Haig's Diary

[PhilB]

Yes, Robert, there are other CinCs but would you say any were holding similar command with similar force available? If so they would be a reasonable comparison, except that we wouldn`t have anyone to rate them against - except Haig! We could really do with a statistically significant array of CinCs! Phil B

[Robert Dunlop]

Phil

I guess it very much depends on the criteria you use. By 'similar command with similar force available', I take it you are not referring to the qualitative make-up of the forces. They were broadly similar on all sides, though the Germans had significantly fewer tanks. So I'm guessing you are referring to the quantitative differences (please jump in and correct me if I'm wrong, because this is quite interesting). How would you see the relative differences in size between the German, French and British armies affecting the performance of the respective C-in-Cs?

Robert

[PhilB]

I think you have to include the qualitative make up, plus the weapons and quantitative depth. In fact all aspects of a command that may differ one to another. That`s why I think comparison is so difficult. Unfortunately! Difficult to sort out the effect of size from the many other variables Phil B

[Robert Dunlop]

Phil

I guess it depends in large part on which variables you think were capable of being 'varied' by the C-in-C, ie that he was directly responsible for, as opposed to accountable for.

It could be argued that the functions of the C-in-Cs were broadly similar. Each one was responsible for the prosecution of the war effort of his respective country, the taking of a limited number of chief executive decisions within the bounds of political constraints and for ensuring that the overall prosecution of the war by the enormous variety and numbers of men and women was in keeping with the ultimate goal/s. The next layer of executives was the layer that the C-in-C would deal with, so his choice and monitoring of these individuals was crucial.

Just taking the qualitative make-up of the three major armies on the Western front, it could be argued that the C-in-C had some (but not all) responsibility for determining the broad types of weapons that were used. Tanks is a good example - Haig and his French counterparts encouraged their development and use, Ludendorff did not. Choosing someone like Ellis was important. Dictating precisely how Ellis would manage the Tank Corps in every detail was not the C-in-Cs role. Reviewing the overall impact of the Tanks Corps, particularly with respect to the its place in the grand scheme of things, was the C-in-Cs role.

Robert

[Ken Lees]

I've ordered the book from WH Smith with free delivery to my local store. Can anyone tell me if they e-mail you to let you know it's arrived in store?

Thanks,

Ken

[armourersergeant]

Ken,

I have never ordered from WH Smith online before so i can not tell you but i would have thought that the staff at the store would ring you as soon as it arrives.

I did notice yesterday when in my local that they did not have any on the shelf for sale. i assumed it had all sold out but perhaps they have not yet had any in?

Give them a ring

regards

Arm.

[PhilB]

Phil

I guess it depends in large part on which variables you think were capable of being 'varied' by the C-in-C, ie that he was directly responsible for, as opposed to accountable for.

Robert

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

I`d go along with all you say, Robert. I`d just add that if a non-variable in his force was much more favourable to one CinC than another, then that CinC would have an advantage which would ideally be taken into consideration when assessing his performance. Not, admittedly, an easy thing to do! Phil B

[AndyHollinger]

Gads ... we sound as if we're writing a job description for CiC and then his/her performance review. Can you compare one to another? Contending with LG compared with contending with AC? King versus President of France ...

I don't know if you can compare at that level ...

[PhilB]

I don't know if you can compare at that level ...

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Exactly, Andy. And if there`s nobody to fairly compare him to, no job description and no absolute standard for comparison, how on earth does one assess him? Phil B

[armourersergeant]

Coming back to the Diary,

Having completed the intro section it seems to lay a good foundation to a fair and levelled analysis of the diary. It is obvious that both men are in the Haig camp but they do seem to realise the limitations and mistakes that Haig made.

I also notice it is by the same publishers as the recent Allanbrooke dairy which was brilliant! Not that that is a requiste for a good read but it will sit along side when i have finished.

Though i suspect it will be pulled off the shelf often to check and quote. I am wondering how the same entry(ies) will be interpreted by different readers!

Now all I have to do is stay awake each night to get it read.

regards

Arm.

[Robert Dunlop]

I`d just add that if a non-variable in his force was much more favourable to one CinC than another, then that CinC would have an advantage which would ideally be taken into consideration when assessing his performance.

Phil

I could not agree more. This is an extremely important point.

And if there`s nobody to fairly compare him to, no job description and no absolute standard for comparison, how on earth does one assess him?

I understand the sentiment. But posing the question sparks my interest.

Gads ... we sound as if we're writing a job description for CiC and then his/her performance review. Can you compare one to another?

Andy

I think a job description (of sorts) is a place to start. I am not suggesting that we actually set about making the comparisons but my sense is that many people (including myself) do not fully understand what role/s the respective C-in-Cs played. If we could narrow this down somewhat, it might make an evaluation of someone like Haig more focused. It might even permit comparisons to be made, albeit crudely, particularly if we were clearer about what constituted non-CinC-related variables (NCRVs), for want of a better term. My slight worry with saying it cant be done is that this could be self-fulfilling, or it could be interpreted as licence to blame anything and everything on an individual. This last sentence is not meant in any way as a criticism of your semi-rhetorical question - actually, I think you are right but I am ever up for a challenge.

Robert

[Simon Jones]

To add my recommendation, this is indispensable to understanding the western front and the war as a whole. At about 200,000 words it is far more extensive that the Blake edition yet remarkably the actual unpublished diaries run to around 750,000 words, so there is still scope for a collected works…

Regards

Simon

[Justin Moretti]

Ultimately it comes down to this:

Of the Western Front players, all changed their commanders-in-chief at least once, with the exception of the U.S. (Pershing), which wasn't in the field in major strength long enough for this to happen.

