Lions Led by Donkeys?

[brindlerp]

By Dr Gary Sheffield

The scale of human devastation during World War One has often been blamed on incompetent leadership. Dr Gary Sheffield offers an alternative view.

For those who have not seen this very interesting article, check out >

http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/war/wwone/lio...onkeys_01.shtml

Contents:

1. The generals

2. Haig and the Allies

3. Techniques and strategies

4. Breakthrough battle

5. Military revolution

6. Find out more

[michaeldr]

brindlerp,

Thanks for putting up the conection to that article; an interesting read but,

quote from page 4

"Then, behind a 'creeping barrage' of shells, perfected since its introduction in late 1915......"

Why was the creeping barrage only introduced in late 1915? Its effectiveness was known about since the Russo-Japanese War ten or more years earlier. The British had observers there, amongst them Jardine who told Rawlinson (1916) that the leading troops were not close enough to the barrage and suggested 30 to 40 yards. " 'Well Sir, that's what the Japanese did.' And Rawlinson replied 'Oh, the Japanese' in a rather sneering way." [Travers 'The Killing Ground']

My argument with the school of thought represented by Dr. Sheffield is, having gone to the trouble of sending observers to see new techniques in operation at someone else's expense, why were the lessons not learnt for 10 years or more? Why was the creeping barrage introduced only in 1915 and still being perfected in the following years?

The attitude represented by Rawlinson suggestion that there was nothing to learn, especially from the Japanese, to my mind lends a lot of weight to the 'led by Donkeys' argument.

Regards

Michael D.R.

[AndyHollinger]

One of the major problems of any post event analysis is trying to understand who knew what, when. Take the current WMD fiasco (please! )

People writing military history take stands based on Monday Morning QBing (That term may or maynot work in the UK, what is the proper expression, there?) Frederick Maurice and Liddel Hart were famous for that.

Remember each commander had to integrate his own pervious experience and training with the demands of the day (strategic and tactical) all filtered through his own eyes of what was possible by those doing it.

Historians and enthusiasts of the American Civil War have been debating the Lee / Longstreet set of issues since April 1865. You don't get published supporting DS Freeman so Longstreet has a lot of press. The crux of the argument is Longstreet saying one should be on the strategic offensive but tactical defensive - well, all fine and good, but Fredericksburgs and Bull Run II don't come into play every day, plus they lose the initiative ... suffice it to say, that the falicies of commanders are always called into question by those who know better.

Heck, I still do it by way of saying the Command Structure of the American Army during Viet Nam completely missed the boat ... (boy will that get some rises!) Not only did the knuckle under to a DOD whiz kid for career advancement (hey because they run the place doesn't mean you have to say yes) they spent a generation of American lives (mine, thank you) doing worthless stuff and killing a lot of people who didn't need to be killed! The Command set up processes that eroded American military capabilities simply to punch tickets ... etc. etc. etc.

Sound familiar to the issue at question. Now, if you're trying to support the Lions led by Donkeys thing ... are you saying Haig was as bad as Westmorland?

A real question would be whether the prevailing capabilities of the British Military heirarchy even considered the Russo-Japanese war a good example of "the last war" because of racial stereotypes of both combatants. I mean would the US have looked at the Etheopean defence strategies against Italian armour? On both counts Americans would have looked elsewhere.

Net: How much relevance did the British Hierarchy give the Russo-Japanese War?

[armourersergeant]

P )

People writing military history take stands based on Monday Morning QBing (That term may or maynot work in the UK, what is the proper expression, there?) Frederick Maurice and Liddel Hart were famous for that.

Historians and enthusiasts of the American Civil War have been debating the Lee / Longstreet set of issues since April 1865.

A real question would be whether the prevailing capabilities of the British Military heirarchy even considered the Russo-Japanese war a good example of "the last war" because of racial stereotypes of both combatants. I mean would the US have looked at the Etheopean defence strategies against Italian armour? On both counts Americans would have looked elsewhere.

Net: How much relevance did the British Hierarchy give the Russo-Japanese War?

Andy.

