German military discipline

[Paul Hederer]

Bob,

I found some additional information after being pointed in the right direction by a learned German friend. The punishment known as "Anbindens," being tied to a tree, or a wagon wheel was used, and was not abolished until 21.3.1917.

Below is a letter from a witness to such a punishment, in German:

"Heute wurden bei uns zwei Mann bestraft. Der eine wegen Lügens und unstatthaften Benehmens gegen einen Unteroffizier [...] wurde zur Strafe 2 Stunden, der andere wegen unflätiger Bemerkungen zu einer Stunde am Baume festgebunden. Eine wirklich scheußliche Strafe. Nicht wahr?" BA/MA Freiburg, MSg2/3461, Feldpostbriefe des Gefreiten A. Benedict/Westfront an seine Eltern, Brief v. 26/27.6.1915.

Paul

[Black Jock]

Can you translate please, or is this another means to impose "German Kulture" on the British nation

Tom

[Desdichado]

All,

My German is pretty bad but here's my translation.

Today with us two men were punished. The one because of lying and inappropriate behaviour against (towards) an NCO the punishment (lasted?) for 2 hours, the other one was lashed to a tree for one hour because of unflaetiger (unflattering?) remarks A really terrible punishment? Not really"

It isn't hochdeutsche but it's the best I can do.

[Black Jock]

Thanks for that.

Tom

[Aaron Pegram]

Just to help steer the topic back on course, I made an inquiry through the Militaergeschichtliches Forschungsamt (MGFA) in Potsdam, who reassure me that the Imperial German equivalent to the British Manual of Military Law was the 'Militär-Strafgesetzbuch für das Deutsche Reich'.

http://www.documentarchiv.de/ksr/1872/mili...ches-reich.html

Cheers,

Aaron.

[centurion]

Today with us two men were punished. The one because of lying and inappropriate behaviour against (towards) an NCO the punishment (lasted?) for 2 hours, the other one was lashed to a tree for one hour because of unflaetiger (unflattering?) remarks A really terrible punishment? Not really"

Depends on how they were tied. Done the wrong way is equivelent to crusifixion. There are other positions that can be really painful even after a few minutes.

[bob lembke]

All,

Today with us two men were punished. The one because of lying and inappropriate behaviour against (towards) an NCO the punishment (lasted?) for 2 hours, the other one was lashed to a tree for one hour because of unflaetiger (unflattering?) remarks A really terrible punishment? Not really"

Although it looks like tying up a man was legal, evidentially it had to be out of the sight of other men, so tying him to a tree, clearly in public, as described, was illegal on the face of it. Of course in any army the existing regulations would be violated on occasion. In my father's company the corrupt company CO allowed the company sergeant major to withhold earned leave unless the man let the Feldwebel bug**r him. Hardly to regulation, but as I said the CO was shot a few dozen times 20 miles behind the front and the men were not punished, suggesting official sympathy and disaproval of this state of affairs.

I also noted that the method of tying was not supposed to harm the health of the subject. I probably should not mention this, but some of this discussion is reminicent of some of the disgusting debate about what is "torture" that is going on now.

"Number One Field Punishment" suggests that there was a "Number Two". Anyone?

If someone wants to PM me their e-mail address I will forward the e-mail that I got from my serving officer friend, ecerpts from about four sets of these regulations, including 1872.

Bob Lembke

[Black Jock]

Mein gott! It looks like ive piqued some interest!

The reason why Im interested in German field punishments (eg.strenger arrest) is that Im looking into alied reports of German brutality towards Australian prisoners of war. Australians were known for their lax attitude to discipline, and It came to me that 'brutality' simply could have been the diffrence of discipline expectations in the two armies. Other allies prisoners alleged brutal treatment too, and in this sense, Australians were not the only ones to report their harsh treatment. But im interested to see whether German field punishments for things such as drunkeness on duty, or insubordination can be seen in prisoner grievences. But as you say Bob, a swift kick in the teeth might have presided before any formal punishment took place.

Thank you all for your contributions. Paul has turned up a readily available gem, so I'll have a look and let you all know how I go.

Cheers,

Aaro.

Hi Aaro

I have no idea about German military law. However, it would seem that fair and humane treatment of prisoners did not apply in two instances that I know of. One instance was a man called Harry Brand from my home town of Dundee serving in the Canadian army, who, having been captured was crucified. Another example was a case where prisoners (mainly wounded) were incinerated by a flame thrower in a trench. Given the much admired reputation of the Australians they would receive similar brutal and barbarous treatment. Local newspapers for 1919 carry many stories of the POW's coming home and the factual accounts of their imprisonment.

Tom

[bob lembke]

Hi Aaro

I have no idea about German military law. However, it would seem that fair and humane treatment of prisoners did not apply in two instances that I know of. One instance was a man called Harry Brand from my home town of Dundee serving in the Canadian army, who, having been captured was crucified. Another example was a case where prisoners (mainly wounded) were incinerated by a flame thrower in a trench. Given the much admired reputation of the Australians they would receive similar brutal and barbarous treatment. Local newspapers for 1919 carry many stories of the POW's coming home and the factual accounts of their imprisonment.

