Shipboard Communications

[Bucephalus]

Hi Charles,

I hadn't seen any mention of that before. HMS Invincible was only at Abrolhos for one day (leaving for the Falkands on Nov 27th), so if they were able to install the Poulson wireless equipment during that brief time, one would presume that it wasn't difficult (and would have had to have been accomplished while HMS Invincible was also coaling). I don't know what that installation would have required, but presumably a different aerial array in addition to the beefed up transmitter and receiver.

I reviewed my photographs of HMS Invincible and Inflexible (her sister ship) to see if there was any obvious difference in aerial arrays. Unfortunately, because I cannot verify the dates of the various photos (and because I probably don't know what to look for), I can't see any obvious differences in their aerials.

Regards,

Bucephalus

[joseph]

Bucephalus,

They did install it, a team from HMS Defence was waiting to transfer it as soon as they got there, a whole day..... they probably overhauled the engines as well as coaling. Maybe changed a few gun barrels and embarked stores and water. Then clean into Rig of the Day a meal and sea shanty's on the quarterdeck.

Regards Charles

[Bucephalus]

Hey Charles,

Interesting stuff. I hadn't seen a mention of HMS Defence being at Abrolhos for that rendezvous. I believe Defence was then part of Admiral Stoddart's squadron (his flagship, HMS Carnarvon, was also at Abrolhos then), but I thought that Defence had already been sent north to ensure that no one "snuck through" the Panama Canal while the main force headed south.

Thanks,

Bucephalus

[joseph]

Bucephalus,

On November 26th HMS Carnarvon, Cornwall, Kent, Glasgow(now thoroughly repaired) Bristol, Orama and Defence were at Abrolhos when Sturdee arrived. Two more ships in the communications chain HMS Princess Royal at Jamaica and HMS Berwick (not sure of position) these are mentioned on the 29th November.

Regards Charles

[Bucephalus]

Hi Charles,

Thanks for the clarification. Any info on where Defence picked up the Poulson wireless equipment that they ultimately installed on Invincible? I assume Defence had it delivered from some other ship sent from Britain...

Also, perhaps this is a silly question, but what document are you referencing when you refer to the "OH"?

Regards,

Bucephalus

[joseph]

Bucephalus

OH; Official History; Not conclusive but suspect at Cape of Good Hope.

Regards Charles

[Bucephalus]

Have you read Andrew Gordon's Rules of the Game? Although it covers Jutland, it has a large section on signalling, particularly the grip of flags.

Hi per ardua par mare per terram,

I began reading Andrew Gordon's Rules of the Game this weekend. A very good book - and amazingly densely packed with information. Thanks for the tip!

Regards,

Bucephalus

[Bucephalus]

OH; Official History; Not conclusive but suspect at Cape of Good Hope.

Hi Charles,

Thanks for the info. I am now looking into the differing wireless technologies for comparison: Quenched Spark, Poulson, and Telefunken. I am particularly interested in how jamming tactics developed and why the Germans (at least initially) seemed to be much more adept at it. My initial research indicates that British ships, at least at the outset of the war, didn't even use jamming tactically. Perhaps their wireless equipment wasn't as capable, but it may have had more to do with protocol.

Anyone have any information on this?

Thanks,

Bucephalus

[joseph]

Bucephalus,

The jamming aspect is interesting, my own thoughts on that are because Room 40 was so succesful in its inteligence gathering we would rather listen and learn rather than jam. Tactically jamming was carried out, not to often I suspect as again its better knowing your enemys intentions than not. It was because of the success of Room 40 that the no w/t while sailing was instigated. Anyway just a thought.

