Loyal North Lancashires in East Africa

[bushfighter]

Kagera River

Ambush on the Kagera

Follow-on from Post #332

Along the Kagera River Front in southwestern Uganda in early 1915 the Schutztruppe & the British Forces patrolled against each other, using canoes to glide across the river at night.

If the aim of the patrol was reconnasissance then the number of men on patrol would be small, only rifles would be carried, stealthy observation would be the priority & there would be no fighting unless the patrol was spotted by the enemy & fired upon.
But when reconnaissance patrols came back with good information that indicated an enemy weakness, a fighting patrol would be organised with more men & a Machine Gun, & this time offensive action would be the priority.

The British troops patrolling from the vicinity of Rukuba, a post about 7 miles north of Kyaka Fort on the Kagera River, were from the 13th Rajputs, the 4 King's African Rifles Reserve Company & the tribal Baganda Levies.
These troops dropped their guard & made the greatest mistake that patrols can make - they created a pattern of habit.
Patrols from the different units became used to meeting up with each other for a chat & to compare notes at a particular foot-path junction at the same time each day.

Concealed Schutztruppe reconnaissance patrols had been watching for exactly such an occurrence, & a fighting patrol was mounted to ambush the British troops. The fighting patrol crossed the river quietly by night, chose a concealed gun position that covered the British meeting point, & lay there silently all day.

When the Rajputs, KAR reservists & levies met up as usual, the German machine gun cut them down.
British losses were: 5 Rajputs, 2 KAR & 2 levies KIA. 1 KAR WIA. 2 KAR & 1 Rajput MIA.
The Schutztruppe fighting patrol then broke contact & returned south across the river unscathed.

As a KAR officer who was on the Kagera Front at the time writes:
"Needless to say our patrol tactics changed after this debacle."

[bushfighter]

Eastern Lake Victoria area, from Lumbwa to Musoma

Activities in the Eastern Lake Area & The Fight at Mwaika Hill, 09 March 1915

Follow-on from Post #370

On 13 January 1914 General Stewart interviewed both Major C.R. Ross & Lieutenant Paysant of Ross's Scouts at Kisumu. As a result of these interviews it was decided to disband Ross's Scouts.

Ross's 40 men chose where next to go & some went on Intelligence duties. Lieutenant J.J. Drought & 18 other officers, NCOs & men were posted to the East African Mounted Rifles on 15 January. They stayed in the eastern Lake area & were known as "Drought's Troop", & they raised a force of tribesmen for cross-border patrolling known as the "Skin Corps" because of the tribesmens' aversion to using clothing.

Lieutenant-Colonel Hickson, KAR, who had been OC Troops Uganda moved across Lake Victoria to the British base at Karungu on on 22 January to take command of operations in the Eastern Lake Area. A telegraph line had been established between Karungu & Kisumu.

A Schutztruppe patrol of 40 Askari under Lt Becker re-entered Shirati on 02 February, demolished the fort & left the town three days later. Meanwhile a Schutztruppe field gun was positioned at Musoma, the next port west of Shirati.
Four German guns along with submerged mines were reported to be defending Mwanza, GEA's main port on the Lake.

On the nights of 09 & 12 February an energetic Schutztruppe patrol attacked the Uganda Railway bridge at mile 521 between Nairobi & Kisumu. A British sentry was wounded in the second attack. Enemy activity so near Kisumu was disturbing.
This action decided Nairobi HQ to reinforce the eastern Lake area & the KAR Mounted Infantry Company, 80 men strong under Lt H.H. Davies 3 KAR, was entrained for Lumbwa (about 55 miles east of Kisumu) to deal with the raiders. The KAR Mounted Infantry Company was recruited from Abyssinians & Somalis.
After a brief stay at Lumbwa, & having failed to contact the enemy raiding party, the KAR MI Coy joined up with a section of 28 Mountain Battery & moved to join Hickson at Karungu.
The Nairobi-based 3 KAR Reserve Company under Captain Brooke entrained direct for Kisumu to join Hickson.

Lt Col Hickson assembled a force of over 400 men ("E" & "G" Coys 4 KAR, Reserve Coy 3 KAR, KAR MI Coy, Section 28 Mtn Bty, 16 men of Drought's Troop) at Niasoku, a hill on the BEA side of the border 20 miles southeast of Karungu. On 04 March he moved south into GEA, clearing Schutztruppe outposts from Ekoma & Susini hills, killing one German at Ekoma (probably Lt Recke) for the loss of two KAR Askari (one from 4 KAR at Ekoma & one from 3 KAR at Susini).
On 09 March he reached Mwaika Hill, a little southeast of Utegi & inbetween the Mori & Mara Rivers.

Mwaika Hill summit consists of two parallel ridges with a shallow rocky valley inbetween. Drought's Troop as leading scouts had just reached the higher ridge when it observed Schutztruppe Askari approaching the opposite ridge.
As the British & Germans saw each other they each rushed to secure firing positions. The KAR MI Coy galloped forward to secure Drought's right flank whilst the 3 KAR Reserve Coy & the two mountain guns joined the line in the centre. The 4 KAR Asakari secured the left of the British line.

Lt von Haxthausen was the Schutztruppe commander & he had a Feldkompagnie with him. He held his ground all day, re-taking with the bayonet a knoll on his ridge that was twice seized by 4 KAR Askari.
Hickson sent the KAR Mounted Infantry in a wide envelopment around the German left flank to try & trap them, whilst Major A.M. Colville of 28 Mountain Battery personally directed a gun forward to within 200 metres of a Schutztruppe Machine Gun position to destroy it with direct fire.

After nightfall von Haxthausen withdrew south avoiding the KAR MI Coy troops & this short but sharp & determined action was ended.
The KAR claimed the battlefield & the victory (as incidentally did Lettow in his "Reminiscences"), but it was a costly victory for KAR Europeans.
To the KAR the important factor probably was that the Schutztruppe had withdrawn, as in the eyes of the local tribespeople that meant defeat. British influence in this region grew.

Hickson moved west towards Shirati & asked Nairobi for reinforcements. HQ Nairobi ordered a Company of Loyal North Lancashires & Logan's Battery plus a KAR Company to join Hickson.

[bushfighter]

Bush country along the Eastern Lake Area border between BEA & GEA

Continuation of Post #377

CASUALTIES
Schutztruppe: Lettow states 1 German & 10 Askari KIA, 2 Germans & 25 Askari WIA & 1 wounded German taken prisoner. (The British report taking many Askari prisoner.)

British: 3 British Officers & 1 British Warrant Officer KIA, 12 Askari & 1 Indian gunner WIA, several Askari MIA.

The British dead were:
Lt Alexander Gordon Sale 3 KAR & Special List, from Barrow-on-Trent, England
Lt GEH Reid 4 KAR & Special List
Lt AD Thompson 4 KAR & formerly King's Dragoon Guards
Sergeant Major Gordon Reid 3 KAR Mounted Infantry, from Natal, South Africa.
It appears that all were buried where they fell, then after the war re-buried in a CWGC Cemetery at Mwanza & finally re-buried in the Dar Es Salaam War Cemetery.


AWARDS
For his part in the actions on 04 March 1915 Yuzbashi Murjah Effendi Bukhit of 4 KAR was awarded a DCM
"For gallant conduct & cool leading in close bush, when counterattacked by superior forces, at Ekoma".