Tom

Tom;

Can you give us more detail? One often hears of the "crucified Canadian", but I have never heard of someone having a name attached to the story.

Also, I would have great interest in the alleged incident of a flame-thrower being used to kill prisoners. I have details on most of the German flame-thrower attacks (probably totaling about 750) in the Great War. Do you have a date and/or a sector, or perhaps the unit of the POWs?

Bob Lembke

[bob lembke]

Hi Aaro

I have no idea about German military law. However, it would seem that fair and humane treatment of prisoners did not apply in two instances that I know of. One instance was a man called Harry Brand from my home town of Dundee serving in the Canadian army, who, having been captured was crucified. Another example was a case where prisoners (mainly wounded) were incinerated by a flame thrower in a trench. Given the much admired reputation of the Australians they would receive similar brutal and barbarous treatment. Local newspapers for 1919 carry many stories of the POW's coming home and the factual accounts of their imprisonment.

Tom

Tom;

Can you give us more detail? One often hears of the "crucified Canadian", but I have never heard of someone having a name attached to the story.

Also, I would have great interest in the alleged incident of a flame-thrower being used to kill prisoners. I have details on most of the German flame-thrower attacks (probably totaling about 750) in the Great War. Do you have a date and/or a sector, or perhaps the unit of the POWs?

Bob Lembke

[Desdichado]

Tom;

Can you give us more detail? One often hears of the "crucified Canadian", but I have never heard of someone having a name attached to the story.

Also, I would have great interest in the alleged incident of a flame-thrower being used to kill prisoners. I have details on most of the German flame-thrower attacks (probably totaling about 750) in the Great War. Do you have a date and/or a sector, or perhaps the unit of the POWs?

Bob Lembke

Bob, surely you're familiar with the Bryce Report of 1914? It does not contain the details you have requested above but it is otherwise instructive.

http://www.gwpda.org/wwi-www/BryceReport/bryce_r.html

[Black Jock]

Des,

Thanks for that post on the Bryce Report, I have heard and read snippets, now I will read the report great!

Tom

[Black Jock]

Tom;

Can you give us more detail? One often hears of the "crucified Canadian", but I have never heard of someone having a name attached to the story.

Also, I would have great interest in the alleged incident of a flame-thrower being used to kill prisoners. I have details on most of the German flame-thrower attacks (probably totaling about 750) in the Great War. Do you have a date and/or a sector, or perhaps the unit of the POWs?

Bob Lembke

Bob,

The crucified soldier was a recent subject on the forum. If you type crucified into the 'search' field, you will find an article named Harry Band.

Tom

[Black Jock]

Tom;

Can you give us more detail? One often hears of the "crucified Canadian", but I have never heard of someone having a name attached to the story.

Also, I would have great interest in the alleged incident of a flame-thrower being used to kill prisoners. I have details on most of the German flame-thrower attacks (probably totaling about 750) in the Great War. Do you have a date and/or a sector, or perhaps the unit of the POWs?

Bob Lembke

This is the article,

Dundee Advertiser

19th August 1918; Page 3

Highlanders Tortured

Horrible stories of how the Germans, during their offensive against the British, Front in March, tortured wounded British soldiers—some of whom had surrendered themselves prisoners—by turning flamethrowers on the helpless men, are vouched for by the British Ministry of Information. It must be reminded that at that time that the Germans were in the strong belief that they were marching to complete victory in the West, and as always when they have thought themselves sure to win their arrogance and cruelty were in the ascendant. The following facts are authenticated by the sworn statements of soldiers belonging to a Highland Regiment:--

Pte.----, Royal Highlanders, stated that he and a number of comrades were surrounded and compelled to surrender at a post in front of Monchy on March 28th. He continues; “Our rifles and equipment were taken from us about 6.45 am. Our party consisted of one officer and sixteen men, ten of whom were wounded, We were lined up on our original front line trench and left there without a guard till 7.30 am. About 8.15 am a German officer and two men appeared on the edge of the trench in which we were standing, about 20 yards from where I was standing on my right flank. One man carried a container on his back; the other was armed with a rifle and short bayonet. The officer carried a revolver.

A stream of fire

About seven minutes after we noticed them the officer appeared to give an order, and the men with the container turned a stream of liquid fire straight down the trench in which we were standing. He could plainly see we were unarmed. He continued to play on us for six or seven minutes.” Witness added that he and a few of his companions who were able to move scrambled down a communication trench and made their way over the top to the British lines. It took them several minutes to get clear of the stream of fire.

Pte.-----testified that he was captured in the trench near Monchy, and deprived of their arms, were marched down the trench to an emplacement about 6feet in depth, 9feet wide and 9 to 12 feet long. The sides were perpendicular, except at one end, which was sloping; and the prisoners were tightly packed together in the enclosure. After some time two Germans appeared, and Pte----gives the following account of what happened:---

Men Shrieking and Writhing

“One of the two Germans had no equipment or rifle, and he was carrying a revolver and appeared to be an officer. The other German was also not wearing equipment, but strapped to his back a cylinder with a flexible pipe over his shoulder, the end of which he was holding in his hand. Just as he reached the entrance to the enclosure a flame spurted out in a stream from the pipe, and caught the men who were nearest to the entrance. At that time the man was about four yards from the entrance. When I saw the flame I immediately dropped down as far as I could and got my face on the ground. The other men were lying in heaps around and partly on me. I heard the hissing sound for a short while, and then it stopped for a short while then restarted again. During this time the men were shrieking and writhing about. I should say the flame was playing for about half a minute the first time; the second time it reached right to the back where I was, and the back of my overcoat ant tunic caught fire. By this time all the men were on the ground”. The soldier says that being at the back of the enclosure he managed to crawl up the sloping end to get away.

