Gallipoli landing

[1ramsey1]

Hi to all, this is my first post so please be gentle.......I have recently become interested in the Gallipoli cause and am currently reading the book Gallipoli by Les Carlyon. This has raised the question of what difference, if any, it would have made if the ANZACS had landed at the right place at the right time? 1ramsey1

[Guest gumbirsingpun]

hello

tis evident that twas not right place to land at gallipoli, if we go into details, twas only shortly after the landing that high command let it be known that an error had been made – the landing should have been made on Brighton Beach, south of Anzac Cove and in a locality of relatively friendly topography. Instead and by accident, the men found themselves in the heart of precipitous country to the north of the intended landing area. Two explanations were proposed: a sea current had drifted the tows northwards and in the dim light of dawn the silhouette of Hell Spit or Ari Burnu had been mistaken for the intended aiming point, Gaba Tepe.

both explanations can be safely rejected. If a stiff wind blew from the south-west, a set of one and a half knots flowed north-east. This fact was well known to the Mediterranean fleet, which had often visited Lemnos before the war, and was allowed for in orders issued to the marker ship Triumph: "It is absolutely essential for the success of the expedition that your ship should be accurately in this position coordinates given. Also record the direction of the tide and strength of the current and communicate both to Admiral Thursby after his arrival at the rendezvous." In the event, naval log books recorded a breeze blowing at just one knot during the landing, with the result, as hamilton put it in his memoirs, that "Birdwood had no current to trouble him". On the point of silhouettes, no one could possibly have mistaken the headlands in question. The high mountain of Sari Bair rises immediately behind Anzac Cove. The Khilid Bahr Plateau, on the other hand, is some distance behind Gaba Tepe and appears much lower from the sea, with a flatter top. If the tows had lost their direction during the period of darkness, there was time to make any necessary adjustments during the inshore journey because (so Bean told a correspondent) the outline of the land could be seen fifteen minutes before the tows set off.The navigators accompanying the tows were certainly well qualified to make those adjustments. They had studied the shore's profile on a reconnaissance voyage just before the landing and would have made a particular effort to establish their bearings before moonset (2.57 am on the 25th). They would have had plenty of time to do so as well. Thursby's report on the landing states that the loom of the land could be clearly seen at 2.30 am and, even one hour later, Colonel Johnstone found that he could "just see a faint outline of the coast." Godfrey went further. His memoirs state that he was "conscious of the loom of the land about 3 am", little more than an hour before the landing

but on the other hand, seems that those cliffs of crumbling sandstone bush covered and carved up by deep gullies was really the best place to be protected from the enemy fire

[Robert Dunlop]

The outcome would not have been fundamentally any different. Leaving Gallipoli aside for one second, WW1 was a war that favoured the defender, thanks to the modern rifle, machine gun and the power of artillery. Turning now to amphibious operations in general. Immediate deep break-ins are not possible with amphibious landings. One must gain a bridgehead, consolidate it, then push on. This process would have been needed had the ANZACs landed in the 'right' place. So the Ottoman Army was always going to get time to contain the landings. Perhaps the area of the bridgehead might have been larger. But the tactical and strategic threat would still have been insufficient to produce any other outcome, IMHO. And the logistic problems would still have hounded the ANZACs, while the Ottoman Army could maintain interior lines of supply.

Robert

[MartinWills]

The Anzacs were, in one sense, fortunate in not landing where the defenders were amassed - it would have been far more fraught and bloody to land close to Gaba Tepe. Yes, it might have been easier to access the heights but the Turks were expecting them at Gaba Tepe where they could easily access the "valley" across the peninsula to Maidos (Eceabat). I've mulled this one over at great length over the years and probably come to the conclusion that it was "six of one or half a dozen of the other".

[Mat McLachlan]

It's funny how opinions swing on these things. For decades the accepted story was that there was a mysterious northern current that pushed the boats onto Anzac Cove, or that the 'marker buoys' designating the correct landing spot drifted north (or were moved by the Turks!). We now know both these scenarios to be incorrect.

The modern trend of thinking seems to be that the landing at Anzac Cove was a blessing in disguise - that the heavy concentration of defenders, barbed wire and other obstacles at Brighton Beach would have led to a slaughter if the Anzacs had attempted to land there.

