Gas and Flamethrowers

[PhilB]

In the book "Diary of an Old Contemptible" Edward Roe (transferred to 6th E Lancs) gives tribute to the chivalry of the Turks on Gallipoli. The footnote says "This statement of the clean fighting Turk was widely held within the regiment and was based on the knowledge that the Turks had refused German offers of poison gas and flamethrowers". Can anyone confirm? Phil B

[BeppoSapone]

Didn't the "clean fighting" Turks kill most prisoners?

[Devils Own]

Not sure that gas would have helped them when the prevailing winds were mostly probably 'onshore'. Flamethrowers may have set fire to the whole of the peninsula. There are reports that many wounded were burned in no man's land in any case. Just a couple of possible practical reasons at Galipoli. Not sure whether they would have applied in the middle east though.

Steve

[Devils Own]

Didn't the "clean fighting" Turks kill most prisoners?

In the case of Gallipoli and generally in defending one's homeland from aggression, it would seem reasonable not to take any prisoners at all. I am not sure we can hold it against them. Now, in Mesapotamia and Palestine I would be a different viewpoint.

Steve

[bob lembke]

I know an awful lot about German flame warfare in WW I and a fair amount about gas warfare and Gallipoli. (My father, later a Flamm=Pionier, fought there as a volunteer Pionier at ANZAC with the Turkish Army.)

At the time of Gallipoli the German flame effort was only getting off the ground and really did not have the resources to sent a detachment there. It would have been a good area for their use, and would not have burned up the entire peninsula. German FW troops, later in the war, were sent for short periods to other fronts, but never in Turkey or the Middle East.

I don't think that the Germans seriously considered gas at Gallipoli, but I am not sure. Again, it was early in the war.

However, Brit gas commander Foulkes sent some men with 6000 cylinders of chlorine to the area, but of course it was never used. Would they have released it in the Allied trenches, and then, Canut-like, order it to advance uphill? Even landing it on the peninsula would have been nuts and very dangerous. I think that the stuff was left in Egypt.

It seems that later in the war the Germans gave the Turks 30 flame throwers, and I have seen a photo, probably from 1917, that probably was of Turkish troops training with a German FW in a trench on a training ground in Galicia, where the Turks had an army corps. Any info on this FW/Turk situation will be gratefully received.

Bob Lembke

[michaeldr]

The question of gas on Gallipoli has arisen before on the Forum and a GWF search may pick up one of the threads. Basically the previous statement is correct in saying that prevailing on-shore winds prevented the Turks from using it, and since the allies always held only the lower ground, their use of any heavier than air gas was also precluded.

Re flamethrowers; I have never heard of any being used on Gallipoli but there are several well documented examples of the summer’s tinder dry scrub catching fire in battles and that men and wounded were burnt in consequence.

Regarding another point raised above

The foll is from Col Michael Hickey’s criticism of the TV programme ‘All the King’s Men’ which was published in ‘The Gallipolian’ No.91, Winter 1999 – see page 3

“Some of the bodies found in 1919 bore signs of having been shot in the head, but in close quarter fighting this might be expected. Also, men taken from burning buildings, or from blazing scrub where hundreds of wounded soldiers died a terrible death, would have been mercifully despatched by their captors who, with little or nothing in the way of medical support, could offer no treatment for their dreadful burns. Such a coup de grace had been administered wholesale, on Kitchener’s orders, to wounded Dervishes on the field of Omdurman in 1898, and was a frequent occurrence during the Chindit operations in Burma in 1943-44. For soldiers who respect their enemy as a warrior it has long been seen as no dishonourable practice and it was certainly adopted by both sides throughout the Gallipoli campaign without prejudice to the respect the combatants had for each other.” [my emphasis]

Regards

Michael D.R.