Couple of points, with perhaps the main point being not how much relevance did they put to the russo/jap war but how much should they have put. That said it should not be supposed that they should run out and adopt every tatic seen just because it work in a 'single' secenario.

Second point, I dont understand the terminology (Qbing) as such but I would assume that it means that they were always good at predicting the way to go after the event had failed? As an aside to that you mention Maurice who I have always seen as an honest chap do you have a theory to differ that opinion as I would be interested in that.

lastly.....Longstreet was right wasnt he...after all Tom Berringer was better than Martin Sheen I have always pondered that Lee was/is overated?

Arm.

[AndyHollinger]

A couple of ideas:

I have always used Maurice as a reference ... he tries despretly hard to be "fair" in the context of the day ... it's like the Times, you know it's a tory newspaper and I know, but they are more than fair, most of the time. I respect Maurice and use him as my central source ...

I think it would have been a stretch for the British to get R/J war experience into their thinking ... might have been very useful and probably should have been ... but based on the two participants, I don't think many people would take it very seriously ... Kinda like looking at the Spanish Navy in the S/A war as a good source of how WWI naval actions would take place ...

As for Lee / Longstreet ... this could be a hornet's nest. No, Lee is not a God ... HOWEVER, that said, There is only one Episcopal church not named after a saint or theological event, etc. and that is Robert E Lee Memorial Church in Lexington, Va. Longstreet was, in my opinion as wrong as a second level commander could be .... he didn't have the responsibility of saving the doomed Confederacy ... waiting wouldn't work ... only the aggressive assertion of independence would work and that only if the Union let it work ... Lee's major falicy was in not understanding how much T. Jackons's style was unique and not being forceful enough with his lieutenants ... had he pushed them, Cemetary Ridge and Culps hill would have been southern and it may have made a difference ... But, the Confederacy was doomed the moment it took the field ... well, enough on that subject ... believe me I could go on and on ...

And when all else fails ... understand that Longstreet was a Republican!

[AndyHollinger]

I'm sorry, I couldn't help myself ... This is the statue that sits in the sanctuary above Lee's tomb.

No, not dead, but resting on his Army cot. True the "Lost Cause" people deified Lee ... not all too unjustly ... and it is said that DS Freeman never left his knees while writing his biography ... but, all said and done, HE was the Confederacy and never faced a foe at less than 1 to 3 odds ... winning more than any other - mortal - could ... while losing (and rightly so) in the end. I can find faults in his actions as ANV commander - and most of them are command personality faults ... he trusted his subordinates to do the right thing, all too often ... he let Longstreet sulk and lag and wasn't forceful enough in explaining to his corp command what they needed to do ... and these are pretty dire problems for an army commander ... but over-all, there are few in history who could stand with him in military prowess or even manly character.

but, that's just my opinion, I could be wrong ...

[Michael]

Andy

Nice picture. Is the tomb at the Robert E Lee Memorial Church ?

Michael

[armourersergeant]

Andy,

We are in danger of being told off and having to stand in the corner by taking this topic off, though as an effort to keep it on track I have just bought for myself for xmas the book by Nancy maurice about her fathers troubles with Lloyd-George and also his two vol bio of Haldane that he wrote. they are all wrapped away awaiting 25th have you read either?

Also I must have touched a nerve regarding Lee so I will leave alone other than to say that Lee has never had a facination for me though Longstreet has. It also seems ironic to me that certainly 'over here' Pickett seems to collect blame fro the charge, though it seems to me that it is a bit like blaming the poor colonel who led his men over the top in WW1.

Are there any books you would recommend regarding Longstreet that give a true vision of the man that you percieve him to be as I have only read one book by Jeffry d. Wert. it was on the whole biased to Longstreet though did lay some blame etc in his direction. I am also wondering what is a good bio of Jackson who was IMO the best of the best in the war. I think that his campaigns were studied by WW1 officers at staff college if i remeber rightly from things I have read.

Arm.

[BMoorhouse]

quote from page 4

"Then, behind a 'creeping barrage' of shells, perfected since its introduction in late 1915......"

