Forcing the Dardanelles

[PhilB]

Is it possible that Churchill and Fisher were given a false sense of confidence by Admiral Sir John Duckworth`s experience of 1807?

Quote:-

At length the wind shifted to south-south-west, and on the 19th, at 7 A.M., the squadron weighed, and steered for the entrance of the Dardanells. Sir Sidney Smith of the Pompée had previously been directed to take under his orders the Thunderer, Standard, and Active, and, in case any opposition should be offered by the Turkish squadron, to destroy it. The British ships then formed themselves in line of battle in the following order : Canopus, Repulse, Royal-George, Windsor-Castle, Standard, having in tow the Meteor, Pompée, Thunderer, having in tow the Lucifer, Endymion, Active. At 8 A.M., the Canopus arrived abreast of the outer castles, both of which opened a fire upon her, and, in succession upon the ships in her wake ; but, at the suggestion of Mr. Arbuthnot none of the British ships returned the fire, except the two bomb-vessels, who threw a few shell. This appears to have been rather an inconsistent proceeding ; but the bombs were actually signalled by the commander-in-chief to open their fire. What effect that fire produced we cannot positively say ; but we believe it amounted to no more than the squadron suffered in passing these castles, and that was too slight to be noticed. At 9 h. 30 m. A.M. the leading ship of the British squadron arrived abreast of the inner pair of castles, which also opened a fire, within point-blank shot. This fire was returned by the ships of the squadron in succession as they passed, and doubtless with some effect.

The damage sustained by the British ships in passing the Dardanelles, for that object had now been attained, was comparatively trifling. Not a mast or yard had been shot away, and the only spars injured were the spritsail yard of the Royal-George, gaff of the Canopus, and maintopsail yard of the Standard. Nor was the loss of men by any means so great as might have been expected. The Canopus had three seamen killed, one petty-officer, eight seamen, and three marines wounded ; the Repulse, one petty-officer and two seamen wounded ; the Royal-George, two seamen and one marine killed, two petty officers, 22 seamen, and five marines wounded, total, three killed and 29 wounded ; rather out of the usual proportion. The Windsor-Castle had seven seamen wounded : the remaining ships, namely, the Standard, Meteor (who had the misfortune to burst her 13-inch mortar), Pompée, Thunderer, Lucifer, Endymion, and Active, no one hurt ; total, six killed and 51 wounded.

[truthergw]

That is a serious allegation, Phil. Have you any evidence to suggest that they were influenced by an engagement of more than a hundred years previous?

[centurion]

Some of the Turkish guns in that action were so old that they were firing stone shot and may even have dated from the siege of Constntinople. Not really much of a comparison to 1915 conditions and Churchill must have known about the quality of some of the guns in the forts after all some were made and sold by British companies!

[PhilB]

It`s not an allegation. I`m just wondering if that knowledge might have helped to create a false impression in the Naval mind that the passage of the Dardanelles, having been done once, was a distinct possibilty again.

[ianw]

I would certainly think that Churchill the great naval enthusiast would have been aware of the attack a century before and would have thought that the intervening years would have only increased the advantages to the attackers.

[MartinWills]

I know that the events of a century before were alluded to at the time. I'm pretty sure some of the problems from 1807 were looked at and comparisons made.but I don't think it went along the lines of what we did then we could do now in the same way.

[michaeldr]

quote: Is it possible that Churchill and Fisher were given a false sense of confidence by Admiral Sir John Duckworth's experience of 1807?

No, because though Duckworth escaped, his expedition was hardly a success. In the Sea of Marmora he was constrained by a lack of re-supply and the fact that his only line of communication was threatened by the forts along the narrow channel of the Dardanelles. However I do think that they may have been influenced by the success of the Japanese at Port Arthur and by that of the Central Powers against the Belgian Forts.

regards

Michael

[PhilB]

The accusation is partially true.

Larry.

Please, gents. I`m making no accusation or allegation.

just wondering if it was tempting to conclude that what was done in 1807 with wooden walls could be done again in 1915 with superdreadnoughts. Phil B

[Andrew Hesketh]

I was reading Robert Rhodes James' "Gallipoli" recently. I don't recall the precise details, but the impression was that the Navy was not at all convinced that the mission would be an easy one. Fisher was certainly doubtful when the effects of Churchill's optimism wore off. There is also a reference to a 1907 commissioned report which concluded that the Navy alone would not be able to force the straits - a dash through maybe - but not control them. It proposed a joint Army-Navy operation with at least 60,000 troops.

