German military discipline

[centurion]

There were certainly complaints by British officer PoWs about incidents of mistreatment. Some of these incidents appear to have been the result of petty officiousness by military 'jobs worths' but others appear more calculated. Not so much physical brutality but a mixture of 'phsycological' mis treatment (solitary confinements etc) and deprival (withdrawal of food, bedding etc.). It has been alleged by one author (himself a PoW) that the early death of Leefe Robinson VC was a result of the damage to his health during captivity through such practices. This appears in part to have been coupled with corrupt practices (diverting funds intended for prisoner upkeep etc). Two particular camp commandants (who were brothers) were singled and reported by PoWs and a search for them was initiated in late 1918/early 1919 with a view to prosecution but they had quietly vanished in the confusion in Germany in that period (one theory being that they had returned to America where they had been living before the war).

To be fair the Germans did institute a system of inspection and a prisoner complaint procedure but resources for this and enforcement does not appear to have been high on the priority list of the military commands responsible and it appears to have been easily evaded. Some camp commandants appear to have been reasonably fair and did the best they could for their unwilling guests with the (often limited) resources available but some appear to have been incompetent and some positively antagonistc to the prisoners.

BTW I've seenan acount of some Australian PoWs who after complaining about the food supplied by the Germans complained even more loudly about the food supplied after they had been exchanged into an internment camp in Holland! Possibly the Aussies had higher expectations!

[Aaron Pegram]

Yeah I've read something about that too Cent, and from memory I think the man making the complaint was a wounded officer. Probably a different bloke, but the views of Australian officers in captivity seem very similar. Then again, there was only 200 of them. The OR surely had a different type of captivity - I've yet to read Vischer's study, but being on 'Kommando' most probably saved their psychological well-being.

Interestingly enough, I've found a reference comparing Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege to the Manual of Military Law. I doubt I will find what I'm after, and Kriegsbrauch may have been 'overcooked' so to speak, but lets see how I go eh?

thanks to all for your collective efforts

cheers,

Aaron

[centurion]

I found a reference to German military law that might suggest a title on which to search. The particular circumstance around this case are interesting in their own right and I enclose details from a history of the distribution of propoganda by air in 1914 -1918.

"On the 6th June 1917 theSwiss Minister transmitted to the Foreign Office a note from the German ForeignOffice dated 22nd May 1917 stating that enemy airmen on the German WesternFront had recently dropped “inflammatory writings, some in particular directedagainst His Majesty the German Emperor.” The note stated that such acts, werein the opinion of the German Government, outside the scope of acts of war, andthat instruction had been issued that enemy airmen on whom such writingswere found or who have been guilty of scattering them, would be tried by CourtMartial.5Next information came to hand that British officers of the R.F.C.(captain H.R. Hawkins and 2nd Lieutenants G.O. McEntee, J.D.M. Stewart andG.M. Hopkins) were tried by Court Martial on the 17th October 1917 for “havingin April 1917, distributed (by dropping them from aeroplanes) pamphlets,which contained insults against the German Army and Government, amongstthe German Army fighting in the Western Theatre of war”.This was claimed by the Germans to be an offence punishable under para-graph 58, sub-para. 9 of the “Militärstrafgesetzbuch“ (“Manual of MilitaryLaw”). Paragraph 58 (reads) “He will be punished with death for treason who,with the intention to give aid to a foreign power or to prejudice the German orAllied troops”. Sub-para. 9 (reads) “Spreads hostile appeals or proclamations inthe Army”.According to a report of the trial by Dr. Hoekstra of the Netherlands Legation,Berlin, the prosecuting counsel argued that the accused had committed a breachof International Law and should be tried in accordance with paragraph 58 of the“Militärstrafgesetzbuch“ but the fact that the accused belonged to a hostilearmed power should be taken into account in mitigation of their offence indetermining the penalty to be imposed. He demanded that each of the accusedbe sentenced to ten years penal servitude which was the minimum penalty fortheir offence.The Court considered that under paragraph 160 of the “Militärstrafgesetzbuch“and paragraph 5(4) of the Imperial Military rules of the criminal procedure (sic)German law was applicable in the case of the accused.Paragraph 160 (reads) “A foreigner or German who makes himself guilty of oneof the Acts mentioned in paragraphs 57-59 and 134 during a war against theGerman Empire, will be punished in accordance with the sentences mentioned in these paragraphs”.

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[Aaron Pegram]

Good news lads: I managed to find an online copy of the 1872 Militärstrafgesetzbuch at http://www.documentarchiv.de/ksr/1872/mili...ches-reich.html

Cheers,

A.

[bob lembke]

Dear all,

Does anyone know where I might find the German equivalent of the Manual of Military Law? I am trying to find out a little more about German army discipline and punishments applied in the field.

Cheers,

Aaron.