France: Joffre, Nivelle, Petain, Foch.

Britain/Dominions: French, Haig.

Germany: Moltke, Falkenhayn, Ludendorff, (Hindenburg, as, if I recall correctly, Ludendorff's career hit the wall just before the armistice).

Of these armies, the French and the German forces started out as large conscript entities of over a million, while Pershing was backed to the hilt in his efforts to keep the quite sizeable US Army out of the field until he felt it was up-to-strength and ready. Britain's army in the West (including the Dominions) started at about 100,000 and grew to over a million, eventually coming to rely on a very different kind of soldier from the ones who had constituted it at the start.

It is one thing to command; it is another to do so when the army you are commanding is not only expanding tenfold and changing radically in its makeup (meticulously trained volunteers --> hurriedly trained conscripts), but being forced to fight the biggest, most violent and (in terms of techniques) most revolutionary war in its history. When you consider the approach of the Russian military to both world wars (especially the second), there seems very little to criticise in the British, and I wish people like John Laffin and Alan Clark had thought to take this into account when they were 'grinding their axes'.

If you want to whitewash history, you do not leave things in that make you look bad; on this basis alone, I support Haig. I will be ordering this book to decide for myself.

[Muerrisch]

half way through: rivetting. Quite a man was our Haig: flawed, like most of us, but 'one of the good guys' in my opinion. I was a strict sitter-on-the-fence before, but have now shifted a bit further away from the Donkey position.

[Bob Mitchell]

I also notice it is by the same publishers as the recent Allanbrooke dairy which was brilliant! Not that that is a requiste for a good read but it will sit along side when i have finished.

War Diaries 1939- 1945 Field Marshall Lord Alanbrooke, in its latest incarnation is edited by supervisor Dan Todman. Not to pimp his works too much (he did that enough in lectures!) he is possibly the best historian I've come in contact with, and his forthcoming The Great War Myth and Memory promises to be a classic. Scrap that, if he keeps the content I've had the fortune of seeing and reading it definitely will be a classic. Hopefully I can badger a free copy out of him . If you want a taster of his other works, check out Command and Control on the Western Front. That's an amazing collection of essays that superbly highlight the troubles, faults and dificulties commanders at all levels experienced on the Western Front.

As for Haig's diaries, I've got it sitting next to my bed at the moment, once I've finished reading Paddy Griffith's (again!) Battle Tactics on the Western Front. I'll properly go through Haig's diaries. Admittedly I've read the introduction and I wholeheartedly agree with what people have commented, whilst obviously Bourne and Sheffield's positions are sympathetic, this doesn't involve itself much and they treat his diaries in a fair and even handed manner. I've previously dipped into sections when researching essays, but it still needs me to go through it all properly.

[armourersergeant]

War Diaries 1939- 1945 Field Marshall Lord Alanbrooke, in its latest incarnation is edited by supervisor Dan Todman.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

This was a brilliant read both incitive and captivating. It truely gave me a feel for the war almost day by day and how one man came through it all. His love hate relationship with Churchill was something that i had not known.

regards

Arm.

[ianw]

I suppose someone is already working on an analysis of what Bourne and Sheffield

left out to prove that they have whitewashed the "King of the Donkeys" !

Personally, I agree that reading the book will tend to increase our sympathy for D.H. His responsibilities were awesome and he saw them through to the end and Victory.

[Muerrisch]

Haig's Diary is actually my bed time reading: clearly the editors are sympatico, but the book is a fine read and Haig comes over as an "educated soldier". My "sitting on the fence" posture is wobbling ever more to the Haig side the more I read. The editors would, I suppose, be pleased.

[PhilB]

My "sitting on the fence" posture is wobbling ever more to the Haig side the more I read.  .

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Be strong, LB! Remember, Haig`s Diary is the most pro-Haig thing you`ll read - apart from the views of his modern apologists! Phil B

[Muerrisch]

I know, I know ...... I just find DH on my wavelength, would like to have him as a dinner guest, would introduce him to Frank Richards and sit back to listen ......

[PhilB]

I know, I know  ......  I just find DH on my wavelength, would like to have him as a dinner guest, would introduce him to Frank Richards and sit back to listen  ......

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Wow! Don`t forget my invitation! Phil B

[armourersergeant]

I have to say that i am still on the fence, and its getting bloody uncomfortable!

Haig was not in my eyes infaliable, brilliant nor a military Marlborough, Eugen or Napoleon. That said he was not a butcher nor an idiot.

He was a man who did much wrong, but learnt as many of us do as we grow.

My dilema is not that he learnt but did he do it intelligently or by error and too slowly for a competant commander? this is my fence.

regards

Arm.

[Muerrisch]

His diary reads as one from an intelligent man. Mine doesn't!

[ianw]

I have just finished the Diary and share David's view that ( as might I suppose be expected) you come from it with increased respect for Haig.

It is certainly not the work of a stupid man. If he is rewriting history to embellish his part in it, then he does a very good job of it. His keen regard for new technology is demonstrated throughout. The enormity of the job he completed is very clear and his skill at dealing with the Politicians and the Generals (of both Britain and France) is impressive.

Certain that the Haig debate will continue and this book is an important part of it.

[Muerrisch]

Now I too have finished the Diary: the editors seem to have done a balanced job and have certainly added substantially to the literature.

Haig seems humorless [almost] and short on introspection. That apart, he shows a keen interest in innovation, a great love of his men, a great Christian faith, unswerving loyalty to King and Country, and a proper appreciation of the "soldier as politician". And he was almost alone in urging "attack attack attack" when the enemy was off balance mid-1918.

Suffice it to say that I believe the 'Lions led by Donkeys' Brigade really OUGHT to read it before sounding off in future.