[BeppoSapone]

Regarding another point raised above

The foll is from Col Michael Hickey’s criticism of the TV programme ‘All the King’s Men’ which was published in ‘The Gallipolian’ No.91, Winter 1999 – see page 3

“Some of the bodies found in 1919 bore signs of having been shot in the head, but in close quarter fighting this might be expected. Also, men taken from burning buildings, or from blazing scrub where hundreds of wounded soldiers died a terrible death, would have been mercifully despatched by their captors who, with little or nothing in the way of medical support, could offer no treatment for their dreadful burns. Such a coup de grace had been administered wholesale, on Kitchener’s orders, to wounded Dervishes on the field of Omdurman in 1898, and was a frequent occurrence during the Chindit operations in Burma in 1943-44. For soldiers who respect their enemy as a warrior it has long been seen as no dishonourable practice and it was certainly adopted by both sides throughout the Gallipoli campaign without prejudice to the respect the combatants had for each other.” [my emphasis]

Regards

Michael D.R.

You are right. I was in "WW2 mode" and thinking of the British soldiers attitude to the way that the Japanese killed prisoners. I have yet to find a WW2 soldier who has any respect for the Japanese.

Attitudes must have changed because, despite the killing of prisoners that went on at Gallipoli, I remember a quote from a member of the Australian Light Horse that went something like:

"He was a brave honest soldier, Johnny, and he was only trying to defend his own country."

[bob lembke]

In regard to Turkish use of gas and flame, it must be remembered that there was no reliable supply route between Germany and Turkey. The Turkish-made shells, with German help, would fire but usually would not burst. A little German ammunition was delivered by sub. My father got there by wearing civvies and sneaking through Romania by commercial train. The Germans were sometimes able to get a bit of materiel thru by bribing the Romanians (world-famous for corruption), but were forced to pay much higher bribes than the Allies.

So moving gas cylinders, or other exotic stuff, that would probably be used once and thrown away, made no sense. If they could get something thru, it should be German-made shell fuzes, or something like that.

The Serbs really tore up the rails in the Balkans, but late in 1915 the Germans were able to, after the Serbs were defeated, to send thru good German artillery ammunition and a battery of four German 15 cm howitzers (sent to Cape Heles) and one of two Austrian 24 cm mortars, partially overland, as the RR was not running thru. My father watched the latter in operation at ANZAC Cove, and said that they really turned the tide. I think that Hamilton told Bean that he was afraid that they "would be blown off the beaches", and the Allies soon pulled out.

It is not widely appreciated that, besides inferior weapons, materiel, etc., at almost every phase the Allies outnumbered the Turks at Gallipoli. My father thought that they were fantastic soldiers, not technically advanced, but brave beyond belief.

Bpb Lembke

[michaeldr]

Quote: ‘It is not widely appreciated that, besides inferior weapons, materiel, etc., at almost every phase the Allies outnumbered the Turks at Gallipoli.’

Not too sure about those very broad generalisations of yours Bob

I have to hand Prof Travers book & so glanced at chapter 8

There he refers to an equality or ‘stalemate’ in technologies and makes several interesting points about machine-guns, artillery, grenades and SAA

Michael D.R.

[Devils Own]

An interesting combination of subjects coming together here.

I can never understand why it is was considered inhumane to use expanding and hollow-point ammunition for military purposes but perfectly acceptable to fry people with a flame thrower. I think that it is/was the cruellest of inventions.

My question is: Were flame thrower operators ever captured and if so, what was their fate in the hands of their captors? I can't think that they would have been the most popular kids in the playground.

Steve

[AndyHollinger]

Certainly not an expert ... but to the mind, death is not death. There is a degree of concern about the pain/process and the amount of disfigurement that goes into it.

My father chose the Air Corps in WWII because he wanted to be Okay or dead (ended up being shot down over France in 43) ... I chose Tanks in my war for the same reason ... (and this is when the TOW missle ruled the battlefield.)

I think Terror weapons like gas and flame are ties back to an ancient past and attack our minds before any actuallity. Being hit by artillery is probably the nicest way (eh what? poof) and slow bullet wound in a muddy ditch the worst ... but, then I guess it's all up to the person dying ...

The IDEA of Flame scars more people than it kills. I think Mr Lembke's GF is to be commended for his courage ... from my understanding the bearer of such a weapon was usually it's first casualty.