Cpl Ismail Ibrahim of 3 KAR won a DCM for
“Conspicuous bravery & gallant conduct in protecting lead horsemen, misleading the enemy as to our strength & later driving off with only 7 men a hostile force at least 50 strong on Mwaika Hill on 9 Mar 1915â€.

Sgt Matakia of 3KAR also won a DCM
“For conspicuous bravery in leading his section to the support of the MI over open country under heavy fire, & later of returning to his CO with very valuable information, under heavy fireâ€

9589 Pte M. Sullivan, 2nd Bn The Loyal North Lancashire Regiment was awarded a DCM
"For gallantry at Mwaika Hill on 9 March 15, in returning under close fire & bringing up ammunition to the firing line of Lt Drought’s troop EAMR and carrying a wounded man of the 3rd KAR out of action under heavy fire."

What Private Sullivan was doing at Mwaika is not known, but perhaps he had been left at Karungu when No 2 Coy 2LNL departed (see Post #370) to pass on certain military skills to Drought's Troop.
Perhaps also there were other Loyal North Lancashires in this & similar actions along the frontier, & we will never learn about them because time has obscured the details.

Any further information on Private Sullivan will be appreciated.


AFRICAN OFFICERS IN THE KING'S AFRICAN RIFLES
Up to 1919 4 KAR had an establishment for one African officer per Company who commanded the fourth platoon in a Company & who was the first officer to investigate complaints or problems in the Company. He could award punishments for minor disciplinary offences.
Ranks (Turkish titles taken from the Sudanese Army) were:
Mulazim Tani Effendi - 2nd Lieutenant; Mulazzim Awal Effendi - 1st Lieutenant; Yuzbashi - Captain.
Sometimes the Senior Yuzbashi was granted the unpaid rank of Bimbashi - Major.
Promotion was from the ranks. In barracks these officers could wear the Sam Browne belt with sword, & collar & tie. They lived in their own houses.
As can be seen above these officers were eligible for the King's African Rifles Distinguished Conduct Medal rather than for awards granted to European officers serving in the KAR.


MAJOR CHARLES JOSEPH ROSS DSO
On the disbandment of Ross's Scouts Charles Ross dropped out of sight.
The Official History states that he resigned his commission in December 1914, but his unit wasn't disbanded until mid-January 1915.
He qualified for the 1914/15 Star, & for the War & Victory medals & his medal card lists him as a Major in Ross's Scouts, East African Mounted Rifles & East African Signal Company.
The History of The East African Mounted Rifles does not list him as ever being on strength.
Neil Speed who wrote his biography "Born to Fight" (The Caps & Flints Press, Melbourne, 2002) believes that he may have joined his old pals Paddy Driscoll & Frederick Selous in 25th Royal Fusiliers (The Legion of Frontiersmen) & become involved in Intelligence duties. Certainly he was convalescing back in UK in 1917 when the remnants of 25th Royal Fusiliers also were.
After the war Ross re-joined the BEA Game Department, working from his home in Eldama Ravine, Rift Valley Province in what is now Kenya.
On 19 June 1922, just 15 days short of his 65th birthday, he died of double pneumonia caused by exposure after a fall whilst out on patrol.

Does anyone have any more information on Charles Ross's war service?

[bushfighter]

Units that served alongside the 2nd Bn The Loyal North Lancashire Regiment

The 2nd Bn The Rhodesia Regiment

On the 19th March 1915 No 3 Company The 2nd Bn The Loyal North Lancashire Regiment was at Kajiado, having marched there from Longido (see Post #366).
Before entraining for Nairobi the Company was ordered to hand over its tentage & ammunition to a new white unit that had just arrived in British East Africa - The 2nd Bn The Rhodesia Regiment.

As described in Post #340 Southern Rhodesia raised the volunteer 1st Bn The Rhodesia Regiment to assist South Africa in the invasion of German South West Africa.
In mid-November 1914 the decision was taken to raise another volunteer Bn of The Rhodesia Regiment "to be placed at the disposal of the Imperial Government for active service in this territory or elsewhere".
London requested the services of this Bn in British East Africa.

The unit was raised in Salisbury, Gwelo & Bulawayo & concentrated for training at Salisbury. The pay was the Imperial or UK rate of 13 pence per day, which was meagre by Colonial standards.

On 06 May 1915 the Bn, 500 strong, entrained at Salisbury for Beira in Portuguese East Africa, where on 09 March it embarked in SS Umzumbi, berthing at Mombasa five days later.
On the 16th March the Bn entrained & moved north for four miles until a holdup on the railway was encountered at Changamwe - luckily there it was possible to purchase 1,000 bottles of beer.
The Bn detrained at Kajiado the following day.

The Bn performed very creditably in East Africa & was, due to the bush skills of many of its members, probably the most useful white unit in the field.
The Bn Machine Gun Sections recruited their own African Machine Gun Porters from Rhodesia.
After the battle at Salaita the Rhodesians & 130th Baluchis maintained a close professional relationship based on mutual respect, a gesture that white South African units appeared unable to make.
The Loyal North Lancashires & the Rhodesians enjoyed each others' company socially, on the football pitch & in military skills competitions, the Rhodesians usually being victorious in competitive events.

However the Rhodesians suffered the fate of all white infantry units in the theatre & were decimated by disease, malnutrition & exhaustion.
Replacements were sent from Rhodesia & 1,038 men passed through the unit but in early 1917 the Bn was taken out of the line on the Rufiji River, only 91 men strong.
These remnants returned to Salisbury in April 1917 & were disbanded, although some members of the Bn stayed on in German East Africa with the King's African Rifles & the Intelligence Department.

MEDICAL STATISTICS (Compiled by the Battalion Medical Officer)
Killed 36
Died of wounds or disease 32
Wounded 84
Admissions to hospital 2,272
Total cases of sickness 10,626.
Serious causes of sickness were:
Malaria 3,127
Blackwater Fever 41
Dysentery 921
Enteric fever 4
Pneumonia 3

Of the African Scouts & Machine Gun Porters in the unit:
6 were killed
8 were wounded
6 died.

COMMEMORATIONS
So far 86 Rhodesia Regiment commemorations have been located in Kajiado, Nairobi, Voi, Taveta, Dodoma, Iringa, Dar Es Salaam, Morogoro, Zomba, Harare, Mutare, Cape Town & Durban.

Their country has moved on & so fewer people each year can remember & relate to the sacrifices made by this fine Battalion.

[bushfighter]

Mrima Hill. The Jind Infantry ocupied this for 2 nights to cover the coastal advance

The Fighting on the Coast in December 1914

Follow-on from Post #331

After the fight at Gazi in early October 1914 the British, stunned by their defeat at Tanga, stayed on the defensive. The Africans living in the territory between Gazi & the GEA border at Vanga felt vulnerable & threatened, & so moved towards Mombasa.
Over 5,000 of these refugees were having to be sheltered & fed by the British authorities so General Wapshare decided on offensive action on the Coast.

Brigadier-General Tighe was given command of 1,800 troops, 6 Machine Guns & 5,500 carriers.
The troops were: 101st Grenadiers, 2nd Kashmir Rifles, half a Bn of Jind Infantry, Wavell's Arab KAR Company, an interesting Scout Company composed of Indians & Africans, & two Sections of the Indian Volunteer Machine Gun Battery.
These troops were sent to join "B" & "D" Companies of 3 KAR who were garrisoning Gazi.

The troops deployed southwards on 17 December, some moving inland along the hills above the Coast & the remainder advancing down the Coast.
Heavy rain fell & rivers were high.
Schutztruppe patrols were pushed back across the border & Vanga was found deserted.
The Royal Navy "demonstrated" off the GEA coast north of Tanga & successfully diverted the Schutztruppe from interfering with Tighe's advance.

