Breakthrough battles

[paul guthrie]

Paul what is the Gudmonsson book? I did no good with an Amazon search for him being careful to use your spelling.

[Paul Hederer]

Paul what is the Gudmonsson book? I did no good with an Amazon search for him being careful to use your spelling.

Paul,

Sorry about that. I would never trust my spelling .

It's Bruce Gudmundsson.

Paul

[paul guthrie]

Well Paul I found him and the"On" books but nothing on Verdun and the German intention PRIOR to battle. It's strange to me there are no war time verifications that they meant to attrit rather than take ground but , again, I can't see the advantage of a breakthrough there unless it was a whopper unlike anything since wide spread trenching , I remain skeptical but can't support the breakthrough either.

[Paul Hederer]

Well Paul I found him and the"On" books but nothing on Verdun and the German intention PRIOR to battle. It's strange to me there are no war time verifications that they meant to attrit rather than take ground but , again, I can't see the advantage of a breakthrough there unless it was a whopper unlike anything since wide spread trenching , I remain skeptical but can't support the breakthrough either.

Paul,

His Verdun writings are in his book, "On Artillery."

I'll write more later on wartime verification...

Paul

[Robert Dunlop]

Crown Prince's statements are also post war.

Paul, you are right about the timing of Wilhelm's memoirs. But he appears to be quoting from a document published prior to the launch of the Battle of Verdun.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

I would not classify the advances of the German First and Second Armies in August 1914 as breakthroughs. The Belgian Army High Command realised that they could not hope to hold the Germans single-handed. Their defensive policy had, in fact, been predicated on defending all possible avenues of attack. At least this is how the strategy is portrayed in 'L'action de L'Armée Belge pour la défense du pays et le respect de sa neutralité'. Four of the 6 infantry divisions were posted for this purpose - the 1st Division in Flanders in case the British should attack, the 3rd Division at Liége to hold the Germans, and the 4th and 5th Divisions 'regardaient la France'.

When it belatedly became clear, at time of Germany's request for free passage of its forces, that the threat lay to the east, some readjustments were made. However, the High Command quickly realised that they were being faced with a massive invasion, well beyond anything they had planned for. From the German perspective there was resistance at Liége but von Kluck's forces, as well as those forces in von Bülow's army not engaged in subduing Liége, rapidly bypassed the forts without any significant resistance whatsoever.

The Belgian Cavalry Division, as well as elements of the 4th Infantry Division, made a determined stand at Haelen, at the crossing of the Gette River. This holding force then withdrew, having bloodied the noses of the German 2nd and 4th Cavalry Divisions. Most of the Belgian forces then fell back on Antwerpen. At no point did the Germans breakthrough as such. They never got into the rear areas of the Belgian Army. The investment and capture of Liége and Namur were not breakthroughs as such, except in a rather general sense of the word.

There were examples of French forces being surrounded by their German counterparts in the Battle of the Frontiers. In the overall picture of things, these instances were localised and relatively insignificant. The British and French forces fell back before the Germans. There was one notable occasion where an attempt was made to cut off and surround Lanrezac's Fifth Army. The BEF helped stave this off, as the German cavalry attempted to get into the rear of Lanrezac's army towards Soissons. This did not develop into a breakthrough.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

How extensive, laterally, is the breakthrough? How deep is it, through one line, through all the defence lines, no organised opposition in front of you?

Anthony, you raise a good point. As you know, breakthrough typically relates to an organised defensive line. It is not specific to trench warfare but this scenario can be used for clarification. A break-in is used to refer to the penetration of the forward defenses, but there is still organised resistance ahead. Breakthrough refers to rupture of the organised defensive line/s. Width is not critical, except insofar as a breakthrough is most likely to occur when an attack occurs on a wide frontage. This tends to negate the effects of enfilade fire from the enemy beyond both flanks of the attack, at least in the centre of the attack. Sometimes breakthrough is used to refer to the relatively unrestricted movement in the unprotected rear areas behind the organised defence. FWIIW, I prefer the term breakout when refering to this phase.

Robert

[truthergw]

I would not classify the advances of the German First and Second Armies in August 1914 as breakthroughs.

.........................'.

von Kluck's forces, as well as those forces in von Bülow's army not engaged in subduing Liége, rapidly bypassed the forts without any significant resistance whatsoever.

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The investment and capture of Liége and Namur were not breakthroughs as such, except in a rather general sense of the word.

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Robert

I'm sorry Robert, but I think you are redefining breakthrough here. Belgium had a fortified border which was breached at all points.The Belgian army was swept aside. The great majority of the country was occupied. The part which was not, had to be partially flooded to stop the Germans. The Germans then carried on through the other side of the country and many many kilometres into France. The allies were never routed, that is true. They eventually held the Germans and even pushed them back. This we all know but if what happened in Belgium was not a breakthrough, it will do me until a better comes along.

