FOO's RFA

[MParnham]

A FOO (in case you’re wondering!) is a forward observation officer for the artillery. Would anyone happen to know if a FOO was a specialist job? If so were they specifically trained for it - and how many were assigned to a battery?

Perhaps it was it considered a job any artillery officer could do and was part of the standard training? If so did they rotate it around the officer pool within the battery or ask for volunteers?

My wife’s great uncle was a FOO for the 129th battery RFA and was killed only one week after his eighteenth birthday - he had only joined the unit a month before. Perhaps they thought it was a 'suitable' task for an inexperienced officer (2nd Lieut), or perhaps more cynically the senior officers made him an offer he could not refuse, and landed him with a difficult and risky job!

Clearly being a FOO was dangerous - did it have a high casualty rate generally?

thanks

Martin

[CSMMo]

From the letters I have read, FOO's were rotated through the available subalterns of the Battery and all were expected to pull that duty, but this may have been a local policy - I haven't seen anything official on it. This duty could be hazardous depending on the position of the supported Infantry and the progress of the battle. They used wire and telephone so the real hazards were absorbed by the signalmen who accompanied whoever the FOO was on each mission and had to keep the wires open (and repaired - even under shell and rifle fire). The FOO's found many places, some ingenious, some extremely hazardous, from which to observe fire. In the attached photo, taken by my grandfather in Salonika, look up in the tree. Lt. Malcolm Buchanan and party observing fire for the Argyll (Mountain) Battery in Gudeli Wood, March 1918.

Mike Morrison

[MParnham]

Mike – what an astonishing photograph! From the little I have read about FOO’s they were almost as feared by their own infantry as by the enemy. These guy’s had the capability of calling down ‘hell’ on the PBI, and as such inviting a similar (and often more ferocious) retaliation.

Many thanks

Martin

[Robert Dunlop]

As Mike pointed out, I think there were local variations. Some men clearly had an aptitude for the task. Fraser-Tytler was one such example. His book 'Field Guns in France', published by Naval and Military Press, will give you valuable insights in the role of the FOO. He had a powerful telescope, experience of hunting, and a passion for killing, which is somewhat disturbing when you read the book. Another account that will give you further insights is 'The War Diaries of the Master of Belhaven'.

Street, in his book 'With the Guns', describes the meticulous behaviours needed to 'spot' what the enemy was doing in 'quiet' areas of the front.

My impression is that FOOs were welcomed by the infantry. A good FOO would collaborate with infantry colleagues to give them maximum support. The Germans were particularly strong on this, as evidenced in Sulzbach's book 'With the German Guns'. What the infantry did not appreciate was the use of artillery without control, especially when it fell short.

Robert

[CSMMo]

Here is a first hand report of a FOO in a letter written home from Gallipoli postmarked 3rd July 1915. It is written by Lieut. William Hogarth, RGA (TF), Argyll Mountain Battery, 4th Highland Mountain Brigade. This gives you a pretty good feel for the duty. This was written after the Battle of Gully Ravine:

"I am off duty for a short time now, and will give you the benefit of it.

The last time I wrote you was June 27th - the day before the attack began. I was Forward Observing Officer and am never likely to forget it. The general says that even in France there was never a bombardment to equal it -even Neuve Chappelle!! We had all our guns playing on to the left flank and most of the French ones and the fleet helped too. Then when our fellows advanced I think I got excited for the first time in years. It was great seeing them jump up, bayonets fixed, and pour across the open into J9 and J10, the impregnable Turkish trenches. Scarcely a shot was fired on them. Surging on over J10 they ran on to J11 and lay down there. Meantime our supports ran up and passed through the first line, ran, bayonetted J12, were repulsed, attacked again, carried the trench and attacked and carried J13!!

It doesn't sound much to you folks, but it was some achievement. Five lines of trenches.

Then on [the] right of the ravine we advanced, but not so much. My job was to keep in touch with the infantry to let the battery know when the infantry needed support and where. So my two telephonists and I got the wire shifted forward about 600 - 700 yards and established a fresh post.