The British Government has caused to be conveyed to the German Government a protest against the offences described in the above statement.

P A War Special.

[bob lembke]

Bob,

The crucified soldier was a recent subject on the forum. If you type crucified into the 'search' field, you will find an article named Harry Band.

Tom

Did the search, and four threads popped up, of which only one seemed relevant, from 2004. It was started by a Brit lady, who said that she was in the process of writing a Ph. D. thesis on this matter, and who flatly referred to the story as a myth. I could not find an article titled "Harry Band", but perhaps it can be found in a link to a BBC segment from 2002; unfortunately a link to that did not work. However, be that may, I am not terribly interested in the story, and am sure that I will not be the one to uncover revealed truth on this question. Clearly many believe that it was true, and a like number, or more, seem to think that it is a myth. Myself, I don't have a clue.

Desdichado is correct, the Brand Report has nothing to do with these two reported incidents, and in fact predates them, seemingly.

I am, in particular, interested in the flame-thrower/POWs in the trench story. I am writing three books on various aspects of German (and Allied) flame-thrower (FW) use in WW I. Additionally, my father was a flame-thrower operator from 1916 thru 1918, and in the German civil war in 1919. I have only found one mention of such an event, and it is a well-documented account of such an event by French flame troops, and, surprisingly, written and published by a well-known French officer.

I really would be very interested in any information that you have on this, year, date, sector, Allied unit, etc., and if nothing, at least the source of the story. I have organized indices, time-lines, etc. on most of the roughly 750 German FW attacks in WW I, and could probably identify a lot of specifics, such as the unit involved, given some information.

Bob Lembke

[Black Jock]

Did the search, and four threads popped up, of which only one seemed relevant, from 2004. It was started by a Brit lady, who said that she was in the process of writing a Ph. D. thesis on this matter, and who flatly referred to the story as a myth. I could not find an article titled "Harry Band", but perhaps it can be found in a link to a BBC segment from 2002; unfortunately a link to that did not work. However, be that may, I am not terribly interested in the story, and am sure that I will not be the one to uncover revealed truth on this question. Clearly many believe that it was true, and a like number, or more, seem to think that it is a myth. Myself, I don't have a clue.

Desdichado is correct, the Brand Report has nothing to do with these two reported incidents, and in fact predates them, seemingly.

I am, in particular, interested in the flame-thrower/POWs in the trench story. I am writing three books on various aspects of German (and Allied) flame-thrower (FW) use in WW I. Additionally, my father was a flame-thrower operator from 1916 thru 1918, and in the German civil war in 1919. I have only found one mention of such an event, and it is a well-documented account of such an event by French flame troops, and, surprisingly, written and published by a well-known French officer.

I really would be very interested in any information that you have on this, year, date, sector, Allied unit, etc., and if nothing, at least the source of the story. I have organized indices, time-lines, etc. on most of the roughly 750 German FW attacks in WW I, and could probably identify a lot of specifics, such as the unit involved, given some information.

Bob Lembke

This is the link to Band

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...?showtopic=6241

I have just started researching Sgt Stephen Forbes DCM and Bar MM and two Bars, formerly Kings Own Scottish Borderers. He gained his awards serving in the Yorks and Lancs. His bar to the DCM was for thwarting a flamethrower attack, sometime in 1918.

Tom

[bob lembke]

This is the link to Band

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...?showtopic=6241

I have just started researching Sgt Stephen Forbes DCM and Bar MM and two Bars, formerly Kings Own Scottish Borderers. He gained his awards serving in the Yorks and Lancs. His bar to the DCM was for thwarting a flamethrower attack, sometime in 1918.

Tom

Hi, Tom!

Very interesting! When you get particulars I will be happy to look into the FW engagement and perhaps even find out the flame company involved, possibly the name of the commander, the names of any Flamm=Pioniere killed in the engagement, etc. This "cross-pollenation" of our research can add richness to both our findings. For example, I have hundreds of pages of time-lines of FW matters and have constructed a roster of the men of the flame regiment that is presently at about 1200 men. If you have a date, a sector, etc. I can see what I have. I probably will have other information, like which infantry unit was the FW men supporting.

The records for the last few months of 1918 are quite incomplete. But there were not many flame attacks then, anyway. More likely than not I will have info on the attack that he thwarted.

Bob Lembke

[salesie]

Forgive me, Bob, I know you'd like to move on and completely ignore my earlier question - but I feel further clarification of your earlier assertions is needed.

You tell us that you conclude from your research that junior German officers were allowed, even encouraged, to disobey their orders if they felt the situation on the ground warranted it - this being evidence of the "superior" German command and control system - are you sure your research is complete?