Aaron;

I e-mailed a serving German officer that I correspond with, and share some arcane research interests with vis a vis WW I. He is a German General Staff officer of fairly senior rank, so it may be said that the following is "from the horse's mouth", as is said. Clearly he went and reviewed the German regulations for the last 200 years, and wrote, with his text and posted sections of the original regulations, about 10 pages of response. Regrettably, I am having major computer problems, which force me to have open two different AOL sessions, and I have not figured out how to "cut and paste" from his e-mail to the session in which I am viewing the GWF. So for the moment I will summarize what he wrote, which is actually rather simple.

In 1841 corporal punishment was abolished. He defined that as, for example, "beating with a stick". A second set of regulations were installed in 1849, which he said has persisted to the present day, to the Bundeswehr, and was the law in the German Army of the Kaiserzeit and in the post-WW I Reichswehr. The only physical punishment that can be inflicted, seemingly from 1849 on, was for a soldier having to stand for a specified period, but not to exceed two hours. However, it was stipulated that no other soldier could be allowed to see the subject soldier being punished in this fashion, I assume to avoid the soldier suffering humiliation. This punishment, or any disciplinary punishment, could only be ordered by certain officers who had a special status called Diziplinargewalt. I only have two German dictionaries from 1906 on this floor; all my more current ones are some distance away, and I cannot find this term in my older dictionaries, for some reason.

My friend added that in no case could a NCO inflict punishment on a EM/OR. He stated this as an absolute. He stated that such regulations might have been violated on occasion, but that such a violation would be punished, if it came to light.

So, in summary, corporal punishment, including tying up a soldier in view of his comrades, was abolished in 1841; this ban being restated in regulations from 1849 and 1872. He said that there were attempts to reinstate more severe punishments, but these attempts were defeated.

As I said, I almost certainly read more German on WW I than English, often hours a day, all sorts of material, including letters and diaries, for over six years, and I cannot recall ever reading about corporal punishment in the German Army.

So I think we can say that the German Army did not have "punishments applied in the field", in the sense that I think that you mean.

When I overcome some of my computer problems perhaps I can post sections of my friend's e-mail, or perhaps send them to you directly from his e-mail, edited a bit to preserve his privacy. Can you read German?

Someone cited Renn. His writings are interesting, but have to, IMHO, be used with caution. Renn was not his real name; he was a senior communist military leader in the Spanish Civil War, and some of his material is quite useful, some questionable.

Bob Lembke

[Desdichado]

Enlightening stuff Bob, especially when you consider that flogging wasn't abolished in the British army until the late 19th century.

[Aaron Pegram]

Thanks very much Bob, this is fantastic. If corporal punishment wasn't used, surely there must have been SOME preventative for minor misdemeanors? Or maybe I've been reading too much stuff on the Australians to believe that solders have to have a deterrent for misdemeanors Anyway, this answers my initial question; I've certainly read accounts of allied prisoners being punished for refusing to work or insubordination by 'silly stand'-ing for hours on end.

Cheers,

Aaron

[centurion]

Bob

As there was no Germany in the sense of a single political state until 1871 and therefore no German army as such, to what do the regulations of 1841 and 1849 that you refer to apply? Prussia, Saxony, Hanover, Barvaria etc etc? The regulations of 1872 must be the first German Army regulations as there was no German army for such regulations to apply to before.

A link to these has been provided in this thread but these are in German - does anyone have an English translation. These regulations should provide a definitive answer.

[bob lembke]

Bob

As there was no Germany in the sense of a single political state until 1871 and therefore no German army as such, to what do the regulations of 1841 and 1849 that you refer to apply? Prussia, Saxony, Hanover, Barvaria etc etc? The regulations of 1872 must be the first German Army regulations as there was no German army for such regulations to apply to before.

A link to these has been provided in this thread but these are in German - does anyone have an English translation. These regulations should provide a definitive answer.

Of course. In fact, after 1871 till 1918 there still were four German Armies (Prussian, Bavarian, Saxon, and Wuerttemburg, the "kingly states"), and many units from princely states that were in effect attached to the Prussian Army.

My friend never once addressed this, but I am sure that he was referring to the Prussian Army, which was the largest, and also could be considered the model of an efficient army, due to the efforts of Frederick the Great and his father. However, the Prussian Army of the 18th century had brutal discipline.

When I started studying WW I seriously, 6-7 years ago, I probably had many of the same perceptions of "Germany" as most people; rigid, repressive, discipline, etc. As I learn more I continue to be amazed at the reality of both German society and the military. Compared to the UK, for example, although the political system was only weakly democratic, in general social conditions were much more "progressive", and in the military the novel concepts of command, which gave subordinates a great deal of independence and leeway, including disobeying written and/or direct orders in many circumstances, continue to surprise me. There was a lot of cultural and social rigidity, but these were complemented by mechanisms which in effect went about these characteristics in some ways.