This has always struck me as a bit odd - it's true there were more obstacles and Turks at Brighton, but they still would have been unlikely to prevent the large Anzac force from landing. I'm sure casualties would have been relatively higher at Brighton, but still probably within the expected range of casualties for an amphibious landing.

In any case, I assume many of the Turks defending at Brighton were fairly swiftly moved north once the Anzac Cove landing had begun, so these men soon became part of the equation anyway - it's not like they just hung around at Brighton and never joined the fighting.

My personal feeling is that the advantages of a swifter advance across friendlier terrain at Brighton would have outweighed the negatives caused by the more solid defences. I can't help but think the Anzacs would have had a better run if they only had the Turks to fight, and not the landscape.

All supposition on my part, of course. Happy to hear other thoughts.

Cheers,

Mat

[Julian Whippy]

Ramsey1 - What did you think of the Carlyon book ? I have not read it but have been told that it is a rather one sided view, and very anti command/ anti Brit ?? Am i right or just a wingeing Pom !

Julian

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Julian

G'day mate

What did you think of the Carlyon book?

While I am not Ramsey, I have read the book and found it an excellent read.

have been told that it is a rather one sided view, and very anti command/ anti Brit ??

If you are an apologist for moronic decisions, yes it would seem that way. Carlyon places blame for massacres where it uncomfortably belongs and says no more and no less than what is said on this forum.

His theses are:

About the Brits

1. Kitchener was a dud who had no idea on how to run a war. He gave no direction to any of the key players in the Gallipoli campaign and roused at any requests for adequate resources.

2. Gen Hamilton was probably the most academic of all the Generals in the British High Command but the most least suited for combat duties. He was too timid to ask for adequate resources or fire Generals who did not perform.

3. Hunter Weston was a murderous general who had scant concern for the welfare of the men under his command.

About the Australians

1. Monash learnt his combat craft on the backs of sending his men to death. At Gallipoli, he was less than adequate as a General.

2. Godley looked like and undertaker and by his actions became one. As such he deserved none of the acolades given to him at the end of the war.

3. Antill was promoted beyond his capacity and through ignorance sent the 3rd LHB to its death at the Nek.

4. Hughes should never have been given a command under any circumstances.

Carlyon backs his theses up with compelling evidence. As mentioned, if you are an apologist for these men, then yes you could say that he was one sided.

The downside of Carlyon is that he writes as a populist journalist - which he is. Thus there is no in depth analysis given to derive a conclusion. It is more a dot point presentation tied with sentimental commentary. For a beginner, it is a great place to start as it lays out all the events clearly and the launching point for more in depth studies. Because he does not mince words, he highlights all the controversies which allows the researcher to examine the issues and determine through the available evidence the veracity of his conclusions.

The refreshing thing is that none of these issues come up in Bean. It is only when someone like Carlyon comes along filled with bubbling resentment about being fed a crock of bovine excreta that we actually begin to understand some of the problems and thus lift the lid on some of the mythology. That is the value of Carlyon.

But like with anything, so long as you understand the prejudice of the author, then it makes a good read.

Cheers

Bill

[Geoff S]

FYI- The Carlyon book- past comments on the book by forum members

 

G

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Geoff

Good to see you active again mate. Your links are gems.

Bill

[Crunchy]

This has raised the question of what difference, if any, it would have made if the ANZACS had landed at the right place at the right time? 1ramsey1

I undertook some detailed research of the Anzac landings, including a tour of the area, for an article that was published in the Journal of the Australian War Memorial in the early 90’s. To understand the implications of the misplaced landing at Anzac it is important to appreciate the objectives of the 1st Australian Division, the Turkish defences and to what extent the landing was misplaced in relation to the Division’s objectives.

In summary, the 1st Division was to secure the main Sari Bair Range and the Third (or Gun) Ridge which runs in an arc from Battleship Hill on the main range down to the headland at Gaba Tepe on the coast. Once this position was secured the ANZAC (1st Division and the New Zealand & Australian Division) was to advance through Mal Tepe and cut the N-S lines of communication running down the eastern side of the Peninsula.