Some of the sights in going up that gully would beggar description. You remember how I couldn't stand even listening to a First Aid lecture; well, going up that ravine I saw things there that would sicken a surgeon at home, I believe, but there must be a wise Providence who arranges these things for I wasn't in the least revolted, nor did these things seem in any way out of the ordinary. One's senses and faculties are terribly blunted after a bit of this business. Take myself, for instance. I was on duty at the battery on the night of June 27th, went all through the battle on June 28th, was up at the phone all that night, the next day and the next night. Well the actual loss of sleep isn't so much, but when you combine it with incessant rifle and machine-gun fire it's a beezer!

Yesterday morning I could understand anyone all right if they spoke to me, but at times I couldn't speak back. However I got a night's rest last night in spite of a thunder-storm and after a walk this morning I am just beginning to feel a bit weary.

Our lot {Argyll Mountain Battery} lost two officers killed, two men killed and four wounded. Splendid fellows, every one of them. We had a personal letter from the General Commanding Royal Artillery to the Adjutant which I will enclose a copy, by which you will see that we are some Terriers, we are! The infantry say that they would rather have our wee guns behind them than any field guns in the peninsula - which is praise enough."

Mike Morrison

[CSMMo]

Mike – what an astonishing photograph! From the little I have read about FOO’s they were almost as feared by their own infantry as by the enemy. These guy’s had the capability of calling down ‘hell’ on the PBI, and as such inviting a similar (and often more ferocious) retaliation.

Many thanks

Martin

Martin, I had the privilege of presenting a copy of that photo to Lieut. Buchanan's daughter in Rothesay last year. She had never seen it (or a couple of others I had). Now she was astonished!

Mike

[MParnham]

As Mike pointed out, I think there were local variations. Some men clearly had an aptitude for the task. Fraser-Tytler was one such example. His book 'Field Guns in France', published by Naval and Military Press, will give you valuable insights in the role of the FOO. He had a powerful telescope, experience of hunting, and a passion for killing, which is somewhat disturbing when you read the book. Another account that will give you further insights is 'The War Diaries of the Master of Belhaven'.

Street, in his book 'With the Guns', describes the meticulous behaviours needed to 'spot' what the enemy was doing in 'quiet' areas of the front.

My impression is that FOOs were welcomed by the infantry. A good FOO would collaborate with infantry colleagues to give them maximum support. The Germans were particularly strong on this, as evidenced in Sulzbach's book 'With the German Guns'. What the infantry did not appreciate was the use of artillery without control, especially when it fell short.

Robert

Very interesting Robert – thank you. I will try to get hold of the books you suggest. I hope Dudley (our family FOO) was welcome by his infantry, I also hope he did not enjoy his job too much!

Martin

[MParnham]

Another terrific document Mike. It has an immediacy and raw energy which captures the strange excitement and horror of combat. I wonder if Dudley (our family FOO) felt anything like this. I am compiling all of this together with the surviving contemporary paperwork and photo’s for future generations of our family - in particular his one surviving (very elderly) nephew.

Many thanks Martin

[MParnham]

Martin, I had the privilege of presenting a copy of that photo to Lieut. Buchanan's daughter in Rothesay last year. She had never seen it (or a couple of others I had). Now she was astonished!

Mike

I bet she was!!

Martin

[bcerha]

FOO'ing is a distinct "art" which even today favours some individuals more than others. The ability to "read the ground" both in terms of map interpretation and actual terrain evaluation is critical to success, as is the subsequent placement of artillery fire in order to achieve the desired effect. This of course can be affected greatly by a number of factors not least slope, altitude, visibility and a number of other environmental factors - especially the weather. Ideally a good sense of anticipation in terms of what the enemy is likely to do can also aid a FOO tremendously in his success.

These days a FOO is required to plan and co-ordinate the fire from any number of weapons be it Aircraft. Attack Helicopters as well as Guns and Mortars. However the basic principles of hitting the target at the right place at the right time and hopefully achieving maximum surpise will have changed little since the Great War. It takes about 7 weeks to train a FOO these days - but that is just to get the basics right. Itsa one of those skills that takes a whole lot of practice to perfect - and you never stop learning!

Regards

David

[MParnham]

Thanks for this David I had not realized that FOO’s still existed - in my naivety I imagined that technology would have taken over!

