Loyal North Lancashires in East Africa

[bushfighter]

Units that served alongside the 2nd Bn The Loyal North Lancashire Regiment - The Faridkot Sappers & Miners

Post #390 listed the Indian Army Engineer units deployed early in the East African campaign but the only Field Engineer unit initially deployed was an Imperial Service company, the Faridkot Sappers & Miners.

Faridkot was a small Jat Sikh state (643 square miles in area) in the Punjab, located between Lahore & Rajputana. The Rulers had always sided with the British in the Afghan & Sikh wars & during the Mutiny, & had provided horses for British use in the Boer War.

As part of Indian Expeditionary Force "B" the Ruler of Faridkot contributed a company of Sappers & Miners 130 strong. This strength was later increased to 200 men. The ethnic composition was about 93% Jat Sikh with the remainder being Punjabi Muslims. The company was commanded by Lt Col Harman Singh, with Major B.W. Mainprise RE being the Special Service Officer seconded from the Indian Army.
The Faridkot Company did not possess many tradesmen & initially its utility was more that of a Pioneer unit, but its morale & enthusiasm remained high throughout its three & a half years active service in East Africa. Military engineering skills were learned on the job.

As mentioned in an earlier post the Company was not disembarked at Tanga. Once on the ground in British East Africa the Company was split on two road-making & bridge-building tasks working westwards from Voi & Tsavo.
During 1915 half of the Company took part in the raid on Bukoba alongside the 2nd Bn The Loyal North Lancashire Regiment.
In December 1915 Lt Col Harman Singh was invalided to India & Major Nand Singh took over command. Subsequently Major Mainprise became Brigade Major for 1st East African Brigade & Lieutenants C.P. Evill & R.T.S. Sneyd were attached as Special Service Officers.

In preparation for & during the invasion of German East Africa the Company was split on road making tasks in support of the 1st East Africa Division (Gen Stewart) advancing from Longido & the 2nd EA Division (Gen Tighe) advancing through Taveta. The Company was reunited at Moshi.

Subsequently the Company worked in GEA on road, bridge & flying-bridge tasks, often working through the extremely heavy rains of this period. Twice it was used in support of Belgian columns. On one of these occasions the Company cut & cleared a 163-mile long road in 27 days - no mean feat.
On 14 February 1918 the Company sailed from Lindi to arrive in Karachi a week later, & on 23 February it was back in Faridkot.
Seven months later it moved to Lahore & then Ferozepur on garrison duties & in 1919 was despatched to the Khyber for six months.

The Faridkot Sappers & Miners in East Africa pulled their weight & were a credit to the Imperial Service system organised amongst the Princely States of India.

Honours & Awards for service in East Africa
Indian Order of Merit 2nd Class - 1
Order of British India 2nd Class - 2
Indian Distinguished Service Medal - 7
Indian Meritorious Service Medal - 13
Croix de Guerre (France) - 1
Mentions in Despatches - 19

Battle Honours awarded
Kilimanjaro, Behobeho, East Africa 1914-1918

Commemorations
So far 21 commemorations have been located - 10 on the Dar Es Salaam British & Indian Memorial & 11 on the Nairobi British & Indian Memorial.

[bushfighter]

The grave of Major B.W.Mainprise RE at Taveta, Kenya.

 

Major B.W. Mainprise, Royal Engineers

Post #426 described Major Bertie Wilmot Mainprise as being the Special Service Officer (the representative of the Indian Army) attached to the Imperial Service unit The Faridkot Sappers & Miners.

Prior to the advance into German East Africa the commander of 1st East African Brigade, Brigadier-General W. Malleson, obtained the services of Major Mainprise as his Brigade Major. Whilst this was a good career move it must also have been a sometimes difficult one for Bertie Mainprise as Malleson was a particulary nasty & incompetent Brigade Commander, having spent much of his service on rear echelon duties.

On 11 March 1916 Malleson's Brigade attacked the Latema-Reata Nek (see Post

but in the mid-afternoon, having lost control of the battle, Malleson reported sick with abdominal pain & had himself quickly driven to Voi, 40 miles to the rear.
Major-General M.J.Tighe, commanding 2nd East African Division, took over command of 1st East African Brigade's attack.

The initial assault by 3 King's African Rifles & 130th Baluchis did not reach the main objectives (the CO of 3KAR being killed), & a later assault by 2nd Rhodesia Regiment similarly failed. Tighe requested reinforcements from General Smuts.
After dark the 5th & 7th South African Infantry assaulted but both were repulsed. The British Artillery was not in action that night, perhaps because of concerns about fire control in the dark.

Major Mainprise was forward on the battleground when he met the wounded CO of 5th South African Infantry, Lt Col the Honourable J.J. Byron, withdrawing with his Bn.
Bertie Mainprise, perhaps feeling frustrated by the lack of progress, gathered a party of 130th Baluch together & charged the Nek.
He was hit by three German machine guns & killed in action along with over 20 of his party.

This gallant officer was Mentioned four times in Despatches.
He is buried in Taveta Cemetery, Kenya.

 

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The Rubens

Re-supply for the Schutztruppe - the blockade runner Rubens

Although the Royal Navy was blockading the German East African coastline it was a long coastline & the German command in Berlin sent supply ships to try to get through to Lettow & the Schutztruppe.

The first ship sent was the German Rubens, disguised as a Danish freighter & captained by Kapitan-Leutnant Christiansen. As the Rubens approached the GEA coastline north of Tanga on 14 April 1915 HMS Hyacinth was tracking her & closed at speed.
Christiansen immediately sailed into Manza Bay to beach & scuttle his ship. Before evacuating the Rubens the crew covered the deck with flammable material & ignited it.
HMS Hyacinth, now with an engine problem, bombarded the Rubens from a distance & seeing the flames on deck assumed that the blockade-runner had been destroyed. HMS Hyacinth withdrew.

The Germans immediately returned to the Rubens & salvaged the cargo.

1,800 rifles, four machine guns & two 6-cm guns were landed.

4,500,000 of small arms ammunition, 1,000 4.1-inch shells, 500 8.8-cm shells, 3,000 6-cm rounds & 3,000 rounds of 3.7-cm ammunition were also recovered.

Other stores salvaged were: 1 ton Trinitroanysol explosive, 200 tents & telegraph & telephone material.

Sea water had affected the small arms cartidges but the Germans set up production lines at Moshi to empty & clean the powder & replace faulty caps.

The arrival of the weapons & ammunition was a tremendous boost for the Schutztruppe & proved that they were not forgotten by the homeland.

However a major problem for the Konigsberg waiting in the Rufiji Delta was the fact that the Rubens had also been carrying 1,600 tons of high-grade Westphalian coal. That coal now could not be delivered to the Konigsberg.

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Salaita Hill

Operations west of Maktau & Mzima in early 1915

Military morale in British East Africa was low after the losses at Tanga & Jasin & this was reflected in the early 1915 operations mounted east of Kilima Njaro.

To protect the Masai tribespeople east of the mountain British outposts had been placed in the foothills west of Mzima. The KAR Mounted Infantry had established a post at Loosoito which in January they handed over to a company of 2nd Kashmir Rifles commanded by Major R.A. Lyall, who moved the post south to Epiron.

Lyall expressed concern about his post's vulnerability so on 03 March two companies of 130 Baluch & one company of KAR, with two machine guns, left the Tsavo Valley to patrol the Loosoito - Epiron area.
(As an example of transport requirements these three companies totalling 168 men needed 98 donkeys & 158 carriers to move with them.)

This demonstration served only to attract enemy attention as when the Baluch were back in the Tsavo a German force attacked Epiron on 10 March, killing or capturing 11 sepoys whilst the remainder scattered in the bush.

As the Masai now started their seasonal migration Lyall got his remaining men together again & moved his post back to Loosoito - the whole purpose of protecting the Masai was in fact to protect their vast herds of cattle from German raiding parties.