[truthergw]

QUOTE (Phil_B @ May 10 2007, 09:46 AM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Please, gents. I`m making no accusation or allegation.

just wondering if it was tempting to conclude that what was done in 1807 with wooden walls could be done again in 1915 with superdreadnoughts. Phil B

I would like to think that there had been many more recent and relevant incidents to base their assumptions on. The lessons to be learned from the Russo-Japanese war were perhaps discounted to some degree because of the sheer ineptitude of the Russian commanders. There were several incidents in the ACW where convoys forced river passages against battery fire. These may well have had some relevance. There is no evidence that I know of to suggest that Sir John French based his plans on what had happened at Waterloo which was in his locality and more recent than the action you propose.

[Borys]

Ahoj!

Tsk-tsk ... so Anglocentric ... 1807 ... meh ... on the 18th of July 1912 the Italian Fleet sortied half way up the Dardanelles to the Sea of Marmara.

Borys

[PhilB]

No problem getting through the Narrows, Borys? I take it the Turks were contesting the passage? Phil B

[centurion]

I suspect it was after that that they put some modern guns in the forts

[PhilB]

So perhaps Churchill & Fisher were lulled into a false sense of confidence by July 1912? It reads like a foray by torpedo boats rather than a serious attempt to get big units through? Phil B

[centurion]

I suspect that Fisher was always incredibly confident no matter what. It may have been his personal experience of the supression of the batteries at Alexandria in 1888 that helped sway him in his belief that the RN could knock out emplaced guns in land fortresses.

Slightly off centre - did you know that Fisher once commanded an armoured train in Egypt?

[Andrew Hesketh]

I thought Fisher was never fully convinced by the idea of forcing the Dardanelles?

[rob carman]

Good afternoon,

Andrew Mango, says of the Italians' activities in his 1999 book Ataturk. (pub. John Murray London, pp. 666) that:

"Unable to break out of their coastal enclaves, the Italians sought to force the Ottoman government to the negotiating table by naval attacks in the eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea. In March 1912 the Italian fleet bombed Beirut; the following month forts guarding the entrance to the Dardanelles were bombarded; in May the Italians occupied Rhodes and the other islands of the Dodecanese in the Aegean Sea; in July Italian torpedo boats succeeded in entering the Dardanelles Straits."

Mango suggests that the Italian plan had the desired political effect.

Regards,

Rob Carman.

[Borys]

"Dear chap, if the Italy semi-Wogs with their second-rate fleet could get torpedo boats to within sight of the Sea of Marmara, then by Jove! - surely the battleships of the best fleet in the world won't have any problems with that!"

That's what I'd have expected the attitude to be. I think 1912 to be a possible source of inspiration. 1807 is a bit far fetched ...

Two other things - in late 1914 the British fleet would had sailed up the Dardaneles without much trouble - half a year later the Turks were ready, having laid minefields etc.

And at some point during the campaign the Turkish coastal artillery was down to its last shells (after repulsing several Anglo-French attacks), which again would had allowed a fleet-breakthrough. I do not know the exact date, but some Gallipoli expert on the board should know. Or is this an urban legend, like so many others?

Appologies for being slightly misleading with "Italian Fleet" instead of "Italian torpedo boat half-flotilla" - I don't know Italian, so I am down to guessing what Italian pages say on the subject

Borys

[PhilB]

Borys, it really was a torpedo boat foray was it not? And I haven`t read that they got through the narrows - maybe they did? No reflection on the Italians - they did what they were told to do. It`s just that their foray doesn`t seem to be in the same category as Duckworth`s getting a squadron through. Or am I mistaken? Kindly explain. Phil B

[Borys]

Ahoj!

Torpedo boat foray. And the scope was lesser than I remembered from reading another Italian site. They did not pass the Narrows (I think).

Comparison between Capitano di Vascello Enrico Millo and Duckworth - I think that it is apples and oranges, but IMO irrelevant anyway.

What I THINK is that a 2 year old story with contemporary ships sorteying up the Straits COULD had more bearing on minds that what happened over 100 years ago. So I think Duckworth's influence was ZERO. I could be wrong, of course ...

Below is a convulted software translation of what happened in 1912.

Enjoy!

THE RAID OF THE DARDANELLI

The more important action of the sure July the 1912 and most audacious one than all the war Italian-Turk was raid of the Dardanelli, executed from five small torpedo boats commant from the captain ENRICO MILLO, succeduto in the commando of the torpedo boads to the DUCA of the ABRUZZI promoted rear admiral, raid that it had like to force the Dardanelli, thought scope until then inviolabili, to catch up the Turkish fleet moored to Nagara and to torpedo it.

