Lions Led by Donkeys?

[Robert Dunlop]

Hi and welcome to the forum

There have been several discussions about General Haig on the forum. You should use the search facility, which should quickly bring up the variety of views that are held about Haig.

Second, you have developed some important themes in the work that you posted. Notably, his lack of awareness, particularly of the impact of modern firearms. In considering this issue, you need to be clear about whether you are referring to Haig as a general or as commander-in-chief. Check out:

http://www.1914-1918.net/whoswho.htm

for a brief history of Haig's experience in the First World War. Do you know what experience he had of modern war before becoming Commander-in-Chief?

Check out:

http://www.1914-1918.net/wf.htm

notably the battles of Mons, Ypres (1914), Neuve Chapelle, Festubert, and Loos in which Haig played a part.

On the issue of 1st July, the Battle of the Somme, read the following example of an attack on this day:

http://www.1914-1918.net/BATTLES/bat15_somme/montauban.htm

In light of this, and bearing in mind your original comment ("if he gave out the right orders and knew the ground he was fighting on then maybe there wouldnt have been as many as 21,000 people killed on the 1t of july in the battle of the somme"), why was there such a contrast on the right flank? What does this tell you about Haig's role in the planning and execution of the attacks on July 1?

Best of luck with the finished work.

Robert

[Ste]

... Boers. Bombarding their positions did not generally dislodge them, and although shapnel over their trenches caused serious casualties, it only needed a surviving handful of men to wreck havoc on the advancing British lines due to their high standard of marksmanship.

Then the idea of the creeping barrage was conceived. The artillery was split between bombarding the Boer trenches in the traditional pattern to make the defenders keep their heads down, whilst at the same time providing a creeping curtain of fire behind which the British advanced until they were close enough to rush the Boer trenches with the bayonet.

I think this is the crucial thing, moving away from trying to destroy defenders and defences, towards suppressing them at the crucial moments when the infantry is advancing on their position.

Prior and Wilson's Command on the Western Front is very good on how Rawlinson's army used these two approaches in preparation for, and on the first day of, the Somme. The preceeding bombardment attempted to destroy the German positions, but some divisions chose to operate a creeping barrage in an attempt to suppress the defenders as the infantry approached.

Even had pre-war doctrine stressed the importance of infantry attacks being supported by creeping, suppressing barrage wherever possible, one should not underestimate the difficulties in employing it in practice. The vast expansion of the army, mixed quality of shells and fuses, and serious communications difficulties experienced between the attacking force and their artillery support meant that there was much to go wrong in any attempt at a creeping barrage.

However, these problems should not have led to the conlcusion that a mammoth destructive barrage would of itself be sufficient. I believe there was sufficient evidence about the depth (vertical) of German positions to indicate that a large proportion of the defenders would be left alive come the morning of 1 July. To base the infantry attack plan on the assumption that the defenders would be dead without adopting other mitigating measures (Russian saps, nocturnal advance into no-man's land, creeping barrage, smoke...) was folly indeed.

S

[AndyHollinger]

However, these problems should not have led to the conlcusion that a mammoth destructive barrage would of itself be sufficient. I believe there was sufficient evidence about the depth (vertical) of German positions to indicate that a large proportion of the defenders would be left alive come the morning of 1 July. To base the infantry attack plan on the assumption that the defenders would be dead without adopting other mitigating measures (Russian saps, nocturnal advance into no-man's land, creeping barrage, smoke...) was folly indeed.

"should have led to the conclusion" ... is a key phrase. Howso? "sufficient evidence" is another. Where was this evidence in 1916?

Lee should have known his barrage was aimed too high to destroy the Federal line? Monday morning analysis is always 20-20.

[Ste]

"should have led to the conclusion" ... is a key phrase.  Howso? 

"sufficient evidence" is another.  Where was this evidence in 1916?

Lee should have known his barrage was aimed too high to destroy the Federal line?  Monday morning analysis is always 20-20.

Andy,

I misled if my words seemed to mean that I think difficulties with the suppressing/barrage alone made Rawlison decide to use a prologed 'destructive' barrage; there were other factors.

However, regarding evidence, I recall that intelligence existed shortly before the opening of the Somme offensive that the Germans were building dug-outs much deeper than were likely to be destroyed by British artillery. This was based upon dugouts entered during trench raids and experiments about the weight of fire needed to neutralise specific lengths of entrenchments. Prior and Wilson give the specifics, I'll fish it out. In short, it was clear that the initial Somme barrage was relatively less dense than previous barrages known to have failed against shallower entrenchments. They conclude that contemporary analysis of the problem should have concluded that many German defenders would be left alive on 1st July 1916.

Prior and Wilson's approach is as far from 'Monday morning analysis' as it is possible to achieve after the event; rather, it seems a perceptive judgement on an important aspect of the Army Commander's critical faculties.

Yes, Rawlinson should have known that the initial Somme barrage was inadeqaute to achieve its stated purpose.

Cheers,

Ste