The British were not only threatened by the enemy. A KAR officer in the Tsavo wrote:
"Patrol activity was even more hampered by rhinos than Germans. On one occasion a whole KAR company was routed by a charge of three rhinos. Every carrier dropped his load & fled back to Mzima. The operation was abandoned."

To draw German attention away from the Loosoito area the British decided to threaten Salaita hill where an enemy detachment from Taveta was positioned.
At Mbuyuni a small force assembled under Major G. Newcombe 130 Baluch - one company 130 Baluch with 2 machine guns, one company 1 KAR, the Calcutta Volunteer Battery & also 16 cars of the East African Motor Transport Corp carrying water & ammunition & towing the Corp's 12-pounder gun - the first attempted use of mechanised First Line transport in East Africa.

Leaving at midnight the British force moved & fired on Salaita Hill at 0700 hours 29 March (due to a very muddy track the EAMT Corp's gun got stuck & had to be towed back to Maktau, the oxen-drawn Calcutta guns were better powered to move in the prevailing rainy conditions.)

The German defenders probably welcomed the British presence & they returned rifle-fire whilst firing signal rockets to alert Taveta & requesting reinforcements by telephone. After four hours Newcombe decided to withdraw but German reinforcements (commanded by Captain Koehl & The Austrian Lt Freiherr von Unterrichter) arrived & opened heavy rifle & machine gun fire on the British right flank.
The Germans on the hill had located Newcombe's two machine guns in the centre of his line & they now pinned those guns down with accurate fire as the sepoys & Askari withdrew.
The machine gun crews found themselves alone, the rifle companies having withdrawn & the machine gun porters having panicked & fled. The crews abandoned their guns & withdrew rapidly.
The British lost 6 men killed, 10 wounded & 5 missing.
The Germans seized the abandoned machine guns & 70,000 rounds of ammunition.

At the same time a German force 300 strong moved against Lyall at Loosoito who had to quickly withdraw & circle northeastwards to get into the Tsavo Valley.
The Germans & the rhinos were in control east of Kilima Njaro & of Taveta.

Footnote
To a reader several learning points emerge from the accounts of the above actions.
The Rhodesians (see Post #379) would soon be in the Tsavo Valley applying their African knowledge & devising new tactics, but the British seemed unable to change their Indian Army tactical doctrines which had been designed for other theatres.
The failure at Salaita mentioned above was soon to be repeated at Mbuyuni & then again a year later back at Salaita.

Biographical Notes
Major George Newcome 130 Baluch was later killed in action on 11 March 1916 at the battle of Latema-Reata Nek (see Post #427).
He is buried in Taveta Cemetery, Kenya.

Major Robert Adolphus Lyall DSO was on the Indian Army Unattached List. He was originally an army officer in 1st Lancers but he then joined the Indian Political Service as a civilian, being transferred to the Indian Army Supernumerary List. He was qualified in the Persian & Pushto languages.
He temporarily reverted to military duty in August 1914.
As a Lt Col in Sheppard's column he later served on the advance to the Lukigura River in GEA.

[bushfighter]

Lion at Waterhole by Kuhnert

Schutztruppe penetrations in the Magadi area in early 1915.

In early 1915 German morale increased as British morale decreased & Lettow ordered attacks on the Uganda & Magadi railway lines.

Post #397 described how the British withdrawal from Longido to Bissil because of resupply difficulties during the Long Rains led to the Schutztruppe moving into the vacated area.
In late February the Schutztruppe had staged a daring raid on the East African Mounted Rifles near Lone Hill. By using covert OPs the Germans established that "B" & "E" Squadrons of the EAMR grazed their mounts on the slopes of Oldoinyo Orok each morning.
On the morning of 26 February three Germans wearing the nondescript khaki clothes that both sides wore at that time just walked up to the lone sentry (there should have been three sentries but two were detained in camp) in a friendly way, captured & tied him to a horse & then led off the other 52 horses & mules back towards Kilimanjaro.
Despite frantic patrols from every British post in the vicinity the raiders & their booty escaped unhindered, & the Schutztruppe was then able to mount a company of Askari infantrymen to support its existing German-settler mounted unit in the Kilimanjaro area.

On 07 May 1915 a Schutztruppe mounted patrol penetrated onto the Magadi line at Mile 52 near Neuki Station and blew it up before withdrawing without loss.

On 13 May A patrol of East African Mounted Rifles approached the Seki waterhole north of Ngito Hills & was ambushed two miles to the south by a Schutztruppe raiding party. The Germans were using cover well & the EAMR troopers could not identify targets. The EAMR scattered & reformed on a kopje a mile to the rear where they found they had four men missing & one wounded. The wounded man was casevaced the 25 miles back to Bissil, & one of the missing, whose mule had been shot from under him, later walked into Bissil

The next day when a reinforced EAMR party approached the waterhole again they found the Schutztruppe gone. Trooper John Dawson had been killed & was buried where he lay.
Trooper L. Poyer had been shot in both legs, treated by the Schutztruppe medical orderly &, after he had declined a casevac to German-held Longido that would probably have killed him, left near the waterhole. Trooper P. Ducrotoy was found near where his mule had been shot, having concealed himself in the bush.

Poyer & Ducrotoy had spent a night that they both would never forget. This was lion country & the Seki waterhole was the lions' pantry. To quote from the unit history:
"During that long night these two men, completely helpless, lay listening to the devil's chorus of growls & crunching of bones, as the lions devoured the dead mules within a few yards of where they were lying."

Footnote
Trooper John Dawson is commemorated on the Nairobi British & Indian Memorial.
Trooper P. Ducrotoy later transferred to the East Africa Medical Service.
Trooper George H. Bateman of "E" Squadron is noted in the EAMR War Diary & unit history as being missing in action after the horse raid on 26 February 1915.
Lettow's "Reminiscences" note him as retaining his sense of humour until his arrival as a PW in GEA.

[bushfighter]

Thick bush in German East Africa


THE RETURN OF THE COHORT

We're a very tiny army, as armies go to-day,
Just an army of the Tropics and beginning to decay.
We thought you had forgotten us-so long we've been away.

We've most of us had fever or a tropical inside,
And we've foot-slogged half a continent; we're not supposed to ride ;
And lots of us have lost the trail and crossed the Great Divide.

Perhaps the blokes in Flanders our little bit will scorn,
'Cos we've never had an order that gas masks must be worn,
And have never heard a " nine point five " or a Hymn of Hate at morn.

But how'd you like to tramp it for a solid month on end,
And then go on another month till your knees begin to bend,
Or when you're out on picquet hear a lion answer" Friend "?

And what about a scrapping up a mountain three miles high,
A-swearing and a-panting till you thought your end was nigh,
And then to bump a Maxim gun that's dug in on the sky?

And would you like anopheles and jigger-fleas and snakes
To " chivvy" you from dusk till dawn, and fill you up with aches,
And then go on fatigue all day in a heat that fairly bakes?

There wasn't any Blighty, no, nor mails in twice a week:
We had no concerts 'hind the lines; we got too bored to speak,
And there was no change of rations; and our water bottles leak.

So don't despise our efforts, for we've done our level best,
For it wasn't beer and skittles, those two years without a rest,
And though the world forgot us we think we stood the test.

We're a cohort from the tropics, and we've come from far away,
Just an unremembered legion, fret with fever and decay.
And all of us are weary, and lots have lost the way.

We're a tiny little cohort, and we're glad to have a spell
From fever and from marching and a sun that burns like hell,
And now we're back amongst you, we'll very soon get well.

Just a tiny army, as armies go to-day,
Just a handful from the tropics, and beginning to decay,
Just a Legion of the Lost Ones-who have wandered far away.

Just a remnant who've been fighting for you and for your race;
Just a cohort from the northward, where we'd worse than Huns to face.

We thank you for your welcome, and we think you're very kind,
But we'd ask you to remember - all our mates we left behind!


Written by Owen Letcher in 1918 & first published in the Johannesburg "Star".