To achieve this, the 3rd Brigade was to land on a 1600 yd frontage, with its right flank 1 mile north of Gaba Tepe and its left flank just south of Hell Spit, the southern headland of Anzac Cove. From here the brigade, acting as a covering force to the main body, was to seize a covering position from Battleship Hill along Third Ridge to Gaba Tepe.

The 2nd Brigade was to follow, landing echeloned slightly north with its left flank battalion landing in Anzac Cove itself. Moving via First and Second Ridges, the 2nd was to push through the north east corner of the covering force line on Battleship Hill and seize the main heights of the Sari Bair Range from Chunuk Bair to Hill 971.

The 1st Brigade was to land immediately after the 2nd and provide the Division’s reserve. The New Zealand and Australian Division would then land and subsequently the advance inland would be undertaken.

In fact the first wave of the 3rd Brigade landed on a 400 yard frontage astride the northern headland of Anzac Cove, while the second wave retained its 1600 yd frontage and landed astride Anzac Cove, with the left flank landing north of the Cove and the right flank landing south of Hell Spit, in the area originally intended for the left flank.. This placed the 11th Battalion about 800 yds closer to its objectives (Battleship Hill to Scrubby Knoll) and the 10th Battalion roughly the same distance as planned from its objectives further along Third Ridge, however, the 9th was very poorly placed to secure Gaba Tepe, being landed an extra 2000 yds from the headland.

The coastline was defended by the 2nd Battalion, 27th Regiment. It deployed 3 companies along the coast on a 5 ½ mile frontage, extending from Aghyl Dere in the north to Semerly Tepe in the south, and the fourth company in reserve 1 mile inland from Gabe Tepe. The other two Battalions of the 27th were held in reserve at Maidos on the eastern coast just north of the Khalid Bair Plateau. The defences on the western coast of the peninsula consisted of a series of small posts, with strong points at Gabe Tepe covering Brighton Beach to the north and at the Fishersman’s Hut covering the long stretch of beach between Aghyl Dere and Anzac Cove.

The machine guns on the Gaba Tepe headland covered the intended landing site and would have been able to engage the boats in enfilade for at least the last 2-300 yds to the shore. Indeed, the second wave companies of the 9th Battalion landing south of Hell Spit received enfilade machine gun fire from Gaba Tepe albeit at long range. Had they landed as intended the troops coming ashore would have received punishing fire from these guns. When the leading elements of the 7th Battalion (2nd Brigade) landed near the Fisherman’s Hut they were destroyed and the remainder of the Brigade was diverted to land in Anzac Cove. The Cove provided a sheltered landing place from the strong points at Gaba Tepe and Fisherman’s Hut. Had the landing gone as planned, IMHO far heavier casualties would have occurred and it is likely the follow on landings may well have been untenable until Gaba Tepe had been taken. By landing where they did, the Australians were confronted by light opposition and were still well placed to secure the Sari Bair Range and a covering line along Third Ridge, although it is very doubtful that they could have secured Gaba Tepe.

As it was the 3rd Brigade quickly secure First Ridge above the Cove, pushed on and by 0630 had secured Second Ridge from Baby 700 on the main range to Lone Pine. IMHO, the failure at Anzac was not due to the misplaced landing but to Australian command failures. Primarily because the Commander of the 3rd Brigade ordered his brigade to halt and dig in along Second Ridge, rather than pushing on to secure his allotted objective. He also convinced the Commander of the 2nd Brigade to divert that brigade from securing the vital ground of the Sari Bair Range to cover the right flank of the 3rd Brigade on the spurs south of Lone Pine. When Bridges, the Divisional Commander, reached Lone Pine some time after 0800 he commented that there was nothing to prevent the advance continuing but he did nothing to rectify the problem. Thus the 1st Division, less those isolated parties that reached Battleship Hill and points along Third Ridge, continued to dig in on Second Ridge and await the Turkish counter attacks. The first substantial Turkish reinforcements (1st and 3rd /27th) arrived on the southern end of Third Ridge around 0900 while the leading elements of the 1st /57th arrived on Chunuk Bair around 1030.

.

The idea of the misplaced landing being a blessing in disguise is not a new concept. Birdwood himself believed so at the time, in a letter to his wife on 29th April; while the historian of the 12th Battalion (3rd Brigade’s reserve) wrote in 1925 that the misplaced landing “was an act of providence for which [they] were profoundly grateful”.

