Gallipoli Evacuations - views

[ZackNZ]

Hi pals

What are the views "out there" with respect to the Gallipoli evacuations? Did the Turks know what was happening and simply let the troops "escape" rather than deal with the problem of what to do about it or was it a masterful stroke of subterfuge and strategic planning?

I'd be really interested in people’s thoughts, as I’ve read a lot of what is written on the subject? Personally I find it difficult to believe that the Turks weren’t aware of what was going on but……..

Regards and season greetings to everyone!

Zack

[stevem49]

It was the only well executed part of the campaign.

A withdrawal made whilst a few men held the line.

According to the information from the battalion I research, the Turks had no clue as to what was happening.

The last men off expected to become prisoners but all got off safely.

stevem

[Guest gumbirsingpun]

hi zack

i personally think the evacuation must be considered as the greatest allied success of the campaign,as troop numbers hid ben progressively reduced since dec 7 and cunning ruses were performed tae fool the turks and prevent them discovering the allies were departing., well im o the opinion that they knew the peninsula wis bein evacuated.as i hae read in some books that the turks wir warned o the likelihood o evacuation and mounted an attack on January 6

regards

tuna

[Jonathan Saunders]

I just cant believe the Turks didnt know. They might not have known the last part of the evacuation was taking place on the night of the 8/9 Jan, but the Turks were aware the ANZACs had left and they must have known that the Allies were leaving for good.

[Crunchy]

When I spoke with Loutit (Lt 10th Battalion) in 1978, he expressed the view that the Turks were aware that the evacuation was about to take place. When pressed as to why, he couldn't say, other than there was a general feeling about it and that the Turks let them slip away. Maybe a feeling generated prior to the evacuation by the view that they wouldn't be able to pull it off and then afterwards a feeling that the Turks didn't intervene when they slipped away. The deception and planning to cover the evacuation at Anzac was quite sophisticated and we shouldn't underrate what was achieved. My own opinion; I’m not sure - either good planning deceived the Turks or the Turks felt why lose men attacking when the enemy were leaving? Haven't seen anything in the Turkish records that indicates they knew about the evacuation prior to it occurring.

[PhilB]

I believe the Aussies played cricket to make things seem normal. Are there any photos or artefacts from the game? A cricket ball from Anzac beach would rank with the football from the Somme! Phil B

[Jonathan Saunders]

QUOTE (Phil_B @ Dec 22 2006, 12:04 PM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>

I believe the Aussies played cricket to make things seem normal. Are there any photos or artefacts from the game? A cricket ball from Anzac beach would rank with the football from the Somme! Phil B

There is a pretty well known photo of a game of cricket - I presume THE game - up at Shell Green.

Try this link:

http://www.national-army-museum.ac.uk/exhi...ket/page4.shtml

[PhilB]

Right!

That looks like a pukka bat. Wonder if it survived? Phil B

[michaeldr]

The best person to ask is surely the Ottoman commander, Liman von Sanders. He has left at least two sets of comments on the campaign; an interview in Constantinople in November 1918 and his book 'Five Years in Turkey' which was mostly written the next year during his involuntary stay on Malta. Information on the former comes via 'The Dardanelles' by Major-General Sir C. M. Callwell.

The decision to leave Gallipoli was not clear-cut. There were those who feared the 'Loss of face' in the orient and the Navy would have preferred us to keep Helles to help them with the blockade of the Dardanelles. Therefore when LvS says he 'entirely' agrees with the wisdom of the British evacuation one suspects that hindsight may have played a part. However once the decision had been made, did he then know what was going on?

In the case of Suvla and Anzac the answer must be a definite NO. He admits that he thought that the flares seen on the beach were an indication that the British were landing reinforcements. The flares which he refers to can only have been the burning of the dumps! Therefore, he definitely did not know.

Helles is a bit more difficult. LvS claims to have seen the preparations, but again this smacks of hindsight. For he also says that at that time he was constantly being reinforced and that in the end he had 21 divisions; an overwhelming superiority. If this number is correct, then why did he not attack?