[Robert Dunlop]

Tom, I agree with your general description of the events in 1914. I would respectfully disagree on one minor point. The Belgian border was only partially fortified. Or more specifically, there were forts in some places. To the north of Liége, Forts von Barchon, von Pontisse, von Liers, and von Lantin formed the northern-most limit of the ring of forts. They were approximately 8-10 km from the centre of Liége, with Fort von Barchon on the eastern side of the Meuse River. It was captured first, by General Emmich. If you look on the map, there is a significant distance, about the same again, from the northern forts to the Dutch border. The southern limit of von Kluck's army included the above forts on the western side of the Meuse in their line of march. To the north, First Army crossed unhindered. Fort von Pontisse had the bridge at Visé under observation but the Germans got round this by building a bridge further north at Lixhe and using the undestroyed bridge at Herstal. Von Kluck was really sweating it as his army compressed into the gap between Visé and the Dutch border, but they crossed unopposed and swept forward.

Of course, by this time the German cavalry were already operating in Belgium. I have not had time to read their histories yet (apart from the details about the battle of Haelen), and will do so now that this issue has been raised. They were not, however, operating in the rear of the majority of Belgian forces, only those holed up in the forts of Liége and Namur (some defenders escaped from both sets of forts). Hence the ability of the Belgian Army to fall back ahead of the Germans (as opposed to being routed from the rear) and thence to effect the halt to the Germans at the Yser Canal (with some help from the flooding, a little Royal Naval gunfire support, and the French Marines).

You define breakthrough as the sweep through Belgium. I have no problem with that definition. I was using a different definition, once which interprets the 'Belgian army [being] swept aside' as a masterful retreat on their part, withdrawing back from the German sweep and thereby forcing von Kluck to use forces to protect the Antwerpen flank. According to the definition I have used, which should only be regarded as different from, certainly not superior to, your definition, and given that the Germans outflanked the defenses at Liége/never broke through at Haelen, then I would not define their sweep through Belgium as a 'breakthrough' in the narrower sense of the word.

Robert

[Paul Hederer]

Well Paul I found him and the"On" books but nothing on Verdun and the German intention PRIOR to battle. It's strange to me there are no war time verifications that they meant to attrit rather than take ground but , again, I can't see the advantage of a breakthrough there unless it was a whopper unlike anything since wide spread trenching , I remain skeptical but can't support the breakthrough either.

Paul,

There are documents out there, mostly in the German archives that detail the plans for Verdun.

The original plan called for an advance as far as the ridge Froide Terre-Ft Souville-Ft. Tavannes. Falkenhayn wanted to pin the French reserves at Verdun, and cause them to launch costly counter-attacks there, and a possible premature offensive somewhere else along the line. These attacks being held, and great losses inflicted, he would launch a counter-offensive.

On 11 February, at a staff meeting in the West, Falkenhayn gave his estimation of how the battle would develop. He thought either the French would think the fortress strong enough, and not send additional troops, not a very likely outcome (as he states), they would send all troops possible, the French would launch attacks at other points on the line (which he wanted), or the French attempt to hold Verdun with all their reserves, while the English attempt to attack.

Falkenhayn thought the last possibility to be the most likely.

The planners felt that the Germans needed 23 divisions to take Verdun, but Falkenhayn gave them 6, with 2 in reserve, under his control, and only to be released when he it necessary. He wanted to hold his reserves in place to meet the expected Allied counter-offensive.

Paul

[Paul Hederer]

From Gudmundsson, "On Artillery,":

"The senior German soldier of the time, Erich Falkenhayn, drew a different conclusion. Believing, largely for operational reasons, that a breakthrough on the western front was not possible, he was nonetheless convinced that Germany's superiority in artillery could knock France out of the war. 51

Falkenhayn first promulgated this vision in mid-December 1915, at a meeting of army commanders and their chiefs of staff. A strong blow against the French Army in the west, he argued, would put stress on the "internal weaknesses" of the French nation and convince the French people of the uselessness of continuing the war. Falkenhayn therefore asked each army commander to explore suitable areas for attack within his sector.

In the course of follow-up conferences during the last two weeks of December 1915 and the first week of January 1916, Falkenhayn repeatedly expressed his belief that the goal of the upcoming German attack should not be the seizure of any particular piece of terrain. It was not to be another attack with limited objectives. Neither was it to be a breakthrough. Rather, the goal of Falkenhayn's proposed attack was to be direct attrition--the "bleeding" ( Ausblutung) of the French army.