I've done a little research of my own, and it didn't take me long to find references from a book: Reddemann, Bernhard. Geschichte der deutschen Flammenwerfer-Truppe. Berlin: Verein ehem. Angehöriger d. Garde-Reserve-Pionier-Regiments, 1933. The two most glaring examples (amongst others), that German troops were "obliged" to carry out their orders even when thinking them wrong can be found on pages 17 & 31 in these memoirs of Bernhard Reddemann, the flamethrower commander:

When the 3rd Guard Pioneer Battalion--the expansion of Reddemann's initial flamethrower detachment--first saw action at Neuville on May 22, 1915, the flamethrower operators were ordered to accompany the infantry across open ground instead of approaching under cover the way they had been trained. Reddemann protested but was overruled, and his men suffered high casualties. Then, during the Battle of the Somme, flamethrower operators were ordered against Reddeman's will to use their weapon defensively, which they were not trained to do. Again, the result was high casualties. In this case, Reddemann was so certain that his men were doomed that he had explosives put on the flamethrowers so that the operators could blow them up right before they were inevitably captured or killed.

It seems certain, from Reddemann's account, that the highly trained non-commissioned officers ordered to undertake these missions knew they would end in disaster, but these men did what they were told.

From your extensive research, Bob, how do you think this can be?

Cheers - salesie.

[Desdichado]

There is some stuff stuff in Martin Middlebrook's work The Kaiser's Battle (Penguin Books 1983) regarding aspects of discipline in the German army in 1918. On officer, Leutnant Friedrich Wellhausen commented upon the calibre of the rear-echelon men who were being pushed up to the front for the coming battle:

'Men of different ages did not always get on well with each other and there were certain tensions among the officers. The old front-line "pigs" who shared everything with their men through blood and lead-filled air, preferred to ignore the instructions of the communication-zone cowards concerning the preparation of the troops....'

Another anecdote concerned the theft of some potatoes by a German Corporal:

'The field police carried out a search and they found the full sacks in our room. All nine of us were charged by a proper court-martial of officers from another unit. I was told "You are responsible for what your section has done." It was possible that I might have been sentenced to capital punishment - to be shot - but that did not happen.'

I wonder if the Corporal means that he could have been executed for the actions of his section, or that he could have been executed for taking part in the theft? It's a shame that Middlebrook makes no comment on this but I suppose that it is irrelevant to the main aim of the book.

[bob lembke]

Forgive me, Bob, I know you'd like to move on and completely ignore my earlier question - but I feel further clarification of your earlier assertions is needed.

The "questions" you were asking were, IMHO, were so broad and possibly so fuzzy that I found it hard to answer properly. Now you have asked some quite specific and focused questions, and I will be able to address them usefully.

You tell us that you conclude from your research that junior German officers were allowed, even encouraged, to disobey their orders if they felt the situation on the ground warranted it - this being evidence of the "superior" German command and control system - are you sure your research is complete?

Generally, IMHO historical research is never "complete", and, to use a loaded word, history is revisionism. There were several components in the German system of command and control that, in part, tolerated a junior officer not following the direct orders of a superior; and in part made it less necessary to disobey direct orders. To address the last point first, the nature of German orders and the extreme level of delegation of authority were such as to make the frequency of not following the orders of a superior less frequent. The orders generally (there is a important exception, to be discussed below) were structured about the goal that was to be achieved with the resources available to the junior commander (whether a Leutnant or a Leutnantgeneral), rather than the order being a detailed list of actions to be followed, often worked up by "Red Tabs" sitting off in a chateau 20 miles behind the lines, a list of actions that might or might not reflect the realities on the ground. (The British literature on the war is full of complaints about these detached, sometimes unreal orders.) Generally, the officer on the spot was left to determine how to achieve the stated objectives, given his resources, so there were fewer occasions where the orders from the rear did not match the realities on the ground.

In contrast, I read (in British sources) of British general officers boasting that they meddled about and gave detailed orders as far as five levels down the chain of command. Let me give an example. Let's say that a German army corps of two divisions was in a defensive posture, and let's say that it was 1917. The army corps was in position with one division in line, and the second division in reserve. The front-line triangular division's three regiments were in line side-by-side, each regiment having one battalion in the front line, one battalion in support, and one battalion in reserve. Each of these battalions was normally commanded by this time by a captain, and occasionally by a major, or possibly a first lieutenant. The commander of the front division only had four officers reporting to him; the three captains commanding the three front-line battalions of his three regiments, and also the (usually) Generalmajor commanding the divisional artillery. For purposes of combat command, the captain commanding a front-line battalion also commanded the battalion in support and the battalion on reserve behind them if they had to be committed to the defense of the sector. If a regiment from the division in reserve had to be brought in to support the front-line regiment being commanded by our captain, he also would direct the tactical employment of the second regiment. Reducto ad absurdum, it might be possible that our captain might end up directing the efforts of four regiments. Under this system, it was less likely that the officer at the point of contact would be burdened by orders from on high, from staffers or a CO at some remove, that did not reflect the realities on the ground.