Why was the creeping barrage only introduced in late 1915? Its effectiveness was known about since the Russo-Japanese War ten or more years earlier. The British had observers there, amongst them Jardine who told Rawlinson (1916) that the leading troops were not close enough to the barrage and suggested 30 to 40 yards. " 'Well Sir, that's what the Japanese did.' And Rawlinson replied 'Oh, the Japanese' in a rather sneering way." [Travers 'The Killing Ground']

The attitude represented by Rawlinson suggestion that there was nothing to learn, especially from the Japanese, to my mind lends a lot of weight to the 'led by Donkeys' argument.

Far from being a donkey when it came to the implementation of the creeping barrage, Rawlinson was amongst the earliest to use it on the Western Front. (The barrage fired by 15th divn gunners at Loos - details of the use of a method [not called a creeping barrage] are in Budworth's "remarks on IV Corps Artillery Operations 6/10/15, Rawlinson Papers at the National Army Museum.

The reason why it was probably not implemented before this is hinted at in the title of the report which includes reference to an "Estimate of the Ammunition Required". It should never be forgotten that all British commanders in the first few years of the war laboured under severe shell shortages - which were not beginning to be alleviated until late 1915. Creeping barrages were expensive on ammunition, and needed a reasonably high concentration of guns to be effective.

Batching of artillery shells had also not been properly implemented (due to the previously scattered 'private contractor' approach to purchasing ammunition and a lack of proper quality control methods). This led to a lot of 'shorts' in the early part of the war. Not particularly pleasant for the following infantrymen.

Rawlinson (Tactical Notes from a Conference at Army HQ 16/4/16) was a clear and unequivocal supporter of the creeping barrage. "The idea is for the artillery to keep thir fire immediately in front of the infantry as the latter advances."

[AndyHollinger]

Andy,

We are in danger of being told off and having to stand in the corner by taking this topic off, though as an effort to keep it on track I have just bought for myself for xmas the book by Nancy maurice about her fathers troubles with Lloyd-George and also his two vol bio of Haldane that he wrote. they are all wrapped away awaiting 25th have you read either?

Also I must have touched a nerve regarding Lee so I will leave alone other than to say that Lee has never had a facination for me though Longstreet has. It also seems ironic to me that certainly 'over here' Pickett seems to collect blame fro the charge, though it seems to me that it is a bit like blaming the poor colonel who led his men over the top in WW1.

Are there any books you would recommend regarding Longstreet that give a true vision of the man that you percieve him to be as I have only read one book by Jeffry d. Wert. it was on the whole biased to Longstreet though did lay some blame etc in his direction. I am also wondering what is a good bio of Jackson who was IMO the best of the best in the war. I think that his campaigns were studied by WW1 officers at staff college if i remeber rightly from things I have read.

Arm.

I know we're going in several different directions here .... so in respectful fear of the moderators - I will respond just a bit. And I ask the moderators to let me reply but not take the conversation further. Maybe we should have a new thread on Utterly Off Topic?

First the picture is the recumbant Lee in Lee Chapel on the campus of Washington and Lee University (of which I am humble graduate) and I took it. Anyone is free to use it respectfully. R E Lee Memorial Episcopal is about 200 m down the path from his office, which was in the basement of the chapel. Traveler's grave is just outside the office door. (I was present at his burial in 1972 after being "found" in a storeroom in the Chemistry dept. - Little Sorrel - Jackson's horse - is stuffed and stands, proudly in the basement of their church over at VMI - about a mile away.)

Longstreet is the pre-ennial "#2, I told you so" guy ... the best book I know to put it into perspective is Gary Gallagher's new book (really a collection of older essays) Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia (you realize I have to genuflect everytime I say ANV!) His larger anthology of Lee: The Soldier is very, very good. The young buck historians now praising Longstreet are, I believe, blowing him out of proportion. And yes, Pickett is not to blame ... one must either blame Longstreet for delaying or Lee for ordering it in the first place and not making Longstreet obey orders (but Lee and his digestive tract did get in the way). No soldier could ever blame Pickett.

