand a little on my broad brush view expressed above. It seems to be generally accepted that a major failure on the first day (and a few other times during the campaign) that the artillery were tasked to destroy targets beyond their capability. The basis of the 'bite and hold' versus 'breakthrough' discussions. The point is how many shells of what size due you need to deal with a given length of trench (a length that is doubled if you go for the first and second line trenches) and to destroy the enemy artillery behind his line. I would have thought that by that time the artillery staff should have been able to resolve that sort of question. But, as I said they were all either not trained as staff officers or grappling with much larger forces than had been envisaged pre-war.

These decisions were, I think, matters for the Corps HQs who should have been able, as a staff rather than command issue, to have ensured that the Commanders set achievable tasks. I read somewhere that when General Birch, Haig's artillery adviser arrived at the HQ he found that his staff did not know where all the available artillery was deployed, I suppose that must have been when the Somme offensive was being planned.

I have not come across any accounts of how the higher HQs conducted their business but there must have been considerable failures in artillery planning.

In the first half of 1916 a lot of officers had still a lot to learn.

Old Tom

[Jonathan Saunders]

Good words Tom.

[Bernard_Lewis]

Phil B - I wouldn't claim to be an expert but I reckon that once you're in an enemy trench its not the machine guns that you worry about but the Germans that (maybe) you can't see approaching the trench with a view to dropping a few bombs in. And, of course, you're below the level of the (unreversed) parapet and fairly helpless to that sort of attack.

I dare say the counter barrage from the Germans will play havoc with the heavily laden guys trundling across when the line of attack is now obvious.

No easy answers, and I'd hate to have been an attacker or even a General trying to outguess the enemy response.

Bernard

[armourersergeant]

Knobbly,

Your comments are as usual well constructed. With in many instances valid conclusions. 18th div did have the advantage of French artillery. 36th did end up back at go, not necesserilly their fault mind!, and yes 21st div did suffer heavy casualties. Regardless they did gain some success, where regular divisions did not.

As for individual training, this was true also of the army in WW2. The German army was well equiped for a private to do a sergeants job and so on, the British army were not, so again I find myself agreeing with you, and perhaps this is what Kiggel was about.

My point is that the new army divisions did on the whole better then the regular or territorial divisions. The exception maybe some of the bantam divisions who incidently were very new to the front. It is noticable that 21st, 18th, 9th, 12th, were out in France for sometime. The bantam divs were not particualrly. (I am not just talking about 1st july here but the somme in general, 41st div under Lawford were involved in two attacks, new to the front and had some success in both battles)

Another factor especially for 21st, was that it had been baptised already and as a result on 1st July it had in its troops, 1st Lincolns and 1st East yorks, which had joined in nov 1915. Sent after the debacle of Loos, I am sure to stiffen them.

It had on 1st july just handed over command to Campbell, who was a regular, straight talking, calm thinking soldier, who coincidently believed that the plans for artillery etc on day one were wrong and that he could have done it better, if he had been given the chance. Its brigades were commanded by Rawling, who on 3rd July used initiative and abilty in the action at Shelter Wood. 64th bgde was commanded by Headlan who was to stay for just over two years and was a quietly competant commander. Campbell adopted a chain of command that devolved responsibility to his brigade commanders, as did 18th div.

21st had also been nursed back to health by Claude Jacob, who commanded after Loos and before Campbell. He seems to have installed not just soldierly qualties in the men but took a concern for their care.

What I think is that in many instances the older New Army divs had been baptised and had been in theatre long enough to get used to the conditions, they had exchanged some battalions to help stiffen the resolve and I think that whilst the regular divs had possibly more 'regular' officers and perhaps other ranks, it is not as marked as one would think.

Another concept perhaps is to consider the man in command. Were the men who commanded New Army divisions, the more recent risers to command, men who had won there spurs in 14/15 as colonels and brigade commanders, in comparision to regulars who were more senior officers. (I have not done any research on this as I write, so it may be bull) Certainly Maxse had been Brigade in 1914, Campbell had been Colonel 9th lancers. or perhaps it just comes down to a bit of luck who commanded. I think Maxse and Campbell were two of the best divisional commanders of the war.

Artillery, well Corps drove most of this I think so perhaps if its all about artillery then its down not to the divisions but the corps commander?

As for Success, well i guess that comes down to how you judge success, I would say not neceserilly taking some or all of their objectives but success in this instances as who achieved the most.

