Shipboard Communications

[KizmeRD]

To be fair to the Army - early radio sets were not exactly suitable for use in field conditions - neither were they particularly portable.

It was only really after the invention of more robust valves that smaller, portable wireless sets started to make an appearance in large numbers (1916 onwards).

Michael

[Old Tom]

Some interesting stuff. Many thanks.

Old Tom

[towisuk]

I thought I was being fair to the Army...I've read a lot about the development of Wireless in WW1...and given a couple of lectures on that very subject.

There is no getting away from it...the Army were complacent...the Navy were ready pre-war for any hostilities, and the RFC took matters into their own hands to develop wireless for their sphere of operations.

regards

Tom

[MikeMeech]

"However, it is of course much easier to carry the early type of wireless equipment in a ship than over land, especially the source of the power supply!"

Of course they managed to do that a few years later Mike...they were just not as far seeing as the Navy.

Needs must, and the Navy had to find a way to communicate with their ships once they were out of sight of the shore, and people like H B Jackson (who ended up as First Sea Lord), pushed it forward and developed a system that meant all large ships were equipped with wireless at the start of the war.

The army sat on it's hands...it didn't see the urgent need for wireless, after all being in land based Britain at that time, we had an efficient telegraphy system,.

But of course when the war started, the rapid advance of the Germans meant the massive loss of telegraphy equipment in Belgium that they relied on for communications.

To see what could be done in a short time....look at the Royal Flying Corps, within a few years it went from a spark transmitter in an aircraft to the ability to have voice communication with tanks at the end of the war. Much of the development being carried out at Biggin Hill. The Army was complacent and didn't have personnel or leaders that saw the need for developing this means of communication that the Navy and RFC did.

regards

Tom

Hi

There was an interesting short article in the Summer 2012 edition of the 'Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research' by Nick Evans, titled 'The British Army and Technology before 1914'. On British Army wireless in 1914 he states:

"In 1914 the Wireless Telegraphy Company of General Headquarters of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) held almost as many wireless sets as all German army headquarters in the west put together, though the British could anticipate a more benign signals situation than the Germans"

The footnote that goes with that states:

"The British used WT mainly to link their cavalry formations to GHQ, the Germans apparently to communicate between army and Imperial HQ when line did not work. This was harder due to greater distances and traffic volume."

Also the RFC was part of the Army (in 1914 the Army spent 5% of their budget on the RFC). Early RFC sets were the Rouzet transmitters, which was fairly large and usually an observer could not be carried. The Sterling Spark Transmitter was much smaller and appears to have been tried out also as a 'Trench' set during 1915.

On Air/Tank communications I covered some of the experiments in my articles on 'Tank Contact Patrols' that were published in the 'Cross & Cockade International Journal', Winter 2009 and Spring 2010 editions.

Mike

[KizmeRD]

Hello Tom,

My apologies if you felt I was having a dig at you - but actually, the only reason I had for starting my post 'to be fair to the army' is the fact that as an ex navy communicator myself, I have to make a conscious effort not to be too biased in favour of the senior service.

Interestingly, the Marconi Company sent wireless telegraphy apparatus out to South Africa for use by the British Army in the Second Boer War (1899-1902). However atmospheric and geographical conditions, as well as the crude and experimental nature of the wireless apparatus meant they were unsuitable for use on land. However the same wireless apparatus was put into navy hands and was successfully adapted and used to support the naval blockade of Delagoa Bay. This was the first use of wireless telegraphy under wartime conditions.

The point that I had tried to make in my earlier post was the fact that wireless technology at the start of WW1 was still a rapidly developing technology and the early spark sets were somewhat cumbersome, unreliable and didn't like being roughly handled. However once superior valve sets started to enter service, the appreciation (and practical usefulness) of wireless communication in various combat situations became more readily apparent and extensive (even the army caught on!).

And just to comment briefly on Royal Flying Corps take-up of wireless technology during the openning years of WW1 - it should be appreciated that early airborne wireless sets were heavy (spark) sets that could transmit, but could not receive. The sets themselves weighed 75 lb, plus battery, and akwardly required a 250 ft aerial wire to be paid out behind the aircraft, creating drag that made the aircraft fairly tricky to fly.

Michael

[simonharley]

Found the paper I referred to earlier, written by Jackson in December 1902. By that point the Admiralty had 126 sets of Admiralty specification and Marconi wireless sets in use and on order from the first order being placed in December 1899.

Gordon's book really isn't that useful a guide. Merely scratches the surface with his usual dispassionate style.

[KizmeRD]

Early wireless sets consisted of spark transmitters with coherer/inker & tape receivers, however mutual interference between ships in close company was a problem, and another major limitation was the erratic performance and lack of sensity of the recievers, therefore the adoption by the Royal Navy in 1904 of transmitters fitted with alternators as well as magnetic signal detectors with operator headphones was a considerable step forward. However, probably the most significant development in radio communication during the Great War was the introduction of hard vaccum tube valve amplifiers and receiver sets. The first such valve to be manufactured in large numbers was the French TM valve which in Britain was called the Type R valve, thousands of these were produced.