On Christmas Day Captain T.O. Fitzgerald 3 KAR mounted a successful surprise attack on Jasin, the German post just across the border, with a KAR Company & a 101st Grenadiers Company.
The Schutztruppe trenches were taken in a fast bayonet assault which killed one German & 6 Askari for the loss of 2 British troops killed & 3 wounded. The remainder of the Schutztruppe Askari retired at speed to the south.
The dead German was the post commander who was relaxing in his pajamas whilst his servants laid out his Christmas dinner.

Fitzgerald then withdrew with his KAR Askari & the Christmas dinner whilst Tighe deployed Indian units to hold the Jasin position.
Just north of the border Tighe located a camp at Umba, & the carriers were employed to move the supplies landed nearby on the mangrove beaches by the Royal Navy to this camp, & then on to the troops at Jasin. Some carriers also moved loads from the roadhead at Gazi to Umba.

Lettow decided to act & started planning the movement of troops down the Usambara Railway line from Moshi, where his Feldkompagnien were concentrated, to Tanga.

[bushfighter]

Uganda Railway passenger coaches in the Nairobi Railway Museum

The Uganda Railway Volunteers

On page 52 of the Official History "Military Operations in East Africa Aug 14 - Sep 16" is an entry on a "Distribution of Troops" table stating that 60 men of the Railway Volunteers were located at Voi.
This is the only mention of this unique unit, which is a pity.

A few years before the Great War commenced a Uganda Railway Volunteer Reserve had been recruited from amongst the European employees of the railway.
The unit followed the lines of the Indian Railway Volunteers (see Post #346) & had been formed to guard the railway in the event of an emergency.
The strength was around 100 men & training had usually been rifle practice.

On 09 August 1914 the unit was mobilised & 60 men under the command of Captain H.V. Kershaw, an assistant accountant, left Nairobi by special train for Voi, along with a KAR patrol.
For the next four months the Uganda Railway Volunteers guarded the line & bridges along the 147 mile stretch of rail between Sultan Hamud (in between Kiu & Simba Stations) & Voi.

During late September the Schutztruppe sent two demolition patrols through the waterless region from Lake Jipe, south of Taveta, to Kasigau Mountain & on another 20 miles to the railway.
On 24 August a patrol of Uganda Railway Volunteers found one of the Schutztruppe patrols nearly dead from thirst & exhaustion - the map used by the Germans was innacurate - & captured it.
These enemy prisoners, the first taken in BEA during the war, were despatched to Nairobi with justifiable satisfaction.

With the arrival in BEA of Indian Expeditionary Forces "C" & "B" there were sufficient other troops for railway security duties & The Uganda Railway Volunteer Reserve was stood down, allowing the men to return to their vital war work of running the railway.

The unit had been the only trained reserve available in BEA (probably because the Uganda Railway funded & organised it), & during the first weeks of August 1914, whilst Nairobi Racecourse Camp resounded to the greetings & backslappings of other European volunteers awaiting mobilisation, The Uganda Railway Volunteers had drawn their weapons & deployed immediately onto successful operational duties.

[SteveE]

On 09 August 1914 the unit was mobilised & 60 men under the command of Captain H.V. Kershaw, an assistant accountant, left Nairobi by special train for Voi, along with a KAR patrol.

Shows how difficult it is to follow the miriad of 'minor' East African units in the theatre. Captain H(enry) V(alder) Kershaw's MIC makes no mention of the Uganda Railway Volunteers but has him down as East Africa Volunteer Artillery prior to transfers.

Just for information.....

Medal card of Kershaw, Henry Valder

Corps Regiment No Rank

East Africa Volunteer Artillery Captain

East African Railway Transport Department Captain

London Regiment Captain

London Regiment Major

and from CWGC.......

KERSHAW, HENRY VALDER

Initials: H V

Nationality: United Kingdom

Rank: Captain

Regiment/Service: London Regiment

Unit Text: 19th Bn.

Age: 38

Date of Death: 15/09/1916

Additional information: Son of Mrs. Georgina Kershaw, of 51, Briar Avenue, Norbury, London.

Casualty Type: Commonwealth War Dead

Grave/Memorial Reference: Pier and Face 9 D 9 C 13 C and 12 C.

Memorial: THIEPVAL MEMORIAL

Regards

Steve

[SteveE]

The Uganda Railway Volunteers

Harry

I must admit to being a bit confused about this unit.

A while ago (for something to do ) I listed down all the men (according to their MIC's) who served in this unit. What's confusing me is that there appears to be two distinct numbering 'blocks' for this unit, as you suggest there a number of Europeans who seem to have been allocated numbers in the range 1 to 53 (53 being the highest I found) which fits in with what you've stated but there is also a second number 'block' in the 11xxx range for an Indian section which would appear to be later in the conflict and after the unit was supposedly disbanded. What confuses me even more is that, unlike the Europeans who have an apparently 'normal' rank quota the majority of the Indians are shown as Havildars (Serjeants).

In your opinion are these two separate units of the Uganda Railway Volunteers or have two completely separate Volunteer units been wrongly grouped together under the one banner.

On the same topic, there were a number of troops listed as Protectorate Railway Volunteers, in your opinion is this one and the same as the Uganda Railway Volunteers?

Regards

Steve

[bushfighter]

Steve

Thanks for the interesting & relevant contribution. My source is the Uganda Railway history: "Permanent Way" by M.F. Hill.

My interpretation of the Uganda Railway Volunteer Reserve's activities is:

It started as an all-white unit.

In November 1914 it was stood-down from full-time service but not disbanded.

After that members paraded on certain evenings, weekends & for special operations, like the Indian Volunteers in India.

Then, just as the Indian Volunteers accepted certain classes of Indians as members once the war had started, the Uganda Railway Volunteers did the same.

My guess is that the Indian members who were Havildars were Stationmasters & others with authority.

This would fit in with the military take-over of the Uganda Railway. Everyone would then be accountable under Military Law.

The Protectorate Railway Volunteers probably were from the same unit.

(MICs tell us a lot, but spread false trails also. Last week I was tracking down African names in the Mekran Levy Corps until I realised that there were also Maltese names on the list. The abbreviation MLC - Maltese Labour Corps, Military Labour Corps - had been bundled under Mekran Levy Corps. But I am thankful that the MICs are on the internet.)

Henry Kershaw's service in the Uganda Railway Volunteers may just not have been noted on the MIC, or he may have been holding a commission already from the South African War or elsewhere.

Regards

Harry

[bushfighter]

The GEA coast between Tanga & Moa Bay

The Fighting on the Coast in January 1915 - Preliminary Skirmishes

Follow-on from Post #380

Lettow brought six Feldenkompagnien down the railway from Moshi to Tanga. They moved quickly without their porters as the German plantations in the Tanga area could supply sufficient labour. Three Feldenkompagnien were already on the Coast.
One factor assisting Lettow’s plan was that at Jasin, his objective, a trolley line ran south from the sisal plantation there for 7 miles to a jetty at Moa Bay.
The Schutztruppe would be able to use this trolley line for swift casevac & ammunition resupply.