The BEST book on Jackson - by far - no questions asked - is Bud Robertson's Jackson. He is an aquaintance of mine - he being much too revered and important and our association too minor to be considered friendship. The book follows Jackson down to the minutes of his life. It shows, I believe Jackson to be the Tactical genius he was, but unable to grasp the war outside either the contest of the moment or it's biblical interpretation. Lee and Jackson rival any military partnership in history! With this book you have the whole picture.

In US Army training, we still - or did 30 years ago- study Chancellorsville as the "perfect" battle ...

Haldane - Here we get back to the BA - I have the two volume Maurice bio and it's spendid - however if you look at a thread I have on him elsewhere in this forum, there were several suggestions for more recent scholarship.

[Tim Birch]

quote from page 4

Why was the creeping barrage only introduced in late 1915?

Far from being a donkey when it came to the implementation of the creeping barrage, Rawlinson was amongst the earliest to use it on the Western Front.

The first recorded use of a creeping barrage was during the Anglo-Boer War by Buller's Army following the successful crossing of the Tugela and the battles for the heights between Colenso and Ladysmith in 1900

[Robert Dunlop]

The evolution of artillery tactics is an important topic. At the outset of the war, the British principally used direct aimed fire. The aim was to have the artillery up with and in direct support of the infantry. The Germans used a similar approach for field artillery. However, they had also developed the use of observed fire for their howitzer batteries.

In open warfare, there was a reliance on shrapnel. It was extremely effective against large infantry formations in the open. It could also make a mess of gun crews. So the Royal Artillery could do a lot of damage to the advancing German infantry in the opening days of the war but in turn, their policy of maintaining the batteries well forward made the guns very vulnerable. Le Cateau is the example where the artillery helped slow down the German advance, only to find itself sustaining serious losses in doing so.

Then everyone started digging in. By the Battle of the Marne, British artillery was beginning to use observed fire. As I recall, the crossing of the Aisne was the first occasion when an aerial observer was used. In the defence of First Ypres, the artillery had problems in delivering timely and accurate observed fire. However, forward observations, balloons, and aerial observation became the norm.

In the early battles of 1915, trenches were less sophisticated, especially in the Flanders region where the high water table required breastworks. The Germans did not use the same degree of defence in depth as they did later in the war. So the Battle of Neuve Chappelle, where a short preliminary bombardment of observed fire was used, demonstrated that large sections of trench and some German strongpoints could be demolished. This opened the way for an infantry break-in. It was perceived that the failure to break-through was due to the presence of undamaged strongpoints, particularly on the left flank. The answer was to bombard the German defences for longer, with the aim of killing the Germans and leaving the way free for the infantry.

Subsequent early failures with this new tactic were put down to lack of ammunition. Thus, when the Battle of the Somme was planned in 1916, the idea was to blast the hell out of the frontline for days and let the infantry walk over. The creeping barrage was advocated to protect the infantry advance but while 'the Artillery Commanders understood what was wanted... in a number of cases they could not convince divisional and brigade commanders of its merits, and many remained unconvinced. They still wanted concentrations of fire on the enemy trenches themselves and missed the point that, to be effective, the fire must start well on the "home side" of the enemy, to protecting the infantry as they moved forward. It was (and still is) a principle that in the last resort the fireplan was a commander's own decision, and thus it was. Of the six corps engaged, VIII Corps ordered a creeping barrage to lift by 100 yards every two minutes; XIII and XV Corps adopted a partial moving barrage and the three remaining corps did not 'creep' and abandoned the idea of a barrage at all'.

On the British right, XIIIth Corps also made effective use of counter-battery fire leading up to and on the morning of July 1. CB fire was just as important as the creeping barrage. This, coupled with the effect of bombarding of key strategic communications and other targets with French 240mm mortars in the preparatory phase meant that the infantry were able to make a significant penetration into the German front at Montauban. Elsewhere, well that's painful history.