As Tuna has already said he did make one last attempt on 7th January 1916. The Turkish bombardment was the heaviest of the campaign and it fell mainly on the 13th Division, on the left of our line. The British artillery had already partially withdrawn and their loss was made up for by the Navy who brought down terrible destruction upon the Turks massed in their trenches ready for the attack. By attacking at the point precisely where naval support could best be provided, LvS weakens his claim to have known or indeed seen anything of our withdrawal.

The final word must be that of his 'Five Years in Turkey'

"But all in all the enemy here again was successful in his withdrawal in spite of our watchfulness."

[my emphasis]

best regards

Michael

[Robert Dunlop]

The diary of Lt Mehmed Fasih is helpful:

'19 December 1915 Sunday

03.30 hrs - Get up. Tea is ready. Wake up Nuri. We have tea together. The front lines are extremely quiet. No grenades.

03.35 hrs - A dumdum explodes to our left. Nuri and I have tea. Battalion Commander arrives. "Hurry! Prepare a reconnaissance patrol. Consisting of ten men. The enemy has withdrawn from Anafarta and the entire right part of our front. Our 19th Division has moved up and occupied his trenches.

Offer him tea. The patrol is readied. He asks me where it will emerge from our lines. Explain it will move no-man's-land from the spot where the mine was detonated."'

The translator noted 'Mehmed Fasih's diary ends here. The patrol returned and confirmed the news... That night the enemy had abandoned not only his positions opposite the Anafarta's, but the entire front! He had been defeated and was wise enough to accept this fact'.

The only other point to make is that there were several other examples of one large force disengaging from another in secrecy. The German retreat to the Hindenberg Line in 1917 was a classic example.

Robert

[alliekiwi]

Interesting thread. I don't know anything about the evacuations at the other beaches, having only read the Anzac perspective. I do know that the men who stayed behind on the final night were thought to be on a suicide mission, according to the history of the Auckland Infantry Batallion.

Did all the beaches evacuate at the same time? I had a feeling the British evacuated later than the Anzacs, and would that not have made the turks more aware that it was a possibility?

Allie

[Crunchy]

Did all the beaches evacuate at the same time? I had a feeling the British evacuated later than the Anzacs,

Allie,

You are correct. The final parties departed from Suvla and Anzac on the night of 19th/20th December 1915 and from Helles on the night 8th/9th January 1916.

Have a great Christmas

Regards

Chris

[Chris Best]

What are the views "out there" with respect to the Gallipoli evacuations? Did the Turks know what was happening and simply let the troops "escape" rather than deal with the problem of what to do about it or was it a masterful stroke of subterfuge and strategic planning?

I think the latter, Zack. A higher level agreement between belligerents would have to be passed down the chain of command. Some Mehmets would not have received the order. They would have fired at movement. And had the order gotten down to each individual, it is inconceivable the tale would not have stronger roots in Turkish oral history.

Chris

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Phil

G'day mate

That looks like a pukka bat.

Not only was the bat real, so was the game. This was a dinkum contest properly reported. Below is the score sheet kept by the Brigades - the match was played between the 1st & 3rd LH Bdes and they were playing for keeps.

Cheers

Bill

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Mates

Of course, during the Great War there was one other memorable cricket match - just the reporting of it reminds me of the perthetic performance in the current Ashes series. Anyways, here are the two different versions I have found.

Version #1:

TIBBY COTTER AT BEERSHEBA

(in Headon, D. ed., "The Best Ever Australian Sports Writing" [2001] pp 498-9)

'Sergeant'

When Johnny –‘Won't- Hit-Today’ Douglas comes to write his memoirs, ‘My 97 Years of Cricket at Home and Abroad’, I bet he won’t remember a certain cricket match played on the sands of the Mediterranean coast of Southern Palestine between the British Yeomanry and the Australian Light Horse. Both divisions were having a short rest and clean up on the coast. The Yeomanry, led by Gentlemen from the Very Best Families of England, sent the Light Horse Commander a challenge to a game of cricket. Our scouting parties had seen the Tommy officers sporting themselves in flannels in the cool of the evening. Anyhow, we took them on.

Douglas was a Colonel of the Yeomanry, although I never rightly knew whether he was in the Warwicks, the Worcesters, or the Gloucesters. He was always there when it came to a cricket match or a fight according to the Marquis of Queensberry.

