Naval Superiority

[PhilB]

With a marked Naval superiority, Britain spent the war waiting for the Germans to come to battle, which they rarely did. Would it have been possible to exploit the superiority by taking the war to the Germans? What attempts were made to lure the High Seas Fleet out, comparable to the shelling of East Coast towns by German battleships? Phil B

[squirrel]

I understood that the British strategy was to keep the German Fleet bottled up so that they would not have to take them on in battle and suffer the losses.

I think the German Admirals wanted to take on the British Fleet but were frustrated by the Kaiser who did not want to take them on and risk losing his Navy in the process.

This is perhaps why the Germans used submarines rather than the Fleet.

Grossly over simplified and stand to be corrected as always.

[Neil Mackenzie]

To a certain extent they did exploit it but in economic terms rather than military. The blockades of the German ports preventing vital raw materials reaching German industry and food reaching the populace was a major factor in the Allies winning the war.

Neil

[ian turner]

It can be argued that Britain did indeed exploit its naval superiority. It enjoyed a freedom of the seas largely denied the German navy, as per Squirrel's comments, and don't forget it blockaded Germany for the whole war and was surely material in contributing to a collapse on the home front in Germany.

Of course this produced the U-boat offensive, but which was not sufficient to end the Royal Navy's domination.

Ian

[PhilB]

A few points, gents, seeking enlightenment:-

1/ If you have great superiority, wouldn`t you want the opposing fleet to come out?

2/ Which British ships were instrumental in maintaining the blockade?

3/ Our shipping losses would surely indicate that we didn`t have freedom and control of the seas for much of the war?

4/ How did the submarine/U-boat numbers compare?

Phil B

[Gilgamesh of Uruk]

The British did exploit their naval superiority.

Consider - how many German colonies still existed in 1918?

Which nation underwent the "turnip winter"?

Ever heard of "Horton's private lake"?

Ever taken a look at the mountains of supplies that were carried to Russia? Much of the "Intervention" was to prevent those being passed on to the Germans.

Without naval superiority, the Dardanelles campaign, the Mesopotamian campaign and Salonika would have been suicidal. OK, so mishandling went a fair way to acheiving that result in reality, but the concept would have been inconceivable without naval superiority.

[Bruce Dennis]

The war was about naval superiority, according to some people, and there is something to the logic. The arms race of the late Victorian era saw more powerful and better armoured ships being built at a breathtaking pace, and, most conveniently, a ready market for recently obsolescent ships to the poorer countries with their mini-arms races. In light of the enormous costs, the British Admiralty did something it had (I think) never done before: it estimated its fleet requirements as an ally of another continental country. In other words, if the combined strength of Britain and her chosen ally were greater than her potential enemy(ies), then that was good enough. At the time, the enemy envisaged was the French and the ally would have been Germany, but the Kaiser got stroppy and scared a few important people, so the French and British struck a deal co-operating to counter German fleet building. The problem they saw was that Germany could not be allowed to have both the most powerful army and navy on the continent: that was not tolerable. This understanding between the two traditional foes was refined further in February 1913, when the British (Jackie Fischer) agreed to use their fleet to guard Frances Atlantic coast and ports in the event of a war with Germany, and the French would look after the whole of the Mediterranean, including defending the British interests at the Suez Canal.

The Great War alliance between France and Britain was based on this initial mutual need: it grew after being tested in the crisis at Agadir in July 1911 and both countries were heavily dependant on the other by the time of the start of hostilities. Kaiser Bill was shocked when Britain entered the war against him, as despite having Tirpitz warn him before the event, he had been wrong footed and did not, to his fury, have naval superiority.

The blockade was effective, the U-boats were able to counter-blockade and the war of attrition at sea started. It was never glamorous and the expectation of another Trafalgar was confusing to the public at home, but the fighting was constant, demanding, expensive and absolutely vital. In particular, the success of getting colonial troops to the continent was crucial.