[bob lembke]

Certainly not an expert ... but to the mind, death is not death. There is a degree of concern about the pain/process and the amount of disfigurement that goes into it.

My father chose the Air Corps in WWII because he wanted to be Okay or dead (ended up being shot down over France in 43) ... I chose Tanks in my war for the same reason ... (and this is when the TOW missle ruled the battlefield.)

I think Terror weapons like gas and flame are ties back to an ancient past and attack our minds before any actuallity. Being hit by artillery is probably the nicest way (eh what? poof) and slow bullet wound in a muddy ditch the worst ... but, then I guess it's all up to the person dying ...

The IDEA of Flame scars more people than it kills. I think Mr Lembke's GF is to be commended for his courage ... from my understanding the bearer of such a weapon was usually it's first casualty.

Hi, Andy;

An important element in the success of the flame thrower (FW), when properly used, was its shock effect, which seems to have been greater than rifle rounds whistling past your ear or some thug running at you with a large bayonet on the end of his rifle. Medium-sized flame attacks employed, say, 30 FW teams, and the largest one 154 FW in a carefully planned attack that was commanded and directed from the air.

My father's (Yes, Andy, not my grand-father; my parents waited quite a while before deciding to produce a replica.) flame company was stationed in Stenay-sur-Meuse, the Crown Prince's HQ, and Wilhelm had sponsored the FW and even initially bankrolled the weapon when the OHL was initially sceptical about it. KP Wilhelm often dropped into the barracks and schnuzzed with the men; Pop said that he often bummed cigarettes off the KP, and one of his Feldpost also said that. One day Willy dragged his father over as well. Of course the company had to be drawn up and inspected. The Kaiser went thru the ranks, and stopped before a probably terrified private and said: "Well, my son, have you burned up any Frenchmen lately?" The flustered EM stammered out: "No, your Highness, when we turn on the FW they usually run away." The Emperor scowled, did not say another word, and moved on with the inspection. When the Kaiser was out of earshot, the poor private's NCO came over and bellowed: "Fool! Idiot! The Emperor does not want to hear about Frenchmen running away, he wants to hear about them fighting bravely and getting burned to a crisp!" I imagine that the Flamm=Pionier almost had a nervous breakdown, getting silently chewed out by the Emperor and loudly by his NCO at almost the same minute. My father loved it.

The correspondence between my father and grand-father, a staff officer, featured my father trying to convince his sceptical father how safe it was to conduct flame attacks on the French. This argument was not helped by the fact that my father was wounded four times in about 5-6 months of occasional combat. However, I have, I believe, the full statistics, and lots of detail, and it really was a very successful, and, yes, safe service. In summary, there were 563 FW attacks by the principal flame units, and (from memory) 889 or 890 deaths in these units during and just after the war, from KIA, missing, died of wounds, died of sickness, and died in training accidents, which may have been more than a few. So there were not much more than one combat death per flame attack, which, as I said, involved as many as 154 flame throwers. 82% of the attacks were evaluated as "successful" (The commander of flame troops, a scientist, wrote a report on each flame attack, and had to report personally or in writing to the OHL (Highest Army Command) every month on the successes or lack thereof of the previous month), and in most attacks not one Flamm=Pionier was lost.

I'm sure that that sounds nuts, but I am confident in my numbers, but my detailed sources I am keeping close to my chest until I publish my damned book.

As to success, I was going to state broad statistics, which I am sure that you would find astonishing, but let me cite one instance instead. In Alistair Horne's classic (and flawed) The Price of Glory, page 161 of my paperback edition, he went on in the usual fashion about the FW being a suicide weapon, exploding FW, FW bearers burning to death, etc., and then on the next page mentioned briefly the mysterious collapse of an entire brigade of the French 29th ID on 3/20/16 at Malancourt Woods. He had stated on the previous page that "the weapon had become little more than a suicide weapon". (This from memory.)