Letcher fought with the King's African Rifles out of Nyasaland into German East Africa. He wrote an autobiographical novel about his experiences:
"Cohort of the Tropics".

[SteveE]

Harry

Thanks for that, never seen it before in its entirety and doesn't it just sum up the campaign brilliantly!

Steve

[ShirlD]

THE RETURN OF THE COHORT

We've most of us had fever or a tropical inside,

And we've foot-slogged half a continent; we're not,supposed to ride ;

And lots of us have lost the trail and crossed the Great Divide.

How poignant Thanks Harry

Cheers

Shirley

[bushfighter]

The Uganda Railway

German attacks against the Uganda Railway in 1915

Opposite Kilima Njaro Schutztruppe raiding parties attacked the Uganda Railway on 56 occasions, mainly on the stretch between Maji Chumvi & Kiu.
The first successful attack was on 20 April 1915 when a 120-foot three-span girder bridge near Makindu was damaged, but quickly repaired.
Engines & rolling-stock were derailed on 17 occasions & the permanent way was damaged in 13 places.
Three Schutztruppe patrols fired on passing trains, a station was attacked but not captured, 13 undetonated mines were removed from the track by British troops & nine enemy patrols were driven off by rifle fire as they approached the line.

The total damage achieved by the Schutztruppe was not very great but the nuisance value of these attacks was considerable.
For nearly a year trains were not run at night through part of the danger zone & it was necessary to keep repair trains loaded with construction materials standing-by at several stations.
Line repairs led to delays in schedules & the attacks themselves led to stressful duty hours for the train crews.

The British tried whitewashing sections of the track & also laying oil trails either side of the lines in order to detect if the track had been interfered with, but the Schutztruppe countered those measures by carrying their own whitewash & oil to re-beautify the track after they had laid their mines.
Lettow states that he had plenty of dynamite available on plantations in German East Africa but the best charges were made from the British military explosives unloaded & abandoned at Tanga in 1914.

Using Indian troops a system of continuous track patrols & bridge guards was started in the danger zone, but even so some Germans who could speak good English easily captured the defenders by pretending to be British officers & then disarming the sepoys. The captured sepoys were released in the bush later but their rifles & ammunition were taken back to GEA.
As in other areas of BEA the enemy was not the only threat. In December 1915 a 3 Kashmir sepoy on duty at Tsavo was taken & eaten by a lion.

The British assumed that all Schutztruppe attacks would come from the west but Lettow’s men stayed ahead of the game by using a base camp on the Athi River, 15 miles east of Mtito Andei. This gave the attackers freedom of movement onto the line when they attacked. The Schutztruppe abandoned this base camp before the British discovered it.
Using British telephone equipment captured at Tanga English-speaking Germans tapped into British telephone lines for information about troop & train movements.

Trains started using armoured trucks at each end. These were 10-ton high-sided trucks protected by half-inch steel plate & carrying infantrymen ready to return fire & repel attacks.
For a time the 2nd Bn The Loyal North Lancashire Regiment in Nairobi had to provide a nightly armed escort of 1 NCO & 10 men supported by an Indian Volunteer maxim gun to travel on the train down to Mombasa & then back again the following day.
Also a 20-ton truck loaded with sand was run ahead of the engine to take any damage from a mine, but the Germans then used delay detonators that allowed several axle-loads to run over before detonation of the mine.
These defensive measures considerably reduced the tonnage of freight that the trains could move. In the end trains pushed trucks containing “expendable†or low-value freight ahead of them in order to keep freight tonnages moving.

As seen in Post #430 the Schutztruppe could use mounted patrols in the Magadi area but east of Taveta the lack of water for mounts meant that raiding parties had to move 40 to 50 miles on foot before finding water.
This patrolling was extremely arduous & Lettow describes how some men died of thirst & others just survived by drinking their own urine.

Demolition patrol sizes were small – one or two Germans, three or four Askari & five to seven carriers. Food & water had to be carried on the return journey & so badly wounded men could not be evacuated.
Casualties who could not walk would hand their rifle & ammunition over to be taken back to GEA by a comrade, & then would be left in the bush to await their fate.

[bushfighter]

Units that served alongside the 2nd Bn The Loyal North Lancashire Regiment - The Jind Infantry

Jind was a Princely State in the Punjab with an area of 6,050 square miles. The population was Jat Sikh.
The Jat people tend to be cultivators & have a reputation for being sturdy, stolid & determined. Sometimes outside observers mistook these characteristics for denseness.
(A Punjabi proverb states: "Three things are improved by beating: women, wheat & a Jat.")

After initially confronting the British the Sikh rulers of Jind became staunch allies, particularly during the Mutiny.
In 1914 the Ruler had 821 troops committed to the Imperial Service scheme, all of them being infantry.

As with all Imperial Service troops the Government of India paid for the first issue of arms & equipment before deployment of the unit, after that the running costs were the liability of the Maharajah of Jind.

A half-Bn of Jind Infantry arrived in British East Africa in September 1914 as part of Indian Expeditionary Force "C". The CO was Major-General Natha Singh & the attached Special Service Officer from the Indian Army was Captain R.J. MacBrayne.

In the actions at Gazi & Jasin (as described in Posts 331 & 386) the Jind Infantrymen showed that they could fight with courage.
After these tough fights the Jind Infantry was retained on the BEA Coast until March 1916 when it was dispersed along Lines of Communication for the invasion of GEA.
Then in late June 1916 it was reassembled with a strength of:
British Officers 3, Indian Officers 14 & Sepoys 375 at German Bridge in GEA & deployed to Korogwe.

The unit was involved in operations down the GEA coast including, in early September 1916, the occupation of Dar Es Salaam alongside 40th Pathans & 2nd Bn The Loyal North Lancashire Regiment.

After 40 months in theatre the unit returned to India.
The Jind Infantry stood out from many other Imperial Service infantry units because of its professionalism, as can be seen by the way the Command used it for infantry duties in the field rather than placing it permanently on Lines of Communication.

Battle Honour
East Africa 1914-1917

Commemorations
So far 101 commemorations have been noted on the British & Indian Memorials at Dar Es Salaam, Nairobi & Tanga (Jasin Memorial).

[bushfighter]

The launching of the S.S. SYBIL at Port Florence (Kisumu) on 08 January 1904

The recovery of the S.S.Sybil in May 1915

Post #354 described how the Uganda Railway's steamer Sybil had, whilst being used by the British military, struck a rock near Majita on Lake Victoria & been abandoned. Majita was well inside German East Africa, two-thirds of the way down the Lake shore from Karungu to Mwanza.

The Royal Navy were worried that the Germans who had successfully recovered their beached Muansa might also recover the Sybil & put it into use on the Lake.
The Germans did try but could not get the Sybil into the water, so they looted her.
The British steamer Winifred approached the Sybil on 30 March 1915 in an attempt to destroy the stranded vessel & claimed 19 direct hits on her with Winifred's 4-inch & 12-pounder guns.

However the Sybil had been well-built & she remained a possible asset to the enemy. A proposal to blow her up had to be abandoned because of lack of explosives in BEA so it was decided to attempt salvage.

On 20 April Numbers Nos. 3 & 4 Companies of the 2nd Bn The Loyal North Lancashire Regiment left Nairobi by train for Kisumu accompanied by two Maxim Guns manned by the North West Railway Volunteers. Two guns from Centre Section 28 Mountain Battery joined them. The force, under command Captain R.E. Berkeley 2LNL, was moved down the Lake to Karungu two days later along with half a signal section, a Field Ambulance & Supply detachment.. Here they camped on the peninsula, occupied posts at Nyesoku & Kuja Ferry & patrolled the frontier.
At this time Karungu was garrisoned by a half-company of 98th Infantry, "B" Coy 3 King's African Rifles & “E†Coy 4 KAR, supported by 1,000 carriers, with Lt Col L.H. Hickson KAR in command.