We had a few sets of cricketing tools bought out of certain regimental funds—never mind whose funds. The desert sand, watered and stamped with tibbin by the Kamleelah wallahs, made a pretty fair concrete pitch.

The Yeomanry team, all officers, was a treat to see in spotless flannels. The officers were always punctilious about appearance and cleanliness even in the desert. How they carried their boudoirs about in the desert was a marvel.

Our team looked like a mob of Murrumbidgee whalers who had lost their swags. A few of the officers were in khaki slacks and shirts, and the other ranks wore their old blue-grey flannel shirts, riding strides with the knees out for the most part, no leggings, and their knitted socks hanging down over their ankle boots.

Our fellows won the toss, and had a bat. They put up only 57, Douglas getting most of the wickets.

Then the Yeomanry took block. That's about all they did take. Tibby Cotter, a trooper in the 12th Light Horse Regiment, bowled with the wind behind him, and the Tommy officers never saw which way he went. They just walked in and out in a dazed manner. We had four men behind the stumps to stop any risk of byes getting into double figures.

Clive Single, Colonel of our ambulance, bowled from the other end. He had been high in Grade cricket in Sydney and had a good University career—as far as cricket went, anyhow. He bowled a mixed over of slow and medium balls breaking in from both sides.

Cotter and Single bowled the Yeomanry all for 4, including one bye.

'Who is this Cotter man?' they kept asking. Douglas had spotted Cotter the first time he made his characteristic long run before bowling, but thought it wise not to break the news to the batsmen beforehand.

They took it like sportsmen when they knew. It hardly seemed fair. They squared it off with us later—but that is another story.

Poor old Tibby Cotter was given out at Beersheeba later. He was in the front of the mounted charge.

The Melbourne Evening Sun, November 1924

Version #2

The Larwood Story by Harold Larwood, Sydney [1982] pp 53-54.

When I first went to Trent Bridge they were still talking about the terrifying speed of Albert (Tibby) Cotter, the human catapult who was reputedly a menace with the ball even when a boy in short pants playing for Forest Lodge public school in Sydney.

When he came into the game in Australia, Trumper, Noble, Duff, Hopkins, Syd and Charles Gregory were all in their prime, with colts like Bardsley, McCartney and Kelleway looming up behind.

Cotter was picked for Australia against England in the Fourth Test in Sydney in 1904 at the age of twenty-one, the youngest fast bowler to win Australian colours since Sammy Woods in 1888. Ernie Jones had finished his career by riding his bicycle into a water-cart and breaking his arm.

Although the returning Englishmen reported that Australia had un-earthed a new pace bowler nobody was prepared for the Cotter who demoralized English players in 1905 (he took 8 for 65 in the last Test). At Worcester he so unnerved the County team that he took 12 wickets for 34 in one day. He bagged 124 wickets on the tour, leaving behind many a set of bruised ribs. The Sydney Express, as they called him, was described on all sides as terrifying, his deliveries frequently playing about the ears.

Cotter won several Tests with his bowling and big hitting. And in a club game in Sydney he once hit 121 for Glebe in 64 minutes and for New South Wales against Victoria scored 68 in 20 minutes.

No cricket enthusiasts were surprised when Tibby was mentioned in despatches for gallantry in the First World War in bringing wounded out under heavy Turkish fire.

In March, 1916, when the war was at its height, a cluster of troops on leave renewed memories of more peaceful days when they gathered at the Gezireh Sports Club, Cairo, to watch a cricket match. The game was between a team of English troops and A.I.F. members. Some of the Australians were from the small headquarters staff left in Egypt after the Gallipoli evacuation, the rest were light-horsemen training for the campaign which eventually was to beat the Turks in Palestine.

The odds were on the Tommies. Several had played for English counties and their captain. Colonel J. W. H. T. Douglas, was the celebrated "Johnny" Douglas who had led England to victory against Australia and South Africa.

Expecting an easy win the Englishmen weren't prepared for the shock they got from a big and powerfully built light-horseman who was brought in from the Suez Canal and dressed for the match simply by discarding hat, shirt and leggings.

Apologizing for being a bit out of practice the Australian skittled the Tommies with short-pitched bumpers, yorkers that knocked bats out of some hands, full tosses which broke a couple of stumps and occasional good-length balls. Most were out before scoring. He then pasted the bowling all over the field before retiring to catch a train back to Suez.

