Breakthrough battles

[PhilB]

How many battles on the Western Front could be described as attempted breakthrough battles? How many could be described as successful? Kindly separate into German, French, British! Phil B

[Guest Benoit Douville]

Well, all the major offensive Battles like Verdun and The Somme were supposed to be breakthrough Battle but none of them were succesful and they kept continuing this nonsence for 4 years if you are talking about the Western Front. Of course, they were some victory but not to be considered major breakthrough, the Allies never reached the German soil...

Regards

[Landsturm]

the Allies never reached the German soil...

Except in Alsace where French soldiers occupied a strip of Germany...

[Mr_Sunray]

they were some victory but not to be considered major breakthrough, the Allies never reached the German soil...

Regards

So what happened in 1918 when the Allies drove the Germans out of France & Belgium and occupied parts of German soil?

Steve

[roel22]

So what happened in 1918 when the Allies drove the Germans out of France & Belgium and occupied parts of German soil?

The orginal question was how many battles can be described as breakthrough battles. I hardly think there was much of a serious 'battle' going on late 1918. In those last months the no. 1 objective of many Germans was to get home asap to their often starving families. The fact that allies were able to reach German soil at the end of the war was hardly due to serious 'battles'...

[delta]

Roel

I would tend to diagree - certianly the drive through the Hindeburng line was certainly no cake walk

Stephen

[Guest Benoit Douville]

If You are talking about the Battle of Epehy in September 1918, it was really tough for the Allies I agree.

Regards

[truthergw]

How many battles on the Western Front could be described as attempted breakthrough battles? How many could be described as successful? Kindly separate into German, French, British! Phil B

British, Several attempts 1915, then at least 1 major attempt each year, 1918 successful counterattack in last few months. French battles were , I believe aimed at repossessing French soil and so, not breakthroughs as such although victory would have necessitated breaking through the German lines. German, the Kaiserschlacht was an attempt ( in 3 parts?) to break through to the Channel coast, failed. In trench warfare, a successful attack would always entail breaking through the enemy lines so , I suppose , all the battles after the Battles of the Frontiers were attempted breakthroughs. I will not be too surprised if not everyone agrees totally with me.

[PhilB]

How about Germans at Ypres 1914 & 15? Verdun - no? Phil B

[truthergw]

How about Germans at Ypres 1914 & 15? Verdun - no? Phil B

The Germans at Ypres, certainly. The intention was to take the Channel ports. Verdun is thought to have started as a breakthrough. Verdun is fortified because it has been a gate to Paris for hundreds of years. When the breakthrough stalled, it was claimed that the intention was to bleed the French army white. A sort of prequel to the British practice of continuing to attack after the momentum had gone. A stalled breakthrough or a battle of attrition? You pays yer money and you takes yer choice. The Schlieffen Plan was perhaps the major attack of the war which was not intended as a breakthrough. The intention was to catch the French armies and squeeze them between the forces attacking through Belgium and France and the forces standing in Alsace- Lorraine. That is why they were allowed to occupy a small part of German soil.

[Paul Hederer]

Well, all the major offensive Battles like Verdun and The Somme were supposed to be breakthrough Battle but none of them were succesful and they kept continuing this nonsence for 4 years if you are talking about the Western Front. Of course, they were some victory but not to be considered major breakthrough, the Allies never reached the German soil...

Regards

I'm willing to argue that the original concept for Verdun was 100% an attritional battle. Taking the city of Verdun, or breaking the lines was never the original intention.

More recent research has put forward the idea that Verdun was only a part of the overall 1916 plan, which was to start with an offensive at a place the French would not give up, and then to prompt the Allies into a premature counter-offensive.

The Germans never massed enough reserves to achieve a breakthrough, or to even attack on a wide enough front (both banks of the Meuse) to capture the city or break the front. Think about the limited forces involved--3 Corps. I think Falkenhayn knew his job better than to think he was going to breakthrough with such a small force.

Two good sources for this topic are:

"German Strategy and the Path to Verdun, Erich von Falkenhayn and the Development of Attrition, 1870–1916," by Foley.

"Falkenhayn. Politisches Denken und Handeln im Kaiserreich," by Afflerbach.