One example of how this played out (and dropping some generalizations), I believe that in 1916 the unit of independent manuver and command in the UK army was the battalion commanded by a lieutenant-colonel, while in my father's storm regiment, at least, it was the Flamm=Trupp of eight privates commanded by a lance corporal, and I think that the lance corporal had, in practice, more leeway to ignore his orders than the Brit LTC. I just read, yesterday, again, for perhaps the sixth time, how UK Special Brigade officers opened hundreds of gas cylinders at the specified time, although the wind was blowing into the British trenches. In this case the gas officer and his men were gassed, and then were not able to turn the gas off; in an example I read a few weeks ago the Special Brigade troops opened the cylinders as ordered and then fled to the rear (taking their wrenches with them?), so that the gas was still entering the UK trenches over two hours later. These gas soldiers were not massively stupid; they were operating in a very rigid system that clearly did not reward innovation. In the German system, it was generally recognized that the junior officer actually leading the effort knew best, as he was at the point of action, and could modify or ignore orders issued, for example, by the Generalleutnant commanding the division. This was not as big a leap as it sounds, because German orders were supposed to be structured as specifying the desired result, not a detailed set of steps that the junior officer was expected to perform. The junior officer at the front was generally expected to figure out how to best achieve the desired results.

Bob Lembke

[centurion]

I just read, yesterday, again, for perhaps the sixth time, how UK Special Brigade officers opened hundreds of gas cylinders at the specified time, although the wind was blowing into the British trenches. In this case the gas officer and his men were gassed, and then were not able to turn the gas off; in an example I read a few weeks ago the Special Brigade troops opened the cylinders as ordered and then fled to the rear (taking their wrenches with them?), so that the gas was still entering the UK trenches over two hours later.

Not exactly. This is a somewhat mis focused account of the British Gas attack at Loos

See the following account

"Preparations and execution

During September 1915, 150 tons of chlorine gas in 5,500 high-pressure steel cylinders had been transported across the Channel in unmarked wooden boxes under conditions of great secrecy. For reasons of security, the gas was known only as 'the accessory'. On arrival in France it was transported to Loos by rail. From the railway sidings there, the cylinders were man-handled into the trenches under the highest possible level of security, including aerial surveillance.

By midnight, 24th September 1915, all the cylinders were in place in the forward trenches. Major Foulkes waited at the General Haig's chateau battle headquarters for the order to commence the release of the gas along the 6.5 miles of front from the slagheaps south of Loos to the La Bassée Canal. Haig hesitated as the wind was light, with a tendency to blow towards the British lines. Nevertheless, at 0550 hours on the 25th September 1915, the orders were given to release the gas in the various sectors.

Results achieved

The results were, at best, mixed. In a northern sector the officer commanding the Gas Company, concerned about the wind direction, refused to comply, only to be ordered directly to do so. As he had predicted, the wind was unfavourable and hundreds of the troops in his sector were gassed. In another sector, the keys for turning the release cocks did not fit and only a few cylinders were opened on schedule. The Germans, now forewarned, opened fire and several of the fully charged cylinders exploded releasing the chlorine gas into the British trenches, routing and stampeding the Gas Company personnel. Elsewhere in the northern sector, the wind blew obliquely between the trenches transporting the gas amongst the British and German trenches alike.

In the southern sector, the gas behaved largely as expected, and at 6pm Haig received reports that the gas was rolling over the enemy trenches. Inexplicably, the Germans' gas discipline was generally poor, and the respirators issued to the infantry, ineffective. German commanders reported panic in some trenches, casualties and deaths. By interspersing the releasing of the chlorine gas with smoke, the Gas Companies extended the period of the attack to 40 minutes; a period exceeding the 'operational life' of even the better German gas masks. The smoke added greatly to the confusion and disorientation of the Germans.

2,600 British soldiers were also affected, including some of the Special Companies' own men, and seven were killed. But it was claimed that the toxic gas had facilitated the territorial gains of up to three miles that were made where the gas did penetrate the German lines. German casualties due to the chlorine gas were around 20,000 with an estimated 600 killed."

So it might have been stupid generals but not blind obedience to orders. The spanners were lost before the gas attack and the stampeding gas troops was when the cylinders were exploded by shell fire and turning them off was not an issue.

[Desdichado]

General social conditions were certainly more progressive in Germany towards the end of the 19th century. It can be argued that Otto von Bismarck was the founder of the modern German welfare state; a modern term that would likely be anathema to him were he alive today. He proposed the introduction of health insurance; accident insurance (the forerunner of today's worker's compensation laws); disability insurance; and a pension scheme for the elderly. The Health Insurance Bill became law in 1883 without any serious political opposition. It provided health care for the German labour force and was administered locally with the costs split - though unevenly - between the employer and the workers. We had to wait until 1945 for similar legislation.

[bob lembke]

General social conditions were certainly more progressive in Germany towards the end of the 19th century. It can be argued that Otto von Bismarck was the founder of the modern German welfare state; a modern term that would likely be anathema to him were he alive today. He proposed the introduction of health insurance; accident insurance (the forerunner of today's worker's compensation laws); disability insurance; and a pension scheme for the elderly. The Health Insurance Bill became law in 1883 without any serious political opposition. It provided health care for the German labour force and was administered locally with the costs split - though unevenly - between the employer and the workers. We had to wait until 1945 for similar legislation.