Regards

Chris

[CSMMo]

Bill,

Thanks for that quick review of Carlyon's book. I was quite mixed in my response to it and you described the dichotomy that plagued me well. It was a good story well told and in-depth in terms of criticism. The news reporter is clearly at work here and does as good a job of it as any other contemporary news reporters might have. What it seemed to lack was a historian's perspective of why Kitchener and Hamilton and the other generals were so much out of their league. This was, after all, a military endeavor on a scale unheard of in their experience. The successes were minimized and the failures emphasized to an extent that I felt, uncomfortably, like the adaptations, successes and valor of the soldiers was being dismissed as unimportant. The strategy was brilliant, the plan flawed and poorly supported. Kitchener's shock on seeing the terrain for the first time in November of 1915 tells a lot about why. The book's strength was that it made the story of the ANZAC battles very clear.

Why did they land where they landed? Because that's where the boats went! (Sorry about that.) I tend to agree that it locked them into impossible terrain and that, had they gained a foothold at Brighton Beach, they would have been much more likely to cut off the southern portion of the peninsula. Although this was the first battle for most of them, they demonstrated their abilities to fight from the beginning. Who knows? While we have the luxury of speculation (in which I just indulged), they had to do the deeds and they have my undying admiration for the way in which they did it.

The generals? In scraping the bottom of the barrel, they placed officers in positions of responsibility for which they were not suited. They seemed to have clung to the old system of seniority and tenure in their selections over competence, not to mention the "pecking order" of Western Front over Gallipoli. That's clear in Hamilton's requests for generals which were routinely ignored and is why he was stuck with Stopford (retired how many years?) and Mahon, who, as Carlyon rightly asserts, would have been court martialed for his behavior at Suvla Bay had he not been a general.

Please forgive me for getting off track here, a bit, but it is an interesting subject that relates to the original subject. Lack of adequate maps and reconnaissance were instrumental in several problems with the landings.

Mike Morrison

[Crunchy]

Lack of adequate maps and reconnaissance were instrumental in several problems with the landings.

Mike Morrison

Mike,

Interestingly, Lt Loutit of the 10th Battalion who was in charge of one of the parties that reached Third Ridge, whom I interveiwed on three occasions, said that maps were not a real issue for him. While not perfect he believed they were more than adequate. He knew where he was on the ground and that Third Ridge, his Battalion's objective, was easily recognisable from Second Ridge. Bean writes in the OH Vol 1 that the initial parties on Plugge's Plateau readily identified where they were and where their objectives lay.

Reconnaissance was undertaken both by the Australian commanders from the sea and from the air by British aircraft. An accurate picture of the Turkish dispositions and defences had been built up prior to the landings and these had been plotted on the maps. Loutit knew to expect the battery of guns in Owen's Gully which he subsequently captured prior to pushing on to the Third Ridge. In the 1930's one of the USMC Staff College classes was devoted to a full year's study of the Gallipoli landings. The syndicate investigating the Intelligence gathered for the landing concluded that it was very good. The flaw, however, was the assessment of the fighting quality of the Turkish forces themselves, which was rated as poor.

As I wrote in the post above, irrespective of whether they landed on Brighton Beach or in Anzac Cove the objective of the 1st Division was to secure the heights of the Sari Bair Range and Third Ridge; the impossible terrain you speak of. It was not, as has been generally portrayed in anecdotes, to dash across the low ground south of the range. The advance inland was to come from this secure position towards Mal Tepe, the next objective, which is on the southern end of the large ridge that runs south east from near Hill 971, the heighest point on the main Sari Bair Range. This ridge and Mal Tepe dominate the N-S communications on the peninsula.

I am not sure that with a lodgement on Brighton Beach the ANZAC would have been much more likely to have cut off the southern portion of the peninsula. An advance due inland from Brighton Beach, once they had passed the southern slopes of Third Ridge, would have placed them in the lower ground between the 19th Division on the Mal Tepe heights, under Mustafa Kemel Bey, and the rest of the 27th Regiment on their southern flank. They would have also had the dominating ground of the Sari Bair range overlooking their northern flank. In fact an advance due east from Brighton Beach would have placed the Anzac forces between the two dominating features of the Sari Bair Range in the north and the Khalid Bair Plateau in the south.