Of course this is a subject of intense debate, especially in German-language sources.

The German attacks of 1918 were planned as breakthough battles.

Paul

[truthergw]

I'm willing to argue that the original concept for Verdun was 100% an attritional battle. Taking the city of Verdun, or breaking the lines was never the original intention.

.................................

Paul

This has been argued back and forth since before the war ended. There can be little doubt that the battle was launched in order to capture the city of Verdun and the fortifications surrounding it. If that had occurred, it is hard to see how the high command would resist the pressure that would have been exerted on them from Berlin. After all, they would have taken the French armies in the flank. Paris would not have been beyond them. This is why, apart from symbolic reasons, the Germans knew that the French could not choose to abandon Verdun. It was truly of vital importance and losing it would have changed the whole strategic situation. I think that the Germans were in a very good position here. Capture Verdun and on to Paris or at the very least, force the French army to meet them in battle in a situation of the German's choosing. The only outcome which would not be to their advantage, would be being forced back to the start line with roughly equal casualties. This is what the French finally achieved, at enormous cost. Carrying on the simultaneous battle of the Somme with more heavy losses was more than the German armies could sustain. The army which fought in 1917 was not that which had marched toward Verdun or held the line on the Somme. By 1917 the Germans would be well aware that a battle of attrition is a two edged sword. 1918, with the Americans about to arrive meant attrition was not an option and so, breakthrough or bust.

[Paul Hederer]

This has been argued back and forth since before the war ended. There can be little doubt that the battle was launched in order to capture the city of Verdun and the fortifications surrounding it. If that had occurred, it is hard to see how the high command would resist the pressure that would have been exerted on them from Berlin. After all, they would have taken the French armies in the flank. Paris would not have been beyond them. This is why, apart from symbolic reasons, the Germans knew that the French could not choose to abandon Verdun. It was truly of vital importance and losing it would have changed the whole strategic situation. I think that the Germans were in a very good position here. Capture Verdun and on to Paris or at the very least, force the French army to meet them in battle in a situation of the German's choosing. The only outcome which would not be to their advantage, would be being forced back to the start line with roughly equal casualties. This is what the French finally achieved, at enormous cost. Carrying on the simultaneous battle of the Somme with more heavy losses was more than the German armies could sustain. The army which fought in 1917 was not that which had marched toward Verdun or held the line on the Somme. By 1917 the Germans would be well aware that a battle of attrition is a two edged sword. 1918, with the Americans about to arrive meant attrition was not an option and so, breakthrough or bust.

Again, I respectfully disagree. Are you saying that the Germans were going to smash the French, breakthrough and take them in the flank and reach Paris with 3 Corps, and another few in reserve? I think that's a bit hard to believe.

Falkenhayn would not release, under any circumstances, any more troops for Verdun initially. When other commanders argued with him that they needed more troops he angrily refused, before the battle even began.

The on-scene commanders had to fight and kick to get additonal troops to widen the battle to the West bank of the Meuse to clear the French guns that were taking them in the flank.

The battle became a fight for the city later, under pressure from above, and also from below, namely from 5th Army. But it was never planned to be a breakthrough battle.

Paul

[paul guthrie]

Paul was Verdun planned as an attritional battle? Since the allies had more men that does not make sense to me or to Huw Strachan. Falkenhayn did not make the claim til after the war.

The trouble with my position is I can't argue the other point either, a breakthrough there, unless a real absolute rout would have led nowhere as at the Somme.

I lean toward Falkenhayn's claim but have real doubts.

[truthergw]

Again, I respectfully disagree. Are you saying that the Germans were going to smash the French, breakthrough and take them in the flank and reach Paris with 3 Corps, and another few in reserve? I think that's a bit hard to believe.

Falkenhayn would not release, under any circumstances, any more troops for Verdun initially. When other commanders argued with him that they needed more troops he angrily refused, before the battle even began.

The on-scene commanders had to fight and kick to get additonal troops to widen the battle to the West bank of the Meuse to clear the French guns that were taking them in the flank.

The battle became a fight for the city later, under pressure from above, and also from below, namely from 5th Army. But it was never planned to be a breakthrough battle.