Michael

[TeeCeeCee]

Early wireless sets consisted of spark transmitters with coherer/inker & tape receivers, however mutual interference between ships in close company was a problem, and another major limitation was the erratic performance and lack of sensity of the recievers, therefore the adoption by the Royal Navy in 1904 of transmitters fitted with alternators as well as magnetic signal detectors with operator headphones was a considerable step forward. However, probably the most significant development in radio communication during the Great War was the introduction of hard vaccum tube valve amplifiers and receiver sets. The first such valve to be manufactured in large numbers was the French TM valve which in Britain was called the Type R valve, thousands of these were produced.

Michael

Is it true that these sets when operating made the aeriels electrically 'live' and that a man could be given an electic shock if he touched the 'live' parts of the upperworks/rigging when operating?

[KizmeRD]

Is it true that these sets when operating made the aeriels electrically 'live' and that a man could be given an electic shock if he touched the 'live' parts of the upperworks/rigging when operating?

Prior to 1907 early RN wireless sets feed the spark energy directly to the aerial (the so called 'plain' method), however after that date transmitters were linked to the aerial by induction (the oscillator method).

Under the plain method (particularly when the air was damp - for example in fog) it certainly wouldn't have been wise to have gotten too close to the aerial, that's for sure.

Michael

[TeeCeeCee]

Prior to 1907 early RN wireless sets feed the spark energy directly to the aerial (the so called 'plain' method), however after that date transmitters were linked to the aerial by induction (the oscillator method).

Under the plain method (particularly when the air was damp - for example in fog) it certainly wouldn't have been wise to have gotten too close to the aerial, that's for sure.

Michael

Cheers

[Kath]

https://oxford.academia.edu/ElizabethBruton

Hope this link works.

Kath.

[towisuk]

To demonstrate how poor the Army were in developing wireless as a means of communication compared to the Navy....

This from.... "Communication- An International History of the formative years"...

Go to Chapter 16 The great War Years 1914-1918, page 403....

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=7eUUy8-VvwoC&pg=PA401&lpg=PA401&dq=wireless+in+the+british+army+1914-1918&source=bl&ots=JxcLYqWQqK&sig=fx7mJHt5vhddUGI74w-L_o5TV80&hl=en&sa=X&ei=GmuHUZL6NIKqOtCxgOgG&ved=0CHcQ6AEwCQ#v=onepage&q=wireless%20in%20the%20british%20army%201914-1918&f=false

Regards

Tom

[MikB]

Jason Hines (USN) makes the point that the difficulties at Jutland weren't entirely caused by infant technology or procedure, but by the Admiralty's need to conceal their ability to read HSF operational signals.

The result was that intelligence from intercepted messages had to be 'sanitised' to disguise it as D/F data. That also meant that Jellicoe couldn't tell the difference, and he already had reason to distrust D/F information from the early transmissions. So he didn't have unqualified belief in what he was passed - and they failed to advise him of Scheer's Horns Reef aerial recce request because there was no obvious way to sanitise that.

Regards,

MikB

[KizmeRD]

Yes, the weaknesses in naval wireless telegrapy at Jutland weren't so much technical issues, but rather the content of the messages themselves (poorly drafted signals). Greater clarity would certainly have helped.

Michael

[towisuk]

Read from page 242 to get an idea of the course of events................

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=W9J3QkkNFl0C&pg=PA243&lpg=PA243&dq=battle+of+Jutland+and+Direction+Finding&source=bl&ots=2Jw4eSNtWa&sig=Ub_yHm5J6WvXeHJ38-81FmOqBBE&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CCwQ6AEwAmoVChMIqv6xiqqGyAIViA8aCh0whg_8#v=onepage&q=battle%20of%20Jutland%20and%20Direction%20Finding&f=false

regards

Tom

[KizmeRD]

Admiral Thomas Jackson wasn't particularly enamored by the goings on in Room 40, and in turn, the people who worked there didn't particularly like him either. Andrew Gordon labels him a "ridiculous, blustering officer",which may be a tad unfair,or it may not, however the unfortunate manner of his request for information on the position of Admiral Scheer, his misunderstanding of what callsign 'DK' actually meant, and his subsequent erroneous signal to Jellicoe regarding the position of the High Seas Fleet certainly hurt the credibility of British DF capability (given the subsequent unexpected encounter with the Germans only hours later).

Michael.