Not sure this has answered your comments, not lunch either, just tired!

regards

Tubby

Ps, picky I know but 10th W Yorks were 50th brigade, part of 17th div, however I will conceed that at the time they were attached to 21st div.

[armourersergeant]

Actually to go back to the beginning and Kiggells words, it occurs to me that I am taking his words as to the new army divisions and not battalions on their own. Looking at 7th regular division on 1st July they contained,

8th devons

9th devons

20th Manchesters

21st Manchester

22nd Manchesters

Thats just under half of their compliment who were New Army men!

Kiggells actually says "reminded the Divisions that the officers and men of the New Armies were as yet untried, and that the general quality of the army was not what it had been a year ago." Whilst this would not necesserily true of all new army units, it does not always imply he meant divisions and not the thinning out of regular divisions by new army units.

regards

Arm

[Jonathan Saunders]

My point is that the new army divisions did on the whole better then the regular or territorial divisions. The exception maybe some of the bantam divisions who incidently were very new to the front. It is noticable that 21st, 18th, 9th, 12th, were out in France for sometime. The bantam divs were not particualrly. (I am not just talking about 1st july here but the somme in general, 41st div under Lawford were involved in two attacks, new to the front and had some success in both battles)

Lonnie – apologies I thought your point had moved to training, I probably need to go back to the beginning of the thread and read it all again. I would agree with you that the new army divisions were certainly no worse than the regular army divisions. Obviously both regular and service battalions were, at this stage (commencement of Somme) made up mainly of volunteers.

Also agree that the role of good command, preferably at Division level but also at Brigade and Battalion level, and sometimes company and platoon, was instrumental in any successes – certainly for some, such as the men of 18 Div, it was the difference between life and death and it could be described as luck in having the right Divisional commander, in the case of 18 Div, Maxse.

Also agree that artillery was down to Corps command and higher ie. C-in-C. The C-in-C had a duty to ensure that his Corps commanders knew what was expected of their artillery (MGRAs). Apparently very little was expected in the way of counter-battery work on the Somme.

[Robert Dunlop]

It seems to be generally accepted that a major failure on the first day (and a few other times during the campaign) that the artillery were tasked to destroy targets beyond their capability. The basis of the 'bite and hold' versus 'breakthrough' discussions. The point is how many shells of what size due you need to deal with a given length of trench (a length that is doubled if you go for the first and second line trenches) and to destroy the enemy artillery behind his line. I would have thought that by that time the artillery staff should have been able to resolve that sort of question. But, as I said they were all either not trained as staff officers or grappling with much larger forces than had been envisaged pre-war.

I have seen this view put forward by Prior and Wilson. I disagree. Other battles in the campaign, as well as the likes of Cambrai, showed that 'hurricane' bombardments of sufficient intensity were quite adequate in enabling infantry to get forward and successfully take objectives, provided wire was cut or breached by tanks. The days-long preparatory bombardment aimed at knocking out trenches, strongpoints, etc was, in terms of the direct effect of artillery, neither here-nor-there in determining the outcome of the infantry advances on 1st July.

Prior and Wilson also make much of the weight of shells, comparing the Somme with Neuve Chapelle for example. Again, I think this is a red herring. The timing was much much more significant IMHO. Thus, the same weight of shells applied on day one (minus those needed to cut wire) as protective barrages that did not lift until the last moment could have made a big difference.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Also agree that artillery was down to Corps command and higher ie. C-in-C. The C-in-C had a duty to ensure that his Corps commanders knew what was expected of their artillery (MGRAs). Apparently very little was expected in the way of counter-battery work on the Somme.

It was not the role of the C-in-C to dictate exactly how the bombardment was to proceed. The C-in-C did raise questions with Rawlinson. The latter originally recommended a longer bombardment. On 12th April 1916, Haig commented:

'As regards artillery preparation, the possibility of surprising the enemy and the effect on his morale both seem likely to be greater as a result of a comparatively short intensive bombardment immediately preceding the assault than if the bombardment is spread over a longer period. Your further consideration to this question is therefore desireable'.

Haig understood the importance of the hurricane bombardment. Rawlinson replied (19th April):

'As regards the actual length of bombardment preceding the assault, this must depend on the following factors:-

a. Action of the French

b. The amount of ammunition available when offensive operations begin

c. The length of time the gun detachments can work at high pressure without danger of breaking down.

As regards b. and c. we must bear in mind that the preliminary bombardment is only the first phase of two to three weeks sustained operations. I propose to go into this matter more fully before deciding the actual length of the bombardment.'