In contrast, I have read of a British lieutenant-colonel commanding a front-line battalion in action having to get permission to move a pair of machine guns from their position, as it was dictated in his detailed orders. The phone line being cut, the lt.-colonel had to send a runner to his brigadier to get written permission to move the two machine guns, a process that took four hours, by which time the facts on the ground must have changed considerably. Later in the war most Zug (platoon or section) in the field companies of the flame regiment had a pair of light machine guns; their deployment would either be up to the CO of the Zug, a Leutnant (lieutenant), Feldwebel-leutnant (a NCO, sort of an acting officer), or a Vize-Feldwebel (platoon sergeant); or possibly to the CO of the MG=Trupp, a Gerfreiter (lance corporal) or an Unteroffizier (junior sergeant).

An exception was the orders developed for a raid or attack planned for some time, and at the level of a company or battalion, for example. In these actions detailed sequences of actions and cooperation between units and different arms were vital, and very detailed orders were prepared, down to the level of how many grenades and cartridges were carried by each man; who carried wire-cutters, and the size; who carried flares and a whistle, etc., etc. But I believe that these plans were developed in cooperation with the junior officers that had to carry out the attack. If time and resources permitted a replica of the position to be stormed was constructed behind the lines, and the attack was rehearsed, and presumably the detailed orders were refined. I have studied an attack of this sort at Verdun, in which my father participated, and received his worst wound, and I have four letters of his describing the attack. One letter, written the eve of the attack, shows that he, as a buck private, knew the detailed plan of attack, the breath of the attack front, the exact moment of the attack, how long his unit was expected to remain in the enemy positions, etc. I assume that this letter, to his father, a staff officer on the East Front, was embargoed until the attack was performed. Certainly as a private he did not participate in planning the attack, beyond carrying out the drill attacks, but that he was fully informed of the basic plan of attack before the engagement. His understanding was more complete, IMHO, than that of a typical British junior officer participating in an attack on the Western Front.

Above I have discussed how the usual nature of German orders allowed the junior officer at the point of action to craft his own plan of action to attempt to achieve the goals that his orders specified. Additionally, one frequently sees examples of officers ignoring their orders and seemingly suffering no adverse reaction. (Of course, it would be better if the junior officer was right; that his actions were successful!) I recall two examples from the Eastern Front. One amusing incident was in the opening days of the war, when two Russian armies were pouring into eastern Germany, and there were only a few defending divisions, some third-rate units. These units were ordered to fall back to a defensive line. However, one army corps was commanded by a General von Francois (seemingly ethnically French), who was deeply offended at the idea of Russian armies entering Germany. Instead of falling back as ordered, as the other units were, he decided to attack, and push into Russia. He advanced, in clear violation of his orders, and seemingly this so rattled the German CO in the east that he had a mental collapse, and Hindenberg and Ludendorff war hurredly recruited to take his place and were rushed to the east. (Von Francois did eventually fall back as ordered.) Von Francois was retained as a commanding general thruout the war, but he never was promoted past corps commander, as far as I know, although the army was expanding a great deal.

The second example was a commander of a unit, perhaps a division, ordered to advance against the Russians on a certain axis, thru some woods; in his memoirs he recalled how he felt that the terrain and vegetation was too rough on the specified route, and he just decided to advance on a different route, but he took the precaution of dictating a memo to the files explaining his reasons for disobeying his direct orders.

I have been writing for a while; I will address your further points in a little while.

Cheers - salesie.

[bob lembke]

I've done a little research of my own, and it didn't take me long to find references from a book: Reddemann, Bernhard. Geschichte der deutschen Flammenwerfer-Truppe. Berlin: Verein ehem. Angehöriger d. Garde-Reserve-Pionier-Regiments, 1933. The two most glaring examples (amongst others), that German troops were "obliged" to carry out their orders even when thinking them wrong can be found on pages 17 & 31 in these memoirs of Bernhard Reddemann, the flamethrower commander:

I am familiar with the book. I have translated it into English.

When the 3rd Guard Pioneer Battalion--the expansion of Reddemann's initial flamethrower detachment--first saw action at Neuville on May 22, 1915, the flamethrower operators were ordered to accompany the infantry across open ground instead of approaching under cover the way they had been trained. Reddemann protested but was overruled, and his men suffered high casualties. Then, during the Battle of the Somme, flamethrower operators were ordered against Reddeman's will to use their weapon defensively, which they were not trained to do. Again, the result was high casualties. In this case, Reddemann was so certain that his men were doomed that he had explosives put on the flamethrowers so that the operators could blow them up right before they were inevitably captured or killed.

