What options were there for the German surface fleet in 1917?

[ATM]

What options were there for the German surface fleet in 1917? Was there any real possibility of luring out part of the British fleet to destruction or were nibbling cruiser raids and commerce raiders the only real option?

[ionia]

What options were there for the German surface fleet in 1917? Was there any real possibility of luring out part of the British fleet to destruction or were nibbling cruiser raids and commerce raiders the only real option?

By 1917 both fleets were restricted in respect of operations in the southern North Sea by large scale mining and the increasing effectiveness of submarines. The Heligoland Bight action of November, 1917 illustrates the difficulties. The British policy was to keep the Grand Fleet north of the latitude of Horns reef (i.e. not much south of the Firth of Forth). There were no cruiser raids on the British coast subsequent to the abortive venture on 19th August, 1916. The submarine threat also restricted the use of detached squadrons and the nescessity for such was reduced by the Grand Fleet's move to Rosyth. The chances of the HSF scoring a success of this nature became remote. The two attacks by weak forces on Scandinavian convoys were the only signs of German initiative in this area until the unsuccessful sortie of HSF units in April, 1918. The use of battlecruisers for raids on commerce had been canvassed earlier.

In November of 1914 Captain Hahn of the SMS VON DER TANN had submitted to Hipper a proposal for the employment of the newer battlecruisers on cruiser warfare in the Atlantic. This plan was amplified by Hipper and forwarded to the C in C, von Ingenohl. The objects were the destruction of trade and of British cruisers engaged in commerce protection. Hipper believed that the West Indies and South America were the most suitable areas in which to operste. The supply of coal was the major problem and Hipper recommended the blistering of the ships to provide sp[ace for additional coal for the first part of the voyage. The effective German etappe system (i.e. the organization of supplies by German consuls/agents in foreign countries using German and neutral bottoms - a very effective organization early in the war) was to supply them thereafter. The proposal was not proceded with as von Ingenohl and von Pohl preferred to try U-boat warfare before commiting large warships to commerce warfare. By 1917 the etappe system was practically non-existent.

[ATM]

Thankyou. Was the idea of battlecruisers in teh Atlantic ever a real possibility? Also what is blistering. Thankyou for your reply.

[ionia]

Thankyou. Was the idea of battlecruisers in teh Atlantic ever a real possibility? Also what is blistering. Thankyou for your reply.

Hipper certainly considered it a real possibility. In addition to the extended deployment mentioned earlier, an alternative considered was a raid via the Iceland Faroes Passage with 4 BCs out to a point about 500 miles west of the Hebrides or to the general area of the southern exit to the Irish Sea. This could be undertaken at an economical speed of 15 knote. Coal consumption was still a worry when higher speeds were nescessary and the possibility of coaling in a Norwegian Fjord or in one of the U-boat anchorages in Icelandic waters was discussed. Anchorages would certainly be nescessary because, although refuelling at sea from oilers had been practiced by the RN since 1906, no adequate system of coaling at sea had been devised.

Hipper greatly preferred the longer deployment.

Blistering is the addition of bulges or compartments on the outside of the ship's hull. The bulges added to many large warships in the 1920s and 30s as protection against torpedoes were an example of blisters.

[SiegeGunner]

Captain Hahn's suggestion was presumably inspired by the success of the Emden, but evidently pre-dated the annihilation of von Spee's squadron at the Battle of the Falkland Islands, which must have dampened enthusiasm for the idea of long-range deployments into the South Atlantic — as much because of the ease with which von Spee's colliers and transports were rounded up as for the painful lesson that the British could rapidly counter such incursions with overwhelming force.

The idea of using 'blisters' as auxiliary coal bunkers sounds impractical — does anyone know whether it was ever tried? BCs like Von der Tann also carried around 300 tons of oil, and finding space for another couple of hundred tons would doubtless have helped, but I can't imagine that there would have been much support for placing it in bulges around the ship's waterline.

Mick

[per ardua per mare per terram]

Atlantic break outs were only a serious propersition in WW2 when the German's had control of Norway. The High Sea's Fleet's inability to mount an action shows what an indulgance it was.

[MartinWills]

We tend to think of unrest and revolution in the German Navy as something that only reared it's head towards the end of the war. In fact there was some unrest in the fleet in 1917. This gave rise to a lack of trust between ships and units of ships. Interestingly the prospect of "going to sea; going to fight" would probably have helped pull the fleet back together, but equally there was unrest at the top as to whether the unrest would flare up and cause problems at sea. All a bit of a quandary, this, but it probably did not encourage any offensive actions/

[ATM]

Thanks for the replies. I find it fascinating. A hypothetical question then. The 4 BC's of the 1st Scouting group run into the 9 British BC's. Would the improved shell quality of the British have made it one sided? Would the Repulse and Renown ended up like the Queen Mary, Invincible and Indefatigable?

One other thing, U-Boat anchorages in Iceland. I have never heard about these before. Under what context were they allowed to anchor there? What facilities were there there for them? How many U-Boats at a time would stop there?

[per ardua per mare per terram]

In your hypothetical, who is in command of the battlecruisers? If it was Beatty or someone else who ignored basic safety and the concept of hitting a target then there could have been more bc losses.

In the hands of a good Admiral Renown and Repulse 15" guns would have had several thousand yards range advantage and had better range finders which would have led to more hits. It should have been overwheming odds...

[ATM]

Tyrwhitt, Sturdee or Beatty.

[Gibbo]

The commander of the Battle Cruiser Force from Beatty's appointment to command the Grand Fleet in late 1916 to the end of the war was Rear Admiral (Vice Admiral from 1918) Sir William Pakenham.

[Jonathan Saunders]

If the Germans had been able to use their surface fleet to any great extent from 1917 onwards then how would this have impacted their ability to fight war on land and in the air?