Rawlinson had responsibility for XIIIth Corps but there is some evidence that he was reluctant to go along with the plan for a creeping barrage. However, by July 14th he was persuaded and the assault on Bazentin used a creeping barrage along the line. The infantry crept well forward so that they could closely follow the barrage, just as 18th Division (XIIIth Corps) had done on July 1. Not surprisingly, Ivor Maxse was responsible for this tactic.

Of interest, Rawlinson had a real problem trying to persuade Haig that the new tactic would work. However, the key issue was not the creeping barrage but the forming-up of the infantry at night.

Slowly but surely, it became widely accepted that bombardments were needed to suppress rather than destroy. The epitome of this thinking was pre-registered fire, which did not 'creep' but lifted from target to target. Without any preparatory fire, this tactic was devastating. It enabled maximum surprise, maximum suppression of the enemy, and caused less damage to the battlefield.

Robert

[Greg]

Artillery tactics are a fascinating area. I would recommend a number of sources. JBA Baileys Field Artillery and Firepower( very hard to get hold of ) is very interesting. Bailey went on to do a lot of work on doctrine and has lectured to the WFA. Zabecki D., Steel Wind, which is a study of German artillery tactics used by Colonel Bruchmuller. This draws on some of Bailey's work.It is also good on task organisations. The Journal of the Royal Artillery for the war years and through to about 1924 has a whole series of articles about technical and command issues.( I think Naval nad Military Press has three articles published as a book in their current list.

Greg

[Tim Birch]

Following my post about the use of the creeping barrage during the push for Ladysmith in 1900 it is strange that the British seemed to have forgotten the lessons they learnt here only 15 years later.

During the early Anglo-Boer War battles the British suffered heavy casualties when trying to cross open ground to attack well concealed and dug in Boers. Bombarding their positions did not generally dislodge them, and although shapnel over their trenches caused serious casualties, it only needed a surviving handful of men to wreck havoc on the advancing British lines due to their high standard of marksmanship.

Then the idea of the creeping barrage was conceived. The artillery was split between bombarding the Boer trenches in the traditional pattern to make the defenders keep their heads down, whilst at the same time providing a creeping curtain of fire behind which the British advanced until they were close enough to rush the Boer trenches with the bayonet.

The adoption of these tactics was highly sucessful resulting in the capture of a string of stategically held hills at minimal loss to the attackers.

Yet, in common with a lot of the lessons learnt in South Africa, the concept of the creeping barrage seems to have faded away by 1914, and had to be re-invented in 1915.

Tim

[BMoorhouse]

It was perceived that the failure to break-through was due to the presence of undamaged strongpoints, particularly on the left flank. The answer was to bombard the German defences for longer, with the aim of killing the Germans and leaving the way free for the infantry.

Subsequent early failures with this new tactic were put down to lack of ammunition. Thus, when the Battle of the Somme was planned in 1916, the idea was to blast the hell out of the frontline for days and let the infantry walk over.

I agree entirely, and also that not all infantry commanders were convinced at the effects of the creeping barrage. BUT the 1st July 1916 artillery/infantry tactics appear to me to have been a deliberate decision not borne of ignorance (or forgetting prior experience) but through what had been 'learnt' in the fighting in 1915.

I agree that 60,000 casualties in one day is good evidence that they 'got it wrong'. In my view the principal reason for this was the German change in defensive tactics between 1915 and 1916 - moving to a deeper battlefield (not to mention deeper dugouts). Had German defensive methods not changed there might have been a significant breakthrough using the tactics the British employed. Hindsight is a wonderful thing!

Brendon.

[michaeldr]

Brendon,

Correct me if I am wrong, but I thought that the change in German defence tactics came about later, with the change in their command, when Falkenhayn was replaced by Hindenburg & Ludendorff: "The Principles of Field Construction" 13 Nov '16 and "The Principles of Command in the Defensive Battle in Position Warfare" 1 Dec '16

Regards

Michael D.R.

[Robert Dunlop]

German defensive tactics evolved throughout. The concept of defence in greater depth arose, in part, out of the experience of Neuve Chappelle. The Allied forces had broken the German defences on the right. However, they stopped short (as ordered) of breaking out and by the time an assault was made on the Bois du Biez, it was too late. Although a break-out was not achieved, the Germans realised it was a near run thing.