Yes, the Neuville attack is covered on page 17. This was about the fourth or fifth Flammenwerfer (FW) attack of the Great War. The flame troops worked thruout the war to develop an assortment of tactics, most of which were sort of counter-intuitive. I have just looked at my translation (which, as my first significant German to English translation, was remarkably bad; now I generally do not translate, but simply read the original, I have started taking notes in German, and my wife, who has 11 European languages down well, including German, says that my sentence structure in English conversation is now shifting from the English to the German; anyone who knows German would know that that is not a good development). You wrote: the flamethrower operators were ordered to accompany the infantry across open ground instead of approaching under cover the way they had been trained. Reddemann protested but was overruled, and his men suffered high casualties." The first sentence is correct. This was an attempt to see if this sort of attack would succeed. Where did you get "Reddemann protested but was overruled, ---- "? There is no hint of this, at least in my translation. (My original in German, a xerox provided by a German state library, is buried in my files. The translation is rough, but I don't think that I left out sections. Such a phrase would have popped out at me. Reddemann's relationship with the Highest Army Command was evolving at this time, but I have never seen anything that suggested that tactics were being imposed on him. Is this your translation?

As to the "high casualties", Reddemann wrote "Their casualties were considerable." To put this in context, three men, one junior sergeant and two privates, were killed in this attack. This was a high casualty rate for this unit, which lost, on average, one man kia or dow per flame attack, across the whole war.

As to the Somme, Reddemann was unhappy to have to have his men engage in a defensive action, for which FW were not well suited, but seemingly this was done as part of the desperate effort to stop the British and French on the Somme. He expressed his regrets more than 20 years after this fighting. The exact process behind the decision to engage in defensive fighting, which was generally prohibited by the OHL, is unclear. My father, at Verdun with the 2. Kompagnie at this time, expressed thanks for being there and not at the Somme, where he stated that most of the flame regiment was fighting, although he was wounded twice in short order at Verdun at this time. I am guessing here, but I would imagine that the flame regiment lost something like 80 men in several dozen engagements on the Somme. I have the complete death roll of the regiment; I could poke thru it and come up with a complete figure. This was a high casualty rate for this unit.

It seems certain, from Reddemann's account, that the highly trained non-commissioned officers ordered to undertake these missions knew they would end in disaster, but these men did what they were told.

The Neuville attack was one of the first; it really was not known what the results would be. I do not know too much about it, but three men lost was a "disaster" only in relative terms. (I have a letter from my father in which he described a flame attack in which they lost three men and has 12 wounded as a "catastrophe".) Perhaps in relation to the Garde=Reserve=Pionier=Regiment (Flammenwerfer), not necessarily in relation to the fighting on the Western Front in general.

From your extensive research, Bob, how do you think this can be?

I think that you have conflated several of my statements about the level of devolution of authority in the German Army of the period. The flame regiment had a OHL order which gave flame unit commanders the right to review and perhaps veto the plan of attack written up for a proposed flame attack. This was not generally applicable to the entire army, of course. The flame regiment and its components were under the direct control and allocation of the OHL (Highest Army Command). Also, the right of officers to modify their orders on the ground as events unfolded did not extend to NCOs or EM/ORs, of course. If a Leutnant told a Unteroffizier to take his squad and do something, the sergeant did not have the discretion to do it or not do it, as he wished.

Cheers - salesie.

[salesie]

Bob, more direct quotes from page 17 of Reddemann's memoirs:

He also writes that the Neuville operation “seemed to lie completely outside the intended purpose” of the flamethrowers. He goes on to describe the mission thusly: “A completely new kind of employment of the flamethrowers! Will it succeed?”

“The result showed that these doubts were probably justified.”

“The unit was not yet sufficiently trained in what was even for them a new kind of attack. Therefore it was understandable that certain doubts in it emerged, on whether with such an insertion of the flamethrowers any success could be obtained.”

“Here, however, it was different: Here, without going into action, they had to advance far over open terrain against an enemy not yet shaken by flames. That contradicted the past kinds of attack and seemed to lie quite outside of the framework of the tasks of the flamethrowers.”

Do these sound like the words of a man who crafted the mission himself? Sound like the words of an officer "allowed to ignore” his orders if he thought them tactically wrong? It seems perfectly clear from the text that the operation was ordered by Reddemann's superiors despite his doubts. As a loyal officer, Reddeman seems very circumspect in his memoirs, refusing to come right out and say that his superiors bungled the operation, but how else can these comments be interpreted?

But also, let’s look at your last post a little closer, Bob, and compare it to your earlier assertions:

I quote from an earlier post of yours; “One example of how this played out (and dropping some generalizations), I believe that in 1916 the unit of independent manuver and command in the UK army was the battalion commanded by a lieutenant-colonel, while in my father's storm regiment, at least, it was the Flamm=Trupp of eight privates commanded by a lance corporal, and I think that the lance corporal had, in practice, more leeway to ignore his orders than the Brit LTC.”

I quote from your last post; “Also, the right of officers to modify their orders on the ground as events unfolded did not extend to NCOs or EM/ORs, of course. If a Leutnant told a Unteroffizier to take his squad and do something, the sergeant did not have the discretion to do it or not do it, as he wished.”

I quote from an earlier post of yours; “In the German system, it was generally recognized that the junior officer actually leading the effort knew best, as he was at the point of action, and could modify or ignore orders issued, for example, by the Generalleutnant commanding the division. This was not as big a leap as it sounds, because German orders were supposed to be structured as specifying the desired result, not a detailed set of steps that the junior officer was expected to perform. The junior officer at the front was generally expected to figure out how to best achieve the desired results.”