At Jasin a fortified post had been constructed that was occupied by two Companies of the 2nd Kashmiris.
On 12 January 1915 No. 4 Schutzekompagnie (German reservists) & half of No. 15 Feldkompagnie (Askari) attempted to bypass Jasin Fort half a mile to the north. The Kashmiris stood firm & were quickly reinforced by a 3 KAR Company in Umba Camp & the attack was stopped at a sisal factory near the crossing-point of the Suba River.
When two Companies of Jind Infantry also arrived & a Section of 28 Mountain Battery at Umba Camp came into action the German force withdrew having lost 4 KIA, 14 WIA & 6 MIA.
The British had 5 WIA.

Tighe now added another Company to the Jasin Fort strength, 40 men of which occupied a new strongpoint built into the sisal factory.

On 16 January an estimated three Feldenkompagnien again attacked Jasin but were beaten off by the same defenders – the Kashmiris & 3 KAR.
The Schutztruppe had been probing again to learn more about the British strength & positions, but failed to spot the new strongpoint in the sisal factory.

The hot, humid, malarial climate in the Umba Valley was now affecting the British troops & many in Umba Camp were sick with fever. At Bwaga Macha, a British position to the north holding five rifle companies, only 150 men were fit to march out.
The four 1 KAR Companies (“A”, “B”, “C” & “E”) who had attacked & taken Mafia Island (see Post #316) sailed on the transport Barjora from Mafia to Vanga, arriving 18 January, to relieve “B” & “D” Companies 3 KAR.

The British Troops now in Jasin & the sisal factory strongpoint were two Companies of 2nd Kashmiris, one Company of 101st Grenadiers (these Grenadiers only occupied the Fort during daylight hours, returning to Umba Camp in the evenings) & one KAR Machine Gun detachment. Forty of the Kashmiris were stationed in the sisal factory.
The ammunition reserve at Jasin was only 300 rounds per man. Also although there was a well just under the Jasin Fort perimeter wire the British officer who took over command of the Fort on 17 January was unaware of it.
It was possible to easily surround & isolate both the fort & the sisal factory strongpoint.
The Royal Navy did not have any armed vessels offshore ready to provide fire support.
These factors were major weaknesses in the British defensive arrangements.

Meanwhile by 17 January Lettow had quietly concentrated nine Kompagnien (1, 6, 9, 11, 13, 15 & 17 FK plus 4 & 7 SchutzeK), 2 Field Guns & a Field Hospital at Totohown Plantation, 7 miles south of Jasin.
The Schutztruppe was ready to strike.

[bushfighter]

Sketch-map of Jasin Area

The Fighting on the Coast in January 1915 - The Action at Jasin on January 18th

Follow-on from Post #385

At first light on 18 January 1915 the Schutztruppe advanced on Jasin.
Two Feldkompagnien moved around the right flank & two more around the left flank of the British Fort. 9 FK advanced frontally with Lettow's HQ & the Main Body behind it. The German Arab Corps about 200 strong was positioned to the northwest.

Jasin Fort fired 3 signal rockets & successfully alerted Umba Camp, & also fired 10 rifle grenades to slow up 9 FK's advance.
Lettow's HQ swung to the left & were surprised to find that they were under short-range effective enemy fire that mortally wounded Lettow's Chief of Staff Oscar Hammerstein.
This fire was being delivered by the Kashmiris in the sisal factory strongpoint, & so far the Schutztruppe had not located this position.

The Company of 101st Grenadiers that moved into Jasin Fort during daylight hours had been approaching the position when battle started & most of them now rushed into the Fort & joined the Kashmiris.
The KAR Machine Gun in the Fort broke down after firing two rounds & stayed out of action.

Meanwhile at Vanga only one of the four 1 KAR companies ("B" Company) had disembarked from the Barjora & reached Umba Camp, so that Company & "B" & "D" Companies 3 KAR were immediately sent forward to join the battle.
On reaching the Suba River the three KAR companies found that Lettow's encircling plan had worked & that there were now Schutztruppe Askari defending the far bank of the river.
Jasin Fort & the sisal factory strongpoint were cut off.

The KAR companies under Captain J.G. Gifford 1 KAR attacked across the river. Gifford's "B" Company 1 KAR could not get across to the sisal factory because of the weight of hostile fire coming down. A couple of hundred yards further south Captain T.O. Fitzgerald's "B & "D" Companies of 3 KAR did get across but after two hours of hard fighting could not maintain their position on the south bank & so withdrew.
Supporting troops had been moving towards Jasin from the British positions in the hills to the north, but they either were deflected by Schutztruppe flank guards, got lost, or avoided contact.
Gifford requested reinforcements.

Apart from the Schutztruppe Arab Corps in the northwest that had disintegrated on contact, Lettow's other Kompagnien were now putting heavy fire down on both British positions at Jasin, using several Machine Guns against each position.
The result was that the noise created was so intense that the Sepoys lost any sense of fire control & responded with continuous rapid rifle fire, using up their ammunition stocks quickly.

Jasin Fort was surrounded by 4-foot high sisal except to the south, & this allowed the Schutztruppe to move & deploy Machine Guns unobserved - the Fort had six Machine Guns firing at it, but the defenders could not locate the gun positions.
The Fort also had two detached outposts – one to the south & one to the west. The western one did not attract much enemy attention but the south one had two Schutztruppe Machine Guns deployed against it. This post was manned throughout the day by relays of 2nd Kashmiri riflemen.

At around 1100 hours the sisal factory strongpoint ran out of ammunition. The Post Commander Subedar Mardan Ali ordered 20 of the 40 Kashmiri defenders (all were Punjabi Mussulmen) to fix bayonets & charge out to the north. He led 10 others in a rush down to join the defenders of Jasin Fort. Jemadar Hakim Khan & the remaining 10 Sepoys in the strongpoint acted as rearguard & then withdrew themselves, but the Schutztruppe predicted their actions & six of Hakim’s Sepoys were shot down. Most of those who charged north eventually got through to Umba Camp.
These men knew how to fight.

For now the Sepoys in the Fort stood firm but their ammunition was running low. Most of the 101st Grenadiers (this company was composed of Konkani Mahrattas) were still unsettled from the Tanga battle or else were inexperienced replacements.
Demoraliation set in & they avoided looking over the parapet, & if they fired then it was into the air or the roof of the firing port.

During the afternoon German Red Cross parties searched for wounded but two stretcher bearers were hit by British rifle fire – a result of the thick sisal cover obscuring Red Cross insignia.

In answer to Gifford's request for more troops the now fully disembarked 1 KAR companies were sent forward. "A" & "C" Companies were put in the firing line & "E" Company positioned in reserve in Umba Camp.

Two single companies of Jind Infantry joined Gifford as did the Section of 28 Mountain Battery. The gunners soon showed their utility by disabling Schutztruppe Machine Guns firing onto them at under 500 yards range, & by destroying an enemy bayonet attack on the guns by firing "Shrapnel, (Fuze) Zero". The Section fired 40 rounds in 5 minutes then was permitted to retire north to a ridge where it could fire over the heads of the British infantry. But from then on the Section’s fire was not coordinated with the infantry assaults.
(The reality was that when the Gunners were within shouting distance then the infantry could obtain effective artillery fire support, but when there was a greater distance between the infantry & the guns then there were no means to closely coordinate infantry tactics & artillery fire support. Forward Observation was not yet practised.)

New British assaults were made across the Suba River. On the right 1 KAR were again shot out of the water when they attempted to cross.
In the centre the Jind Infantry fired "Three Rounds Volley Fire" & stirred by bugle calls charged across cheering, but were decimated by rifles & machine guns on the south bank, losing nearly half their 120 men. They withdrew with their walking wounded who included their CO Major-General Natha Singh, his Adjutant & their only attached British officer, Captain R.J. MacBrayne.
On the left Fitzgerald's 3 KAR companies again got across to the south bank & held their ground, but without support they could not advance to relieve the Fort & they were withdrawn to the north bank.