And on this side of the Big Drink we are still waiting.

Bob

[salesie]

One example of how this played out (and dropping some generalizations), I believe that in 1916 the unit of independent manuver and command in the UK army was the battalion commanded by a lieutenant-colonel, while in my father's storm regiment, at least, it was the Flamm=Trupp of eight privates commanded by a lance corporal, and I think that the lance corporal had, in practice, more leeway to ignore his orders than the Brit LTC...... In the German system, it was generally recognized that the junior officer actually leading the effort knew best, as he was at the point of action, and could modify or ignore orders issued, for example, by the Generalleutnant commanding the division. This was not as big a leap as it sounds, because German orders were supposed to be structured as specifying the desired result, not a detailed set of steps that the junior officer was expected to perform. The junior officer at the front was generally expected to figure out how to best achieve the desired results.

Bob Lembke

Leaving aside the more liberal social conditions that Germany's civilians enjoyed (though many Belgian and French civilians found German rule far from liberal) and the enlightened (almost benevolent) disciplinary system you say was enjoyed by its troops, I have a couple of nagging questions, Bob.

Would it be fair to say, seeing as the original BEF held the line at 1st Ypres when greatly outnumbered, and the British Empire's armed forces were the main cause of Germany's defeat, that the German systems of command and control you eulogise about were in fact inferior in practice?

If not fair, then why did Germany lose war - why were the Kaiser's wishes that this contemptible little army be swept into the sea not fulfilled?

Cheers - salesie.

[bob lembke]

Salesie wrote:

Would it be fair to say, seeing as the original BEF held the line at 1st Ypres when greatly outnumbered, and the British Empire's armed forces were the main cause of Germany's defeat, that the German systems of command and control you eulogise about were in fact inferior in practice?

I have always wanted to use the trendy word "deconstruct" in a post, and after conferring with my supremely literate wife, I believe that I am ready.

Let's deconstruct this sentence. (There! I did it.) It has three components. "seeing as the original BEF held the line at 1st Ypers when greatly outnumbered" is the first. Here I am at a disadvantage. The principal focus of my studies are German storm formations, and the service of my father and grand-father in the Great War. All of this largely started in 1915, with the exception of my grand-father's service as a staff officer in Belgium in 1914. However, on tht subject, my study has not progressed past his very interesting role in the siege and conquest of Antwerp, which took place far to the east of the fighting at Ypers. GF's army corps then moved to the west but then quickly was sent to the Eastern Front to help confront the Russian armies pouring into East Prussia. So, in short, I do not know a lot about the fighting at 1st Ypers. I do know that the BEF, only about 5-6 divisions, the only truely professional army in the fighting, by all accounts a superb force, did fight larger German forces to a standstill, and in the process was to a large extent destroyed in the process.

I do not know too much about this fighting, as I have said. I would guess that three factors probably had some role, in what proportion I do not know. The British forces were entirely professional, and by every account of superb quality. I do know that some of the German units attacking there were also some of the best units in the German Armies. Secondly, I do not know to what extent the German forces had outrun their supply lines, or if this was a factor at all. The third factor, to my mind possibly the most important, was the tremendous impact on the open fighting that first developed in 1914 that the two new weapons, the machine gun and the quick-firing field-gun (a la the French 75), the former firing 450 rpm or more, the latter supposedly up to 24 rpm, had on the balance between the offense and the defense, which was the factor that drove the war, so to speak, underground, into trench warfare. Incidentally, the German command structure had, supposedly, immediately realized that something was seriously wrong, and sent about bulletins warning against the classic bayonet charge, etc., but that some elite formations, Prussian Guard units, got carried away and still mounted such attacks, with disasterous results. (I have to say that that is an example of a superior command structure; the Germans very quickly started to drop the attempted use of the bayonet, as a really marginal weapon {as far as I can tell, my father's storm unit did not carry any rifles, and only a small number of slung carbines, in the attack. Their reliance on the bayonet was, obviously, nil.}. The Allies were generally trying to encourage the use of this marginal weapon thruout the war, largely for extra-military reasons.)

The second component of the sentence was "the British Empire's armed forces were the main cause of Germany's defeat". I would say that the French Army, not the British Army, was the single most destructive force facing Germany, although arguably the combination of the British Army and Navy were more destructive than the combination of the French Army and Navy. I would think that the chief cause of the German defeat was the almost hopeless geo-economic-political situation that Germany was in after failing to win the war in the opening months. I think that you will find that in almost every phase of the war the German Army was fighting at a numerical disadvantage and still was usually able to inflict casualties at an average ratio of 1 1/2 or 2 to 1.

Third component: "the German systems of command and control you eulogize about were in fact inferior in practice". I certainly feel that the German system of command and control was conceptually unique and was far superior to the British system. What I guess that you are saying is that because of sentence components 1) and 2), ipso facto, the British command system was in practice superior, even though it may or may not have been inferior in concept. I recently have been reading a number of major British sources, thousands of pages of primary and secondary sources, and I am struck with the number of examples of really bad staff work, leading to the loss of engagements and thousands of men, things like failing to bring up the reserves that had been planned to follow in after an initial assault, forcing the staff to have to order the reserves to perform a forced march for 24 or 30 hours, and then to attack immediately (but too late) without rest, food, or water, seemingly due to someone having simply forgotten to bring one or two divisions up to a support position in a timely fashion.