It was Haig's job as C-in-C to ensure that Rawlinson knew how much extra artillery he would have control over, as well as the ammunition supply. Haig provided this information, for example in the reply of 27th May he noted 'the allotment in ammunition for the Fourth Army includes preliminary operations, bombardment, day of assault, and 13 days subsequent fighting'.

Rawlinson decided on a longer bombardment. The Army issued the 'Artillery programme of preliminary bombardment' on 5th June, 1916. It was the Army's responsibility to identify the broad tasks and the timetable. The tasks were:

"Bombardment - Trench system, fortified localities and strong points, OPs and Machine Gun emplacements, water supply, etc.

Bombardment - billets.

Shelling of - Communications, approaches, railways, working parties, etc with the object of preventing replenishment of ammunition, food and water.

Counter Battery work [my emphasis]

Wire cutting...

Smoke barrages...

P bombs and candles...

Flammenwerfer...

Gas..."

Fourth Army specified counter battery work as a task. It was to be 'very active' on U, V, W, X, Y and Z Days, with the additional instruction that on Z Day there would be 'concentration of gas shells on hostile gun positions before the assault'. The General Instructions for counter-battery work were:

'Special batteries detailed for the destruction of hostile artillery personnel and material and the neutralization of fire in conjunction with aircraft.'

Very clear, but general, instructions - as you would expect from an Army command.

Simpson noted in his book 'Directing Operations' that the Fourth Army plan followed months of discussions and planning within the corps and divisions. The latter did contribute fire plans, which centred on the tasks for divisional artillery. Counter-battery work typically fell outside the scope of divisions. At the Army conference on 16th April, Rawlinson noted 'counter-battery work is becoming more and more important'.

I have not seen the details of all corps artillery plans. Those that I have seen all include reference to the counter-battery task. For example, XIII Corps assigned 29th HAG (4 batteries of 60 pounders, 1 battery of 4.7" guns, and 1 battery of 4.5" guns) to counter-battery work. No doubt these guns were 'very active' throughout the timetable, and reported as such. No doubt they fired gas shells on Z Day too. And reported same. So the instructions were carried out. The question that I cannot answer is what did GOCRAs base their allocations on? What experiences, and other information, were used when making their decisions?

Two issues therefore stand out. There was no clear consensus about how long an artillery bombardment should be continued. Second, there was no clear consensus on what constituted counter-battery work. The root causes of these issues do not lie with the inability of highest level commanders to specify that CB was needed.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Also agree that the role of good command, preferably at Division level but also at Brigade and Battalion level, and sometimes company and platoon, was instrumental in any successes – certainly for some, such as the men of 18 Div, it was the difference between life and death and it could be described as luck in having the right Divisional commander, in the case of 18 Div, Maxse.

In the past, I have presented the thesis that the success of commanders like Maxse on the British right, as well as the success of their French neighbours to the south, was highly dependent on what happened to the north, for example around Thiepval and further north at Gommecourt. The significant British build-up and attacks, which failed, caused the Germans to focus most of their attention in these areas. The area around Thiepval was very important as a lynchpin in the German defence of the ridge. Gommecourt was an obvious salient. Divisional, corps and even army commanders were not responsible for the plan that facilitated the success in the south by focusing attention elsewhere. Even if you regard the British 'success' on the right as minor, it must be seen in the context of the very significant French advance that took place on the shoulder of the British right flank. Writers too often ignore this achievement, which is not to say that the British losses should be ignored.

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

Second, there was no clear consensus on what constituted counter-battery work. The root causes of these issues do not lie with the inability of highest level commanders to specify that CB was needed.

Robert - this is where we differ. If Haig had not concerned himself as closely as he did with Rawlinson's plan and had not insisted on changes to the overall plan of attack as I believe he did (I know your opinion differs), I might sympathise with your view. From my reading it appears clear that no direct instructions were given concerning counter-battery work other than some effort should be made.

To quote Hart in his writing on the counter battery work he states "One corps allocated only derisory numbers of shells - as few as six in one case - to deal with target batteries. There was no overall understanding of the absolute necessity for pinpoint accuracy in counter battery fire ..."

My reading suggests that roughly 50% of the casualties on 1 July were caused by German shelling. That is just under 30,000 casualties. The Corps commanders must take their share of the blame that the German guns were able to inflict such heavy losses but IMHO the buck stops with Haig.

Regards,

Jon