As dusk fell Brigadier-General Tighe realised that he was facing a strong Schutztruppe force & requested reinforcements from Mombasa & gunfire support from the Royal Navy.
He planned a new counter-attack the next day & was confident that Jasin Fort could hold out as it was provisioned for a week. Outlying British units were brought in to Umba Camp.

In Nairobi the 2nd Bn The Loyal North Lancashire Regiment were ordered to entrain one double-company for Mombasa immediately.
A 12-man detachment of the North West Railway Volunteers with one Maxim Gun joined the train (this detachment had come with IEF "B" from India).

[bushfighter]

Vanga waterfront, east of Jasin

The Fighting on the Coast in January 1915 - The Surrender at Jasin on January 19th

Although the situation was getting grimmer for the Sepoys in Jasin Fort, Lettow had his problems also.
The sun was hot & thirst became a major problem, alleviated by the availability of coconut milk in the plantations.
Young & inexperienced Askari got carried away & fired blindly. Others found reasons to withdraw from the fighting zone.
Not all of Lettow’s officers & men thought that the battle was worthwhile. Jasin Fort appeared to be impregnable & Schutztruppe casualties mounted.
By having his HQ well forward Lettow was able to see the situation, issue effective orders, & maintain his aim, in contrast to Brigadier-General Tighe who did not involve himself enough in the early stages of the fighting.

The Schutztruppe Machine Guns were used incessantly against the two British positions at Jasin & against the KAR & Sepoys trying to cross the Suba River, & the gunners soon needed more full ammunition belts.
Trolley loads of boxed ammunition came forward, belt-filling machines were tied to palm trees & worked non-stop & the forward supply of charged machine gun belts was maintained.

Casualties moved back down the trolley line to the field hospital & then were moved south down a new road in man-drawn tongas (light carts) to Tanga Hospital.

Within Jasin Fort the Kashmiris popular CO Colonel Raghbir Singh was killed & his death affected the morale of his men.
Three British soldiers were in the fort, Serjeant Burgiss of the KAR Machine Gun Section & a Lance Corporal & a Private who were Signallers. During the fighting on 18 January these three had been a great help to the two British officers in the Fort, Captains Hanson & Turner, by controlling sections of the perimeter, exhibiting professionalism & firing aimed shots at the attackers.

At 0530 hours 19 January the last four boxes of ammunition in Jasin Fort were opened & distributed. The Machine Gun belt ammunition had already been stripped down, given to the riflemen & expended.
At 0600 a Schutztruppe bombardment of the Fort started again & the two German light field guns joined in. Although they were firing high the effects of the shells hitting nearby palm trees demoralised the Fort defenders even further.
Now even the two British signallers did not want to expose themselves above the parapet, & only a handful of Kashmiris continued to fight professionally.

At around 0700 hours on the 19th January, with his ammunition stocks almost expended & the water containers empty, the OC Captain Hanson decided to surrender the Fort.
The Sepoys were ordered to remove & conceal their rifle bolt-heads, & some did so.
A white flag was raised. Subedar Mardan Ali went forward with the Flag of Truce.

Once again, by integrating his artillery & his machine guns into his infantry tactics Lettow had been able to apply decisive force & firepower at a critical phase in the battle.
He knew how to win.
His strength of character & determination, backed up by his experience & professional military acumen placed him head & shoulders above the British Generals who opposed him.

PRISONERS
British troops taken prisoner were:
101st Grenadiers: 132 (4 of them WIA)
2nd Kashmiris: 131 (14 of them WIA)
KAR MG Section: 8 (1 of them a British Sjt)
31st (Indian) Signal Company: 5 (2 of them British)
King’s African Rifles: 3 Askari

The two British officers were taken before Lettow, congratulated on their defence, paroled (they agreed not to fight again in the War) & returned to the British lines with all their baggage.
In return for this gesture General Wapshare ordered the release of Lieutenant Schiller & his wife. Schiller had been wounded & taken prisoner during the British capture of Mafia Island. He was being treated in Zanzibar Hospital.

Sadly we don’t know the fate of the three British soldiers taken prisoner. They had no bargaining worth & probably were sent to a Prisoner of War Camp deep in German East Africa.

For every prisoner taken the Schutztruppe gained a modern British rifle & bayonet & a set of magazines & equipment.

CASUALTIES
Indian Units: 2 Indian Officers & 74 Sepoys KIA; 3 British Officers, 3 Indian Officers & 39 Sepoys WIA;
1 KAR: 1 British Officer & 10 Askari WIA
3 KAR: 15 Askari KIA; 1 British Officer & 38 Askari WIA; 1 Askari MIA.

Schutztruppe:
27 Germans & 61 Askari KIA; 36 Germans & around 150 Askari WIA.
(Lettow was one of the wounded – shot through the arm.)

Leaving aside the Prisoners of War, the total figures of 187 British casualties compared to 274 German casualties, (& bearing in mind that 123 of the British casualties were suffered when counter-attacking across the Suba River) show that being in defence was much safer than being in an attacking force.

Lettow digested this lesson & realised that after losing one in seven of his German troops at Jasin, he could not sustain such losses for very much longer. He could expect no reinforcements & had to fight his future battles with dwindling resources.

From now onwards Lettow’s tactics were designed to cause attrition to British Forces whilst the Schutztruppe always used a back or side door to slip away & mount another threat, so tying up vast British military resources that would have been very useful elsewhere.
Lettow succeeded in his aim.

[bushfighter]

Baobab trees on Wasini Island, northeast of Jasin

The Fighting on the Coast in January 1915 - Initial Minor Operations in the Umba Valley Area

After the surrender of Jasin Fort both sides maintained their positions - the Schutztruppe south of the Suba River & the British north of the Umba River - & mounted small patrol & sniping actions whilst casualties were replaced.

The British were now concerned that Lettow would push north towards Mombasa.
No 1 Company of the 2nd Bn The Loyal North Lancashire Regiment (strength 7 officers, 199 ORs, 3 Public & 7 Private Followers & an Assistant Surgeon) arrived at Kilindini railway station at 6.00 pm on 19 January 1915.
The Company embarked immediately on SS Ellenga for Mgoa, carrying: 2 days' rations; 45 lbs of kit per officer & 15 lbs per OR; & 200 rounds rifle ammunition in reserve, mostly in 500 round boxes.
The Ellenga sailed at 5.00 am on 20 January & by 9.30 am was off of Mgoa fishing village, where OC No 1 Coy Major H.A. Robinson went ashore with a Serjeant.
HMS Weymouth was offshore shelling the Schutztruppe positions at Jasin.

Brigadier-General Tighe ordered No 1 Company to disembark the next morning, 21 January, which it did between 6.00 am & 8.00 am.
Major Robinson was placed in command of a reserve entrenched camp containing: No 1 Coy 2 Loyal North Lancashires; a double-company of 101st Grenadiers; the North West Railway Volunteer Maxim Detachment; & the Bombay Volunteer Maxim Gun Section (the Bombay Volunteers arrived on SS Barjora).

2/Lt Parker took out a patrol of eight of his Loyal North Lancashires plus two KAR Askari, had a contact in no-man's land, wounded a German & siezed the German rifle.