If not fair, then why did Germany lose war - why were the Kaiser's wishes that this contemptible little army be swept into the sea not fulfilled?

Cheers - salesie.

Indeed, if the BEF had been "swept into the sea" in 1914, the odds of a Central Power victory in the opening months ow WW I would have been vastly improved. However, the Allies eventually won despite a British command concept and structure that I feel was demonstratably inferior, in both concept and performance, to the German command structure. When the opening phase of the war settled down the Central Powers were out-numbered, out-industried, out-raw materialed, out-financed, etc. by the Allies, and it is a wonder that the war lasted 4 1/3 years.

There is a Pal who has not only attended (I believe) UK general staff training, but also was able to attend the entire two-year German General Staff college course. He may not see this post, or may not chose to contribute. This discussion has slipped a bit OT, but is, IMHO, quite interesting and important, and might warrant a new thread.

Aaron, I will try to get the material on German military discipline regulations from 1841 to the present to you, but I presently have some wierd technical problems. If you want to PM me your e-mail address I might have a good shot at it. I do not want to identify the serving Bundeswehr officer that provided it, to you or the Forum, for good reason.

Bob Lembke

[salesie]

It seems from your answer, Bob, that you are saying the superiority of British control and command over industry, raw-materials and finance heavily out-weighed German army superiority? In essence, trying to say that the German army wasn't defeated it was let down by civilians back home?

I would argue this is a somewhat misleading argument, you said,"When the opening phase of the war settled down the Central Powers were out-numbered, out-industried, out-raw materialed, out-financed, etc. by the Allies, and it is a wonder that the war lasted 4 1/3 years." Would it not be more accurate to add out-fought to this list - seeing as every single offensive action by the German army in the west failed to meet any of its strategic objectives, failed even when it wasn't out-numbered, out-industried, out raw-materialed, out financed etc?

Also, why place out-numbered in prime position? Not only at 1st Ypres was the BEF greatly outnumbered; during the spring offensive of 1918, the BEF found itself in a similar position because of German reinforcements from the eastern front, and the holding back of fighting men in England by Lloyd George. Consequently, it is crystal clear that on at least two vitally important occasions the German army, when holding manpower superiority, failed to out-fight the BEF and achieve its strategic objectives. Industry, raw-materials and finance played a part in the spring of 1918, but they played no part at all in 1914, indeed the BEF was probably under-resourced at this critical time - if, as you say your research shows, the German army's systems of command and control were vastly superior to the British, how does your research explain these failures? Does your research pinpoint the overriding factor that the BEF must have had in order to out-fight the German army, despite any German command and control advantages, despite, on occasion, German manpower superiority, and despite the times when the allies held no industrial/material advantages?

Cheers - salesie.

[centurion]

In essence, trying to say that the German army wasn't defeated it was let down by civilians back home?

I've a vague feeling that sombody else came up with this theory, shortish fellow from Austria I think he had a funny moustache. I'm sure it'll come back to me.

[bob lembke]

My study of WW I is detailed study of mostly military matters, not this sort of global us versus them comparisons. My sense of the superiority of German command and control, both in concept and performance, has largely formed during my recent readings of British sources, where participants or authors that I respect freqently express themselves sharply, even bitterly, over the failures of the UK "Red Tabs". I have never read German criticism of British command and control. But then again I almost never read German secondary sources. I am getting a sense that I have blundered into an intra-Brit arguement here, the "Butchers and Bunglers" controversy.

It seems from your answer, Bob, that you are saying the superiority of British control and command over industry, raw-materials and finance heavily out-weighed German army superiority? In essence, trying to say that the German army wasn't defeated it was let down by civilians back home?

I never said, nor thought, anything about the supposed British superiority of command and control over industry, raw-materials and finance. Since you mentioned it, I do not think that the command and control of economics was superior, but clearly that the resources in these areas available to the Allies were so vastly superior that it is hard to see how the Central Powers could ever win the war once the war evolved into a Materialschlacht, a "war of resources". Nor did I say anything about "wasn't defeated it was let down by civilians back home"; I view that as a crummy attempt to win an argument about WW I by introducing a theme familarly associated with the Nazis. We, and this Forum, is clearly focused on WW I. You keep on putting things in my mouth that I never said, or thought.

I would argue this is a somewhat misleading argument, you said,"When the opening phase of the war settled down the Central Powers were out-numbered, out-industried, out-raw materialed, out-financed, etc. by the Allies, and it is a wonder that the war lasted 4 1/3 years." Would it not be more accurate to add out-fought to this list - seeing as every single offensive action by the German army in the west failed to meet any of its strategic objectives, failed even when it wasn't out-numbered, out-industried, out raw-materialed, out financed etc?