I quote from your last post; “The flame regiment had a OHL order which gave flame unit commanders the right to review and perhaps veto the plan of attack written up for a proposed flame attack. This was not generally applicable to the entire army, of course. The flame regiment and its components were under the direct control and allocation of the OHL (Highest Army Command). ”

NCOs can then they can't? The whole German system then just the flamethrower unit? Perhaps you'd like to explain these massive contradictions, Bob?

Cheers - salesie.

[bob lembke]

This is the article,

Dundee Advertiser

19th August 1918; Page 3

Highlanders Tortured

Tom;

I only noticed this post now; having just got in the door; it is 3:20 AM and I will discuss this article in detail later today. I have only skimmed it, but the article does not describe any WW I German flame thrower equipment, even more so the German equipment in use in 1918; it describes performance of equipment which no portable flame thrower equipment, German or of any other country, of WW I or WW II, could ever perform. The descriptions of the effect of flame throwers at different ranges also does not seem to reflect the actual effect of these devices.

To me, the description of this supposed event (events?) is so inaccurate, in everything that can be corroborated or disproved, that I at least would think that it is a fabrication. During WW I the British turned out a virtual tidal wave of propaganda, false accusations, etc. on such a scale that even today the history of the period is seriously poisoned. Deborah Lake, in her recent excellent book on the Zeebrugge raid, describes finding a document at the IWM that provides interesting detail on this very large and organized effort, which was very useful in the overall war effort, but has created a big problem in writing the history of the period.

I will address this question later when I can see straight.

Bob Lembke

[bob lembke]

This is the article,

Dundee Advertiser

19th August 1918; Page 3

Highlanders Tortured

Horrible stories of how the Germans, during their offensive against the British, Front in March, tortured wounded British soldiers—some of whom had surrendered themselves prisoners—by turning flamethrowers on the helpless men, are vouched for by the British Ministry of Information. It must be reminded that at that time that the Germans were in the strong belief that they were marching to complete victory in the West, and as always when they have thought themselves sure to win their arrogance and cruelty were in the ascendant. The following facts are authenticated by the sworn statements of soldiers belonging to a Highland Regiment:--

Any clue as to the Highland regiment?

Pte.----, Royal Highlanders, stated that he and a number of comrades were surrounded and compelled to surrender at a post in front of Monchy on March 28th. He continues; “Our rifles and equipment were taken from us about 6.45 am. Our party consisted of one officer and sixteen men, ten of whom were wounded, We were lined up on our original front line trench and left there without a guard till 7.30 am. About 8.15 am a German officer and two men appeared on the edge of the trench in which we were standing, about 20 yards from where I was standing on my right flank. One man carried a container on his back; the other was armed with a rifle and short bayonet. The officer carried a revolver.

No German WW I FW, and certainly no FW in use in 1918, was operated by one man. The last model operated by one man was a model adopted in 1910, and had been replaced with a series of improved models. (There are Allied drawings of supposed German FW operators with the device operated by one man.) The length and the stiffness of the flame hose was such that it would probably be impossible for one man to hold and additionally operate the device.

A stream of fire

About seven minutes after we noticed them the officer appeared to give an order, and the men with the container turned a stream of liquid fire straight down the trench in which we were standing. He could plainly see we were unarmed. He continued to play on us for six or seven minutes.” Witness added that he and a few of his companions who were able to move scrambled down a communication trench and made their way over the top to the British lines. It took them several minutes to get clear of the stream of fire.

The portable German FW used in 1918 had a flame duration of from nine to 20 seconds, depending on nozzle size, which modified the flow rate and the range of the device. "Six to seven minutes" is perposterous. No one has ever developed a portable device that could play that long, I doubt if there ever was one that exceeded one minute, if that. A German portable FW of this period, really all of them, would put out about two liters of thick sticky oil a second, at a range of 20 yards the oil would be partially consumed and the width and height of the stream of oil and flaming oil would be about ten feet high and wide, and would probably move at a velocity of about 100 mph. The "observer" stated: "It took them several minutes to get clear of the stream of fire." If he were in a trench and the stream of a FW were played down the trench, they would be splattered with a large amount of blazing oil and in the middle of a stream of flame that would envelope them and make breathing almost instantly fatal. The Allied command freqently informed the troops that one just had to evade the flame in some way, simply by bending over, for example, to minimize the fear of this weapon. In fact, the stream of fire from the FW was found to be fatal even beyond it's say 90 foot range, as the stream of hot gasses pushed beyond the obvious length of the fire stream could kill.

Pte.-----testified that he was captured in the trench near Monchy, and deprived of their arms, were marched down the trench to an emplacement about 6feet in depth, 9feet wide and 9 to 12 feet long. The sides were perpendicular, except at one end, which was sloping; and the prisoners were tightly packed together in the enclosure. After some time two Germans appeared, and Pte----gives the following account of what happened:---

If men were "tightly packed" in a space of about 100 square feet we would be talking about 30-40 men.