Regards Charles

[Bucephalus]

Hello Charles,

You are correct that because of the work of Room 40 and the various finds of signal code books (most notably from the light cruiser SMS Magdeburg, a sunken U-boat, and a German merchant vessel), the British were able to crack Germany's wireless codes and listen in throughout the war. However, Room 40 wasn't able to really break the code until later into 1914 (October/November), and at that time German warships had already been using wireless jamming tactics against British vessels. I haven't seen any mention of the Royal Navy doing the same, even before they would have broken the German signal code. Just speculating, but I think that not only did the German vessels at the outset of the war have potentially superior wireless equipment (making jamming a more viable option for them), but it seems like they were able to use wireless jamming tactically in a way that was either not possible for the Royal Navy or was prohibited (or overlooked) by RN W/T protocol.

It is possible that the Royal Navy simply didn't view jamming as a useful tactic, even though it was used against them (in some cases rather effectively, at least temporarily). It seemed that at the outset of the war wireless communication was still viewed by the Admiralty rather dubiously, and that may have constrained their acceptance of jamming as a legitimate tactical maneuver.

Regards,

Bucephalus

[per ardua per mare per terram]

Let’s start at the beginning before we condemn the people of the time: wireless was high tech at this time and its development progressed faster than computers did after their introduction and there are still people who are not computer literate. There were no senior officers who grew up with wireless; even Beatty, one of the youngest admirals, was a commander by 1898 (when Charles indicated wireless was adopted in the RN). From 1898-1914 the Royal Navy changed dramatically in every area of ship design and they couldn't even keep up with the increasing power/ range of gunnery let alone signals. When we say the Royal Navy did not have a policy, what you mean is that the senior admirals and their staff did not. Wireless was a tiny fraction of what those admirals (particularly the Sea Lords) had on their plate at this time, not least the Fisher/ Beresford feud. They were responsible for the largest Navy in the world with all the attendant problems; Fisher resisted the introduction of a war staff and in all aspects the tactical appreciation was lacking. In civilian use wireless had only become to be seen to be effective for about 4 years before WWI (the Crippen case and Titanic being headline indicators). I think that it was more a case of individual captains not developing this tactic.

Conversely the German navy was smaller and had a definite opponent in mind; they could prepare tactics accordingly. Additionally, the German Navy pretty much started (or at least seriously expanded) in 1898 and its officers had less to unlearn. How many incidents can you cite of this tactical use between August and December 1914? The only units I can think of that were at sea then were small squadrons away from the dead hand of official control, were noted for their ability in several fields and who had the luxury to practice tactics with their equipment having been at sea for years. Their opponents at Coronal were reservists who did not have time to work up their ships, let alone devise wireless tactics. Those at the Falklands had just taken delivery of new equipment on the way to the battle – not the time to be devising new tactics.

From what I have pieced together (predominantly on the civil side) the limitation was more with respect to Marconi control rather than with the equipment; I admit I haven't looked into how far Marconi were involved in the Navy. Civilian telephonists who would have been taken into the navy were solely Marconi trained and he was very restrictive in his practices, probably more so than the admirals.

Glad you are finding ‘Rules of the Game’ of use.

[joseph]

Bucephalus,

Jamming wasn't a real problem to the RN as their battle tactics didn't rely on W/T. The signal structure was based on a maximum of 20,000yds, that is what the senior management had been trained to work on. Outside that range 'Fleet Messengers' took messages normally fast light cruisers, if they could find the recipient!.

So how was the Wireless Telegraph accepted in the RN as Per Mar says with trepidation, the senior chaps not thinking or believing it was any good. But like the computer era in the recent years, all senior officers had by his side a young vibrant 'Flag Lieutenant' that had to be trained to the latest standards especially in communications.

My opinion is that the W/T was used to its best potential at the time, the signal manuals had been long written, times of send/receive may have been more on the peace time thought. W/T 6 minutes according to the Signal Manual 1913 from send to receive.

Did W/T work, yes, I suspect far better than is recorded in the contemporary accounts, even the Official History would have to be careful what it said when it was published. There are subtle hints as to the significance of this up and coming new technology. Mention voice communications during the 'Great War' most people would be very surprised it existed.

As the war progressed the senior management did understand the versatility of W/T, in 1915 most Flag Officers are crying out for it.