The terrain didn't defeat the ANZAC as has been popularly portrayed. Yes it was difficult country getting up onto the ridges but by 0630 the 3rd Brigade had secured Second Ridge from Baby 700 to Lone Pine. Also, it was pretty much intact with the 11th Battalion securing Baby 700 on the main range, the 10th complete under its CO in the centre and the 9th on the left around Lone Pine. From here isolated parties pushed forward and reached their objectives on Third Ridge unopposed. Had they gone ashore on the northern half of Brighton Beach as intended the climb up from the beach is difficult, particularly in the north, and then leads through the series of spurs running south from the 400 Plateau. IMO the failure resulted from Australian command decisons and inaction as outlined in my previous post.

Regards

Chris

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Chris

G'day mate

Just to support your statements and in anticipation of your excellent analysis, [great mind reader huh?] I put online the intel and maps possessed by the Brits prior to the landings.

You'll find them at:

 

As soon as I saw this little treasure trove, I knew that the story about landing at the wrong spot was just a cover up for something a tad bit more sordid - plain stupidity. You know the story - Stuffup or conspiracy? 99% of the time it is stuffup. Indeed the nub of your thesis is command stuff up.

Cheers

Bill

[bluedog]

Bill

General Hamilton's Dispatch on the ANZAC Landing

As printed in the London Gazette 6th. July 1915

Last Paragraph on Page 6572

"Owing to the tows having failed to maintain their

exact direction, the actual point of disembarkation

was rather more than a mile north of that which I

had selected, and was more closely overhung by

steep cliffs"

Regards

Peter

[Crunchy]

Bill,

Thank you for your comments and the images of the maps. They are much appreciated.

The first map appears to show the intended landing sites of the 2nd Brigade. The 7th Battalion was supposed to land in Anzac Cove as shown on the map. The climb from the Cove to Plugge's Plateau is not all that difficult, took me 15 minutes when I was in my 40's, and not as bad as depicted in most of the paintings. The climb from the northern portion of Brighton Beach to Lone Pine is about the same difficulty.

Both maps show the extent of the information gathered prior to the landing which proved to be quite accurate as mentioned earlier. Thanks for the confirmatory post.

Have a great Christmas and we should get together again for coffee in January. Will give you a call.

All the best,

Chris

[CSMMo]

Chris,

Thanks for that thoughtful (and thought provoking) reply. One of the difficulties of understanding the failure of the Dardanelles strategy is the complexity of it all. Amphibious operations hadn't been done in that scale before, although it had been done. (The world's military was well represented as observers in the 1840's when the US landed the Army in Mexico to see what would happen in that amphibious operation.) The brilliance of the strategic move and the complexity of the tactical actions is reflected in the number of times it has been studied by subsequent military professionals such as your cited USMC study and Patton's US Army study in the 1930's as well as the study mentioned in the Australian Light Horse site mentioned in your earlier posting.

One thing that sea and air recce can't provide is the 3 dimensional nature of the ground and the dynamics of the ground to be used. That's where the 'terrain surprise' comes in, as reflected in Kitchener's profound 'discovery' of this difficulty faced by the armies in this campaign.

I have been concerned with artillery at Gallipoli and I believe there was a problem of the Indian Mountain guns' position being under fire from higher ground in their initial positions which deprived the ANZAC front of their only immediate artillery support. In the ad hoc atmosphere of changing plans on the fly (which seems to be the thought here as to why they were landed at a different place) the artillery positions originally planned were not available and the ground they found was not secured. Again, this is one point out of the innumerable points that need to be considered in combat operational planning. We go back, then, to the nonchalant manner in which the Army operation was tacked on to a failed (doomed?) Navy effort to take the Dardanelles. Hamilton was sent packing by Kitchener with no staff and the promise only that he would get absolutely no aircraft for support. That he was able to put together a staff and prepare a plan at all is impressive, however the planning was rushed, resources were parceled out in inadequate measure (which would plague the entire effort) and was forced to consider an invasion of a country's homeland several months after they knew we were coming.