On 28 April Governor Belfield & Generals Tighe & Stewart visited Karungu, during which time a reconnaissance was made of Bukoba on the western Lake shore in preparation for a raid. The reconnaissance included firing 10 shells from the Winifred’s 12-pounder & 4-inch guns at Bukoba Boma & 3 more at an enemy post south of Sango Bay. The post was hit at 3,700 yards range much to the Governor’s & the Generals’ satisfaction.
A staff officer commenting about Karungu wrote:
"Everyone seemed very cheerful in camp; parties of the Lancashires were fishing from the shore, whilst others were shooting geese, hippos & crocodiles. At night the monotony is varied by hippos strolling into the camp."
Such sporting activity wouldn't happen today, but in 1915 the local fishermen would be thankful that their two biggest predators were being cropped & that hippo meat was available. Even today hippo kill more Africans than any other wild animal does.

On 11 May Captain Berkeley, six officers & 150 men from 2LNL, one 12-pounder manned by Logan's Battery plus 100 Askari of "B" Coy 3 KAR, a Volunteer machine gun & a naval salvage party left Karungu in the Nyanza, Winifred & Kavirongo for Majita Bay.
An unopposed landing was made two miles from the Sybil & the infantry moved inland to clear three rocky kopjes held by a Schutztruppe force of 3 Germans & 30 Askari. After a skirmish the enemy withdrew leaving one dead & one wounded Askari.

The Loyal North Lancashires & KAR then dug in on a perimeter that included the kopjes to protect the naval salvage party. On 12 May the 12-pounder & machine gun were landed to support the position.
The 2LNL War Diary records that on the perimeter the KAR shot one of their own Askari by mistake & hit him in six places - good marksmanship but wrongly applied.
The salvage party had the Sybil ready on 13 May but that night a violent storm on the Lake swamped the steamer, & it was not until 16 May that the Sybil could be towed off to Irungwa Island, four miles away, & there prepared for the voyage to Kisumu. On 18 May Capt Berkeley's force left Irungwa Island with the Sybil.

A 2LNL officer wrote:
"We spent three of the worst nights at Majita it has ever been my misfortune to spend. About midnight it would pour with rain & after an hour of it we would be attacked by thousands of mosquitoes. Every officer & man was down with fever within sixteen days of their arrival on the Victoria Nyanza. The rain by night, mosquitoes & the great heat by day, contributed to make things very unpleasant at Majita."

As the naval convoy passed Karungu on 16 May a message heliographed from shore ordered the infantry to disembark & rejoin Hickson's force as the Schutztruppe was reported to be approaching.
For the next four weeks the two companies of 2LNL, now reduced by 50% due to men sick with malaria, manoevred under Lt Col Hickson KAR along the GEA border.
The Schutztruppe always seemed to obtain better information than did the British & avoided contact when it suited them.

On 05 June Lt Anderson 2LNL attacked an enemy patrol southeast of Karungu but the German commander riposted by attacking & stampeding the British carriers. 3,000 rounds of ammunition, 12 picks & shovels & two days' rations were lost (& faithfully recorded in the Bn War Diary).
Trooper H. Thorne “E†Coy East African Mounted Rifles & a sepoy of 98 Infantry were killed & Private C. Thirkell 2LNL & a sepoy were wounded in this action. Five men from 2LNL became separated in the bush but rejoined Lt Anderson later.

The Schutztruppe was deliberately moving groups around to raid cattle & threaten Karungu & Kisii in order to tie British troops to the Lake border area, whilst using the opportunity to train new Askari recruits in bush warfare. This pressure on the north of the BEA border helped the Schutztruppe units that were attacking the Uganda Railway further south.

On 13 June the bulk of the two 2LNL companies arrived back at Nairobi, sick & worn out.
Captain Berkeley & 46 men had been detached to garrison Kisii which was being threatened by District Commissioner Schultz & his men.
The Sybil sailed again under the British flag.

Footnote
Trooper H. Thorne, East African Mounted Rifles.
Both the EAMR history & the Nairobi HQ War Diary list Trooper Thorne as being killed in action (the unit history on 07 June & the War Diary on 05 June). The EAMR War Diary does not mention him.
His date of enlistment into EAMR was 15 January 1915 which indicates that he was formerly in Ross’ Scouts.

I cannot find his name on CWGC lists (& I cannot find a CWGC record of a death in the 98th or 99th Infantry in June 1915) & I feel that because of the remote area where Pte Thorne & the sepoy were buried these graves may have been overlooked & these two men may not be commemorated.

Has anyone any comment on these possible non-commemorations?

[bushfighter]

Units that served alongside the 2nd Bn The Loyal North Lancashire Regiment - "Z" Divisional Signal Company, Sappers & Miners

In 1914 signalling in the Indian Army was a Sappers & Miners' responsibility. British & Indian signallers served together in dedicated signals units.
Two Brigade Signal Sections from 31st Divisional Signal Company RE had landed in East Africa with Indian Expeditionary Force "B" but on 03 April 1915 they were transferred out of theatre & sailed from Mombasa to Mesopotamia.

It was decided to form a Signal Section in Nairobi with personnel drawn from units in theatre & from a few 31 Div Signal Company RE sappers who had not been posted to Mesopotamia.
The units supplying men were:

2nd Bn The Loyal North Lancashires 9
31 Div Signals Coy (signallers) 4
31 Div Signals Coy (motor cyclists) 7
2nd Rhodesia Regiment 1
Gwalior Imperial Service Infantry 12
98th Infantry 6

Lt G.D. Ozanne, 99th Deccan Infantry, Indian Army was placed in command of the Section which formed on 16 April 1915..

Equipment was collected from other units but was of poor quality. Initially the section supported operations in the Eastern Lake area (Karungu) & ran a training school in Nairobi where it trained 25 Regimental Signallers for 25th Royal Fusiliers & 25 more for various Indian units. This was quite an achievement for a newly-formed & itself untrained unit that did not possess the correct scale of signals equipment.

In June 1915 the entire Section deployed on the Bukoba raid providing ship to shore & land communications support.

On 05 July reinforcements arrived.
From India two Signal Sections arrived consisting of a total of 2 Officers, 24 British & 44 Indian soldiers under Captain W.E. Beazley, 54th Sikhs (Frontier Force).
From UK 18 British Royal Engineer signallers arrived.

Now a Company could be formed & it was titled "Z" Divisional Signal Company, Sappers & Miners & the War Office sanctioned an Indian Army War Establishment for the Company.
(The establishment was 226 all ranks & 26 followers.)

However throughout the Company's existence the Indian Army only sent casualty replacements to reinforce the two Signal Sections that arrived on 05 July. This meant that the Company strength never exceeded 50% of establishment & slowly the Company wasted away, as many other units did, because of lack of effective reinforcement.

Detachments of the Company took part in the actions at Salaita, Latema-Reata, Pangani River, Nguru Hills, Morogoro, Uluguru Mountains, Duthumi & Kilwa during 1916 & on 31 December that year a detachment commenced laying & maintaining a submarine cable under the Rufigi River.

The Company continued operating in the Rufigi & Kilwa areas where for a time 259 Machine Gun Company (formed from 2nd Loyal North Lancashire personnel) provided the Company with a couple of signallers until reinforcements arrived.
On 01 June 1917 "Z" Company, now with a strength under 10% of of its establishment figure was disbanded at Dar Es Salaam.

Awards
Personnel of "Z" Divisional Signal Company, Sappers & Miners were awarded:

Military Cross 4
Distinguished Conduct Medal 6
Military Medal 1
Meritorious Service Medal 3
Cross of St. George 2nd Class (Russia) 1
Indian Distinguished Service Medal 10
Indian Meritorious Service Medal 6
Mentions in Despatches 26

Monetary awards were made to a headman & six armed scouts for driving off a larger enemy force whilst a line fault was being repaired in the Nguru Hills.

Casualties
Killed in Action 1
Died of Disease 3
Wounded in Action 4

In reading the short history of this excellent & professional unit you also read the history of many of the other small units formed in British East Africa in 1914 & 1915.