Paul

Paul, I don't claim to know something that no-one else does. It is only an opinion. And I'm grateful for the discussion. The hard bit for me as far as attritional battle goes is where were they going to stop? The whole area was covered with interlinked defensive works. Did they intend to capture Douaumont and not take Vaux? Froid Terre? What about Le Mort Homme. capture it then fall back? Make camp under the walls of Verdun? I just cannot see an army capturing parts of a fortified system and leaving other parts unscathed. I think that once you start you have to finish or your men are going to pay a terrible price. This, after all is what drove the attack on Passchendaele. It was seen (rightly or wrongly) as part of a whole. Failure to take the last ridges would have forced a withdrawal from ground that had been hard won at great cost.

[Old Tom]

Hello,

I am of the opinion that there were no successful breakthroughs on the western front. I suggest the main reason was that until 1918 the necessary technology was not available and even then advances were achieved by a series of attacks which were not, individually, break throughs. If it had been possible to advance artillery quickly enough to provide full support for the second and third days of many attacks and if resupply of the infantry in the forward areas on a large scale was possible, and if tanks had been more reliable etc a breakthrough with mobile forces getting behind the German line might have occured.

Old Tom

[Robert Dunlop]

Crown Prince Wilhelm (who was the Army commander) wrote the following in relation to the battle of Verdun (from 'Memoirs of the Crown Prince of Germany'):

'The order to attack Verdun naturally did not proceed from me: it originated in a decision of the General Higher Command. This decision and the General Higher Command's reasons for the enterprise find expression in a report to the Kaiser by General von Falkenhayn, as head of the commander-in-chief's General Staff, at Christmas, 1915. This report contains the following passage: "Behind the French section of the western front, there are, within range, objects for whose retention the French are compelled to risk their last man. If they do so, the French forces, since there is no option, will be bled white, whether we reach our objective or not. If the French do not risk everything, and the objective falls into our hands, the moral effects upon France will be enormous. For this local operation, Germany will not be forced seriously to expose her other fronts. She can confidently face the diversion attacks to be expected at other points, nay, she may hope to spare troops enough to meet them with counter-attacks." Soon afterwards, the General Higher Command issued orders for the advance on Verdun. The General Higher Command was unquestionably influenced by our numerical inferiority and a desire to anticipate an expected enemy attack with the maximum strength at some spot unsuitable to ourselves.

In judging of the plan, the Higher Command of the 5th Army took the view that both sides of the Meuse must be attacked simultaneously and with powerful forces. Such a proceeding was vetoed by the General Higher Command.'

In this passage, we see an interesting concept that is repeated over and over. The modern equivalent might be called scenario planning - the ability to hold at least two potential futures in veiw when planning something. Breakthrough or not. Haig often did this. Prior and Wilson, in their various books such as 'Command on the Western Front', keep on, in my opinion, making the mistake of interpreting Haig's directives as breakthrough only. Particularly for the Somme and Third Ypres. Haig always kept this possibility to the fore, but always sanctioned efforts that had limited objectives at the same time. Had these efforts worked, then his commanders needed to be ready to exploit them. This means it is often possible to interpret the objectives of battles in two ways, whereas in reality breakthrough and no breakthrough co-exist.

Robert

[truthergw]

Hello,

I am of the opinion that there were no successful breakthroughs on the western front. I suggest the main reason was that until 1918 the necessary technology was not available and even then advances were achieved by a series of attacks which were not, individually, break throughs. If it had been possible to advance artillery quickly enough to provide full support for the second and third days of many attacks and if resupply of the infantry in the forward areas on a large scale was possible, and if tanks had been more reliable etc a breakthrough with mobile forces getting behind the German line might have occured.

Old Tom

For a large part of the war, you are quite right but we should bear in mind that the war started with a breakthrough by the German forces on a massive scale. They overran the Belgian forts and reached well into France in the initial thrusts all along the frontier. All this in 1914.

[roel22]

For a large part of the war, you are quite right but we should bear in mind that the war started with a breakthrough by the German forces on a massive scale. They overran the Belgian forts and reached well into France in the initial thrusts all along the frontier. All this in 1914.