In the second week of January, after a number of consultations with General Schmidt von Knobelsdorf, the chief of staff of the German 5th Army, Falkenhayn chose the fortress complex of Verdun. 52 Located at a sharp bend of the Meuse River, in what might be called the foothills of the Vosges Mountains, Verdun seemed to serve Falkenhayn's purpose admirably. The area around the fortified zone formed a slight indentation--what World War I soldiers called a "salient"--in the German lines. This salient, and the slight advantage its possession would give to the French if they attempted to envelop the German position north or south of Verdun, provided an argument of "military necessity" to any general who wanted an excuse to fight over the area. Far more important to the French, however, and therefore to Falkenhayn, was the symbolic value of Verdun.

Verdun's heavy guns, whose domination of the valley of the Meuse had been the original justification for fortifying the area, had been withdrawn from the citadel. And the outlying forts had been all but vacated to provide the garrisons for trenches, blockhouses, bunkers, and other, more modern, field fortifications. Nonetheless, Verdun was still a fortress. Its loss to the Germans, in the third year of a war where the loss or gain of a few hundred yards was cause for banner headlines, would be considered by all but the most astute military observers to be a major defeat. This perception would be exacerbated when the French public was reminded, as it inevitably would be, of the history associated with Verdun--particularly its role as a "frontier post" in the expansion of France toward the Rhine.

From a purely military-technical viewpoint, the fact that Verdun was a salient, surrounded on three sides by German forces, facilitated the execution of Falkenhayn's strategic conception. Falkenhayn assigned the actual work of "bleeding" the French nation to the 1,612 artillery pieces of the 5th Army. 53 About a third of these were light (7.7mm) field guns and light (105mm) field howitzers organic to the infantry divisions. The rest were considerably heavier weapons of the "foot artillery," long-range guns of calibers up to 230mm and high-angle-of-fire weapons of calibers up to 420mm. The peninsular nature of the French position made it possible for this huge artillery park to concentrate its fire while the individual batteries remained reasonably dispersed.

Falkenhayn's confidence in the German heavy artillery was well placed. The terminal effect of the German shells, most of which were larger and fired at higher angles, was superior to that of French shells. The rate of fire of German pieces, most of which had been built in the decade prior to the battle, was greater than that of the generally older French pieces. And, most significantly, the German artillery greatly outnumbered the French

artillery in the sector. This overwhelming superiority in artillery gave Falkenhayn every reason to assume that the 5th Army would be able to gain permanent fire superiority over the French artillery while having enough firepower left over to repel French counterattacks and repeatedly bombard French infantry positions.

In Falkenhayn's conception, the role of the German infantry was subsidiary to that of the artillery. It would maintain contact with the French, forcing them to bunch into suitable targets for the artillery. It would protect artillery forward observers. And it would, by threatening to occupy the citadel of Verdun, entice the French to send as many men as possible into the meat grinder. However, whether or not the German infantry succeeded in taking that citadel, Falkenhayn emphasized on a number of occasions, was secondary to the attrition of the French forces. 54"

Paul

[paul guthrie]

Pretty convincing material Paul but to be sure I need to know he was using verifiable war time material, was he?

[Muerrisch]

Coming late to this, how is 'the 100 days' of 1918 categorised? A 'break-in'? A 'breakout'? Or a 'breakthrough'?

If the essence of a breakthrough is 1. an organised enemy to penetrate [not outflank, as in 1914], and 2. a return to mobile warfare [only achieved twice, both in 1918], surely Somme II and 'the 100 days' fulfill both criteria?

[truthergw]

Tom, I agree with your general description of the events in 1914. I would respectfully disagree on one minor point.

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I would not define their sweep through Belgium as a 'breakthrough' in the narrower sense of the word.

Robert

I am more than happy to agree to agree and I accept that the Belgians withdrew rather than be swept aside. E si pur muove

[Paul Hederer]

Pretty convincing material Paul but to be sure I need to know he was using verifiable war time material, was he?

Paul,

Sorry for the delay in answering.

Foley's book gives ample evidence from war-time documents of Falkenhayn's intentions. It's well worth a read.

Falkenhayn's war-time thoughts seem to have been what Gudmundsson outlined above, and Foley shows that.

What 5th Army thought was different, and its staff planned the battle to take the Fortress, but again, not a break-through battle, but one with limited objectives.

An interesting example of this is shown in the first days of the battle. The commanders were instructed to minimize casualties, yet the Corps Commander opposite Bois de Caures ordered his men to clear the woods "regardless of cost."

That's one of the things that makes Verdun so fascinating, the complete divergence of purpose and understanding of the objectives at different levels of command.

Von Zwehl, one of the Corps commanders at Verdun wrote a book, which is a fascinating read, though it's only in German.

Though there has been some good English-language works on Verdun, most recently Foley's, there are newer sources in German, and some older ones that beg to be translated. Even Werth's standard work on the battle has not been translated...it's a shame.

Paul

[paul guthrie]

OK, I am sold, I had real doubts about the attrition claim since Huw Strachan told me after a talk that Flakenhayn had not documented this until after the war but even if so you say and I believe there were war time German statements that confirm his claims.