Churchill had a great idea. It feels, from my readings, that the Army felt it was being pushed on them and they resented it and did it, piecemeal, because they were forced to. The cost? Huge. The failure to open the Dardanelles and take Turkey out of the fight? Several more years of war which contributed it's part to the Russian revolution, eventually brought the US into the war and bled the UK of men, materiel, wealth and prestige and eventually set the stage for WW2. How different the 20th century might have been. (But that's another topic.)

One discrepancy that might exist in the maps earlier cited regards artillery. One shows 24 guns on a ridgeline facing the proposed landing beach, yet the Turkish maps show the symbol for one Artillery battery within the regimental organization depicted. 4 to 6 guns vs. 24 guns would make quite a difference, particularly if they are sited for beach protection or firing at naval targets.

Thanks for the information - it is very helpful.

Mike Morrison

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Peter

G'day mate

Interesting quote and deliberately avoided as a version to hide a defeat by blaming nature rather than himself or the command structure as mentioned by Chris.

Cheers

Bill

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Chris

G'day mate

Glad you made it safely across the ditch.

Because of your recent coming, I realised that you would not have come across this issue on this site. It is one of those perenial discussions. I liked your points because they pull away the mythos surrounding the event - built to protect the reputations of those who needed to be properly examined. That's why I value Carlyon - he is an important popular voice articulating that which was already known in the cloistered communities of the ivory towers. Sites like this also do a great deal to popularise scrutiny and the results of this study. Your work on Gallipoli forms a valuable building block in understanding this part of our history - it essentially humanises it and by so doing brings it into the realm of the every day man and so is very comprehensible. It really is great stuff mate.

As for the kafe - that would be great. I will try to organise a few more personal disasters to occur at the same time. The flooded bathroom and new housekeeper just didn't cut it as exciting enough.

Cheers

Bill

[1ramsey1]

Chris

G'day mate

Glad you made it safely across the ditch.

Because of your recent coming, I realised that you would not have come across this issue on this site. It is one of those perenial discussions. I liked your points because they pull away the mythos surrounding the event - built to protect the reputations of those who needed to be properly examined. That's why I value Carlyon - he is an important popular voice articulating that which was already known in the cloistered communities of the ivory towers. Sites like this also do a great deal to popularise scrutiny and the results of this study. Your work on Gallipoli forms a valuable building block in understanding this part of our history - it essentially humanises it and by so doing brings it into the realm of the every day man and so is very comprehensible. It really is great stuff mate.

As for the kafe - that would be great. I will try to organise a few more personal disasters to occur at the same time. The flooded bathroom and new housekeeper just didn't cut it as exciting enough.

Cheers

Bill

[Crunchy]

I will try to organise a few more personal disasters to occur at the same time. The flooded bathroom and new housekeeper just didn't cut it as exciting enough.

Knowing the circumstances, I had a good chuckle. Again thanks for your kind comments and I will give you a call when the funny season is over.

Regards

chris

[Crunchy]

The brilliance of the strategic move …

Churchill had a great idea. It feels, from my readings, that the Army felt it was being pushed on them and they resented it and did it, piecemeal, because they were forced to.

Mike,

I support your view that the strategy to knock Turkey out of the war was brilliant; however, the execution of it was poor from the start. The Army was reluctant from the beginning, although given the availability of troops following the losses of 1914 I think this is understandable.

While Churchill is credited with being the person who thought of the strategy, it was first proposed by Hankey, Secretary to the War Council, in a Boxing Day 1914 Memorandum in which he proposed an attack to knock Turkey out of the war, reopen the vital sea route to Russia and induce some of the wavering Balkan States to join the Allies. This was in response to call from the Russians in later 1914 for the British to make some sort of demonstration so as to draw away Turkish forces attacking the Russians in the Caucasus.

Hankey’s Memorandum received support from the Council after which Lord Fisher, the First Sea Lord, developed a plan employing 75,000 troops from France, all of the troops in India and the Egyptian garrison for a landing on the Asiatic shore of the Dardenelles near Kum Kule while a squadron of pre-dreadnoughts forced the Dardenelles. His plan also envisaged the involvement of the Greeks attacking the Gallipoli Peninsula and Bulgarian forces marching on Constantinople. This plan received little support, primarily because Kitchener was emphatic that no troops could be spared for a new expedition. Remember this was January 1915 and the British Army was trying to make good the losses of 1914 from a small Regular Army and Territorial units.