Ofcourse you're right about 1914. But from the moment both sides had dug themselves in I don't know of any attack that might be considered a real breakthrough on its own. Perhaps late 1918 there were some -I don't know that much about offensives in the last months of the war- but that would be a bit like a groggy boxer getting a final blow.

[PhilB]

It seems to be the consensus that only in 1914 was there a successful breakthrough and that before the advent of trench warfare. Would it be fair then to say that the "learning curve" used to justify poor performances didn`t extend to breakthroughs, as it never happened again but they kept trying? Phil B

[roel22]

Would it be fair then to say that the "learning curve" used to justify poor performances didn`t extend to breakthroughs, as it never happened again but they kept trying?

Sounds fair to me.

[Anthony Pigott]

Without wanting to be pedantic, I think one must be careful about the precise meaning of the term 'breakthrough'.

How extensive, laterally, is the breakthrough? How deep is it, through one line, through all the defence lines, no organised opposition in front of you? Is it open warfare or fixed defences (e.g. trenches), i.e. what is there to 'break-through'? In practice I think it's a relative term.

Regards

Anthony

[Paul Hederer]

Paul was Verdun planned as an attritional battle? Since the allies had more men that does not make sense to me or to Huw Strachan. Falkenhayn did not make the claim til after the war.

The trouble with my position is I can't argue the other point either, a breakthrough there, unless a real absolute rout would have led nowhere as at the Somme.

I lean toward Falkenhayn's claim but have real doubts.

Paul,

There has been quite a bit of new material come out on this in the past years. The whole attritional battle at Verdun seems to have been a strange concept, but the facts seem to support this.

The very limited number of troops available seem to bear this out. I was lucky enough to have an e-mail conversation with Bruce Gudmundsson on this subject, the author of the "On...," books. I asked him about this specifically, and he said (I'm paraphrasing) that the German concept was to put the French into a position where their superior high-trajectory artillery could be brought to bear to kill the largest number of troops. This also invloved a slow, methodical advance to allow the French to reform their lines. 210 and 150mm mortars and howitzers being much more effective at hitting trench lines than troops scattered in shellholes.

Thinking about Verdun, and the way the battle was conducted is worth a lot of thought. The first day the Germans only probed the French defenses. This would be strange behavior for a force attempting a breakthrough.

Consider the Allies on the Somme massing their troops, and then launching only patrols on the first day after the bombardment. See where I'm going with this?

The issue of Falkenhayn only making the claim that the battle was launched as an attritional battle in hindsight has been called into question by more recent historians. There was a smear campaign launched against Falkenhayn after the war, and much that was written must be taken with a grain of salt.

Foley's book is a great treatment on this subject, and I can't recommend it enough.

Paul

[paul guthrie]

Good analysis Paul, I had ignored their day 1 performance, but wouldn't it be nice to have war time confirmation? Crown Prince's statements are also post war.

[Paul Hederer]

Paul, I don't claim to know something that no-one else does. It is only an opinion. And I'm grateful for the discussion. The hard bit for me as far as attritional battle goes is where were they going to stop? The whole area was covered with interlinked defensive works. Did they intend to capture Douaumont and not take Vaux? Froid Terre? What about Le Mort Homme. capture it then fall back? Make camp under the walls of Verdun? I just cannot see an army capturing parts of a fortified system and leaving other parts unscathed. I think that once you start you have to finish or your men are going to pay a terrible price. This, after all is what drove the attack on Passchendaele. It was seen (rightly or wrongly) as part of a whole. Failure to take the last ridges would have forced a withdrawal from ground that had been hard won at great cost.

It is a good discussion, and very interesting as a subject. I hope it grows to include a series of battles, and not Verdun mainly.

The plan was to advance to take a series of ridges, and I think (I'm at work, no references) up to the Ridge with Ft. Bellville, if my memory serves correctly.

The Mort Homme and West Bank were never part of the original plan, though the Generals of 5th Army argued very strongly that they needed to launch attacks on both flanks. The Corps commander along the Meuse even attempted some unauthorized crossings of the Meuse early on in the battle, before any extra troops were provided, but he failed.

Verdun is a fascinating battle, and one that has held my attention for the past years. The more I read about it the more I feel compelled to read more....

Paul