I am thinking of fuel consumption and as I recall a significant part of Germany's oil was imported from Rumania. Up to that time (1917) it had proved sufficient for munitions production, military vehicles, the airforce etc, but would available reserves have allowed Germany to conduct a U-boat and surface fleet offensive at the same time?

[SiegeGunner]

I am thinking of fuel consumption and as I recall a significant part of Germany's oil was imported from Rumania. Up to that time (1917) it had proved sufficient for munitions production, military vehicles, the airforce etc, but would available reserves have allowed Germany to conduct a U-boat and surface fleet offensive at the same time?

Didn't the German surface fleet run mainly on coal? The more modern ships carried some oil, but in this period I think (subject to correction) that it was only used as a kind of 'afterburner' fuel.

[Borys]

Ahoj!

Siege Gunner is correct.

Everything from Grosstorpedoboot *upwards ran on coal, with oil making up (in the newest vessels) 10-15% of bunkerage.

I'm not sure how much of the oil on the larger vessels was burnt in "oil only" boilers - I know that part was used for "dressing" coal.

Coal was plentiful, even if not of the highest quality. It was not as good as "Welsch coal" which was the pre-war standard in fleets the world over.

EDITED: the GBTs were oil fired, anything larger wasn't. The way I wrote it was unclear.

Borys

[Jonathan Saunders]

You might well be right about the capital ships - it had passed my mind as I was posting - but I believe from a paper written by General Kuhl in 1933 and concerning the last months of the war from the German perspective, that in 1918 the "entire Naval war (ie. submarine war including the necessary activities of torpedo boats, mine searching vessels, and cruisers) is dependant on one-third of the Rumanian imports." (referring to available fuel supplies and I assume Rumanian oil rather than coal?)

Although the context of this specific quote is relating to the position in October 1918, would it have been that much better in 1917?

[Borys]

Ahoj!

GTBs and U-boots used oil, cruisers - mostly coal. Mine sweepers I think were mostly coal burning.

But with 100+ destroyers, each wth bunkerage of 200 tons, plus the U-Boots, this is quiet a lot of oil. Think of the oil deficiencies of the Kreigsmarine and Regia Marina in WWII.

Borys

[per ardua per mare per terram]

Tyrwitt a brilliant leader and experienced co-ordinating a fleet as opposed to a few ships, if he could make the mental adjustment to commanding these big gun ships then it would have been an overwhelming RN victory.

Sturdee had the experience of fighting battlecruisers and of the poor accuracy of the Invincible class; if he had learned from that experience then it would have been an overwhelming RN victory.

Packenham had the experience of fighting battlecruisers and had been an observer in the Russo-Japanese War; a pity more attention wasn’t paid to his report, especially to the ranges achievable. If he had learned from that experience then it would have been an overwhelming RN victory.

Beatty are you hoping for a triumph of hope over experience? The man should have been court martialled! Even better he shouldn’t have been in command in the first place: he had the temperament to be a brilliant Captain (D) or admiral whose prime force was destroyers; if he had trained and commanded the destroyers at Jutland then he would have had a brilliant legacy. As it was he was a superb example of the ‘Peter Principle’ being promoted way beyond his competence! In your scenario the result would have at best been disappointing, as when the incompetence of he and his staff led to such a fiasco at Dogger Bank.

[ATM]

I will explain why I have been asking all these questions. I study War at Wolverhampton University and one of my modules is "Dreadnought to Enterprise". For 50% of the module grade we have to come up for a plan for an offensive operation as either the Grand Fleet or the High Seas Fleet in 1917. I was initially the Germans but am now the commander of the British team. For three hours we have to sit in a room essentially playing a big game of battleships with the opposite team in another room and the Proffs in another processing the orders from either side and adjusting the positions of our vessels on the map etc. (Yes that is where my parents money is going for this degree, on a game of battleships!) I do agree on your verdict on Beatty. There is a running joke in my class about me calling him a C * * T. I am certainly no fan. I also have to designate historical captains to ships etc and choose how my order of battle is organised and act offensivley, however unhistorical that may be.

PS Thanks to all of you for your replies. I will look further into the issue of oil for the simulation.

[SiegeGunner]

If I were a German admiral, I would certainly not relish fighting a fleet whose battlecruisers were commanded by Sturdee and its destroyers by Tyrwhitt.

Coincidentally, I shed blood under Sturdee only this morning — when I had a blood test at a local hospital whose War Memorial wing was opened by Sturdee, described on the plaque as 'a worthy successor of Nelson' (after whom the hospital is named).

Mick

[per ardua per mare per terram]

My ideal would be Sturdee in charge of the Grand Fleet & Beatty co-ordinating its destroyers. Packenham Commanding the battlecruisers and Tyrwitt their destroyers. But Sturdee with the battlecruisers and Tyrwitt on destroyers is a good combination too.

[per ardua per mare per terram]

In your scenario do you command the main fleets only or the destroyers and cruisers too? If you do, get them to wireless your main ships occasionally!

[per ardua per mare per terram]

My assessment above is based on his actions. Beatty and the men under his command also failed by their inaction: they failed in their basic duty as scouts to tell Jellicoe where they and the enemy were!

[Jonathan Saunders]

In your scenario do you command the main fleets only or the destroyers and cruisers too? If you do, get them to wireless your main ships occasionally!

what you mean make it fiction?

[per ardua per mare per terram]

The scenario is fictional in the first place.

[ATM]

Thankyou for the replies. I have command of all destroyers, cruisers, battleships and battlecruisers etc in the North Sea. The scenario really smells of a farce. I am not sure whether I will get points knocked off if I order regular wirless communications as unhistorical, plus the German team will be told of any wireless transmission picked up. But hell, I'd rather win than get a perfect grade.