By 1916, the concept was to have several lines of defence, with the first lightly held. Where possible, deeper defensive positions should be hidden from view (die leere des gefechtfeldes - the 'empty battlefield'). Trenches would be located on reverse slopes and machine gun posts should be undetectable from ground or air. It was accepted that the attacker might penetrate into the defenses but then there would be an immediate response (schlagfertigkeit). Two types of counter-attack were made: immediate (gegenstoss) and delayed (gegenangriff). Both were designed to catch the attacker off-guard, preferably from the flanks, after the attacker had become disorganised and had gone beyond the reach of the supporting artillery. Counter-attack formations were kept in large shell-proof bunkers and shelters throughout the battlefield, particularly towards the rear.

Until von Falkenhayn was replaced, the aim of the counter-attacks were to regain all lost ground. This cost the Germans dearly on the Somme. Even in Third Ypres, this German defensive trait was exploited by Plumer in the 'bite and hold' tactics. British advances were made just far enough to keep the attackers in range of their artillery, who would then punish the German counter-attacks.

Ludendorff did seek to loosen this idea of recapturing ground. He wrote: 'Without doubt (the German infantry) fought too doggedly (on the Somme), clinging to the mere holding of ground, with the result that the losses were heavy'. Nivelle's offensive on the Chemin des Dames saw the high point of the German defensive counter-attack. Messines and Third Ypres systematically undermined this doctrine, to the extent that Ludendorff and the High Command were really struggling. At one point, the Germans even went back to packing the frontline with German infantry, only to sustain huge losses in opening bombardment. The coming of winter was seen as a huge relief. I would not be surprised if the timetable of the German 1918 Spring Offensive was driven by these experiences as much as by the concern about the importance of the Americans.

Returning to the British infantry/artillery tactics on the Somme. I am not sure that German defensive tactics were the principal reason for the 60,000 casualties. I have long been intrigued by the success that the British enjoyed on the right, which was mirrored by the French success further right still. The same German defensive strategy was used. What was different was the combination of tactics: getting the troops well forward before the assault, using a protective barrage AND probably most important of all, effective counter-battery fire. It is noteworthy that the 26th Ulster Division make significant headway as well using some of these tactics, only to find their flanks in the air because neighbouring divisions did not.

'Why was there such a disparity between the offensive tactics of the different British units?' is the bigger question. Martin Samuels ("Command or Control: Command, training and tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1918' ISBN 0 7146 4214 2) gives some interesting insights into this, though I do not agree with much of what he has written. I would say that some British commanders had 'learnt' during 1915, some had not. The psychology of the failure to learn in the face of compelling evidence is not unique to British commanders but it is bought into sharp focus.

Would the outcome have been different if a unified approach had been taken? I'm not sure. Cambrai illustrated what could happen if only one defensive position (Flesquieres) were to hold out - exposed flanks can only be tolerated for a certain distance. Also, the Germans had three divisions sitting in reserve. I think a break-in would still have been contained. The width would have been greater but the depth, which was determined more by the distance of atillery support, would not. As the last 100 days showed, cavalry would not have been the answer, even supposing they could have broken-through.

With respect to German defensive doctrine, it should also be recognised that there were often gaps between what was laid down by Ludendorff and what local commanders thought best (problems with consistency of command and control were not the sole domain of the British, which is one of the reasons why I find Samuel's work too limited). Two notable examples include the Battle of Messines and the Canadian assault on Vimy Ridge. In both cases, the local commanders did not agree with the need for counter-attack troops to be present in the defensive zone. They were too far distant.

Robert

[michaeldr]

Roger,

Many thanks for detailing your thoughts on this

With particular reference to the tactics which you mention in your para V above

Jardine was one of those who was prepared to practice what he preached

putting his 97th Brigade into no-man's-land before the off so that they could better follow the barrage

Regards

Michael D.R.