They were destined to waste their manpower away on the baking plains & in the fever-ridden swamps of German East Africa & to be starved by a South African Command that did not appear to appreciate the importance of logistics, until they were eventually disbanded & struck off the Army establishment, discarded & forgotten.

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The Belgian Baron Dhanis, perhaps the first boat with that name

The Royal Naval Expedition to Lake Tanganyika

In April 1915 J.R. Lee, a big-game hunter with knowledge both of the relevant ground & also of naval operations, suggested to the Admiralty that they send light motor-boats to Lake Tanganyika to defeat the German craft that were dominating the Lake.

A similar suggestion arrived at the same time as a result of Anglo-Belgian discussions in East Africa.

The story is best followed towards the end of the very informative article at:
http://www.geocities.com/cdferree/tanganjikasee/tangan.html

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Causeway built from trees

Royal Naval Expedition to Lake Tanganyika - the land journey

For myself the fascinating part of the expedition's story is the land journey through the Belgian Congo.

Here is an image of how small river banks were linked. It needed dry weather for this to work - & lots of local labour.

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Getting up a hill

Oxen pull upwards & men pull downwards

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Detail from a panel on the Nairobi British & Indian Memorial

The East African Intelligence Department

The origins of Intelligence as a function in the East African Campaign appear to have started in August 1914 with Lord Delamere & his settler colleagues who formed the Masai Scouts & sent them across the Masai-Mara GEA border to observe Schutztruppe activities.

Further south in BEA it then appears that British District Officers near the border with GEA used their own local informants to observe similarly.

When Indian Expeditionary Forces "C" & "B" arrived so did Indian Army Intelligence staff who took over control of Intelligence activities. The first CO was Lt Col J.D. Mackay DSO. (As might be expected Meinertzhagen had nothing good to say about him.)
However Mackay possessed a wealth of African experience, having been present at:
Battles of the Atbara & Khartoum 1898, Operations against the Ogaden Somalis in Jubaland 1901, The Nandi expedition BEA 1905-6 (Mentioned in Despatches), & East Africa (Somaliland) 1908-10 (another MiD).

However Mackay did not last long as CO of Intelligence & perhaps he was a staff casualty because of the intelligence failure at Tanga (although Meinertzhagen was the Intelligence Staff Officer on the ground there)
In January 1915 Lt Col Mackay was appointed Military Governor of recently-captured Mafia Island - perhaps he ran Intelligence activities in GEA from Mafia Island - doubtless he would have been collecting information on the Konigsberg in the adjacent Rufigi Delta.
Captain Richard Meinertzhagen was appointed OC Intelligence, performing a lot of work out of Mombasa.

Meinertzhagen appears to have been in his element practising craftiness against the Germans. He recruited local Arab & Swahili agents to cross into GEA on missions (although sometimes the agents worked for both sides), to observe the Schutztruppe but more importantly to collect used toilet paper from German latrine pits (the DPM - Dirty Paper Method). German officers did not waste anything & used redundant military communications for toilet paper. The soiled paper was useful both for the information written on it & for the signatures - Meinertzhagen collated examples of all important German signatures, allowing him to verify documents & to practise a little forgery.
He also claims to have put false signs saying "Poisoned Water" by waterholes that Schutztruppe raiding parties used when attacking the Uganda Railway.

However for many of the infantry in the field the Intelligence Department was often disappointing. Intelligence Warrant Officers deployed with infantry battalions & sent Intelligence Scouts forward to obtain tactical information.
Both the COs of 2nd Rhodesia Regiment & 2nd Loyal North Lancashires expressed disatisfaction with the Intelligence Department. The CO 2RR wrote that the East African Intelligence Department scouts did not go out scouting if they did not feel like it, & CO 2LNL mentions in his War Diary that the Intelligence Department talked too much about imminent Schutztruppe surrenders that never happened.

The Rhodesians went so far as to recruit their own African Scouts from Rhodesia & use them in their Battalion area. (Ten Rhodesian African Scouts were deployed under command of Corporal Guiney 2RR, & two of these scouts were killed in action during the campaign.)

However it must be stressed that the life of an Intelligence Department Warrant Officer in the field was rough & dangerous. He had to be at the "sharp" end in order to achieve results, & if his local scouts were recruited from a non-warlike tribe or from a tribe that lived on both sides of the border then they may not have been very enthusiastic about taking risks on behalf of the British.

The above image shows the East African Intelligence Department commemorations on the Nairobi British & Indian Memorial. All three men were Warrant Officers Class 1.

Thomas Edwin JONES
He may have first served in "E" Sqn of the East African Mounted Rifles. No details of his death on 05 January 1916 have yet been discovered.

F.C. Scott
He may have first served in "B" Sqn of the East African Mounted Rifles.
He was killed in action at Epiron on 10 March 1915 (see Post #429). Whilst Major Lyall was out reconnoitring WO 1 Scott deployed his Masai scouts but stayed in camp as he felt sick (he may even have given himself a morphine injection as a pain-reliever). When a Schutztruppe force attacked the camp WO 1 Scott told the carriers to escape & he himself was last seen with a few sepoys surrounded by German Askari.

Arthur Richard WADESON
On 13 May 1915 WO 1 Wadeson & his Intelligence Scouts accompanied a Rhodesian-commanded column in the Tsavo Valley (Mzima Column). At a water halt on the Tsavo River a Schutztruppe raiding force that was camped nearby mounted a surprise attack on the column. During fierce fighting in the bush WO 1 Wadeson was reported missing, & his mutilated body was recovered the following day.

Other Intelligence personnel:

L/Cpl (Acting Sergeant) Arthur Wilson GUINEY, 2 Rhodesia Regiment (mentioned above).
He was Mentioned in Despatches on 30 June 1917. The unit history lists him as "Died" but as yet a commemoration has not been found.

2nd Bn The Loyal North Lancashire Regiment
On 03 July 1916 on the Lukigura River, GEA the disbandment was ordered of the Mounted Infantry Company due to lack of trained reinforcements. At that stage all personnel in the MI Company were from the Loyal North Lancashires.
The Company Sergeant Major, WO T. HEWITSON, was then attached to the Intelligence Department, 1st Division, along with the MI Company's 10 African Armed Scouts.

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Copyright Queen´s Lancashire Regiment Museum, Preston

Units that served alongside the 2nd Bn The Loyal North Lancashire Regiment - 25th (Service) Bn The Royal Fusiliers (Frontiersmen)

On 06 May 1915 a new British infantry unit arrived at Mombasa aboard the “Neuralia” & was entrained for Kajiado. This was a Service Battalion of The Royal Fusiliers. ("Service" Bns were raised after the declaration of war from volunteers who signed to serve for three years or for the duration of the war if the duration was longer.)

This Bn had been raised in England through the efforts of Colonel P.D. Driscoll DSO who negotiated with the War Office to recruit members of the Legion of Frontiersmen.
The Legion of Frontiersmen was formed in 1905 as a non-official patriotic organisation aiming to enhance the defensive capabilities of the British Empire. Many branches of the Legion were in the Dominions & Colonies.
Legion members were civilians who paraded regularly for training. Units wore colonial-style uniform. Just after the declaration of war Frontiersmen from Manchester went at their own expense to fight alongside the Belgian Army.

Driscoll had raised & commanded Driscoll's Scouts in the South African War & he secured War Office approval to take his new Bn to the East African theatre. He recruited several hunters & bush scouts with African experience as officers.
The Royal Fusiliers agreed to be the Bn's parent regiment.

The Bn was 1,166 strong - around 30% stronger than the established strength of the 2nd BnThe Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, the only other English Bn in theatre. (The 2nd Bn The Rhodesia Regiment had arrived with 500 all ranks.)
About one third of 25 RF were former Frontiersmen.