The day before he was shot Dudley had directed 40 lydite shells into a very small area on the German front lines – this must have caused havoc. I can’t help feeling that they would have been keen for revenge – and if they had known would probably have been delighted at his ‘removal’.

Martin

[CSMMo]

Forward Observers (FOO's) are still very important for accurate and timely fire - in many cases required before fires can be released. Today, their name has been changed in the US Army to Fire Support Officers to encompass what has already been stated as their current duty - coordinating all indirect fires for maneuver. Today they have some tools that would make the FOO's of WW1 dizzy - laser range finders and target designators, digital message devices for transmitting data - the GPS's alone are amazing. But the gunner on the ground with the infantry or armor are still very important men who, if found, are high priority targets for the enemy.

Mike Morrison (retired gunner)

[MParnham]

Forward Observers (FOO's) are still very important for accurate and timely fire - in many cases required before fires can be released. Today, their name has been changed in the US Army to Fire Support Officers to encompass what has already been stated as their current duty - coordinating all indirect fires for maneuver. Today they have some tools that would make the FOO's of WW1 dizzy - laser range finders and target designators, digital message devices for transmitting data - the GPS's alone are amazing. But the gunner on the ground with the infantry or armor are still very important men who, if found, are high priority targets for the enemy.

Mike Morrison (retired gunner)

Very intersting Mike - Would you happen to know what equipment Dudley would have used at that time - I think they used field telephones, and presumably field glasses, and???? The only personal effects found on him was a wrist watch! His brother (Infantry) who was killed three months later had far more equipment on him including field glasses.

Martin

[bcerha]

Predictably, I suppose, the US army is slightly in advance of ours technologically and we do not yet have all the gizmos their FSOs possess. We have Laser range finders and thermal imagers and we are just bringing in digital comms which will provide high speed data links. However we still teach our FOOs to have the ability to shoot if all this techno whizz gives out. Its now called reversionary mode but in fact its not too dissimilar from what Dudley would have recognised.

[bcerha]

Sorry having trouble with the editing process tonight for some reason. Basically all that is needed is a set of binos, a map or a piece of graph paper, a 6 inch shooting protractor, graduated in mils rather than degrees, a set of firing tables relevant to the guns you are trying to shoot and a means of communicating with the gun line. Armed with this tool set and with the application of some rudimentary trigonometry, any FOO worth his salt should be able to bring down and control fire just about wherever he chooses.

Hope this helps

Regards

David

[CSMMo]

David said it best. Accompanying the FOO was a signals team which communicated by wire and telephone as well as semaphore. I have heard that radio was used, but have seen no hard evidence so far. (I have seen evidence that it was used by observers in aeroplanes.)

Mike

[MParnham]

Sorry having trouble with the editing process tonight for some reason. Basically all that is needed is a set of binos, a map or a piece of graph paper, a 6 inch shooting protractor, graduated in mils rather than degrees, a set of firing tables relevant to the guns you are trying to shoot and a means of communicating with the gun line. Armed with this tool set and with the application of some rudimentary trigonometry, any FOO worth his salt should be able to bring down and control fire just about wherever he chooses.

Hope this helps

Regards

David

Thank you David this helps a lot - I hope I don't appear to ignorant, but I am very new to this having only just inherited all the surviving paper work regarding these 2 unfortunate brothers of my wifes grandfather.

I have been rather surprised at how much more ‘material’ seems to be available about the infantry compared to the artillery. This seems a little odd as I have recently read that perhaps 60 – 70% of all casualties on the western front were caused by the artillery.

Many thanks

Martin

[MParnham]

David said it best. Accompanying the FOO was a signals team which communicated by wire and telephone as well as semaphore. I have heard that radio was used, but have seen no hard evidence so far. (I have seen evidence that it was used by observers in aeroplanes.)

Mike

Thanks Mike - Dudleys unit were certainly using aircraft (129th Battery war diary - 31st May 1915) presumably these were trained airmen not the usual Battery FOO's?

Martin

[johnreed]

Not being pedantic Martin I think the actual figure is 59%.