The Central Powers were always "out-numbered, out-industried, out raw-materialed, out financed etc." Occasionally the Germany had a fleeting local numeric advantage in numbers of soldiers, and then were able to achieve a local tactical victory. But this could never be translated into a strategic victory, as the material inbalance was so great. Basically it boiled down to the fact that railroad trains and truck columns were faster than marching and fighting columns of infantry on foot. This made it impossible to convert a local tactical victory, such as the crushing of a British army in the opening days of the March Offensive, into a strategic victory.

Also, why place out-numbered in prime position? Not only at 1st Ypres was the BEF greatly outnumbered; during the spring offensive of 1918, the BEF found itself in a similar position because of German reinforcements from the eastern front, and the holding back of fighting men in England by Lloyd George. Consequently, it is crystal clear that on at least two vitally important occasions the German army, when holding manpower superiority, failed to out-fight the BEF and achieve its strategic objectives. Industry, raw-materials and finance played a part in the spring of 1918, but they played no part at all in 1914, indeed the BEF was probably under-resourced at this critical time - if, as you say your research shows, the German army's systems of command and control were vastly superior to the British, how does your research explain these failures? Does your research pinpoint the overriding factor that the BEF must have had in order to out-fight the German army, despite any German command and control advantages, despite, on occasion, German manpower superiority, and despite the times when the allies held no industrial/material advantages?

As I said, I cannot comment on what happened at 1st Ypers, as I have not studied it, it really is outside my range of interests. But, clearly the new technology put attacking forces using the open fighting tactics that were popular at that time put any attacking force at a great disadvantage. But you seem to want to maintain that, since two exhausted British army corps were able to fight say six exhausted German army corps to a stand-still, and in the process being largly destroyed, therefore British command and control was superior to German command and control. There is no connect there. From the little I have read of the BEF at that point in time, from British sources, there did not seem to be any British command and control, the units fighting and the commanders did not seem to have a clue as to what was going on. Perhaps the Germans were in the same position. I have not read any German materials on 1st Ypers.

Are you saying that the British Army outfought the attacking Germans in March 1918? I do not study WW I in sweeping overview, but it seemed that an entire British army collapsed when attacked. Finally the German attack ran out of steam and more and more Allied reserves were brought up. A major factor was that the German soldiers, even the most elite soldiers, half-starved for almost two years, encountering the relatively luxurious and enormous British stockpiles of food and rum, stopped to eat and sometimes drink themselves into a stupor. Many sources attest to this serious problem. (My father told me that his storm unit used to conduct unofficial raids on Allied positions to loot their food; his correspondence, more about food than war, attest that he kept his extended family in Germany fed by sending them captured luxuries, coffee and soap, which they traded for staple foodstuffs.)

The troops from the Eastern Front were mostly of third-rate quality, and could only be used to hold fixed positions. My father, in 1918, was almost killed by some totally clueless German troops recently arrived from the East.

To return to the basic question, if there is one. The German Army (really four armies) had very surprising concepts and practices of command and control that I only began to understand after several years of study on WW I. I believe that these concepts were extremely effective. It also believe, and it is the general impression, that German staff work generally was of a very high order, reflecting various obsessive German national characteristics. In contrast, the British concepts of command were very ordinary, but, based entirely on recently reading many British sources, was often carried out in mediocre and faulty ways, made much worse by the manner in which carrying out bad orders was clearly mandatory. (German officers, at all levels, from lieutenant to general, were able, and even encouraged to disobey orders that, in light of the situation on the ground, were mis-guided, if not clearly bad. British officers clearly were not encouraged to disobey direct orders. This freedom to adapt to reality prevented much mischief from inappropriate orders.) The eventual Allied victory was not due to superior British command and control; after the failure of the Central Powers to win in the opening months (partially due to the ability of the BEF to fight the Germans to a stand-still), eventual Allied victory was almost or entirely ineviatable. It is astonishing that the Central Powers held out as long as they did.

I do not think that the general tone of this discussion is particularily constructive. Perhaps a thread on specifics of command concepts would be useful.

Bob Lembke

[salesie]

Bob, you were the one who introduced the concept into this discussion that German command and control was superior to the British, and yet, when challenged, you regard the tone as being non-constructive - why?

There is no doubt that British staff officers "struggled" with their tasks until later in the war, but I can see no evidence that the German staff didn't struggle with the enormity of their task either. Being a non-academic, practical man who looks at results and works backwards from there, I would argue that it was in fact the German staff who performed less well i.e. the German army NEVER achieved any of its strategic objectives at any stage of the war, whereas the allied armies, particularly the BEF, did; the allies held the so-called superior German army at bay, forced it to dig in, and, after Verdun until March 1918, forced it to sit in well prepared defensive positions whilst the allied armies came on to them (hardly smacks of innovative, flexible and forward thinking German staff officers). And, of course, the biggest strategic objective of all was won by the allies - they won the war.