The U-boats came very close to succeeding in their attempts to starve Britain: the overwhelming pressure on the allies to counter them put Japan in the picture as a source of shipbuilding for destroyers and, later, Imperial Japanese Navy destroyers actually fought in the Mediterranean. (They had been escorting Allied troopships in the Indian and Pacific oceans since very early days of the war). Both sides wanted a fleet surface action, but only on their own terms, each knowing that a loss would give the opponent an upper hand in the blockade.

If the Kaiser, influenced by Krupp, hadn’t tried to make his navy superior to that of Britain, there would have been no Entante.

But, as always, I am sure someone has a different opinion.

I’ll duck now.

Bruce

[historydavid]

Phil,

The British would have been delighted if the German High Seas Fleet had come out more frequently, either to raid or to give battle. Whenever intelligence was received from radio intercepts, and always providing it wasn't misused by the Admiralty, the Grand Fleet always sailed to try to intercept.

Several attempts were made to try to entice the Germans out by cruiser/destroyer raids into the Heligoland Bight, but the Bight was not a safe place for the big ships, because the naval guns on Heligoland Island could easily damage a battleship or battlecruiser. Similar damage could result if the German fleet sallied to repel the big ships.

Jellicoe made the point that it was a long way home from the Bight for damaged British ships which could be attacked by destroyers and submarines. Damaged German ships would not have this problem, of course, because they would be quite close to Kiel and Wilhelmshaven.

The Northern Blockade was initially by old cruisers, but it was soon realised that they were not fast enough for the job. They were replaced by armed merchant cruisers, converted merchants, which were much faster.

The Southern Blockade was a natural one, the English Channel, Strait of Dover, North Sea, all of which had British warships, of various types, in large numbers.

The blockade not only stopped food being carried to Germany but also war material. Because Germany had relatively few merchant ships, after internments and sinkings, thay tried to use neutral merchants to carry goods to their home ports, which could then be transported to Germany by rail etc. The British made judgements on these cargoes and, if they thought they were too large for the neutral to require, they impounded them, because they suspected they were destined for the enemy. Impounding was applied to all materials that could be used in warfare and, somewhat controversarily, to food when it was felt that it would be used to feed the armed forces. The restriction on foodstuffs was introduced after the German High Command, under von Hindenburg took over responsibility for food. There is no doubt that that the blockade had a significant impact on the Germans both at the Front and at Home. Their great offensives in 1918 ran out of steam because of a lack of supplies. The Allies moved forward and started to steamroller the Germans, leading Ludendorff to call for an Armistice.

The term "freedom and control of the seas" is very wide ranging and somewhat misleading.

From a naval standpoint it was largely true but from a maritime standpoint much less so.

Because Britain is close to the European coast it was easy for U-boats to reach our shores and concentrate. Trading ships from the west are forced to approach either north or south of Ireland before heading for their destinations. From the south they either enter the Channel or go around Ireland. This means that relatively few U-boats had access to a large number of merchant ships which were obliged to pass through easily determined areas.

Another factor involved was the fact that until part way through 1917 trading ships were unescorted and were therefore more likely to be picked off. After convoying was introduced losses fell.

So why were convoys not introduced earlier? The simple answer is that the Navy was against it. They and others put forward many reasons why it would be a bad thing. Here are a few of the arguments against:-

1) It would tie up too many naval vessels, such as destroyers, which were in short supply so they couldn't afford to lose any.

2) If a convoy was discovered it would lead to a large number, or all, of the merchants being sunk, because they were concentrated in a small area.

3) Merchant captains would not be able, or would refuse, to keep their ships in a neat convoy pattern.

4) The performance, such as speed and reliability, of merchants was too variable.

5) The existing policy of the Navy, to hunt submarines, was better than using convoys which was considered to be a defensive policy.

When Britain was within months of having to sue for peace because of a lack of materials and food the Admiralty started to experiment with convoys. The rest is history.

I will come back on submarine numbers later.

Best wishes

David

[Neil Mackenzie]

Phil.