[Robert Dunlop]

26th Ulster Division

Apologies for the typo - should have been 36th.

Thanks for the information about Jardine.

Robert

[mmbennett]

Yes, that article is most informative, as is Dr. Sheffield's new book, Forgotten Victory -- a concise, excellent reappraisal of the British Army in the Great War. As expected, anyone who attempts to write about the British Army of the Great War must grapple with the "lions led by donkeys" enigma that has surrounded them ever since. Whilst the fact that the Generals made mistakes is beyond doubt, what is also clear is that they did learn from their previous errors. The British Army evolved from a green and inexperienced collection of miners, farmers, shopkeepers and postmen into a highly professional, coherant force that eventually proved the better of the Germans in 1918.

Some, such as Sir Alymer Hunter-Weston and Sir Frederick Stopford leave little to write home about, but it is always the Western Front Generals who receive the most press -- Haig (more so than any other), Rawlinson and Gough.

This enigma is still very much present in the opinions of the Great War today. Just before Remembrance Sunday, Independent columnist Mark Steel wrote an extremely partisan article under the headline of:

Sorry, but this tradition is "Poppycock"

His argument? That the wearing of poppies was "poppycock" because they bear the name of Sir Douglas Haig! I don't like the Independent, or it's left-wing brother The Guardian, but I felt obliged to read this article simply to reinforce my own view -- and this article did reinforce my beliefs. He poured forth the classic criticisms of Haig -- "butcher", bungler", "uncaring" and "incompetant" -- arguments that have been written, re-written and repeated more times than one can count. Haig's name shall forever be associated with the first day of the Somme, yet the victories and successes of 1918 go almost unmentioned. The achievements of the British Army are neglected in favour of engaging in character assassination of figures whom the "assassin" knows little about.

Needless to say, my personal view differs substantially from that of Mr. Steel -- but his article served as a reminder that character assassination still seems to prevail when it comes to British Generalship in the Great War.

Regards,

Matt

[paul guthrie]

Matt I have posted this before but... I have run my own little experiment in Whitehall by the Haig statue, asking a stranger in my US accent, " Isn't that Haig?" and the answer is yes, that butcher, it should come down etc.

[mmbennett]

Sorry Paul, I must have missed that. What got to me about Steel's article was it's blatant use of character assassination and neglect of the achievements of the British Army. In my humble opinion, it was half of one sheet of paper wasted on partisanship.

Regards,

Matt

[Guest rivnut]

In the days of the Great War, the military establishments of most nations were commonly referred to as being "hide bound". There is no doubt that they were extremely conservative institutions. In the case of Britain, one need only remember that the Crimean and the Boer War were not that far in the past. These were amateur affairs and I doubt that, in the few years that intervened, much had changed. But, in the words of Sir John Fortescue, "It would be temerity in a civilian to give an opinion on the subject." I will say this, however, no Army likes a general that loses men in large numbers. Whether the battles fought are won or lost. Malplaquet comes to mind. Marlborough was immensly popular with the Army.

He could hardly do wrong, but the terrible slaughter followed him to his death. personally and publicly. In a day, 24,000 British officers and men were lost. Considering the times and the fact that it was primarily hand work, it rivals the worst days of WWI. It is unreasonable to single out Haig or any member of the British high command. He, like the common soldier, was a product of his time. He was not free agent. The red tape and inefficiency bound the entire army from top to bottom. I vote we either give him a break or condemn him along with the whole shebang.

Cheers,

Kev

[AndyHollinger]

Matt I have posted this before but... I have run my own little experiment in Whitehall by the Haig statue, asking a stranger in my US accent, " Isn't that Haig?" and the answer is yes, that butcher, it should come down etc.

I think one must remember the memory of the public is very fickle and subject to subsequent manipulation. Both Historians and Popular Culture are always active continually morphing the memories or quashing them altogether. There is also the Anglo love of the Underdog which seems to prevade everywhere, though it is probably stronger on this side of the Atlantic.