The following day half of No 1 Company worked on the beach hauling two Royal Navy 15-pounder guns ashore through the mangrove swamps.
There were 1500 troops in the reserve camp that evening (LNL, KAR & Kashmiris) plus 8 Maxim Guns & a sapper section. They were ready to counter-attack any German move north.


King's African Rifles DCMs Awards for the Jasin Fight:
(Most medals were not issued until after the war had ended.)

1st KAR
Corporal Matakuta, Private Tabu & Private Bule: €œ"For conspicuous gallantry in rescuing wounded during the retirement from Jasin on 18 January 1915. They each in turn engaged the pursuing enemy in hand to hand combats & succeeded in bringing off their wounded comrades without the loss of a single rifle."€

3rd KAR
Yuzbashi Effendi Said Abdur Rahman: €œ"Has on several occasions shown conspicuous bravery. On 18th January 1915 he withdrew his company with great skill from Jasin Ridge after their ammunition was expended, & though heavily pressed by the enemy he brought back all the wounded with him."€

Sergeant Juma Gabanda: €œ"Showing conspicuous bravery in crossing the Suba River (near Jasin) by himself, & succeeding in finding a path by which he brought up the Section within 50 yards of the enemy. He maintained his position under heavy Machine Gun fire until his ammunition was exhausted."€

Lance Corporal Kiblagat Arap Tumogan: €œ"For conspicuous bravery in saving a Maxim Gun from falling into the hands of the enemy during the retirement from the Jasin Ridge on 18-19 January 1915."€

Colour Sergeant George Williams:
Sergeant George Williams had won a DCM for night reconnaissance work in the Tsavo Valley on 05-06 September 1914.
Now he was recommended for a VC by his CO, Lt Col R.B. Graham & Brigadier General Tighe:
€œ"At Jassin in the Umba Valley on 18 January 1915 Colour Sergeant Williams, under heavy enemy fire, extricated the remainder of his platoon after an officer had been seriously wounded. Colour Sergeant Williams also carried away the platoon Machine Gun after the crew & the supporting carriers had all been killed or wounded."€
However London was not yet mentally prepared for an African soldier to win a VC (although Lance Corporal Gordon, West India Regiment had won one in 1892) & after protracted correspondence between the Colonial & the War Offices, each defending its own rules & regulations, Colour Sergeant Williams was awarded a bar to his DCM before he was killed in action in Portuguese East Africa in July 1918.

[John_Hartley]

Harry

Thanks for the PM drawing me back to the thread.

I agree that the Sjt Burgiss (sic) may well be Jack Burgess and I've printed off the relevent posts in case further comes to light. However, the link between the capture of this NCO and Jack's death two years later must be a bit tenuous for now.

John

[bushfighter]

 

Units that served alongside the 2nd Bn The Loyal North Lancashire Regiment

Indian Army Sappers & Miners

Despite needing military engineering resources desperately, the East African theatre did not get many, as it was decreed that any engineer unit that could be employed in France or Iraq could not be deployed anywhere else.

Engineering did not feature in Indian Expeditionary Force "C"'s strength.
However a local unit, the East African Pioneers  was raised.

 

[bushfighter]

Passenger boats at Vanga

The Fighting on the Coast in January 1915 - Continuing Minor Operations in the Umba Valley Area

No I Company 2nd Bn The Loyal North Lancashire Regiment continued sending out joint patrols with KAR Askari into no-man's land. As the Schutztruppe were doing likewise frequent contacts were made.

One interesting factor that the troops discovered was that firing that sounded close-bye could in fact be a mile or more away, & conversely firing just 500 yards away might not be heard.
This was due to density & types of vegetation in the coastal plantations & to the direction of the wind. Being on the Coast meant that there was usually a breeze.

However the Umba Valley was extremely unhealthy, with intense heat, myriads of flies & very malignant strains of fever. Many men started going sick.

On 25 January 1914 2LNL was ordered to send No 4 Company (just returned to Nairobi from Lone Hill on the Longido sector) that night to the Coast, along with Logan's Battery of two 3-pounder Hodgkiss Guns.
No 4 Company left Nairobi by train at 1800 hours taking 9 officers & 174 ORs. The CO & Adjutant travelled with them. The train journey lasted 24 hours.
That same day 2/Lt Grove of No 1 Coy had covertly patrolled across the Umba River to the sisal factory, where he observed around 200 of the Schutztruppe in battle order.
Brigadier-General Tighe congratulated 2/Lt Grove (ex-Lincolnshire Regiment, East African Mounted Rifles & Intelligence Department, one of the young local gentlemen recently commissioned into the Bn) for penetrating further south than any other British patrol.

In London when Lord Kitchener received news of the surrender at Jasin he rebuked General Wapshare & forbade further offensive action until British troop levels had increased.
The British now decided to withdraw north to more healthy ground nearer Mombasa & confidential plans were made.

At Kilindini Port No 4 Company 2LNL & Logan's Battery stood-bye as a reserve force. The CO & Adjutant embarked with Brigadier General Tighe on SS Weismann for Vanga on 02 February.
In the Umba Valley No 1 Company was living in quickly-constructed grass huts & sleeping on local charpoys (beds made from tree bark & other local materials). The local issue mosquito nets were totally unsuitable for protecting the sleeping troops in these conditions.
During the nights the Schutztruppe guns fired random shoots.

On 03 February No 4 Coy & Logan's Battery were ordered back to Nairobi by train. The next day the CO & Adjutant left Vanga on SS Baralla for Mombasa, & a hospital ship the Madras left Mombasa with some of the Bn's sick & wounded who needed treatment & recuperation in India.

Officers' Patrols into no-man's land continued, some being led by Lt Philip Percival of the Intelligence Department (later to be known as "Pop" Percival the big-game hunter, colleague of Baron Blixen & friend of Hemingway).
Two soldiers of No 1 Coy were wounded & one was lost in the bush but later found alive.

On 08 February, having backloaded kit & stores (& 25% of the company strength who were sick) , No 1 Coy at Vanga embarked in boats to be taken offshore where SS Barjora waited for them. The withdrawal was covered by two launches from HMS Weymouth armed with Maxims.
On the shore the KAR & the Kashmiris withdrew by land northwards to Gazi.
HMS Weymouth remained off Jasin for a couple of days ready to fire on any Schutztruppe close pursuit.

At Kilindini No 1 Coy entrained for Nairobi arriving there late on 10 February. Two days later around 35 men of the Coy were in hospital with fever. The OC Major Robinson joined them along with the Bn QM Lt R.L. Rowley who had also been in the Umba Valley.

On the Coast a clean break had been made. The Schutztruppe remained at Jasin and patrolled north into BEA to identify British positions.
On the British side Wavell’s Arab Rifles & the KAR reciprocated & patrolled south towards GEA.

[bushfighter]

Bush Rule: "Do not put your foot or your hand into anything without first making a visual inspection".

The Political Situation in British East Africa in early 1915 & Colonel Kitchener's Visit

After the initial enthusiasm at the outbreak of war had subsided, discontent set in in some quarters & snakes were discovered working in offices as well as inhabiting the bush.

On 10 January 1915 Governor Belfield in a speech stated:
"I wish to take this opportunity to make it abundantly clear that this colony has no interest in the present war except in so far as its unfortunate geographic position places it in such close proximity to German East Africa".

The Governor did not like anything interrupting his weekend deep-sea fishing trips off Mombasa.