However 25 RF arrived in East Africa without having done any military training prior to embarkation. This imposed a delay upon operational deployment & doubtless slowed down efforts by key personalities such as the Adjutant & Regimental Sergeant Major in getting a disciplinary grip on this large Battalion.

Things started moving at Kajiado & the nearly 50% of the Bn who had never fired a British Army Musketry Course were sent to Nairobi in May to complete the course.
Bn specialists such as Signallers were also quickly trade-trained in Nairobi.

The acquisition of this strong Bn was a big boost for General Tighe & for British East Africa, & though the unit strength would soon diminish through the ravages of disease & climate leading to a recuperation period for the Bn in South Africa, the hard-core remnants of the Bn would still be fighting courageously in German East Africa until the end of 1917.

Would a 25 RF enthusiast like to post a description of the Bn's recruitment in the UK, uniform, the backgrounds of the non-Legion members, training programmes they used on arrival in BEA, Battle Honours, Awards, Commemorations etc?

Frontiersmen in British East Africa.
As war was declared the Mombasa branch of The Legion of Frontiersmen was preparing to attend its annual camp at Shimba Hills southwest of Mombasa.
It appears that most Frontiersmen in BEA joined one of the mounted units that were formed in August 1914.

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Detail from the first panel of the Nairobi British & Indian Memorial, showing 25th Royal Fusilier (Frontiersmen) commemorations.

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Simba Column country with the Chyulu Hills in the background

Simba & Mzima Columns

Because of the successful German attack on a bridge on the Uganda Railway (see Post #434) on 20 April 1915 which was followed on 27 April by a demolition leading to a 50-man strong Schutztruppe patrol firing on the next train that arrived & causing seven British casualties, Nairobi HQ decided to send out three columns to confront the raiders.

Intelligence reports indicated that the raiders were based at Loosoito, in between Kilima Njaro & the Chyulu Hills to the north, & due west of Tsavo.

The strongest column assembled at Simba under the command of the CO 2nd Loyal North Lancashires Lt Col C.E.A. Jourdain DSO. It consisted of:

No 1 Coy 2nd Loyal North Lancs: 6 officers, 145 men & 2 machine guns
"D" Coy 3rd King's African Rifles: 2 officers & 115 men
KAR Mounted Infantry: 5 officers & 88 men
Cole's Scouts: 5 officers, 98 men & 1 machine gun
Indian Volunteer MG detachment: 1 officer, 20 men & 2 machine guns
a section of 27 Mountain Battery: 1 officer, 100 men & 2 Mountain Guns
Signals Detachment
Field Ambulance
Supply Column
Ammunition Column
plus a couple of staff officers from Nairobi HQ

Smaller columns were assembled at Mzima (a total of 207 men from 2 Rhodesia Regt, 3 KAR & 130 Baluch with 2 machine guns tasked to march west) & Maktau. The Maktau column's task was to "reconnoitre Salaita in force" in order to keep the Schutztruppe garrison there in place.

On 10 May Simba Column first marched west to Katetema where Cole's Scouts were based. Overnighting & leaving the mounted troops there the column then marched, using the cool of the morning & the evening for movement, towards Loosoito. On 13 May, now marching only at night for concealment, the column was joined by the mounted units.
But in the dark the Masai guides could not identify any features. At dawn on 14 May Loosoito was seen 3 to 4 miles ahead & quickly occupied, but the German campsite there had not been used for a few days. The intelligence had been fresh when produced, but was now stale.

Simba Column recconoitred the area for three hours & then marched back towards the railway, bivouacing at Lemeboti Hill that night. Rum was issued!
Finally the Column arrived back at Simba Station on 17 may, entraining for Nairobi the next day.

The marching riflemen of The Loyal North Lancs had exerted themselves, covering 36 miles in 24 hours during the approach to & withdrawal from Loosoito. Those men already weakened by fever were now easily susceptible to exhaustion-induced ailments.

The Maktau Column did not make contact with the enemy but the Mzima Column under Major R. Cashel, 2 Rhodesia Regiment, did.
The Mzima Column used donkeys as transport animals in a trial attempt to see if donkeys were more suitable in tsetse-prevalent areas. However the donkeys brayed loudly, struggled against being loaded, often refused to cross rivers except at crossing points on tracks & generally were much less co-operative than mules.
The donkeys’ one good point was that they did not run away when under enemy fire but as Major Cashel reported: “… as the natives that control them do, & thereby let the donkeys calmly graze towards the enemy, this cannot be called an advantage.”

On 13 May as Mzima Column was watering on the Tsavo River the Schutztruppe attacked. After a two-hour engagement during which the German Maxims were liberally used, a Schutztruppe assault was launched & decisively broken by the enfilade fire of the Rhodesian machine guns that had remained silent up to that point in the battle.
Both sides then withdrew through the thick bush to their respective camps. The Mzima Column became separated during the night due to a man becoming impaled in a thorn bush, & was charged three times by rhino before a bivouac was made.

Mzima Column had stood its ground & repelled an enemy assault but at a cost of 5 men killed & 3 men wounded.
When the British bodies were recovered they were in a badly mutilated condition.
Donkeys were not used at the "sharp end" again & in fact they were susceptible to tsetse bites.

Mzima Column Casualties
Killed in Action: (all are commemorated on the Nairobi British & Indian Memorial)
Private J. CHAVE Rhodesia Regiment
Private E. McRAE Rhodesia Regiment
Warrant Officer Class 1 A.R. WADESON East African Intelligence Department
Corporal J. CAMERON East African Transport Corps
Corporal R.P. ROBERTSON East African Transport Corps

Wounded in Action:
Sergeant G. ROBERTSON Rhodesia Regiment (later to become Regimental Sergeant Major)
Sepoy SAILDALLAK 130th Baluch
Sepoy DAL RULED 130th Baluch

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Bukoba from the south

The Amphibious Raid on Bukoba

Bukoba was a German town on the western side of Lake Victoria, near the Uganda border. An important wireless mast & communication centre was located there.
In 1915 London gave General Tighe permission to mount an amphibious raid on Bukoba. Brigadier-General Stewart was ordered to command the raiding force.
The raid occurred between 22nd & 24th June 1915.

As listed in General Stewart's after-action report the composition of the raiding force was:

4 Companies 25th Bn Royal Fusiliers & 4 machine guns
3 Companies 3rd King's African Rifles (400 rifles)
2 Companies 2nd Loyal North Lancashire Regiment & 4 machine guns
1 Double-company 29th Punjabis
a Section (2 guns) 28th Mountain Battery
a Section East Africa Regiment with 4 machine guns
Faridkot Sappers & Miners
Bridging Section
"C" Section 26th British Field Ambulance
C/22 Indian Clearing Hospital

The Nairobi Signal Section (fore-runner of "Z" Divisional Signals Company) also landed whilst Logan's Battery manned ships' guns afloat.

The Schutztruppe strength was estimated at 200 men with two Maxim Guns & one Field Gun.
One of the Schutztruppe units was composed of Arabs & they fought well on the broken high ground that dominated Bukoba town to the north & west.

The raid was a success - the first notable British success in the East African Campaign, & the Royal Navy deserves credit for the work of its Flotilla during the raid.
This was the first time, after the training at Kajiado & Nairobi, that 25th Royal Fusiliers was in action as a unit.

The casualty figures listed in General Stewart's report were:

25th Bn Royal Fusiliers 6 soldiers killed in action & 2 soldiers died of wounds, 1 officer & 9 soldiers wounded in action
2nd Loyal North Lancashire Regiment 1 soldier killed in action & 6 soldiers wounded in action
3rd King's African Rifles 3 Askari wounded in action
East Africa Regiment 1 officer & 3 soldiers wounded in action

Schutztruppe losses: 3 Germans & 13 Askari killed in action & 3 Germans & 26 Askari wounded in action.
(Plus an unknown number of persons killed & wounded during the preliminary British bombardment.)