I have come across, but never completely read, a book called 'The Starvation Blockades - Naval Blocakades of WW1' by Nigel Hawkins which may be of interest to you.

It covers the naval blocakades by the British and the U Boat campaign.

I had a quick look at a copy in my local library agin today and it mentions that during the U Boat crisis of early 1917 up to 42 U boats could be on patrol at any one time:-

21 from German ports

8 from Flanders

13 in the Mediterranean

The best month for the U Boat fleet was April 1917 when it sunk 849,000 tons of shipping (423 ships) killing 1125 sailors in the process and lost just 2 U Boats. The convoy system was introduced as a direct result of these losses.

Neil

[Gibbo]

My analysis of the naval rivalry is slightly different to that of Bruce, but I come to the same conclusion, namely that the Kaiser's attmept to build a navy forced Britain into the Entente & thus the war.

The strength of the RN was based a two power standard, whereby it should be 10% larger than the combined sizes of the second & third biggest navies in the world. This policy was introduced at a time when the next two naval powers were France & Russia & there was a risk that a colonial dispute with one would cause a war with both. In the late 19th century, Germany & the UK were friendly & the Germans depended on the RN to protect its international trade. The Kaiser, advised by Tirpitz, then decided to build a navy big enough to hold the balance of power between the UK & the Franco-Russian alliance. This, they hoped, would enable them to get colonial concessions in any dispute.

Things changed in 1905. Firstly, the UK & France signed the Entente Cordiale, thus wrecking the German strategy. The Germans then decided to try to match the RN. The Russian navy was largely destroyed by Britain's ally Japan. Around the same time, the USA started to build up the USN, which was the world's third biggest by 1914. There was then no logical scenario resulting in a war between the UK & the USA so why consider the USN when determining the necessary size of the RN?

In 1912, the UK & France came to the Anglo-French naval agreement. The RN's Mediterranean fleet was reduced in size & the French Navy concentrated in the Med. There was no formal agreement that the UK would go to war in support of France but it was now under at least a moral obligation should the German Navy threaten the northern coast of France.

About the same time the UK abandoned the two power standard & introduced a one power standard whereby the RN would be 60% bigger than the second largest in the world. This is usually presented as being a realisation that it could no longer be as big as required by the two power standard. However, it should be noted that the if the gap between the world's second & third biggest navies was very large, then the one power standard could require a bigger navy than the two power standard e.g. 20 German & 9 US dreadnoughts require 32 British ones under either standard. The construction of two more German vessels means the construction of two British ships under the two power standard but three under the one power standard. The British did now take account of an ally, with the French being left to take care of Germany's allies in the Mediterranean.

[RNCVR]

Picked up on this interesting thread after an absence of a bit & find it very interesting. Thought the readers might like to know that Jackie Fisher (First Sea Lord of the Admiralty & a personal friend of King Edward VII - who was largely responsible for keeping Jackie in power) had a plan in place as early as 1908 to deal with Germany’s growing Naval power.

His plan was to ‘Copenhagen” the German Fleet - similar to what Nelson had done at the battle of Copenhagen in 1801 - that is, to destroy the Fleet in its harbours entirely by surprise. In 1919, after the war, he claimed that if his advice had been taken the war would never have started & millions of lives would have been saved. Jackie accurately forsaw the Great War & predicted Jutland with a fair degree of accuracy – he called it ‘Armageddon’ tho.

But in 1908 his idea was considered preosterous – at the time Germny was a friendly nation to Britain & the politicians of the day could not have contemplated a strike at a nominally friendly power.

King Edward, when told of the plan by Fisher is reported to have said in response: “Fisher, you must be mad”!

Bry

[Guest]

A few points, gents, seeking enlightenment:-

1/ If you have great superiority, wouldn`t you want the opposing fleet to come out?

Why risk your own fleet when keeping the enemy in port did the job just as well? There is a historical precedent too. Despite Trafalgar, after 1805 the French still possessed many ships of the line, but they never again came out to challenge the British fleet, which maintained an effective blockade.