However, the idea of using old battleships to force the Dardenelles did make an impression on the Council, particularly Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty. It was at this point that Churchill pushed strongly for the Navy to force the Dardenelles, without reference to the other members of the War Council. His persistence resulted in several attacks on the forts of the Dardenelles by the Navy during late February and March, although by mid February Kitchener had wavered and agreed to send troops. The failure to coordinate a combined effort until after the Navy had been repulsed and the Turks thoroughly aroused was critical.

Although Kitchener agreed to send troops on February 16, the Navy went ahead and commenced its bombardments on February 19, including landing Marines unopposed at Helles on the very beach where the Royal Munster Fusiliers were slaughtered two months later. These bombardments continued until the Navy tried to force the Narrows on 18 March. Only after this repulse was a combined operation developed. By the time the Army landings were made in late April, the Turks had reinforced the Peninsula and significantly improved the defences.

One thing that sea and air recce can't provide is the 3 dimensional nature of the ground and the dynamics of the ground to be used. That's where the 'terrain surprise' comes in, as reflected in Kitchener's profound 'discovery' of this difficulty faced by the armies in this campaign.

Agreed, but this had always been the case. The Commanders had a reasonable idea of the difficulties prior to the landing. Certainly the Commander of the 3rd Australian Brigade expressed his views on the difficulty of the country.

One discrepancy that might exist in the maps earlier cited regards artillery. One shows 24 guns on a ridgeline facing the proposed landing beach, yet the Turkish maps show the symbol for one Artillery battery within the regimental organization depicted. 4 to 6 guns vs. 24 guns would make quite a difference, particularly if they are sited for beach protection or firing at naval targets.

I agree Mike. Not sure the marking is meaning the 24 guns are in emplacements though. Elsewhere they show guns in emplacements, whereas the 24 are shown as if they in line as part of the camp which is marked beside them. Thus they might have been parked guns at the time of the reconnaissance. Your point is valid and it would be interesting to know why they were marked as such.

I have been concerned with artillery at Gallipoli and I believe there was a problem of the Indian Mountain guns' position being under fire from higher ground in their initial positions which deprived the ANZAC front of their only immediate artillery support.

Yes artillery support was a major problem throughout the campaign. The initial landings had to rely on naval gunfire support until batteries could be landed. The problem was exacerbated by stopping short on the Second Ridge. This left the Anzacs in a cramped position with little depth and few positions for guns to be deployed. Securing Third Ridge would have provided much greater scope for guns to be deployed.

Throughout the day of the 25th the Anzacs were subjected to shrapnel fired from the Turkish guns on the right flank and later deployed behind Third Ridge. The ability to effectively respond to the Turkish artillery was very limited on the 25th April largely because there were few guns landed that day.

Have a great Christmas

Regards

Chris

[CSMMo]

Chris,

Many thanks for that clear, concise explanation of the buildup toward the invasion.

One of the strengths of Carlyon's book was the detail he included about the battles in the ANZAC area. Most of what I have read focuses on the action (?) at Suvla Bay after August 6th while it seems clear that the initial purpose of that landing was to provide a second front to assist with an ANZAC breakout. At least that's what I get from reading Hamilton's diary.

The problems with artillery were multifold. Too many to discuss in this thread. Maybe another!

Thanks again for your input and wishes. Merry Christmas to you and yours as well.

Mike Morrison

[Guest gallipoli fan]

Hi to all. I am new in this forum. First of all, I am ismail, from Canakkale. I am absolutely interested in Gallipoli campaign. here you debate on 25th April landing. You say that it would be better if landing was on Gaba tepe. however, do not forget that Turk Soldiers are the best ones in country wars.

[Chris Best]

Hi to all. I am new in this forum. First of all, I am ismail, from Canakkale. I am absolutely interested in Gallipoli campaign. here you debate on 25th April landing. You say that it would be better if landing was on Gaba tepe. however, do not forget that Turk Soldiers are the best ones in country wars.

Welcome to the Forum, Ismail, look forward to seeing your input and commentaries, particularly on Gallipoli.

Chris

[Guest gumbirsingpun]

wellcome to the forum ismail,

you wull find the number o people on the forum,wha are as much interested in the gallipoli campaign as yer

im ane of em

regards

tuna