Horne did not mention, and probably did not know, the circumstances of the collapse of the brigade. The brigade was attacked by the 4th and 5th Companies of the then principal flame unit, III. Garde=Pionier=Bataillon, with 63 FW on a 800 meter front. (Note that that averages as one FW every 42 feet.) The quick attack captured 2883 POWs, including 58 officers (including the brigade staff and CO and the two regimental staffs and COs; the brigade commander, captured in his dugout, complained that he had not heard a shot. I wonder why?), 25 MGs, 12 cannon, and 18 mortars, and took the Woods and a nearby village. The losses to the flame troops? Four NCOs and men from the 4th Company. I can supply their full names. Remember that this attack was at the height of the Battle of Verdun, where both sides fought fiercely, and dramatic successes were the exception.

Hardly "little more than a suicide weapon". I actually wrote Horne about this, politely, but did not get a response.

Bob Lembke

[AndyHollinger]

What a kind, serious and detailed rebuttal. Thank you for correcting me and in such a professional manner ...

I've learned a lot. Remember Horne was principally a writer of Historical Novels ...

[bob lembke]

My question is: Were flame thrower operators ever captured and if so, what was their fate in the hands of their captors? I can't think that they would have been the most popular kids in the playground.

Steve

My father was in "French hands", so to speak, once, for about five minutes, and they probably knew he was a flame thrower pioneer, and they actually gave him money!

Pop lay severly wounded in a French dugout on Dead Man's Hill at Verdun for three days by himself. A French 75 shell had wounded his entire troop; he was the worst wounded, and the other wounded men could not get him away as well. He was sitting against the wall, left arm badly damaged (I still have a piece of his arm bone given him by the surgeons), and he heard approaching Frenchies. He took his P 08 and slipped it under his butt so that they would not see it. The two French soldiers came over to him, and one took out a knife. However, instead of stabbing him, they cut off the skull and crossbones insignea on his lower left sleeve, an honor granted to his flame regiment by the Kaiser. They then stuffed some French paper money in his pocket and left. As I tell people: "You can find collectors everywhere." Pop spoke good French, but he did not mention speaking to the Frenchmen; I suspect he was playing being even more badly wounded than he was.

If anyone has one of these valuable patches and it seems to be stained possibly we could do a DNA test!

Note that my father went into the assault with the FW insignea on his sleeve; from many photos more blouses in the unit did not have the death's head patch sewn on, so I don't think that he worried much about being captured. The wounded troop had been carrying two FW, and if they could not take my father back they probably dropped the devices there as well, and the French soldiers probably knew that he was a FW Pionier, which may be why they took the patch.

There occasionally were meetings or personal interactions between the opponents. On a raid on Hill 304 at Verdun, my father tried to save a French officer, speaking to him in French and asking for his pistol. The dope shot my father instead at a distance of inches. Within a couple of seconds my father's sergeant bisected the officer's helmeted head with his "razor-sharp" spade.

Bob Lembke

[bob lembke]

What a kind, serious and detailed rebuttal. Thank you for correcting me and in such a professional manner ...

I've learned a lot. Remember Horne was principally a writer of Historical Novels ...

Andy;

Thanks for the kind words. I will give you some summary statistics, against my better judgement.

I have a spread-sheet with details on about 300 flame attacks that I have been able to identify. To measure success, I have built a second spread-sheet with, to date, additional details on the 39 attacks for which I have been able to find out how many POWs were taken. All engagements where the POW take was uncovered are included, none were excluded to make the statistics look better.

In the 39 engagements 62,901 POWs were taken. In 17 of these, 573 MGs were captured, in 9 engagements 449 cannon were taken, in 4 73 mortars. In 11 I have data that about 30 square km of territory was taken. In one of these attacks a tank was knocked out. These were attacks, not totals for drawn-out battles, often engagements that lasted 1/2, one, 1 1/2 hours. Some were only a few minutes, with the defenders collapsing. Some of these figures are from a single German source, but for others I have as many as three or four German sources and one or two French sources, basically giving the same statistics. Almost no or possibly no secondary sources were used.