A bullet ended Tibby Cotter's life. About eighteen months later, on October 20, 1917, he was shot through the head at Beersheba by a Turkish soldier, and was the first Australian international cricketer to be killed in war.

++++

Sigh

Johnny –‘Won't- Hit-Today’ Douglas and Freddy have so much in common.

Cheers

Bill

[PhilB]

Did the Aussies invent sledging before or after the match on Shell Green? Phil B

[Crunchy]

QUOTE (Phil_B @ Dec 23 2006, 09:05 PM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Did the Aussies invent sledging before or after the match on Shell Green? Phil B

Nah. It was after the Brits introduced "Body Line"

Merry Christmas

Chris

[Jonathan Saunders]

Nah. It was after the Brits introduced "Body Line"

Merry Christmas

Chris

Not that old myth. Bodyline was not bowled until the Third Test - the only "serious" injuries sustained by Australian batsmen that I am aware of, were sustained when the batsmen were facing a traditional field placing. Gubby Allen, who was the second highest wicket taker for England in the Series, not once bowled to a "bodyline" field. The following season the England team batted against bodyline bowling without a murmur.

Sledging on the otherhand, is something beyond the pale and we have all heard the McGrath incident - where he dished it out but got rather upset when it was given back (v Sri Lanka I think). A very poor showing. Douglas Jardine on the otherhand, showed that "bodyline" could be turned to your advantage and scored a Test century against a bodyline field in the next Series.

Happy New Year

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Mates

Merry Christmas to you all.

I am especially looking forward to Boxing Day - a day of records.

4-0

And

700 ++

Cheers

Bill

[bob lembke]

This is from memory, and from 2-3 years ago, but I think that the German General Kannengiesser, a CO of a Turkish division at Gallipoli, said in his book about Gallipoli that they figured out what was happening, not before, but during the evacuation. However, the Turks, who had fought with great bravery during the campaign, were not keen on attacking at that point. Perhaps it was a "not wishing to be the last man to die in a war" sort of thing. They then knew that they had prevailed.

I don't know if the book has been translated into English. I believe that I read it in the German.

Just looked in my notes, I read it in the German. Published in Berlin in 1927. The notes did not mention this "knowing" business, but that is not of particular interest to me, so I may have not taken notes on the matter when I read it. Any rate, Kannengiesser is another good German source on the battle.

Anyone remember reading about a German volunteer company of Pioniere (Pioneers) fighting at Gallipoli? My father served in it. I have only found a couple of very brief mentions of it, I think in von Sanders. I know he served at the ANZAC bridgehead and may have been involved in mining efforts.

Bob Lembke

[alliekiwi]

Bob, do you have any idea of when they 'knew'? I'm rather wondering if the Turks et al knew during the Anzac evacuation, or if that evacuation made the following ones more likely to come and thus they were more clued into signs that evacuation at Helles etc was imminent?

Allie

[Cliff. Hobson]

Allie. One man's view of the evacuation. Regards Cliff.

Beswick Frank Lincolnshire Regiment

WHITWELL SOLDIERS EXPERIENCE - ONE OF THE THIRTY TWO.

Writing from ‘Somewhere in Egypt’ to his chum Mr. S Lovatt, Bakestone Moor,

Whitwell, Pte F. Beswick, D. Company, 15th Battalion, Lincolnshire Regt., says I am very pleased to see that that you have found me at last. . What did you think to the evacuation of Suvla, the sight was one I shall never forget, I was one of thirty two who held 300 yards of firing line for 5 hours. When I got the order to leave my post I only left sixteen of the lads to chance their luck. We went to the beach to get on our ship, I was about beat, I carried two dixies of meat to the ship. We could only pass by certain paths as our Engineers had placed mines and trip wires all over the place. The hours seemed like days as we waited for the remainder to come, but at last they came in the early hours of the day it was pitch dark. We sat fire to large clumps of rations , my word it was a proper bonfire, we did look objects dead beat, Officers and Men alike.

Everything went splendidly every man a true Britisher, Johnny Turk was completely mesmerised, four came and gave themselves up, we should have got more

prisoners only they were afraid of the Australians. They told us they thought we were

preparing for a big advance, it was a fine bit of work which will always be history.