I'm not to sure of the Royal Navy's attempts at 'Jamming' but their fantastic growth of direction finding stations across the world and the reliance placed on them, would suggest to me that although both nations was 180 degrees apart, one jamming and one finding the W/T was taken seriously.

Regards Charles

[Bucephalus]

Hey Charles and Per Ardua,

It makes some sense that the RN wouldn't bother with jamming if their own battle tactics didn't generally rely on wireless. It also makes sense that the British were gaining valuable intelligence from their intercepts of German wireless transmissions - and wouldn't want to risk turning off the tap.

The fact that the Germans blithely ignored evidence that their RN foes had obtained their signal codes - and continued to transmit sensitive information via wireless without changing their codes fleet-wide - is curious and seems to indicate that the Germans, too, did not fully appreciate the value of wireless communication. Even the act of jamming during a battle brings up a couple of questions: 1) If the Germans thought that jamming British wireless would affect them tactically (and give the Germans an advantage), they obviously didn't know enough about RN tactics and protocol; and 2) The act of jamming not only hampers the enemy's wireless communication, but it would also keep the Germans from effectively communicate among themselves via wireless (and they DID try to use it in more tactical scenarios than did the British).

Overall this is a fascinating look at two different implementations of what was then emerging high technology - and apparently neither side did a very good job of it.

Thanks,

Bucephalus

[joseph]

Bucephalus,

"and apparently neither side did a very good job of it"

The evolution of W/T during the war years was fast and furious, I think they made the most of what they had, fitting a Poulson System would also entail new operators and maintainers bearing in mind the maintainers in them days would be Torpedomen. That was another problem lack of communication and teamwork between operators and maintainers, I seem to remember reading about prising the job off the Torpedomen, I will see if I can find it.

Measuring how well they did in retrospect is easy, a steep learning curve would be in order at the time. The Royal Navy would always condemn mistakes and be slow to praise.

Regards Charles

[Bucephalus]

Measuring how well they did in retrospect is easy, a steep learning curve would be in order at the time. The Royal Navy would always condemn mistakes and be slow to praise.

Agreed. It certainly is easy for us, a century later, to pass judgement upon their wartime handling of emergent technologies.

Point well made.

Regards,

Bucephalus

[David B]

Is there any thread which may refer to the type of communication gear ships of the day would have carried.

This was early days for wireless telegraphy and I assume that the range of transmissions would have been

restricted, however sufficient enough for local waters around UK.

David

[David B]

Thanks Charles,

If I may I can add that the wireless office in all ships that I served on were quite a way from the

bridge in probably one of the most secure places on a ship. In a light fleet carrier there were two wireless receiving

offices one under the main deck and the other called the BWO (Bridge wireless office) which was mainly used for

tactical communications. Messages to and from the bridge were normally sent by vacuum tube on a larger ship or

by a message carrier on a rope (all modern cons) on smaller vessels. There was also provision for an emergency

radio room, equipment normally powered by battery. In larger ships the transmitting room was also a sererate

office but in destroyer and below the main transmitting was integral with the wireless office.

David

[David B]

Charles,

thanks for that thread, I wish I had been on the forum then, as an old Telegraphist Petty officer instructor I think I could

have had quite a lot to say on the subject.

David

[joseph]

David,

One of my main intrests is the development of two way voice communications and its use in the Great war, and a closet aeriel spotter.

Regards Charles

[per ardua per mare per terram]

I wish I had been on the forum then, as an old Telegraphist Petty officer instructor I think I could

have had quite a lot to say on the subject.

The thread isn't closed so chip in!

[Bucephalus]

The thread isn't closed so chip in!

True! This is an area that I am still researching, so the more input the better!

I am now focusing my research more on the state German telegraphy and wireless technology at the outset of the war. If anyone knows the customary range of German shipboard wireless equipment on most ships in 1914, I'd be most appreciative.