2/ Which British ships were instrumental in maintaining the blockade?

In addition to the Grand Fleet, which was there to contain the High Seas Fleet, Britain used a small fleet of converted ocean liners as merchant cruisers in the North Sea etc.

3/ Our shipping losses would surely indicate that we didn`t have freedom and control of the seas for much of the war?

It was a close run thing in 1917 until the convoy system was introduced. Anti-submarine warfare was in its infancy and had only primitive means of locating submerged U-boats. However, beyond a fairly restricted area of Western Approaches, British shipping had complete freedom of the seas after 1914.

4/ How did the submarine/U-boat numbers compare?

The Royal Navy never attempted to match the Germans in numbers and had a much smaller number of submarines, which were not used in the same sort of roll as the U-boats.

[Michael Lowrey]

It was a close run thing in 1917 until the convoy system was introduced. Anti-submarine warfare was in its infancy and had only primitive means of locating submerged U-boats. However, beyond a fairly restricted area of Western Approaches, British shipping had complete freedom of the seas after 1914.

U-boats were also quite active and effective in the Mediteranean from 1915 on. In fact, the top scoring boats were based there.

The Royal Navy never attempted to match the Germans in numbers and had a much smaller number of submarines, which were not used in the same sort of roll as the U-boats.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

The Germans thought that the RN would engage in a close blockade, as blockades had been done before. The distant blockade came as a surprise, and submarine warfare against merchant shipping (a counter blockade by the only means available) was the responce. The prewar plan most certainly was not an emphasis on submarine warfare; indeed U-boats only sank three merchant ships in 1914.

And actually, the Royal Navy had far more submarines in commision as the war began than Germany. The Kaiserliche Marine had 29 submarine as of August 2, 1914 (18 paraffin-powered boats, 11 modern diesel-powered boats) with 13 more boats to complete by march 1915 (12 more large diesel-powered boats plus the small-diesel powered UA that had been nearing completion for Norway). Beyond that, they had only three more boats on order.

It would be 1916 before the Kaiserliche Marine had more submarine than the Royal Navy.

Best wishes,

Michael

[historydavid]

Hello again Phil.

Prior to the war both sides had submarines but really had only one idea for their use, and that was as an extension of the fleet. They would be used to attack enemy units where found and carry out reconnaissanse.

When the war started this was exactly how they were employed and the British largely continued this way throughout; it has to be remembered that Germany did not have a large merchant fleet that could be attacked. Some attempts were made to attack enemy U-boats and a few were sunk.

In keeping with the idea of fleet support Britain developed the K class submarines, which had the necessary surface speed to keep up with the Grand Fleet. They were, however, a disaster waiting to happen. Their crews openly referred to themselves as "The Suicide Club", because, before diving they had to haul down funnels which were needed by the steam driven surface engines and shut down the boilers. Needless to say most of them were lost, either through accident or misadventure.

Germany quickly conceived the idea of using their U-boats to attack British merchant shipping (see Michael Lowrey's post). Initially this was carried out under"Prize Rules", which meant that an enemy ship was stopped, the crew given time to vacate, and then it was sunk. In the case of neutral ships whether it was sunk depended on its destination or its cargo. "Prize Rules" were developed well before the war and were intended to apply to cruisers and destroyers, before submarines became a viable weapon and before radio telegraphy was introduced. It was dangerous for a U-boat to be on the surface for too long because it might be sighted by a warship and shelled or run down.

These difficulties led some U-boat commanders to argue it was justifed to attack without warning, and some did. A commander's personal attitude to the enemy also played a part in determining his approach.

Germany continued this policy throughout the war, except for a short period, with varying intensity; twice total exclusion zones were declared around the Britain, in which any ship sighted would be sunk.

Like the British they also attempted to attack warships and submarines when chance offered. Largely they were unsuccessful in this. On the occasions that their fleet came out they always stationed U-boats to intercept the Grand Fleet emerging from Scapa Flow and the Firth of Forth, but they were always without success, often not even sighting it.