General Stewart listed these German items destroyed or captured:
67 rifles
32,000 rounds of small arms ammunition
24 small gun rounds
1 Field Gun 2.9" calibre (which was lost in the Lake whilst being removed from Bukoba)
2 machine gun barrels plus ancillary items
Flags, military stores & clothing, explosives, kerosine & lubrication oil,
9 large canoes, 1 motor launch (complete), 2 whaler boats, 2 small boats

The following buildings were destroyed:
The Wireless Station
The Fort
Government House
Government School & Rest House
Military & Police Lines
Boat Sheds & their contents

On the return journey 12 civilians were taken to BEA at their own request:
6 European British Subjects
I Indian British subject
5 Greek subjects

The General's report omitted the looting & sacking of the town by some British soldiers.
After the departure of the British Force the local inhabitants also looted what was left of the German buildings. When the Schutztruppe re-occupied Bukoba two local Chiefs were arrested, one being hanged in punishment.

Wikipedia gives a nut-shell summary of the raid at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Bukoba but that account is not entirely accurate (nor is General Stewart's).

The Danish Chakoten sites: http://www.chakoten.dk/cgi-bin/fm.cgi?n=895 & http://www.chakoten.dk/cgi-bin/fm.cgi?n=894 display good maps & images of the battle.

Further information
I intend to visit Bukoba soon & walk the ground. Afterwards I will be able to produce an account of the action supported by recent images.

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The Rampur Imperial Service Infantry badge

Units that served alongside the 2nd Bn The Loyal North Lancashire Regiment- The Rampur Infantry

Rampur was a Princely State of 893 square miles located 120 miles east of Delhi.
The ruling family was of Afghan Pathan descent & had assisted the British during the Mutiny.
The Nawab was entitled to a 13-gun salute. (Entitlements varied from 21 for States such as Gwalior down to 9.)

The dominant people in the area were known as Pashtun Rohillas - Muslims of Afghan descent. (The Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb brought Afghans into the area to counter-balance the militant Rajputs to the south.)

In 1914 the Nawab of Rampur despatched a half-battalion of his Rampur Infantry to British East Africa with Indian Expeditionary Force "C".
Initially the unit was deployed in the Kajiado - Magadi region but in 1915 it was sent to the British East African Coast. Here the half-Battalion suffered badly from fever & after a few weeks in the coastal region was reported on as unfit to march.
In 1916 during the invasion of German East Africa the unit was deployed on Lines of Communication duties between Kajiado & Longido.

It appears that the half-Battalion returned to India in 1918 having done all that was asked of it on the Lines of Communications.


Battle Honour
East Africa 1914-18

Commemorations
So far 15 commemorations have been located on British & Indian War Memorials, 11 in Nairobi & 4 in Dar Es Salaam. The final commemoration is dated November 1917.

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Thick bush below Mzima Springs

 

Infantry Tactics in the Tsavo Valley

In mid-April 1915 2nd Rhodesia Regiment was moved from Kajiado to the Voi - Tsavo area. Initially "A" & "D" Companies occupied Tsavo on the railway line, "B" Company moved from Voi to Maktau & "C" Company was deployed to Mzima, up the Tsavo Valley & north of Maktau.
The British Command's plan was to defend this vulnerable stretch of the Uganda Railway by siting entrenched camps at Maktau & Mzima from where strong columns could intercept Schutztruppe raiding parties.

As the Rhodesian boots were worn out the men were marching barefoot. The Kashmir Rifles at Tsavo donated their own boots & 200 yards of pugaree cloth was purchased to wrap around the remaining bare feet. (New boots, helmets & new short rifles arrived later.)
400 porters accompanied "C" Company.

Indian troops including Kashmiris & Baluchis had been deployed to Mzima in early April but their bush-craft skills were not, as might be expected, up to the standard of the Schutztruppe’s skills.
On 11 April the Mzima commander Major W.A.S. Walker was killed in action when his small patrol was surprised & attacked.
Major Walker had gone out with Intelligence Agent Chitty, 18 Wateita Scouts & porters & an escort of seven Kashmir Rifles to look at locations for a proposed screen of British African Scout observers west of Mzima. (The Wateita were the local tribe, mainly living in the Teita Hills to the east of Maktau.)
Shortly after setting out Walker saw a waterbuck & fired three shots at it, alerting everybody within earshot. Intelligence Agent Chitty then found the fresh spoor of between 40 & 50 enemy heading west towards Campi Ya Maribu, & he advised Walker to terminate the patrol. Walker, wanting to gain more information, proceeded for a time until Chitty & the Wateita refused to go on. The British patrol then turned around. Chitty advised that a new route should be used for the return journey but Walker did not think that necessary.
On the return journey a small enemy group (2 or 3 Germans & 12 Askari) that had been dropped-off by the main group in order to reconnoitre Mzima in daylight, ambushed Walker’s patrol at 20 yards’ range, killing him, two sepoys, one Scout & Chitty’s cook. The remaining British troops ran into the adjacent lava-flow (see image at Post

& escaped.
A strong KAR patrol recovered Walker’s stripped & mutilated body & the bodies of the two sepoys..

In May the Rhodesians learned how efficient a Schutztruppe ambush could be.
130th Baluch had used a hill, six miles north of Mzima & named "Signal Hill", as an Observation & heliograph Signal Post, sending relief parties from Mzima out at the same time & by the same route each day.
The Schutztruppe, who had their own camps in the densely-vegetated Tsavo Valley, observed this, & on 08 May ambushed the British troops approaching Signal Hill.
Four Rhodesians were killed & one other,who spoke German, was evacuated westwards to a Schutztruppe camp at Rombo (north of Ziwani) where he died of his wounds.
The ammunition in use by the Rhodesians at that time was unreliable & misfires were common. Several misfired cartridges were discovered alongside the Rhodesian dead.

The Rhodesians were jolted & set out to develop tactics to match the Schutztruppe's. In the thick bush troops could only advance in single file along game tracks, & a column of 200 rifles with 60 porters would stretch for a mile in length. On one occasion a large Rhodesian column later discovered that a similar-sized German column had been just 150 yards away going in the opposite direction. Neither column knew of the other's existence.

The Rhodesians also discovered that the Schutztruppe placed watchers in trees on the approaches to their camps. If a British patrol appeared the watchers would fire rifles, alerting the German commander who could practise "active defence" & plan an ambush on ground of his own choosing as the British patrol came nearer.

"D" Company 2nd Rhodesia Regiment was moved up from Tsavo to Crater Hill, eight miles southeast of Mzima on the Tsavo River, & the Rhodesian CO Lt Col A.E. Capell was appointed Commander of the Tsavo - Mzima Line.
The Bn was losing men quickly to the ravages of the climate & terrain - common ailments were: repeated malaria, enteric fever, veldt-sores, colds, rheumatism & dysentry.
By mid-June 25% of the Rhodesian Battalion was in hospital.

Lt Col Capell abandoned Signal Hill & also moved the camp at Mzima to the more healthy "Rhodesia Hill" rising above the Springs.
He ordered that patrols should be either over 100 men strong with machine guns, or else be composed of three men or less.
The small patrols, consisting of one Rhodesian & two African Scouts, avoided contact & concentrated on reconnaissance.
The large patrols went out to fight.

These patrol tactics, similar to the Schutztruppe's own, reduced the British casualty rate, brought good information into Bn HQ, & inspired confidence amongst the British troops that they could match the Germans in bush-craft & operational effeciency.
Soon the Schutztruppe abandoned the Tsavo Valley as an approach route to the Uganda Railway.

The last words have to be Lt Col Capell's:
"This bush work is very trying for troops; rifles must be kept loaded, those of the flank & advance guards with safety-catches off. It is continual stopping & catching in thorns, listening to & for sounds; momentarily expecting the crack of rifles at short ranges; for hours hardly speaking in more than the lowest whisper; the continual anxiety that someone may be losing touch; all these combine to make the most nervy & wearying class of fighting imaginable. No one who has not seen the bush of the Tsavo Valley can understand it."