Some of these attacks were small attacks with one or two FW, some larger, with say 30 FW, and some very large, with 60 to 154 FW. The sample is slanted, as obviously more successful attacks were more likely to have results noted. These were descrete attacks, not broad battles, and by necessity generally had to be largely flame attacks. You do not combine a big flame attack with a classical charge if you don't want your own troops fried. The FW obviously have to lead from the front, infantry, if any, following. The FW learned to usually avoid inexpert infantry participation, if possible; masses of infantry drew more fire than their support was worth. The FW troops carried their own light MGs and especially light mine throwers that they built in their own workshops.

Some of the largest hauls were on the Russian front, but the large majority of these attacks were against the French and English. At least one English general was captured; the French brigade commander mentioned in another post was a colonel, not a brigadier.

In these 39 attacks a total of 105 flame pioneers were KIA or died in hospital immediately after. In the biggest attack, in Russia, with the 154 FW, against a square kilometer of concrete fortifications, about 22 men fell, by far the greatest number in any flame attack in the war; these statistics would have been better if that attack had been excluded from these statistics. So these great statistics are not simply due to the few attacks against the Russians. About eight of these attacks were in Russia.

Many of the FW losses were not taken in the initial attack, but caused by enemy artillery then bombarding the captured position.

Some day I will break these figures down in more ways, isolating the pure FW attacks, for example.

Bob Lembke

[bob lembke]

Guys;

I received a PM from a Pal who, basically, said a variant of the old saw: "If you're so smart, why ain't you rich!" He asked if the FW were that effective, why weren't they used even more (although they were used a good deal more than generally thought.)

One basic reason for the German successful use was being very selective in where they were used. The FW were allocated for operations by the OHL (Highest Army Command). For example, a flame Zug (platoon) might be sent to an army corps. Let's say that the army corps staff wrote up a plan for an attack. This would be shared with the commander of the flame platoon, who would likely be a Vize=Feldwebel (platoon sergeant), who, based on a written order of the OHL (i.e., Hindenburg and Ludendorff) could actually decline to participate in the attack as planned, if in his judgement the plan was flawed and did not properly reflect the advantages and drawbacks of this special weapon. In other words, a platoon sergeant could be presented with an attack plan drawn up on the authority of a Generalleutnant (divisional CO) or General der Infanterie (corps CO) and decline to participate in the attack as planned ob the basis of his opinion that the plan of attack was flawed. And every month the supreme flame CO, who was a captain, and later a major of the Landwehr, reported directly monthly to the OHL in person or in writing; a general forcing a platoon sergeant to take part in an attack that the sergeant did not approve of, costing a number of casualties, could be expected to be reported directly to the OHL in a week or two.

Now, when I realized this, I was swept away. Can you imagine a sergeant in Haig's army telling a major- or lieutenant-general that the attack plan drawn up by the general and his staff for the sergeant's platoon was poor, and that he would not participate?

The same order said that the FW were not to be routinely used for the defense, as it was not a suitable application of the weapon. The above factors helped prevent the use of the FW in all but the most suitable situations.

Flame attacks were generally carefully planned and rehearsed, sometimes even on an actual mock-up of the enemy position. The tactics, as developed, varied, but were generally rather novel and perhaps counter-intuitive. The flame troops learned to try to avoid the participation of ordinary infantry, or in other times were able to train and even lead the infantry themselves.

Additionally, the flame troops were carefully picked troops; many if not all seemed to have been volunteers. At first they were all firemen, although this could not hold when the unit grew to a regiment of 3000 men. The arm was very resource hungry, special equipment, material such as special oils and nitrogen, their own trucks at the company level, extensive research and training, etc.

There also seemed to have been some sort of shortage limiting the growth of the arm, according to the writings of a senior flame officer, but its exact nature is not clear.

For all these reasons, the weapon's use was limited; but, when used, usually successful (supposedly 82% of the time), often crushingly so, frequently simply collapsing the defense in a matter of minutes. Imagine facing a surprise attack by 65 or even 154 flame throwers!

I could probably easily write 50 pages on this topic; the reasons for the success, and the factors that limited an unlimited expansion of its use, but I think that the above gives a flavor of this, and hopefully to some degree answers the very perceptive question of the Pal who PMed me.

Bob Lembke

[PhilB]

The same order said that the FW were not to be routinely used for the defense, as it was not a suitable application of the weapon. The above factors helped prevent the use of the FW in all but the most suitable situations.