A couple of examples:

Chamberlin the hero, Chamberlin the goat ... a few short months and having Churchill follow him were all it took - he is a popular culture figure now, quite devoid of any real historical analysis - as is appeasement ... heck, even GW uses the reference.

Grant was incredibly popular with the Army and the GAR, etc. - won two Presidential elections based on this alone -yet he was the callous butcher of the newspapers and fought attrition style till he achieved breakout / war of manuver and victory. He is also, almost personally, a partner in saving the US as a country and as a future great power ... see April 1864 by Jay Winik and his tomb is a forgotten, musty, hangout for druggies in NYC - until the Wild Wild West resurrected him in popular culture ... to both children of the 70s (who saw the TV show) and the current movie audience who saw the movie - he's almost a good president ... There are few statues to him, not because of his generalship, but because of his presidency.

Lee, on the otherhand is criticized today for bleeding the Confederacy into defeat by the Revisionist Revisors of history yet sat on the Right Hand for generations who believed the Lost Cause theory of Southern Defeat and Redemption. He lost but was always the underdog who won battles up until the end ... and since he was, personally, beyond reproach, - except for a group now claiming he was a control freak over his daughters - he remains popular. Though statutes, street names and School names will be dissappearing fast in the next few years due to PC issues ...

No ... what people feel about leaders, especially military, is very fickle. As every platoon loves its Drill Instructor (I suspect the same is true in the BA as it is in the US Army) every victorious army loves it General even it experienced hard times ... they have to be taught to hate or despise (Kudos to Richard Rodgers) ...

Historians and the public WANT to find feet of clay and issues with those on-high, and unless they die while on top ... they usually find them.

I've saved my British examples for last ... why is it the Statue of Cromwell is so majestic and across the road from Westminster Abbey?

I suspect it was a subtle reminder to Royal authority that Parliament won the Civil War and even though a Stuart might display a rotted head on a spike, afterwards, the power lies there ... (Talk about a reputation switch - back and forth - in history - Cromwell, the soldier deserves a LOT more credit than he gets)

How about the statue to Richard C'dLion?

Talk about romanticization! Nothing in popular culture is founded in fact ... he is not the Robert Taylor of MGM or the Sean Connery of new ... nor (I forget the guy's name) actor who played him for Disney ... but a homosexual, reclass soldier who didn't give ... well - not that much - for his English dominions ... reconcile the facts about him to both the statue in London or his appearances ...

WWI is about the same ...

[Guest essay_gal]

im not sure what everyone is talking about but if you are talking about lions led by donkeys then i will tell you my side of the story...

i believe that haig was a unaware leader, not a bad general, just unaware...he apparantly had never seen a trench in the whole time he gave out his orders. i bet some of you didnt know...he basically bought his way into his place... coming from a wealthy scottish background...his wife being lady in waiting for the queen and it just so happens he was pals with the king. so who other that sir douglas haig was put in generals position. I also think that douglas haig tried to prepare the public, because he knew people were going to die, he gave a speech saying that everyone must learn to lose loved ones. i think this is wrong...if he gave out the right orders and knew the ground he was fighting on then maybe there wouldnt have been as many as 21,000 people killed on the 1t of july in the battle of the somme. i also believe he didnt realise what affects his artillary would give. giving the soldiers bayonet (which are ideal for close up shots not for long distance) to go over into no mans land, which he had no idea of how long it would be till they got to the oppositions trench, was not a good move. He was used to fighting old fasioned wars and not having machine guns that shoot 600 bullets a second...he should have known what he had let himself in for, beofre he readily agreed to the idea of being general! not all about haig was bad, maybe he never knew what type of weapons he was supposed to be using and maybe he did know tha land but didnt predict well enough what was going to happen. he was also put under extreme pressure and under alot of trust by his fellow mate the king...his tactics were supreme, using an artillary barrage to destroy the barbed wire, but it failed to work so when he sent the 750,000 men to go over the top...they couldnt do anything but to be shot down by the germans.

i believe this general took great risks but has been critisied to harshly.

please could you tell me your side of the arguement as i am only 14 and am studying this for my GCSE cousework at school.many thanks

xx