Men Shrieking and Writhing

“One of the two Germans had no equipment or rifle, and he was carrying a revolver and appeared to be an officer. The other German was also not wearing equipment, but strapped to his back a cylinder with a flexible pipe over his shoulder, the end of which he was holding in his hand. Just as he reached the entrance to the enclosure a flame spurted out in a stream from the pipe, and caught the men who were nearest to the entrance. At that time the man was about four yards from the entrance. When I saw the flame I immediately dropped down as far as I could and got my face on the ground. The other men were lying in heaps around and partly on me. I heard the hissing sound for a short while, and then it stopped for a short while then restarted again. During this time the men were shrieking and writhing about. I should say the flame was playing for about half a minute the first time; the second time it reached right to the back where I was, and the back of my overcoat ant tunic caught fire. By this time all the men were on the ground”. The soldier says that being at the back of the enclosure he managed to crawl up the sloping end to get away.

This account, and the other, refers to an officer carrying a "revolver". No German front-line officer carried a revolver, to my knowledge; some rear-echelon EM carried a 45 year old clumsy revolver. Admittedly, possibly both "victims" calling an automatic pistol a "revolver" might been out of habit. Not an important point, just one that raises the rate of factual error in these narratives to 100%.

The portable FW used in 1918 did not have a cylindrical tank. The oil tank was a large doughnut-shaped FW, very distinctive, that could even be noticed from the front. It is unbelievable that a man could see and note the shape of the flame tank and describe it as a "cylinder", instead of a much more distinctive doughnut-shaped oil tank. No German FW had a "flexible pipe". As a mechanical engineer, I don't even know how you would design a "flexible pipe". No German FW had a flame hose or flame tube passing over the shoulder. Aside from the unnecessary complexity, the considerable recoil of a portable FW wound make this very unsafe. (I have an e-friend, a serving officer in a non-US or Brit army, who (legally) has a working German FW, a friend of his, another officer, has fired one, and reported that it has a surprising recoil.) There is yet another reason why such a design would be unsafe and unwise, which I will not bother to explain unless asked; it is complicated. The work on these devices began in 1901, by a professional engineer and a scientist, and the devices that evolved were quite sophisticated designs, arguably more sophisticated than the German devices of WW II.

The account states that the FW was employed "four yards" from the nearest man. It would be nuts and very dangerous to utilize a FW that close to a packed group of men. If such a stream of mostly flaming oil, not flame (at that range) played into a packed group of men would have involved all of the men in s second or two. The idea that it could be played for half a minute, halted, and then played again, and only on the second projection would reach the end of a 9 to 12 foot long enclosure, is rediculous. This was written by someone who had the popular, uninformed notion that the "flame projector" projected a burst of flame. It projected a mix of flaming oil, some flame, lots of smoke (usually dense black), and hot gasses, and at that range it would mostly be liquid oil, but with enough flame to ignite the oil splattered on the men.

Also, the idea that two men, only armed with one "revolver", with 5-6-8 shots, would approach within four yards of their intended victims to try to kill 30-40 soldiers, is rediculous. Certainly the 30-40 men would have has a number of weapons still with them, a grenade or two, a trench knife in a sock, a little .25 caliber pocket pistol, etc. Had they been strip searched? Even physically they could have easily overpowered the two Germans.

Also, almost all German Flamm=Pioniere carried the P 08, the "Luger". None carried rifles, and only a few NCOs carried carbines. The description of the weapons carried by the Germans in both described incidents are incorrect in every particular.

Even if the Germans were as evil to want to kill a bunch of POWs, the use of a FW to do so is absurd and would have been prohibited. First of all, the flame oil, especially in 1918, was precious. Doubly so in the front line, during an attack. Secondly, the flame and smoke generated would quickly create a pall say 100 feet long, initially 20' by 20' at the end, with the smoke probably eventually rising to 100-200-300'. Hardly the way to conceal a war crime that would be shocking to all. A volley of gun-fire would have been much more intelligent in every way.

The British Government has caused to be conveyed to the German Government a protest against the offences described in the above statement.

All of the particulars of this second story are incorrect, usually wildly, no names, date, specific place, and especially no specific unit, whose war diaries could be examined. Possibly this also was on March 28, 1918; see the following. How many Highland battalions were there? However, there is one possible lead; the first story mentions a fairly specific place and a date. I should be possible to identify which Highland battalions were in front of Monchy on March 28, 1918. I would think that if men experienced such an event, and then immediately escaped and presumably returned to their unit immediately or soon thereafter, the war diaries of the battalion, and possibly the brigade, would mention such a serious incident. I have worked with some British war diaries, but I am at a disadvantage here on this side of the Big Drink. In particular I do not have tha materials at hand to identify the Highland battalions operating at that place. What I can do is look into my materials on the Hunnish side of things; I would estimate that there is a 50% probability that I could come up with the identity of any flame company or platoon operating there on that day, and very likely might even have the name of the CO.

Perhaps we could work together and see if we can get to the bottom of this. The article itself, published during the wartime, is not by itself very believable, with its many factual details. Corroborated by material like war diaries, it would be a different story.

P A War Special.

[bob lembke]

The 10. Kompagnie, Garde=Reserve=Pionier=Regiment (Flammenwerfer) , fought near Monchy le Preux on March 28, 1918, engaging in "trench fighting, machine gun nests, dugouts". They lost one man, Pionier Johann Haber.

Bob Lembke