We hadn’t been away many days before the Turks found us by a Taube (German Aircraft) on Imbros Island, we were prepared for him with our guns but he dropped a few bombs which did little damage. One dropped among a lot of Turks and cleared them out. He often came afterwards but couldn’t do much damage and we enjoyed the sport watching our aeroplanes after him and our guns firing shrapnel at him. We left the place safely, “Thank God” while our Navy was busy bombarding the Peninsula, they gave them plenty of iron rations to be going on with for a bit.

Where we are now is safer than Blighty there are no Zeppelins here but we have plenty of sly natives. We are at a beautiful place called............(censored) by the silvery sea and we are having some hot weather for our Winter. I have come across Bob White in a Detail Camp. I hope I will have a walk up to your house before long and then I will tell you more about things..

[bob lembke]

I think but am not sure that I read that in Kannengiesser. I do not have the book; my "Librarian of Fortune" wife got it for me (some librarians over here actually wear shirts so marked, a bit of "librarian humor".) My impression that they figured out that something was going on but that the Turks were not enthusiastic to attack. I have no recollection as to whether or not it was at ANZAC or at the tip of Gallipoli. As to it actually having been in Kannengiesser, I am not sure, it was in something written in the first person, and I tend not to read secondary sources.

I have not found many sources from the Turkish/German side. Translating Turkish is absolutely murder, due to the way they construct compound words. Anyone come across other German first-person accounts of Gallipoli? I didn't find anything besides Liman von Sanders and Kannengiesser, as I remember. (I did this work several years ago, but want to get back to it soon.)

Bob Lembke

[Chris Best]

Johnny Turk was completely mesmerised, four came and gave themselves up, we should have got more prisoners only they were afraid of the Australians. They told us they thought we were

preparing for a big advance, it was a fine bit of work which will always be history.

Good one, Cliff, seems to disprove the conspiratorialists .......unless ........ those Turkish surrendees (is there such a word?) were to be 'sleepers' in captivity.

C

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Mates

At this point it might be worthwhile making mention of Liman von Sanders - he has his own observations on the withdrawal. You might find they contradict some of the above conclusions. However, I will let von Sanders speak for himself. Here are the appropriate pages in his book - I have included the page titles so that it is easier to follow.

98 FIVE YEARS IN TURKEY

The events on the side of the Fifth Army were as follows:

Between 1 and 2 in the morning the enemy had exploded a mine in the Ari Burnu front. The Turkish troops advancing according to instructions to seize the crater, found no resistance.

When the adjoining Turkish companies were feeling their was toward the forward enemy trenches, there were a few shots and then firing ceased. The trenchtes were occupied by the Turks. Reports were despatched to the higher commanders. There was some natural delay before they could arrive and give instructions for further action, since no special instructions had been issued for such a case, and the fog prevented vision. Where the way led through the enemy's trench system, there were obstacles to be removed everywhere. In several places mines exploded when stepped on and caused confusion and loss. In this way the rearmost troops of the enemy had gained a good start. The fire of the ships covered the ground traversed by the advancing Turks. Though the road to the coast was short, the descent through the sleep rocky hills of the coast in the dark foggy night was troublesome. When the leading troops reached the coast, the enemy had disappeared. The ships at once changed their aim to the beach.

The withdrawal on the Anafarta front was similar except that contradictory reports caused difficulties in the issuing of orders. In several places where the fog was less dense, red lights were visible on the shore and some of the subordinate leaders conjectured another landing.

The first reports that reached me at the headquarters camp at 4am were written in this dubious style. I at once ordered a general alarm and the turning out of all reserves including the cavalry. Each unit in its own sector was to advance in a direct line to the shore. But orders do not circulate as fast as one hopes, particularly when two languages are involved.

SECOND PART OF DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN 99

The troops of the Anafarta group encountered mine fields which caused much loss. At some points short engagements took place with the rear points of the enemy, as in case of the Turkish 126th Infantry Regiment. Here too the enemy had embarked with hardly any loss. The withdrawal had been prepared with extraordinary care and carried out with great skill. The hostile artillery had been removed except a small number of guns which now fell into our hands. This removal had been possible because all British land batteries lay close to the shore.