John

[rflory]

David wrote: "Sorry having trouble with the editing process tonight for some reason. Basically all that is needed is a set of binos, a map or a piece of graph paper, a 6 inch shooting protractor, graduated in mils rather than degrees, a set of firing tables relevant to the guns you are trying to shoot and a means of communicating with the gun line. Armed with this tool set and with the application of some rudimentary trigonometry, any FOO worth his salt should be able to bring down and control fire just about wherever he chooses. "

David: From what you state above and from what I have read about the Royal Artillery in the Great War it appears that the FOO in the RA operates somewhat differently than an FOO in the US Army, at least in the 1960's when I was a field artillery Battery Commander. An American FOO at that time would carry binoculars, a map, a compass and a grid square but would not have a protractor or a set of firing tables. The reason for this, I would guess, is that the US Army artillery had a battery FDC (Fire Direction Center) between the FOO and the guns. The fire mission from the FOO to the FDC would contain a set of coordinates (or range and azimuth to the guns), type of target, type of shell, and type of mission (registration, adjustment, fire for effect, etc.). The FDC would then compute the gun data and send it to the guns. In adjusting fire the American FOO would give a deflection (in mills) and range (in meters) correction, i.e. Right 30, Down 400. I take it that in the Great War in the RA that there was no FDC between the FOO and the guns. Is that correct?

The other difference that I have noticed between the RA and the American artillery is the manner in which the guns were laid. I have never seen any indication that the RA had an instrument similar to the BC scope in the American artillery.

Regards. Dick Flory

[bcerha]

Dick,

I am afraid I am guilty of being misleading in what I wrote with regard to FOO'ing. I was attempting to paint a generic picture of how a FOO could, if pushed, fire the guns himself with the tools described. I was not describing how a FOO in the RA regularly operates today or for that matter in the Great War (in fact to my shame I know very little of the techniques and procesdures used by FOOs in the Great War! - perhaps you can enlighten me!!)

We do of course, like the US Army, utilise an FDC at Regimental level (again terms can be confusing because in UK terms RA Regt is equivalent to US FA Bn). Depending on the target and the weight of fire requested, the FDC will decide which batteries will take on the mission. It is then the job of the Battery Command Post or BCP on the battery gun position to calculate the target data from the target info sent by the FOO, using a computer and then issue this data (bearing, elevation, ammo type fuze setting etc) to the guns.

Having seen the adjusting round land the FOO then sends corrections to the BCP(s) for line (left and right) and length (plus(add) or minus(drop) to bring the fire on to the target. A typical correction might be left 200 add 400 (the figures being in metres)

Finally as you know, having just spent a year with the US FA, RA FOOs are different in that they not only call for fire and direct it, but they are also called upon to co-ordinate and control the fire of different assets (mortars, aircraft, attack helicopters and even ships) in a process known as fire-planning. They do this in relation to the tactical level at which they are fighting - in a FOOs case at what we would call the Coy/Sqn level. To reflect this additional responsibilty our FOOs are Captains, and have already served at the gun end as Command Post Officers (CPO) and Gun Position Officers (GPO).

As far as laying the guns is concerned, we have now got rid of dial sights and rely totally on electronic gyroscopic direction and azimuth determining systems. This does away with the requirement to "pass line" to the guns and greatly increases the speed at which guns can be brought into action.

Hope this helps to clarify matters

Regards as ever

David

[Petroc]

v. quick response; can't add much to what the experts have already said, but try to find R.B.Talbot-Kelly's 'A Subaltern's Odyssey' (even the WFA site says its hard to obtain; I found my copy by chance in a second hand store); wonderfully illustrated by the author, and a well-written autobiography of a RFA FOO in the 9th (Scottish) Div

[MParnham]

Thank you - I often browse in second hand book shops, I have hit the odd 'Gem' so I will keep my eyes open. I will also try EBAY.

Martin

[Muerrisch]

Not knowing much about artillery, I consulted my copy of Field Artillery Traing 1914, the 1914 edition.

Forward Observation Officers had not been invented: the battery [and indeed the artillery brigade] was directed in a top-down manner. Only the scantiest references can be found: this the most substantial:

[essdee]

Attached is a page from some artillery instructions I came across you might find of interest.

I have cut the page in two to make reading easier

Stuart