As for your assertion that even lowly lance corporals could disobey their orders if they thought the local situation warranted it - all I can say is it's no wonder the German army failed, and, if that was the reality on the ground (which I strongly doubt), I agree with you that it is a wonder the war lasted over 4 years.

One last point - Germany was out-industried, out-materialed and out-financed, so the British command and control in these areas must have been superior otherwise Germany would have out-done us in these spheres, wouldn't they?

Cheers - salesie.

[Paul Hederer]

I'd like to throw in a few comments, if I might.

First, no doubt the German Army was a well-organised fighting machine. But having said that, I would add that it had its problems--especially in the realm of command.

If you read the accounts of the various German Corps commanders at Verdun--von Zwehl (VIIRK), von Deimling (XVAK), von Guendell (VRK)--they are pretty severe in their judgements of the command staff at the various levels above them and the conduct of the battle.

Even Petain commented "They don't know their business," when speaking about the Germans failure to attack on both banks of the Meuse during the initial stages of the Verdun battle.

No one army had a monopoly on command difficulties or blunders.

Second, on the issue of field punishment in the German Army during the war. I am not convinced that it was the case that there was no field punishment. This issue came up for debate in the Reichstag during the war, so it would be common sense that there was a system of punishment or there would have been no debate on the issue. Unfortunately, beyond this rather obvious observation my knowledge is sparse.

Paul

[bob lembke]

One last point - Germany was out-industried, out-materialed and out-financed, so the British command and control in these areas must have been superior otherwise Germany would have out-done us in these spheres, wouldn't they?

Cheers - salesie.

We have been talking past each other thru this whole discussion. This seems the crux of your position. I do not do sweeping, global studies, and have not done these numbers, but clearly the Central Powers, Germany and the two very sick empires, A-H and Turkey, plus little Bulgaria, were up against the British, French, and Russian Empires, the United States, Japan, Italy, plus perhaps 20 other states. Especially since the Allied empires called on their colonial territories for combat forces as well as economic resources, the Central Powers were probably outnumbered say five to one in manpower, and heavily in almost any other resource one could think of, and additionally the factor of the Central Powers soon being entirely out of many key materials, like rubber. You may think that British command and control was superior, and I may feel the opposite, but that has nothing to do to with the extreme inbalance of manpower and industrial, materiel, and financial resources.

Paul;

Thanks for those leads. I have studied Verdun a good deal, and have read memoirs from privates and lieutenants on one end of the scale, and a few major leaders, such as "Little Willi", but generally not participants in the middle, so to speak, such as corps commanders. I will look those up.

Of course German generals made poor judgements and issued deficient orders, as well as British commanders. In the fog and pressure of combat, it is a wonder that anyone ever made good choices. But some features of the German system ameliorated poor orders. In particular, the trend toward orders specifying the desired results, rather than a detailed list of actions and steps that were expected to be followed to the letter, even if clearly nuts, like releasing gas into one's own trenches. The second is the tolerance and even approval of the junior officer at the point of contact deviating from specific orders if it seemed to him that a different course of action was better. (In such cases, it certainly would be better if the junior officer was in fact correct.) So, IMHO, the German system was to some degree self-correcting.

I have a great respect for your scholarship on WW I. I must say, in all my readings over the last 6-7 years, literally thousands of sources, I have never heard of "field punishments" in the German Army of the period, nor in my father's extensive oral history, not in many letters, etc. The only punishment vaguely like this my father ever mentioned was when a sergeant ordered men to be prepared for a formal inspection (for example, highly shined shoes) one hour, and then preparation for field operations the next hour (with boots greased up for field operations), et cetera. So, in essence, the punishment was making men work hard on their boots for some hours on end.

I really have to also rely on the opinion and research of my friend, the General Staff officer, who went back to the early 19th century, and scanned the relevant regulations over more than 160 years. He stated that, as in any army, these regulations might be violated, but that that was then likely to be severely punished. This gentleman, besides being a serving officer for decades, is a serious researcher in the history of WW I, and has been able to work in archives that the rest of us could only dream of. He just found material of extreme interest to me in an archive that I am sure is not open to the public.

The experience of my father is also relevant. From the position of the (corrupt) command structure of his company, he was certainly le bete noir, shooting (with others) his CO, shooting (openly) a sergeant in the butt on manuvers, kicking in the face of another, and having a really big mouth, plus other annoying factors and activities, and yet not seemingly being subjected to anything of the sort. His punishments, it seemed, were being denied his EK till 1921, despite being wounded four times in flame attacks (he was given his black wound badge), and absolutely no promotion past private, despite in practice leading a Flamm=Trupp, which should be done by a Gefreiter or Unteroffizier. Of course he was careful in performing his misdeeds, but clearly there was a legal structure that protected him. I have only touched upon the mischief that he engaged in.