Bob Lembke

Could you outline what "the most suitable" situations would be, Bob? Phil B

[truthergw]

Guys;

I received a PM from a Pal who, basically, said a variant of the old saw: "If you're so smart, why ain't you rich!" He asked if the FW were that effective, why weren't they used even more (although they were used a good deal more than generally thought.)

.................................

Bob Lembke

I have found all your posts on FW use fascinating. Were they affected by weather ? Do you think that the idea that they were suicide squads was pure propaganda? Did your father ever suggest what he would have done to defend against a FW attack?

[bob lembke]

Could you outline what "the most suitable" situations would be, Bob? Phil B

Phil;

This is very complicated. For the first FW attack, the Germans studied air photos and chose a sector where the trenches were as close as 12 meters apart. That, of course, was a "no-brainer". That attack was a complete success, and 10 of the 12 FW used were actually hand-pumped largely wooden FW based on fire-fighting pump designs. But that probably was the last time they were used, as the gas-powered two they used also worked well.

One can see how FW tended to push the Allied trenches away from the German ones, which in balance was to the Germans' advantage.

Terrain that allowed teams to approach within range of course would be useful. Often, in smaller attacks, they used what they called "Indian" or "stalking" techniques, often no infantry were used, and FW troops jumped from shell-hole to the next singly to sneak up within range.

If a sap, covered or not, could be pushed forward, a large fixed long-range unit could be installed, and sometimes a flame pioneer might jump out with a nozzle on a hose as long as 100', rush forward, and be able to reach the enemy first trench, or fire diagonally across no-man's-land to provide cover to light FW teams rushing over to reach the enemy trench.

In at least one case a group of FW opened up (but no one charged), the enemy quickly aimed their artillery laid do

[Robert Dunlop]

Can you imagine a sergeant in Haig's army telling a major- or lieutenant-general that the attack plan drawn up by the general and his staff for the sergeant's platoon was poor, and that he would not participate?

Bob, I can think of alternative ways this might have been handled. The setting up of the Special Brigade was one example of an entity with a separate command structure. From all the material I have read, it is not quite clear to me how Foulkes, Livens or colleagues would have exercised responsibility for the early experimental flammenwerfer attacks. I would be surprised if there was not some degree of comeback available to prevent misuse of these weapons at the hands of an enthusiastic but ill-informed infantry general. In a sense, this is why the flammenwerfer units were made OHL assets in the German Army.

There were examples where even civilians were given high military ranks in order to have clout within the British Army.

Finally, there was less of a tendency in the British Army to opt for highly specialised assault units, or to create a hierachy of infantry divisions. The aim seems to have been to evaluate any new weapons system and, wherever possible, to integrate it across all infantry units. Clearly, this was not always the right way to distribute some weapons systems, hence the Special Brigade for example.

Robert

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Bob

G'day mate

Like everyone else I would like to thank you for your explanations. I was quite taken by your Romanian story and the difficulty in getting war material to Turkey from Germany.

Just to add to your story, here is an entry from the 9th ALHR War Diary:

Thursday, October 7, 1915

9th Light Horse Regiment Location - Rhododendron Hill

9th Light Horse Regiment War Diary - Trench on our exchange left connected with the trench from the Apex held by the 25th Battalion of the 7th Brigade. Enemy sends in more shrapnel shells more than formerly. Some shell marked QF 18Pp C&C Co 1915, fell in our lines. They are British shells refilled or were made by same English speaking firm. Lieutenant General Birdwood inspected trenches.

The expression “QF 18Pp C&C Co 1915” translates to Quick Firing 18 Pounder shell manufactured by the C & C Company, 1915.

Regardless of the explanation given in the War Diary, the question in the minds of the men was more to the notion that the Turks were getting their supply of shells from England, albeit not directly - something that sent a shiver down their spines.

Cheers

Bill

[bob lembke]

Phil;

This is very complicated. For the first FW attack, the Germans studied air photos and chose a sector where the trenches were as close as 12 meters apart. That, of course, was a "no-brainer". That attack was a complete success, and 10 of the 12 FW used were actually hand-pumped largely wooden FW based on fire-fighting pump designs. But that probably was the last time they were used, as the gas-powered two they used also worked well.