The ships that participated to the most audacious raid were the Spica torpedo boats, commant from the lieutenant UMBERTO BUCCI that had with himself the second lieutenants PANUNZIO and CARASSO and the lieutenant machinist DE LEONARDO, the Climene (ten. of boat vessel CARL FENZI, sottoten. MONTELLA and LUZZI, ten. macch. CHILLEMI), the Perseo (ten. of boat vessel GIUSEPPE SIRIANNI, sott. COMMERSATTI and PITTALUGA and sott. macch. BOSCARO); the Goshawk (ten. of boat vessel STANISLAO of SUM, second lieutenants FROM TUSCANY and LEOPARD, sottoten. macch. FAITHFUL) and the Centauro (ten. of BROWN ITALIAN boat vessel, second lieutenants OF the ROCCA and ROSSINI, ten. macch. PICCIARDI.). They were five torpedo boats of high sea, a little advanced tonnage to the 200 tons, that they had a speed of 24 nodes, a range of approximately 2000 miles and were armed with three guns from 47 mill. and of 3 tubes lanciasiluro.

We bring back the relation sended from same commander MILLO to vice-admiral the TREE-LINED AVENUE:

“II day 14 July, to the 4 antemeridian ones, as a result of the orders receipts, I left Stampalia with the “Pisani, the naval destroyers Borea and Nembo and the torpedo boats of high sea Spica, Centauro, Goshawk, Climene and Perseo, directing for the bay of Parthani in the island of Leros. Here I arranged the disembarkation from the torpedo boads of the material not closely necessary. I communicated that opportunely trasbordato on the Spica in order to lead the recognition personally, while the Pisani, on which commander MARZOLO in order to replace to me temporary was boarded, with the naval destroyer Nembo and Borea would have helped the enterprise accompanying to the mouth the torpedo boats. The two naval destroyer would eventually have had to execute of the external demonstrations during the inner action. The bad time obligated to me to remain to Parthani until the sunset of day 17, pointing out to improve, left that anchorage directing to me to E layers completing navigation of night to darkened lights so as to to hold the hidden operation for how much possible one. I have chosen Layers because not connected in some way with other islands, because little lived and outside of every line struck from the steamboats and because me it has seemed the only island that could be used in order to remain you for some hidden hour

to the deep one to attend to you the evening in order to move then to the Dardanelli.

Lemnos, Imbros, Tenedos Metellino would sure have corresponded better to the scope because more neighbors to the place of the action, but they did not give no emergency that our movements were not optically signal you to the enemy who was instead necessary to be strange, for which the choice could not fall that on Layers.

To Layers the torpedo boads in day 18 from the afternoon to the sunset made to rest the crews, to clean up the furnaces and all they predisposed for the recognition. Shortly before a departure from Layers trasbordai personally from the Pisani on the Spica assuming therefore the commando direct of the squadron of high sea destined to operate and leaving that one of the Pisani and the two naval destroyer commander MARZOLO.

The Pisani, second the agreements taken, movements from Layers to hours 18 of day 18, to the speed of 12 miles, continuation from the squadron to my commando and from the section of the naval destroyer. The time was good and calm the sea. A light haze to the horizon induced to think that from the far islands of Lemnos, Imbros and Tenedos they would not have noticed to us, sicché, with appropriate routes was annoying for being to the 23,30 in the established point. Starting on the Dardanelli the floodlights of the external defense in action to Elles Head were discovered to us and to Kum-Kalè which allowed us to identify the opening of the strait where I counted to enter, as it happened, after the midnight.

“Left to the 23,30 the Pisani in the above-mentioned point I have, with the squadron of high sea, directed in order to feed the Dardanelli to 12 miles of speed, and in order to pass possibly unnoticed I have ordered the line of row (Spica, Perseo, Goshawk, Climene, Centauro). Little stated after one contrary current of two miles, I increased the speed to 1.5. The floodlight of Kum-Kalè held the fixed bundle that we crossed without being discoveries. Those of Elles instead explored and of they had already exceeded the devious one when that inner one fixed on the Goshawk that was the n. 3 following it for some minute. We made broken off then for the Levant.

“It was then to the 0,40 approximately, than Elles Head, with a rocket and gun shot it gave the alarm, that it was repeated along the strait with marks them luminous. To the alarm they followed you vary gun shots. It projects them fell in waters of the squadron. Since the defense appeared weak, decided to continue the recognition and to be left over in the strait in order then to decide from it is made to second of the distance and increased the speed to 20 miles I directed to extend very give the coast of Europe close in order to avoid the mined zone of sea. They were at the same time enters in action numerous floodlights to you that subsequently were identify to you as it follows: Foci of the Smandara; Teken; Kilid-Bahr; Cianal; Mejdieh battery between Cianak and Nagara; others two to east north of Kilid Bahr, beyond to those of the ships that we only noticed in action when we were near Cianak.