[MikB]

Admiral Thomas Jackson wasn't particularly enamored by the goings on in Room 40, and in turn, the people who worked there didn't particularly like him either. Andrew Gordon labels him a "ridiculous, blustering officer",which may be a tad unfair,or it may not, however the unfortunate manner of his request for information on the position of Admiral Scheer, his misunderstanding of what callsign 'DK' actually meant, and his subsequent erroneous signal to Jellicoe regarding the position of the High Seas Fleet certainly hurt the credibility of British DF capability (given the subsequent unexpected encounter with the Germans only hours later).

Michael.

Hines' article 'Sins of Omission and Commission' - for which I should thank Simonharley for bringing to attention - makes a bold attempt to clear Jackson of that widely-made charge, pointing out firstly that Clarke is the only ultimate source from which many writers have reproduced it, and secondly that the intercept confirming the DK callsign transfer to Einfahrt 3 shore station wasn't decoded until the following day.

I don't think it's possible to be sure that argument quite works, because as far as I could see he doesn't successfully dispose of Clarke's assertion that the practice of callsign transfer was 'common knowledge' in Room 40 from previous HSF sorties; if it was, then D/F data about its whereabouts proved nothing and Jackson's comment about delay through failed reconnaissance was guesswork, and obviously incorrect.

IMO that charge probably has to go in the 'Not Proven' box.

Regards,

MikB

[KizmeRD]

There has indeed been a great many books published that point to a certain measure of distrust and friction existing between the anti-intellectual, long-serving and very senior regular navy officers at the Admiralty (people like Jackson & Oliver) and the highly educated interlopers working in Room 40 (the likes of Ewing, Knox, Birch & Adcock). But putting personalities aside for the moment, there does appear to be woefully inadequate co-ordination of wireless intelligence and certain structual inefficiencies giving rise to somewhat flawed use of DF & signal intercepts. It would seem that the people with the knowledge can't communicate at all with the people who have need of that knowledge, so if not Jackson, then surely 'Dummy' Oliver must take some of the blame for that? - Were there no regular intelligence briefings and digests of information being provided to the Naval Command Structure? It certainly seems odd that the Director of Operations just happens to bounce into Room 30 on the morning of the battle (apparently a place he rarely ever visited), makes an imprecise ad hoc request for information on the whereabouts of the enemy, and then bounces out again with an inaccurate picture of what was going on. However, that's what all the books ever written on the subject say ocurred. But how likely is that really?

Michael

[MikB]

It would certainly be interesting to know why Jackson thought the HSF had been delayed due to failed air recce. Did he have other sources - possibly intercepts from elsewhere, or agent information - that he'd misinterpreted, or was it pure speculation on his part?

Wireless as a medium was certainly important, but it didn't resolve issues with the message.

Regards,

MikB

[KizmeRD]

Hines' article 'Sins of Omission and Commission' - for which I should thank Simonharley for bringing to attention - makes a bold attempt to clear Jackson of that widely-made charge, pointing out firstly that Clarke is the only ultimate source from which many writers have reproduced it.

Has anyone on the forum ever read Clarke's Jutland paper(s)?

What do we know about his pre-war, wartime and after-war career?

All I know is that Lieut. W.F. Clarke RNVR worked in Room 40, he was on duty when Jackson burst in, and he wrote about it afterwards (in unpublished notes) - are these notes available anywhere for researchers/book writers to study?

Michael

[johnboy]

Was there a difference between Marconi Operator and Wireless Operator?

[KizmeRD]

Marconi Wireless Operators were contract staff, operating radio equipment leased by Marconi.

Other wireless operators were employees of the people running the ship (be it Royal Navy, or commercial Ship owners).

Michael

[johnboy]

Thanks for that.

[KizmeRD]

Further to Post #42, I have now got hold of a copy of Hines' excellent article which was most informative (thanks for the heads-up MikB) , and I'll now be making a start on reading 'Inside Room 40' by P. Gannon.

As for Clarke (the source of the allegations against Jackson), have discovered that he was a Harrow educated barrister (son of a solicitor-general) who was recruited into Room 40 in Feb. 1915 (in the rank of Asistant Paymaster RNVR). Later, he was even tasked with writing the (unpublished) official history of Room 40 (volume 3 of which is still withheld on security grounds!). After the war he decided not to return to a legal career and instead joined the Government Code & Cypher School and worked in Bletchly Park during WW2.

Perhaps I should start a new thread on Naval Sigint & DF?, (as appears that this thread is in danger of slipping away from the topic of wireless at sea).

Michael

[MikB]

Further to Post #42, I have now got hold of a copy of Hines' excellent article ...

It's certainly a good can-of-worms opener. As I've said, I thought his logic a bit 'porous' on the Jackson message - but not obviously more so than anybody else's. One thing I've learned is that in almost any such study - most especially of Jutland - positions have been taken very soon after the event to place the causes in one or other quarter, sometimes for reasons that may not be identifiable at this distance in time. These people were mostly pretty clever, and it's perhaps best not to take anything at face value.

Regards,

MikB