A civil servant in the BEA Secretariat, named by Meinertzhagen as Monson, penned a sarcastic ditty ridiculing IEF "B" ' s efforts at Tanga ending:
"Martial regulations inform us Day by Day,
They may have foozled Tanga but they've taken BEA".

General Wapshare made the most appropriate comment in reply:
"...it is a pity that Monson is not man enough to wear the King's uniform when his country is at war..."
Sadly the relationship between the British Military HQ in Nairobi & the BEA Government became soured by recrimination & distrust.

However in BEA many of the administration & more than a few of the settlers sided with the Governor. Patriots within the administration who volunteered for military duty were often refused leave of absence to enlist. As has been noted already, many white Volunteers from the East African Mounted Rifles & other Protectorate units requested & were granted indefinite leave of absence to go back to their farms & workplaces. The allure of money to be made from the commercial opportunities that the war generated was irresistable to some who took more pride in possessing cash than in wearing a uniform.

But the hard-core of white BEA Volunteers who stuck it out manfully & patriotically, serving until the end of hostilities or until they were medically discharged, fortunately counter-balanced the self-seekers. Sadly it was the men who served, if they survived, who lost the most. The farms they returned to were mostly overgrown & dilapidated, & a life-time's work had to be started over again.

Into this atmosphere Lord Kitchener despatched his brother Colonel H.E.C. Kitchener to report on the situation in BEA "as to the desireability of raising irregular corps for service in East Africa".
Lord Cranworth, a very pragmatic patriot who knew BEA well, accompanied the Colonel.

In short, every proposal made by Colonel Kitchener was negatived by the Governor & his cronies.
An appeal backed by Lord Delamere for 500 more white volunteers only attracted a handful, the Governor having publicly stated that such a recruitment would damage the BEA economy.
A private offer to bring up from southern Africa a battalion each of Zulus & Swazis was dismissed because "only organized troops" could do the job - perhaps an obscure way of saying that more black troops were not welcome.
(Also the South Africans did not want Africans to be trained & deployed in this manner.)

The Governor of BEA did manage to influence Colonel Kitchener in one critical area - he persuaded the Colonel that the King's African Rifles should not be enlarged.
(The Governor & entourage were not only against more Africans being trained to use weapons, they did not like having Indian troops in BEA either, & the Indians were made aware of this. Racial prejudice was a powerful feature of life in British East Africa.)

The Colonel reported back to London accordingly, much against the advice of both Lord Cranworth & Lt Col R.B. Graham, CO 3 KAR.
London sanctioned the recruitment of 600 more Askari to be replacements for battle losses but the KAR was not dramatically expanded until 1917, when white British & South African units & the Indian troops had been decimated by climate, hardships & disease.

Hindsight suggests that this decision was extremely damaging & it probably lengthened the Campaign in East Africa. By the time that the KAR eventually expanded to 22 Battalions East & Central Africa had been bled dry of suitable white officers & NCOs with an understanding of African culture & dialects. Hundreds of officers & NCOs were then drafted into the KAR from Britain, but the operational efficiency of the troops they commanded suffered severely because of communications problems.
However hindsight does not win wars or shorten campaigns.

Fortunately the Governors of Uganda & Nyasaland, not having settler politics to cloud their issues, responded patriotically to the war effort, releasing men from their Administrations & helping wherever they could.
(And in BEA on 07 September 1915 a mass-meeting of white settlers & businessmen in Nairobi turned on the BEA Government & forced changes.)

Meanwhile in early 1915 Lettow doubled the strength of the Schutztruppe.

[bushfighter]

Shirati

No 1 Company 2nd Bn The Loyal North Lancashire Regiment in the Eastern Lake Area in March 1915

Follow on from Post #378

After the fight at Mwaika Hill on 09 March 1915 it appeared that the Schutztruppe might be threatening Kisii & Kisumu again, so Colonel Hickson KAR, CO Eastern Lake Area, dug a defensive camp at Utegi & requested reinforcement.
Nairobi HQ ordered The 2nd Bn The Loyal North Lancashire Regiment to send a double-company to join Hickson & No 1 Company under Lieutenant G.A. Atkinson was selected. Logan's Battery of two 3-pounder Hodgkiss guns was also detailed for the operation, as was "A" Company of 4 KAR stationed at Mzima in the Tsavo Valley.

No I Company entrained at Nairobi for Kisumu on 12 March. The Company strength was: 4 Officers, 101 ORs, 1 Assistant Surgeon & 4 Mules. A Section of Signallers was attached.
THe Company took 500 rounds per man, one Machine Gun with 6,000 rounds, 1 chagal (canvas water container) per two men, 2 Field Stretchers, 7 tents, 40 lbs kit per officer & 15 lbs kit per OR.

The journey to Kisumu lasted 22 hours where No 1 Company, after waiting on the quay for the allocated porters, eventually joined Logan's Battery aboard the Usoga at noon on 15 March.
The Usoga then sailed for Karungu, arriving around midnight & disembarking the troops.
The Winifred appeared the next morning & embarked No 1 & "A" Companies for Shirati, sailing at noon & arriving six hours later when the two Companies disembarked & met up with Drought's Troop East African Mounted Rifles who were occupying the town.
No 1 Company camped opposite the German DC's Bungalow. Lieutenant Atkinson searched the house & found some very useful German maps of the area.

On 17 March No 1 Coy left a guard of 1 NCO & 3 men to secure the Coy stores dumped at Shirati, & marched under the command of Captain G.S.W. Rusbridger, 4 KAR with "A" Coy & 25 of Drought's Troop to Utegi. Rain was deluging down making drinking water muddy & impure.
Hickson's camp was northeast of Utegi at Maniti, & when the Company arrived there all water collected for drinking & cooking was full of sediment.

Under Hickson;s command No 1 Company marched around the area reaching Ukena on 22 March, but no contact was made.
Nairobi HQ considered that a suitable demonstration of its ability to quickly reinforce the area had been made. No 1 Company marched back to Shirati embarking on the Winifred on 23 March for Karungu.
Shirati was evacuated & Hickson & Drought's Troop moved north of the border.
No 1 Coy was back in Kisumu again on 24 March, bivouacing on the quay & drying out the tents next morning before entraining for Nairobi.

Footnote
This appears to be a very mundane tale except for one interesting detail.
Despite the heavy rain, muddy water & lake-side mosquitoes not one of No 1 Coy reported sick on return to Nairobi.

(At this time due to previous operations on the Lake & in the Coast region 2nd Bn The Loyal North Lancashires had about 140 men in hospital in Nairobi being treated for fever, another 100 attending hospital daily for quinine treatment, & yet more in Lady Colville's Convalescent Home in Nairobi - some of these, in the CO's opinion, being still very ill.)

Lieutenant George Atkinson had demonstrated that malaria & water-borne diseases could be prevented. He was an uncompromising man & a sound leader, & doubtless he insisted on correct personal administration - long shirt sleeves & trouser legs at night, after dusk get into a tent unless you are on duty, sleep under a mosquito net, filter all drinking & cooking water through cloth & then boil it before use.

Disease was not inevitable.

[bushfighter]

Units that served alongside the 2nd Bn The Loyal North Lancashire Regiment - The 63rd Palamcottah Light Infantry

In August 1914 the 63rd Palamcottah Light Infantry was stationed at Kamptee near Nagpur. The Regiment was one of the Carnatic units - recruited from the southeastern coastland of India. Madras is in the Carnatic region.