Both sides engaged in mining enemy waters. For the British this meant Zeebrugge against submarines and the Heligoland Bight against the High Seas Fleet. This achieved some successes.

The Germans had far more target areas. Their U-boats mined around Scapa Flow, the entrance to the Firth of Forth and Harwich against British warships. They also mined known trade routes around Britain and many of the harbours. Whilst achieving a few successess against warships they did score heavily against merchant shipping and ancilliary craft.

The numbers of submarines available to each side wasn't really relavent because they each had very different aims.

Best wishes

David

[Guest Simon Bull]

Ever heard of "Horton's private lake"?

Excuse my ignorance, but what was Horton's private lake?

[Gilgamesh of Uruk]

Horton's private lake was the Baltic, so-called because of the damage done to the impots of Swedish iron ore into Germany, by a handful of submarines. The Baltic and the Sea of Marmora were the two main examples of the aggressive use of the submarine in WWI by the RN.

[Guest Simon Bull]

Horton's private lake was the Baltic, so-called because of the damage done to the impots of Swedish iron ore into Germany, by a handful of submarines. The Baltic and the Sea of Marmora were the two main examples of the aggressive use of the submarine in WWI by the RN.

Thanks for letting me know.

[De Petrowski Alexander]

One of the limitations of the Royal Navy, was the lack of any serious amphibian doctrine, including the albeit mutual failure to cooperate with the Army, the one serious landing attempt in the Dardanelles failed partly because of it. The long shores of Palestine, Syria and Lebanon were bombarded but never was a landing attempted

[per ardua per mare per terram]

No doubt someone will point out the occasions where it happened, but so far as I’m aware the army didn’t walk on water in WWI. Every British serviceman and woman with their equipment (plus most of the ground stores for the RFC too) was shipped across the channel to France by sea, without interruption by the German navy. That was down to British naval superiority.

[PhilB]

We do tend to overlook that point. Did we actually have many losses in the channel in WW1? Phil B

[truthergw]

We do tend to overlook that point. Did we actually have many losses in the channel in WW1? Phil B

Ian Hislop's first program featured the captain of a ferry who was involved in two actions. The second time being captured and ultimately shot. I was very surprised to hear that actions like these had taken place. It's not possible to research in depth every facet of WW1 but is there a good general overview of the war in the North Sea as it affected merchantmen?

[Bruce Dennis]

We do tend to overlook that point. Did we actually have many losses in the channel in WW1? Phil B

According to Terraine, in Business in Great Waters, not a single allied soldier was lost in transit to the Continent (read France/Belgium) to enemy U-boat operations.

Bruce

[PhilB]

According to Terraine, in Business in Great Waters, not a single allied soldier was lost in transit to the Continent (read France/Belgium) to enemy U-boat operations.

Bruce

Does that mean some were lost to other enemy ops - eg E-boats, mines, surface ships? Phil B

[Bruce Dennis]

Does that mean some were lost to other enemy ops - eg E-boats, mines, surface ships? Phil B

He was discussing U-boat activity of all types, including minelaying, but I believe he meant enemy naval actions of all types. I can't get at my copy, maybe someone with access could verify?

Bruce

[joseph]

From The Dover Patrol Adm Sir R Bacon,

The arrivals and departures of store carriers, troop transports and ambulance – transports at Dover numbered over 14,800. Of sick and wounded 810,000 were embarked and disembarked. An additional 198,000 troops were embarked or disembarked at Dover. The only casualty was the mining of the Anglia while sailing under the Red Cross.

The Anglia is the only casualty mentioned whilst moving stores and troops across the Channel.

This quote may expand on the magnitude of the task, “the Folkestone – Boulogne route was that selected for the passage of men on leave. Two trips each way of six ships sailing with absolute regularity, each ship carrying 900 men, meant a transport of about 1,900,000 per year”.

Regards Charles