“The enemy fire was then stopped, but it marks them luminous long indugiavano the heights and announced a next resumption low when we would be joints in the field of shooting of other batteries. Extending the coast of Europe to high speed I discovered the floodlight of Smandara all at once; that until then the light bundle was looked at alone. We passed some in short distance, sicché, could not illuminate to us to the devious one, for the too much depression, but only after, when it succeeded to introduce itself in direction of the valley where the small torrent slides.

I have seen personally the arms of the man who in shirt sleeves maneuvered the floodlight and even heard the commando who had to be that one of attention of the battery situated to ridosso in the valley because little after the Spica was invested to short distance from a discharge of small-caliber guns, discharge that of it perforated the funnel in more points.

The floodlight of Smandara allowed me to costatare that the squadron was annoying in ordered line of row at a distance locked and that although the enemy fire that subsequently invested the torpedo boads, the commanders good lead their unit in precise formation.

“Continuing we were object of shooting from moschetteria part and of other batteries of which I cannot specify the location because the numerous floodlights in whose field we entered concentrated all their makes us on the Spica that in order before risbucava along the coast and was left over, quickly, to the speed of 23 miles.

I recognized in such feature the floodlights of the enemy ships to Nagara (are seemed seven) in function and other coastal of which I have made signal, let alone that one to me of the Potenky-Schevket cruiser. From the deep one endured to north of Cianak the batteries they continued the fire and they opened it as we were left over and the prow water mirror appeared completely illuminated like in broad daylight. The Spica has arrived therefore to high velocity to the tip of Kilid-Bahr, approaching quickly from two sides in order not to allow to the enemy a shooting effective and I observed I pull of an enemy battery that is found to Kilid-Bahr hidden to who comes from south and with the field of shooting towards Levant, much lowland, when the torpedo boat on which I was (Spica) slowed down quickly and it stopped itself in little meters while the propellers were arrested of blow. The commander of the Spica (first lieutenant BUCCI) endured maneuvered very arditamente in order to get rid hardly succeeding you after two or three minuteren, and replaced therefore endured to all force the two blots some. That happened in correspondence to the line of shooting that limits to north the obstruction of torpedos and approximately runs from Kilid Bahr to Cianak when that is the reflectors of the ships to Nagara were discovered and therefore near the point more to east than Kilid Bahr to little tens of meters from it.

“Considered the abrupt way of the detention of the Spica and the arrest of the two propellers, they are induced to believe that it has invested of steel cables or other material from clogging, but from which with hoped fortune it succeeded to get rid. The arrest of the torpedo boat on which I found allowed me to observe the mirror of water to the combining north of Kilidi Bahr-Cianak well, which, was all illuminated much good from the numerous enemy floodlights. The battery of Kilid Bahr to rapid fire had while opened the systematic, simultaneous fire for zones to blank with raises increasing, understandings to hit any floating was last near the tip as it was necessary to make in order to avoid the obstructions.

In similar conditions, caught up the scope of the recognition tidy to me, with no probability to succeed in to torpedo the enemy, with the certainty that the torpedo boats to my commando would have been subsequently invested and destroyed from it projects them enemy talks nonsense to short distance and one could not have continued towards the ships, since the squadron was still intact and the enemy ships to two miles more to north, then I have judged useless the sacrifice of men and torpedo boats in order to continue without some hope and succeeding probability of and thought mine it must arrest the recognition and retreat. Gotten rid, as I have said, fortunately the Spica, I have ordered therefore the withdrawn one to south without numeration subjection approaching to straight with all the bar. The squadron entered all therefore in the minefield, taking to the way of the return under the fire of all the coastal batteries and of the fleet and illuminated from the numerous floodlights. And it is to the Valentia and the boldness of the commanders who I must if investments between the several units in therefore difficult surf did not happen. The Spica, remittance to all force, I have from this directed squadron in order to exit the minefield and to extend the coast of Europe. In a feature we newly became target to the shooting of the several batteries, but especially of that one of the foce of the Smandara. Not we had but that floodlights to devious and approached gaft sicché the every torpedo boad with opportune succeeded to also avoid that the enemy could hit it, continuing everyone to maintain to high speed and the routes in order to exit from the strait.

“In the feature to south and east south of Smandara the enemy fire stopped for a sure feature and with the Spica in head I directed in order to pass between Kum-Kalè and Capo Elles where the defense seemed to be in our wait. The floodlights of Kum Kalè and Elles Head were revolts inside and frequent it marks them luminous indicated ours to approximate.