The standard war establishment of an Indian Army infantry battalion was:
Officers: 13 British & 17 Indian
Other Ranks: 736
Public followers: 52
Private Followers: 33
Riding Horses: 14
Ponies: 1
Pack Mules: 12
Mess Transport Animals: 3

The attached transport unit was established for:
Pack Mules: 106
Camels: 62
Personnel: 58

The ethnic composition of the Battalion was:
2 Companies of Madrasi Musalmans
1 Company of Tamils
1 Company of Paraiyans & Christians

As the Carnatic infantry units were not thought to be likely candidates for overseas deployments, their peace-time establishments were reduced. Battalions were placed in pairs or groups to enable mutual support whenever required.

As the 27th Bangalore Brigade was being prepared for deployment with Indian Expeditionary Force "B" the Brigade lost two units. The 108th Infantry was selected to remain in Bangalore on Internal Security stand-bye duties & the 61st King George's Own Pioneers was removed from the Brigade & allocated as Divisional Troops within IEF "B".
Two replacement units were found for 27 Brigade - the 98th Infantry & the 63rd Palamcottah Light Infantry.
This decision to include the 63rd & the 98th in IEF "B" may just have prolonged the East African Campaign by two or three years.

(The background to this decision was mentioned earlier in the thread when the massive military demands made upon the Government of India were mentioned.)

On mobilisation the 63rd's "pair" Bn was the 83rd Wallahjahbad Light Infantry. The 83rd had exactly the same ethnic composition as the 63rd & it supplied a large draft of officers & men to make the 63rd up to war strength.
However the calibre of men in the Carnatic infantry units was not high. The best recruits went to the Sappers & Miners & to the Pioneers. The remaining recruits went to the infantry where they found promotion opportunities stifled because innefective older men were being kept on to qualify them for pension. The consequences of this policy were dissatisfaction & indiscipline.

It has been noted previously that on mobilisation six of the 63rd's 13 British officers became non-available for deployment. Six officers from other units were found & attached (two joining on the day of embarkation), but none of these six new officers trained with their sepoys prior to sailing from Bombay.
The Bn was issued with Machine Guns for the first time after embarkation on 30 September 1914. The Bn then stayed aboard SS Assouan for 16 days, in very cramped conditions before departing & then sailed for the next 19 days before disembarking. Many of the sepoys, new to sea voyages, felt ill at the slightest swell, & cooking their preferred food items in the customary ways, should they have wanted to eat them, was extremely difficult aboard ship.

The problems encountered by the Bn at Tanga, & by the other British units that depended upon it, have been described.
After Tanga the Bn stayed in theatre on Lines of Comunication duties until it sailed for India from Dar Es Salaam on 05 January 1917.
(The 98th Infantry returned to India with the 63rd, whilst at the same time the 2nd Bn The Loyal North Lancashires sailed for Egypt - the remnants of the original 27 Bangalore Brigade were leaving East Africa, burying men at sea as they sailed away.)

COMMEMORATIONS
So far 54 commemorations for the 63rd Palamcottah Light Infantry & 32 for the 83rd Wallahjahbad Ligfht Infantry have been located in East Africa.

[SteveE]

Harry

Commemorations

Have been checking my list against some of those you've been listing and we seem to have a few (very) minor discrepancies...

63rd Palamcottah Light Infantry - 56 not 54 as stated.

83rd Wallajahbad Light Infantry - 33 not 32 as stated.

and a few others, I haven't gone back over the whole thread yet .....

29th Punjabis - 172 not 169.

Indian Mountain Artillery - 136 not 135.

1st Kashmir (Imperial Service) Mountain Artillery - agree on 18.

2nd Kashmir Rifles (Body Guard Regiment) - 107 not 104.

3rd Kashmir Rifles (Raghunath Regiment) - 44 not 43.

Indian Medical Personnel - agree on 30.

17th Indian Cavalry - agree on 21.

130th King George's Own Baluchis (Jacob's Rifles) - 142 not 139.

I'll go over the rest of the list later.

Regards

Steve

[SteveE]

Just one more,

Gwalior Rifles - 31 not 32 as stated (although there are 31 commemorated as Gwalior Infantry and 1 commemorated as Gwalior Lancers).

Regards

Steve

[bushfighter]

The Withdrawal from Longido

Follow-on from Post #366

In March 1914 Nairobi HQ decided that it would be impossible to continue supplying Longido (in GEA) & Namanga & Lone Hill (on the border) during the rainy season.
There was no proper road & the rough cart track to Longido from Kajiado crossed so many watercourses that it would become washed-out & unusable during the Long Rains in April & May.

The initial military transport allocated to the Kajiado - Longido route was:
4 ox-waggons, 11 Scotch Carts & 174 bullocks to pull them.
The transport staff were:
2 Afrikaans Conductors, 1 Cape Boy Assistant Conductor & 39 Cape Boys.
("Cape Boys" were mixed-race men from the Cape area of South Africa.)

Now 50 more wagons & teams of draught animals were deployed into the region, working in relays to shuttle tentage & stores back from Longido to Namanga & Lone Hill (where the Loyal North Lancashires Machine Gun Section had been deployed) to Ole Kononi Pass & on to Bissil & Kajiado.

The Schutztruppe did not miss taking advantage of these soft targets, & on 01 April 1914 a Schutztruppe group of 8 mounted Germans & 15 Somalis (the Schutztruppe also employed Somalis & Abyssinians for mounted infantry tasks) attacked a wagon train being escorted by the Kapurthalas near Kedongai, killing two sepoys & seriously wounding four more. The remaining sepoys were captured, had their rifle bolts removed (presumeably the Germans did not have the spare pack animals to carry the rifles away) & were then released in a demoralised state.

At the end of March No 2 Coy 2nd Bn The Loyal North Lancashire Regiment was joined at Longido by “C†& “D†Companies of the newly arrived 2nd Rhodesia Regiment who were to act as Rearguard. Rhodesian Machine Gunners also relieved the Loyal North Lancashire gunners on Lone Hill. A tactical withdrawal was now made from Longido that was complicated by the need to escort the daily wagon trains moving kit northwards. Escorts had to move at the pace of the wagons.

The heavy rains came early in 1915 & on occasions British troops were delayed on the south side of rivers & drifts (crossing points) by flash-floods. They just had to wait in a defensive posture until the waters dropped sufficiently for the wagons & troops to cross.

By 08 April all British troops were out of GEA. Three days later Bissel was the southernmost defended British position. East African Mounted Rifles & 17th Cavalry patrols attempted to dominate the ground south of Olekonone Pass to the border, but the Schutztruppe had been given a tactical advantage that it made use of by moving patrol bases into BEA.

LEAVE
I'll be away in mainland Europe for 3 weeks visiting the military museums in Lisbon & Brussels, the Royal Museum for Central Africa in Tervuren & then going to look at the Long Rains in UK.
Until Then. Regards
Harry

[ShirlD]

Safe travel and enjoy those hours in the museums, you lucky thing! Will miss the continuing story, but will tune in when you return.

Cheers

Shirley

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Harry

G'day mate

Have a safe and prosperous trip. I will be hanging out for the next instalment.

Cheers

Bill

[Aaron Nelson]

Hello Bushfighter,

In your information do you have a Private John Lynnewood Hinchcliffe Regimental number 41966 as being in the 2nd Battalion LNLR serving in Africa. According to the medal role page this man served in the 2nd batt LNLR but I am trying to establish if he served with them in Africa, or when the battalion moved to France in mid 1918. Thanks in advance for any assistance offered in this matter. Please note his service record does not survive at Kew.

Kindest regards Aaron.