One can see how FW tended to push the Allied trenches away from the German ones, which in balance was to the Germans' advantage.

Terrain that allowed teams to approach within range of course would be useful. Often, in smaller attacks, they used what they called "Indian" or "stalking" techniques, often no infantry were used, and FW troops jumped from shell-hole to the next singly to sneak up within range.

If a sap, covered or not, could be pushed forward, a large fixed long-range unit could be installed, and sometimes a flame pioneer might jump out with a nozzle on a hose as long as 100', rush forward, and be able to reach the enemy first trench, or fire diagonally across no-man's-land to provide cover to light FW teams rushing over to reach the enemy trench.

In at least one case a group of FW opened up (but no one charged), the enemy quickly aimed their artillery laid do

Sorry, a buddy was at the door and I had to run.

In at least one case a group of FW opened up (but no one charged), the enemy quickly aimed their artillery on that sector of trench and laid a defensive barrage, and the real FW attack was made a few hundred yards down the line, and before the fire could be lifted and shifted the real FW assault was in the enemy's trenches. In short, a lot of different tactics were worked out to deal with various tactical situations.

Truthergw;

I have heard of a few cases of flame possibly being blown back (not all German FW), but it would take quite a wind, probably predictable. Heavy rain had been a problem, but mostly for making the mud thick, restricting mobility.

I don't know if the suicide stuff was propaganda or just a resonable (if wrong) assumption. A planned FW attack provided its own cover, so the FW carrier was usually well masked by flame, smoke, and hot gasses in your face. I have seen Allied verbage aimed at telling their troops not to panic, just to bend down and let the flame and smoke to blow over you, that you would be safe. Nonsense! Anyone want to try it?

Pop never said anything about defending yourself. These attacks could be defended against some times, but if one developed well the only reasonable course probably was to run away quite quickly. The flame troops often advanced over terrain scattered with burning bits and pieces of uniforms and scattered arms.

Bob Lembke

[bob lembke]

Bob

G'day mate

Like everyone else I would like to thank you for your explanations. I was quite taken by your Romanian story and the difficulty in getting war material to Turkey from Germany.

Just to add to your story, here is an entry from the 9th ALHR War Diary:

Thursday, October 7, 1915

9th Light Horse Regiment Location - Rhododendron Hill

9th Light Horse Regiment War Diary - Trench on our exchange left connected with the trench from the Apex held by the 25th Battalion of the 7th Brigade. Enemy sends in more shrapnel shells more than formerly. Some shell marked QF 18Pp C&C Co 1915, fell in our lines. They are British shells refilled or were made by same English speaking firm. Lieutenant General Birdwood inspected trenches.

The expression “QF 18Pp C&C Co 1915” translates to Quick Firing 18 Pounder shell manufactured by the C & C Company, 1915.

Regardless of the explanation given in the War Diary, the question in the minds of the men was more to the notion that the Turks were getting their supply of shells from England, albeit not directly - something that sent a shiver down their spines.

Cheers

Bill

G'day, Bill;

I remember reading that some Allied troops at Gallipoli were upset as they had some reason to think that they were being shelled with shells supplied by an Allied source. Perhaps the info you gave is the basis for that feeling. God knows where the shells came from. The Turks had artillery from many sources, not only German, and they even stripped museums of display pieces, including 18th Century mortars hurling, I assume, stone balls. But ammo made in 1915 is interesting. I do not know the caliber of the 18 pounders, but I would not think that that ammo would work in any other artillery pieces. I think that the Turk field artillery was mainly German and French (Schneider).

There was another story floating about that all through WW I the Yanks were paying Mauser in Germany a royalty payment for every Springfield rifle that they produced. Not likely.