The squadron launch to the maximum speed, at first online of row, then without formation for the approached ones of every torpedo boad, understandings to escape makes us of the floodlights and to avoid the regolarizzazione of the shooting enemy, it has happily and without sensitive damages crossed also the zone of shooting of the batteries of the external step (Kum Kalè and Capo Elles) maintaining itself joined. II enemy fire was to blank of small guns and medium-caliber gun and is seemed to me anch'esso, for the regolarità observed in the fall points, with prepared punteria. Then the guns of heavy caliber joined also, whose it projects them fell to short distance from the Spica. The fire of Elles Head was the much alive one than that one than Kum Kalè and the enemy badly made great ammunition consumption directing but its shooting, while the floodlights succeeded to hold to us over a long time span under their action and appeared very maneuvered.

Exceeded combining Head Elles-Kum Kalè, I sighted the section of the naval destroyers and with it I rejoined myself with the Pisani on which taken boarding continuing for Stampalia. The damages brought back from the five torpedo boats for the enemy fire are of no entity and they are reassumed as it follows: Spica, some blows to the funnel, from 70 millimeters, the others of minor bore. It projects them are not exploded. Small-caliber goshawk, two blows in the hull, from 57 millimeters approximately, the others in the soprastrutture and the blanket material. Perseo, one ten of blows from 25 millimeters in covered and the hull, the other torpedo boads null. No wounded and no dead man. The recognition has had most important turns out to you in order to establish which is the conditions of the defense of the Dardanelli.

“Conclusion: Since the action was decided and communicated to Leros the commanders as I meant to carry out it, I stated endured the elevated moral and professional preparation of everyone of they and brought to me poscia on the torpedo boads, also the high feeling of the duty that animated all, official and low force, sicché of it I had great comfort for the arduous mission to complete. All the personal saying place under my orders, under the alive enemy fire has lead like best I could not have wished. And a particular signal deserves the lieutenants who give little hours on the torpedo boads have been to the fire with juvenile self-confidence, and the directors of machine with the employee staff from they, which have lead the drive systems, some of which give much time in service, in perfect way, developing elevated speed without to go encounter to some damage.

In pressed of the Smandara the enemy floodlight it allowed to notice me the entire squadron that he followed me to 22 miles of speed in formation locked like if under the enemy fire muovesse in parade. Then I have felt the high value of ciascuna unit and the word “Bravo” is exited to me spontaneous from the labbra. It can the Spica free when Bahr was entangled to Kilid and the which could possession to resume its place in spite of the rolling up of the propellers is tito it of honor for its commander and its staff of machine. E' to ascribe itself to great fortune that is not remained here, to strain to peak, like I had already thought to order, but to push beyond Kilid Bahr to see the conditions of defense of the enemy, and to costatarla they give near. Once caught up the scope of the recognition, to want to continue was to go encounter to useless sacrifice without some hope to torpedo the enemy.

The mind has not come us less and solo the exact ascertainment of the conditions of the enemy me has been of guide in the taken decision ".

Borys

[PhilB]

Thanks for that Borys. I think I got the gist! Phil B

[Borys]

Ahoj!

You're wellcome, Phil!

Borys

[centurion]

Does anyone know what class of torpedo boats these were? A class 1 torpedo boat was about the size of a small destroyer and getting a half flotilla of these so far up would be quite an achievement but a class 3 boat was little more than a fast steam launch armed with a single torpedo (a steam version of the 1st coastal motor boats). They were often carried on major warships and launched close to their targets. These might get quite a long way even before being noticed but wouldn't pose a huge threat and would probably have problems with the strong current flowing through the narrows in the opposite direction. (class 1 torpedo boat etc were generic catagories in much the same way as heavy cruiser, light cruiser etc). In WW1 the Italians were kings of the small torpedo boat and did the KuK navy a lot of damage with them

[Borys]

Ahoj!

If these are the Pegaso class, then it would be 216 tons:

165 feet waterline lenght

17'5" beam

5'10" draught

3x47 (3 pounder) guns

3x18 inch (450mm) torpedos

26 knots

[per ardua per mare per terram]

In addition to the Admiralty correspondence Churchill and Fisher could have read about Duckworth’s expedition in: William Laird Clowes, ‘The Royal Navy - A History from the Earliest Times to 1900’ and William James, ‘The Naval History of Great Britain.’

If they did they would have found that the 1807 expedition was not a success and didn’t achieve anything: the Turks were not intimidated, the ships could not sustain themselves and Constantinople did not fall. It did not get commemorated on the Naval General Service Medal. Hardly the most inspiring example to look to!