Cheers,

Bucephalus

[jhill]

One well-known book, Geoffrey Bennett's "Naval Battles of the First World War" gives a short Appendix entitled "A Note on Naval W/T Communications in 1914". This is included to illustrate the communications issues during the lead up to the Coronel battle. Generally it aggrees with what has been said here.

Ship-shore range was measured in hundreds of miles so the Admiralty and the Admiralstab could not maintain direct communication with their ships outside Home waters. Signals to and from the "far seas" were routed through Wireless stations in the Colonies, which were connected to Home by undersea cables. The Royal Navy obviously had an advantage here.

For example, signals from Whitehall to ships off the south-east coast of South America went by cable to Montevideo, thence by Wireless to the Falkland Islands, from where they were retransmitted to ships at sea. This could take several days. Signals to ships off the south-west coast, on the other hand, could not be sent in this way, in part because of the opposition of the Chilean Government. These signals had to be cabled to local Consuls, and the Admiral had to send a ship into port every now and again to pick them up. The Germans sometimes cheated a bit and used the Wireless sets of German ships interned in neutral ports.

The spark sets in use at the time were very easy to detect by any ship in the area, so admirals were reluctant to risk the chancy nature of Wireless communications against the greater risk of revealing their position. In this regard, both sides delegated one ship to send all signals for the squadron, to try to disguise their strength if the signal was overheard.

[David B]

Hi guys,

Firstly the positioning of the radio office is generally guided by safety, which means that this office is quite often

far away from the bridge area. Afterall the last thing we need is radio communications knocked out with the first incoming

shell. Different in a merchant ship there is no need for this to apply. The ships that I was a crew member all had their main

office either on the main deck (central) or one deck below that. Communications between the bridge and W/T office was

either by direct phone or the old fashioned voice pipe (most efficient too especially if some @#*^% poured a jug of cold

water down it

Signal handling was accomplished by different paths, if the signal was to be encrypted it would be written out on a S1320B

as usual and given to a comm rating who was designated the cipher hand - generally a Leading hand Signaller. the result

then given to the wireless office and sent via ship-shore w/t (using a general callsign to conceal the originator).

Plain text messages were handed directly to the wireless office and the ship would use its normal international callsign

to call.

A ship at sea would keep in touch with the outside world by keeping watch on the naval area broadcast, a series of high

powered transmitting stations around the world transmitting on several different HF frequencies.

It is rare that the ships radio staffwould miss these broadcast signals ,cause there would be a fair bit of explaining to do

to the Chief Tel. There are procedures in place to request repeats if necessary.

This is of course post WW2 stuff, and used up to the advent of satellite communications, however procedures would have

been quite similar to WW1 - things change quite slowly in the navy.

I think the main difference between WW1 and WW2 would have been the advent of close rangevoice communications which

were used extensively in my day. Firstly VHF then UHF from about 1953 onwards. Intership signalling was in WW1 carried out

mainly by flag (semaphore) or light (morse) and the lead ship would send their messages by mast head flasher this

getting ships in a line to be able to read simultaneously.

Dont ever think that morse communications were slow. When UK tested its first nuclear in the Monte bellos in Oct 1952 the

success signal was in the Admiralty in under a minute, passed via Harman (Canberra) I sent the thing.

Any more questions I will gladly answer

David

[Peter and Ellen]

Maybe the story of the Titanic and the use of her Marconi wireless set might provide some clues.

Went down in 1912 with one of those "new fangled Marconi" wireless sets on board. Try one of the Titanic websites to see what they offer.

It was said that their radio would blow the ears of operators in the ships nearby and was strong enough to reach Cape Race on the Newfoundland Coast prior to the collision, said to be the reason the Ice Warnings never got to the bridge because they were clearing a backlog of passenger cables.

Hope this helps, Peter

[truthergw]

The communications between OHL and von Kluck's 1st Army was at just about the max radio range. Comms were dependent on weather conditions at that distance. Luxembourg to Lille as an idea, is 250 kilometres ( very roughly) so that is likely a max for one hop of a radio chain. The big trouble with a spark TX was it was non-directional so any important message would have to be enciphered.