I am guessing that you are an Aussie. My father fought at the ANZAC beachhead, but as a volunteer with the Turks. I am having extraordinary trouble finding anything about his service there. About 18 months ago I even conned my way into an interview with the Turkish colonel commanding the Military Library at the wonderful Askeri Mueze (Military or Soldiers' Museum) at Istanbul, and he told me I needed written permission from the Turkish General Staff in Ankara to use the library. (The Turkish General Staff had a big office building, complete with sand-bagged MG posts, next door, but that would not do.) I have reason to think that my father was engaged in that fun mining warfare activity there. Do you know of a particular source of info on mining warfare at ANZAC?

Bob Lembke

[bob lembke]

Bob, I can think of alternative ways this might have been handled. The setting up of the Special Brigade was one example of an entity with a separate command structure. From all the material I have read, it is not quite clear to me how Foulkes, Livens or colleagues would have exercised responsibility for the early experimental flammenwerfer attacks. I would be surprised if there was not some degree of comeback available to prevent misuse of these weapons at the hands of an enthusiastic but ill-informed infantry general. In a sense, this is why the flammenwerfer units were made OHL assets in the German Army.

There were examples where even civilians were given high military ranks in order to have clout within the British Army.

Finally, there was less of a tendency in the British Army to opt for highly specialised assault units, or to create a hierachy of infantry divisions. The aim seems to have been to evaluate any new weapons system and, wherever possible, to integrate it across all infantry units. Clearly, this was not always the right way to distribute some weapons systems, hence the Special Brigade for example.

Robert

Hi, Robert;

Yes, I would think that the Special Brigade would have had some automnity (sp?); even the name might have helped. If I remember correctly a lot if not the bulk of their OR were made NCOs and carried revolvers, which might have given them a small dose of authority. I gather that as the war went on a lot of UK divisional commanders did not want Foulkes and his dangerous cylinders in their sectors, and there were some command frictions based on this.

These arraingements are really important to the success of such ventures. The failure, in my mind, of the British flame warfare effort was due both to the particulars of Foulkes, a remarkable bloke, but also to lumping in the flame effort with the gas warfare effort. These two efforts might seem to be similar, but really they called for very different types of personnel. Foulkes seemed to have manned his unit with pharmacists and pipe fitters, which made a lot of sense for gas warfare, but not the type of guys to strap on a 60 lb flame thrower and climb out of a trench and shuffle off into the wire.

Besides field construction work, the German Pioniere were known for stiffening assault forces with men with specialized explosive devices, and additionally had a special role in testing prototype equipment, even artillery. (The famous Storm Battalion Rohr, a Pionier formation, was originally formed to field-test some new artillery pieces.) The original flame unit was manned with firemen, perhaps an analog of Foulkes' pharmacists, but these guys were also Pionier reservists. The flame units became storm units that were trained in a technical specialty, not technicians that were then called on to function as a storm unit. There is evidence that service in Foulkes' Z Company, his flame formation, was not the most popular assignment. This probably was a factor in Foulkes' flame efforts being directed into the dead end of attempting to burrow toward the enemy dragging a giant machine through galleries, planning to pop up from the depths with a nozzle like a submarine's periscope, hopefully spraying in a useful direction.

To compare mobility, the German flame commander, Major Dr. Reddemann, was proud of a photo of one of his Flamm=Pioniere carrying not one but two Wex FW on his back. The Wex, the light device used for most of the flame war, actually weighed less, loaded with flame oil and nitrogen, than the standard infantry pack. The weapon Foulkes settled on weighed, I believe, 4600 pounds, and required 200 - 300 man-carrys to be brought forward. Four of those man-carrys were 212 pound components which could not be broken down further. The loss of a single man-carry, say to a stray shell, would probably, and did, negate the entire effort.

It also would be interesting to compare the British gas and flame commander, Foulkes, an energetic RE field-grade officer, but no technician or scientist, with the German gas commander, Dr. Haber (later a Nobel Laureate), and the German flame commander, Dr. Reddemann, a scientist, fire fighting commander, and scientist, who had worked on flame warfare since 1907, and who had the collaboration of Engineer Fiedler, who had worked on flame thrower design since 1901.

Bob Lembke

[Ozzie]

I can see what is meant by it would be frightening. I think I would prefer to face guns than this.

Kim