Places of Commemoration

Indian Army
Major W.A.S. Walker (46th Punjabis attached to 130 Baluch) killed in action on 12 April 1915, is buried at Taveta, Kenya.
Havildar Khazan Singh & Sepoy Mahant Singh (3rd Kashmir Rifles, Raghunath Regiment) killed alongside Major Walker, are commemorated on the Nairobi British & Indian Memorial.

2nd Bn The Rhodesia Regiment
Signaller E.M. Wells & Privates W.A. Nelson, G.C. Potts, & C.S. Townsend, all killed in action on 08 May 1915, are buried at Voi, Kenya.
Lance Corporal O. Faber who died of wounds at Rombo on or after 08 May 1915 is commemorated on the Nairobi British & Indian Memorial, Kenya.
Private W. Blamey escaped from the German ambush on 08 May but went into shock, sank into a state of lethargy & died of fever on 20 June 1915. He is buried at Voi.

 

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Rhodesia Hill, above Mzima Springs

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Mementos of Kabakas in their special tomb

Units that served alongside the 2nd Bn The Loyal North Lancashire Regiment - The Baganda Rifles

The Baganda are Ugandans who inhabit the north & west shores of Lake Victoria & the hinterland behind these shores. They were ruled by a King, the Kabaka, & the British colonial authorities encouraged the Kabaka to run a centralised beaurocratic Kingdom.

The Buganda had told the British that they would assist them militarily (with warriors bearing spears & shields) if emergencies arose.
When war was declared in August 1914 The Regent of Buganda wrote to the British on behalf of four other Chiefs requesting that the five Chiefs & 500 of their men be sent to England to join the British Army.

The British were grateful but diverted this Bagandan enthusiasm into the formation of a unit titled the Uganda Armed Levies, armed with rifles.
The Levies were recruited entirely from among the Baganda & the unit was re-titled The Baganda Rifles & an establishment of 555 all ranks was sanctioned.
The first Commanding Officer was Captain E. Tyrell Bruce (Uganda Volunteer Reserve). When Captain Bruce was transferred in July 1916 Captain H.B. Tucker (98th Infantry, Indian Army) was given command of the unit.

For the first two years of the war the Baganda Rifles was employed on the Kagera River Front just south of the border between Uganda & German East Africa. Here the Riflemen would have come into contact with members of Logan's Battery who were manning guns on steamers of the RN Lake Flotilla that used to visit Sango Bay.

In 1916 the Baganda Rifles took part in the advance into GEA as part of Lake Force, starting with an amphibious landing on Ukerewe Island, then advancing overland through Mwanza & south towards Tabora on the Central Railway.
During this advance the unit performed excellent long-range patrolling duties, but also suffered from a meningitis epidemic that caused many fatalities within the ranks.

On reaching Tabora (which had been taken by the Belgians before the British arrived) Lake Force was disbanded. The Baganda Rifles, although effective & well supported by the Regent & Chiefs, moved back to Uganda & disbanded at Entebbe on 08 November 1916.
Many Askari of the disbanded unit then joined the King's African Rifles & continued their active service in German & Portuguese East Africa.

Commemorations
As yet no recognition of Baganda Rifles casualties has been found on CWGC lists.

Medal Index Cards
So far 232 African & European names of personnel on strength or attached to the unit have been found.

Officers
These 20 officers have been identified as having served with or been attached to the Baganda Rifles:
Captain E.T. Bruce
Captain H.B. Tucker
Captain P.M. Gettleson, Royal Army Medical Corps
Captain W.G. de Glehn
Lieutenant H.H Allsop
Lieutenant C.T. Doran
Lieutenant R.G. Foster
Lieutenant J.P. Freeman
Lieutenant J. Harmsworth
Lieutenant F.W. Kilbee
Lieutenant M.C.M. Leggett
Lieutenant F.B. Lennard
Lieutenant H.A. Mackenzie
Lieutenant H. Maxfield
Lieutenant W.J. McMillen
Lieutenant A.R. Morgan
Lieutenant F.C. Parsons
Lieutenant G.F. Webster
Lieutenant J. Watt
Lt. Col. W.V. Faber
Most officers came from the Companies of the Uganda Volunteer Reserve & after the disbandment of the Baganda Rifles most officers went to serve with the King's African Rifles.

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Terrain west of Bura - not such dense bush as in the Tsavo Valley, but still providing good cover for foot patrols

The Voi - Maktau Area in mid 1915

On 01 May 1915 Brigadier-General Wilfred Malleson CIE was appointed Commander of the Voi area (extending north from Mombasa to Simba & west to German East Africa), & tasked with protecting the Uganda Railway.
Brigadier-General Malleson had been commissioned into the Royal Artillery in 1886 but had transferred to the Indian Army in 1904. He was qualified in the Persian, Pushtu & Punjabi languages. Most of his service was spent on the Staff.
He does not appear to have had much command experience, arriving at Tanga in November 1914 with Indian Expeditionary Force "B" as Inspector of Communications. The Tanga beaches, his responsibility, were never efficiently managed.
In Mombasa in December 1914 Major-General Wapshare made a special request that Malleson be retained in East Africa to deal with Martial Law & Censorshiop requirements.
In early 1915 Malleson was involved in negotiations in Uganda & the Congo with the Belgians, which led to their participation in the East African Campaign.
Now he was given a field command appointment.

In early May the military railway from Voi had progressed 12 miles towards Maktau & it began to attract Schutztruppe attention.
This took some pressure off the Rhodesians to the north in the Tsavo as the Germans now realised that they had an easier target to demolish, and one that was actually being constructed towards their defended position at Mbuyuni, 12 miles west of Maktau.

On 05 May Brigadier-General Malleson decided to reconnoitre the enemy post at Mbuyuni & with the 130 Baluch CO, Lt Col C.U. Price, he drove towards the German position. A screen of 15 sepoys from 130 Baluch commanded by Subadar Ghulam Haider advanced on foot in front of the car.
The Schutztruppe commander, no doubt warned by his forward screen of watchers, sent out a patrol of 100 Askari & 3 machine guns to deal with the British reconnaissance.
Ghulam Haider saw the predicament that Malleson was now in & so ordered his 15 sepoys to attack the Schutztruppe patrol saying : "Never mind if we lose our lives, we must save the General & the Commanding Officer". This allowed Malleson's driver to turn round & drive to safety.
Ghulam Haider was mortally wounded by machine gun fire but the remaining sepoys under Havildar Mohamed Ali, hearing the car's withdrawal, broke contact & carried their Subadar back for eight miles, initially whilst being pursued. One other sepoy was wounded.

Ghulam Haider died on 06 May. Brigadier-General Malleson recommended him for a posthumous Victoria Cross but this was not approved.

The Schutztruppe now reinforced Mbuyuni using it as a base from which to attack the Voi - Maktau railway line & the various construction parties working on it.
Workers were fired at & demolitions laid under the line.

On 23 June 1915 the military railway reached Maktau, & Malleson knew that he had to destroy the enemy force at Mbuyuni so that the railway line could proceed westwards.


Biographical detail from the British Library website:

Malleson (Major-General Sir Wilfred)
Major-General Sir Wilfred Malleson (1866-1946), Joined Royal Artillery 1886; transferred to the Indian Army 1904; on staff of FM Horatio Herbert Kitchener, 1st Earl Kitchener of Khartoum and Broome as Head of Intelligence Branch, Indian Army Headquarters 1904-1910; accompanied mission to Kabul, Afghanistan, under Sir Louis William Dane 1904-1905; Head of British Military Mission to Turkestan 1918-1920; Afghan War 1919; ran a network of spies from Meshed in north-eastern Persia against the Russians during the same period.

Comment
Despite never winning an engagement that he fought General Malleson had a good war. He survived an enquiry into his conduct at Latema-Reata Nek on 11 March 1916 (see Post #427) & was promoted to Major-General later that year.
He was living proof that effective net-working & clever staff performance are significantly more useful to a military career than battlefield experience & command competence are.