Bob Lembke

[salesie]

We have been talking past each other thru this whole discussion. This seems the crux of your position. I do not do sweeping, global studies, and have not done these numbers, but clearly the Central Powers, Germany and the two very sick empires, A-H and Turkey, plus little Bulgaria, were up against the British, French, and Russian Empires, the United States, Japan, Italy, plus perhaps 20 other states. Especially since the Allied empires called on their colonial territories for combat forces as well as economic resources, the Central Powers were probably outnumbered say five to one in manpower, and heavily in almost any other resource one could think of, and additionally the factor of the Central Powers soon being entirely out of many key materials, like rubber. You may think that British command and control was superior, and I may feel the opposite, but that has nothing to do to with the extreme inbalance of manpower and industrial, materiel, and financial resources.

Bob, in my opinion, we have been talking past each other simply because you stick to the same argument and won't or can't answer relevant questions i.e. the crux of your argument, despite your earlier denial, seems to be that, from a military point of view, the "best team" lost because of the greater industrial/financial clout of the allies - which must mean you believe the German army was not defeated militarily it was simply out-resourced?

I have to form this opinion, because, once again, you fall back on the out-numbered, out-industried, out-materialed, out-financed excuse for the German army's failures in the field. You seem extremely reluctant to attempt anything like a rational answer as to why the "superior" German army did not sweep all before it when these factors had little or no effect. Of the list of allied countries you state, only the British Empire had any industrial/financial significance until late on in the war (when the U.S. came in, but their involvement was far more psychologicaly damaging than in any military sense), and seeing as the British Empire was not effectively geared up for the conflict for at least eighteen months or so, to what do you attribute the German army's failures prior to the rise of Britain's economic powers and prowess?

In this context, I ask again, given your extensive research, and your faith in German army superiority, why do you think the German army failed to achieve any of its objectives at ANY TIME during the war, and particularly prior to July 1916?

Cheers - salesie.

[Paul Hederer]

In relation to the original question, I found an interesting document (I knew I had something somewhere on my computer) by an American Officer on the German military system written in 1895. The following section covers military discipline in depth--see relevant chapters:

clickity click

Paul

[centurion]

Thanks Paul. I found the enclosed extracts interesting suggesting that something akin to the British field punishment did in fact exist.

"Such confinement is attendedwith severe fatigues, e. g., drawing forage or subsistence after forced marche-s, whenemployed in lieu of ordinary arrest, and with tying up, when resorted to as a substitute forsevere arrest.

*A day's confinement to the guard tent is deemed equal to one day's severe arrest when attended with tyingup for two hours, and to one day's ordinary arrest without the tying· up. The tying up is dispensed with on every4th, 8th, and. thereafter on every 3d day. It is effected without injuring the health of the man, who is in anupright position, removed from the eye of the public, but under military supervision."

It obviously wasn't all sweetnesss and light - the "severe confinment" to a dark cell for substantial periods would I think be a subject of condemnation tody.

[JMcCulloch]

Well, the entire discussion/debate about why the Germans lost the war certainly took a hard turn away from the original thread topic. It reminds me of the time I was listening to a radio program on the way to London and missed the turn in Luton. I ended up in Newport Pagnell!

As an aside, in war crimes indictments after the war (1920), there were @150 individual Germans sought for extradition for mistreatment in POW camps by the Allies.

[bob lembke]

Thanks Paul. I found the enclosed extracts interesting suggesting that something akin to the British field punishment did in fact exist.

"Such confinement is attendedwith severe fatigues, e. g., drawing forage or subsistence after forced marche-s, whenemployed in lieu of ordinary arrest, and with tying up, when resorted to as a substitute forsevere arrest.

*A day's confinement to the guard tent is deemed equal to one day's severe arrest when attended with tyingup for two hours, and to one day's ordinary arrest without the tying· up. The tying up is dispensed with on every4th, 8th, and. thereafter on every 3d day. It is effected without injuring the health of the man, who is in anupright position, removed from the eye of the public, but under military supervision."

It obviously wasn't all sweetnesss and light - the "severe confinment" to a dark cell for substantial periods would I think be a subject of condemnation tody.

I wasn't able to open Paul's "clickity-click". (I work in AOL which is often strange.) I guess Centurion's extracts above are from the source from 1895? I am in a severe time jam for the next three days and have not read the ca. 10 pages that my friend e-mailed me, and can not now. My computer problems (yes, AOL-related), are even worse. Perhaps when I can I can e-mail them to someone who then can post them. Perhaps the discrepancy is a matter of a definition of "corporal punishment". Certainly 200 years ago discipline in the Prussian Army was brutal.

Reading Macdonald's 1915 last night, and there was a description of "Number One Field Punishment", as applied to the narrator himself in late 1915. He did not even know what it was, so at least in his unit it was rare. He did not know why he was asked to scrub a wagon wheel. He was strapped to it an hour in the morning and an hour in the evening, for ten successive days. As it was done out of doors, in bitter winter weather, it was awfully cold, and he described it as an awful punishment. He was allowed to run after each session to attempt to get his body going again. Clearly he could have easily contracted pneumonia, and even died. Would a complaint that he had developed a cold modified the punishment?

I can address this question again on the coming weekend. If someone PMs me with their e-mail address I should be able to forward my friend's e-mail.

Bob Lembke