One or another artillery commander had noticed that in the last few days some batteries had fired with one gun only or not at all, but no importance was attached to the fact which therefore was not reported to superiors. It had happened several times that the batteries paused one or two days in their firing, particularly when changing positions. On such occasions the fire from the ships became heavier.

Immense stores of all kinds were abandoned by the British on their withdrawal. Between Suvla Bay and Sri Burnu five small steamers and more than silt}- boats were abandoned on the beach. We found large quantities of material for dummy rail lines, telephones and obstacles, piles of tools of all kinds, medicine chests, medical supplies and water filters.

A great mass of artillery and infantry ammunition had been abandoned and whole lines of carriages and caissons, hand arms of all kinds, boxes of hand grenades and machine gun barrels. Many stacks of conserves, flour, food and mountains of wood were found. The tent camps had been left standing and sacrificed. This probably served better than anything else to mask the withdrawal. Several hundred horses which could not be embarked were killed and lay in loner rows.

How sudden the order for withdrawal must have come to the last troops on the peninsula appears from the fact that in some tents freshly served food stood on the tables. From the written orders found in the camp it appeared that a large part of the

100 FIVE YEARS IN TURKEY

troops not in first line had been embarked during the past two nights and carried away. These captured British papers informed us of other interesting matters.

On the Anafarta front we found foot paths lined with whitewashed sandbags so as to be visible on a dark night. They had shown the last troops the way of carefully avoiding the minefields.

It should be taken in consideration in the entire withdrawal that the distance from the front lines to the shore was short, varying between one and four and one-half kilometers. Hence the British withdrawal from Gallipoli cannot be compared with the great rearward movements on European fronts, as has been done by some.

The enemy continued to hold the position at Seddulbar (Sedd el Bahr).

On the forenoon of December 20 orders were given by the Fifth Army to bring the best batteries of the abandoned fronts to the south group. In like manner it was ordered that the best grenade throwers, scouts and pioneers be at once put in march to the south group.

There was some possibility that in Seddulbar the enemy wanted to keep a base for further operations. The position there was particularly strong and well protected by the fire of the ships. The authors of this idea spoke of a second Gibraltar supplementary to the Salonika position. No such idea was entertained by the Fifth Army. It was thought possible, however, that the enemy might hang on for some time. That could not be permitted.

Hence a plan of attack on the enemy's position at Seddulbar was at once taken in hand, giving due consideration to the technical troops expected from Germany. An attack was prepared on the entire south front by the four divisions there and eight others to be brought up.

Always good to canvass a whole range of views.

As to von Sanders' note about fresh food set on tables, the following tribute from Antill supplies the answer to this idea. In a last act of bravado, Antill left the following note in his dugout as he left for Mudros.

Commander, Turkish Forces,

Gallipoli, Turkey

The Brigadier presents his compliments to our worthy Turkish opponents and offers those who first honour his quarters with their presence such poor hospitality as is in his power to give, regretting that he is unable personally to welcome them.

After a sojourn of 7 months in Gallipoli we propose to take some little relaxation at that period in which we are instructed by a Higher Power to observe "Goodwill towards all men" and in bidding "An revoir" to our honourable foes we Australians desire to express appreciation of the fine soldierly qualities of our Turkish opponents and of the sportsmanlike manner in which they have participated in a very interesting contest, honourable, we trust, to both sides.

For a little while we have been with you, yet a little while and you shall see us not. For us it is a matter of deep regret that the ancient friendship so long existing between the British and Turkish Empires should have been thus disturbed and broken by the insidious machinations of the Arch-enemy of humanity.

We have left this area and trenches in which we have taken considerable trouble and pride, clean and in good order, and would be grateful if they may be so maintained until our return, particular care being asked in regard to matters of sanitation, so vital to the health and well being of an army.

We hope that you will find the Wine. Coffee, tobacco, cigarettes and food to your taste, and a supply of fuel has been left in the cupboard to ameliorate in some measure the discomfort during the cold watches of the winter.

Our only request is that no member of the nation who was guilty of the inhuman murder of that noble woman Miss Edith Cavell to whose photo this message is attached, will be permitted to pollute with his presence the quarters of soldiers who have never yet descended to such barbarous and ruthless methods.

Cheers

Bill