Attrition

[Robert Dunlop]

Ludendorff's assessment:

 

"From July 31 till well into September was a period of tremendous anxiety. On July 31, the English, supported by a few French divisions on their left, attacked on a front of about fifteen miles. They had employed such quantities of artillery and ammunition as had been rare, even in the West. At many points along the whole front the enemy had penetrated with tanks. With the assistance of the counter-attack divisions the Fourth Army, whose Chief of Staff was now Colonel von Lossberg, succeeded in checking the hostile success and localizing its effect. But, besides a loss of from one and a quarter to two and a half miles of ground along the whole front, it caused us very considerable losses in prisoners and stores and a heavy expenditure of reserves.

The costly August battles in Flanders and at Verdun imposed a heavy strain on the Western troops. In spite of all the concrete protection they seemed more or less powerless under the enormous weight of the enemy's artillery. At some points they no longer displayed the firmness which I, in common with the local commanders, had hoped for.

 

The enemy contrived to adapt himself to our methods of employing counter-attack divisions. There were no more attacks with unlimited objectives. He was ready for our counter-attacks, and prepared for them by exercising restraint in the exploitation of success. I myself was being put to a terrible strain. Our wastage had been so high as to cause grave misgivings, and had exceeded all expectations.

The actions in the third battle of Flanders had presented the same set-piece characteristics as those in the second and in the fighting at Verdun. The depth of penetration was limited so as to secure immunity from our counter-attacks, and the latter were then broken up by massed fire of artillery.

After each attack I discussed the tactical phenomena with General von Kuhl and Colonel von Loszberg, sometimes at the front, sometimes on the telephone. This time [september 1917] I again went to Flanders in order to talk over the same questions with officers who had taken part in the fighting.

 

Our defensive tactics had to be developed further, somehow or other. We were all agreed on that. The only thing was, it was so infinitely difficult to hit on the right remedy. We could proceed only by careful experiment. The proposals of the soldiers on the spot tended rather in the direction of our former tactics; they amounted to a slight, but only a slight reinforcement of our front lines, and the abandonment of the counter-attack by the counter-attack divisions, local counter-attacks being substituted for this. These local counter-attacks [Gegenstoss in der Stellung] were to made by a division in the second line, to be brought close up and spread over a wide front, before the enemy's attack began. So, while the whole front line was to be held rather more densely once more, in order to gain in power, the whole battlefield was to be given more depth than ever. 

Early in October the artillery action revived, and on the 2nd and 3rd artillery engagements of great violence took place. The infantry attack took place on the morning of the 4th. It was extraordinarily severe, and again we came through it only with extraordinary loss. It was evident that the idea of holding the front line more densely was not the remedy.

 

I now followed my own judgement and recommended the Fourth Army form an advanced zone - that is to say, a narrow strip between the enemy's front line and line which our troops were to hold by mobile defense. The enemy would have to cross this strip in making his attack, and our artillery would have time to get on him before he could reach our main line of resistance. The great difficulty lay in withdrawing the garrison of the advanced zone in case of attack, and in bringing the artillery barrage back to our own line [especially when the German artillery was under enormous pressure from the counter-battery fire of the massed British artillery]. There were further severe engagements... The line held better than on the 4th, although in some places the enemy penetrated to a considerable distance. The wastage in the big actions of the fourth battle of Flanders was extraordinarily great. In the West we began to be short of troops. The impressions I received continuously were very terrible."

 

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

On 21/06/2021 at 22:23, phil andrade said:

Interesting to see that the ground yielded by the Germans in a couple of days in the Chemin des Dames fight equated to what they lost in 105 days at Third Ypres.

 

They obviously contested the British in Flanders with a stubborn fury.

The map of Third Ypres shows a hatched line that runs close to Roulers. This was the approximate line that would have dictated a withdrawal of German forces from the Belgian coast. Rupprecht noted in his diary that the advances made by the Allies during the period of dry weather in the Third Ypres campaign had caused serious concerns, to the extent that such a withdrawal was being contemplated. Rupprecht went on to note that the return of the rains eased those concerns at least. Rupprecht's concerns illustrated the far greater strategic significance of Third Ypres, compared with the Battle of La Malmaison. Furthermore, the boggy low ground of the Aisne-Oise Canal behind Chemin des Dames ridge meant that German forces on the ridge risked being cut off. Early and complete withdrawal was vital from an operational perspective. There was no such consideration in the German defence of the Ypres re-entrant.

 

Robert

[phil andrade]

Robert,

 

In view of the powerful testimony from Ludendorff - and others -   to the severity of the 1917  Flanders fighting, and the great strain it imposed, don’t you find it hard to reconcile with Rupprecht’s statement that this episode cost the Germans significantly fewer casualties than previous defensive battles ?  Do you think that this was a kind of platitudinous - even “throw away “ - remark designed to encourage his troops, or did it indicate that, however terrific the enemy artillery was, the deployment of manpower had been accompanied by dispersal that minimised the casualties, with exceptions occurring on certain days, the 4th October being the best example ?

 

Phil

[Robert Dunlop]

Rupprecht made different statements, depending on the audience. There were many such instances across all key players, both military and political. At times, different statements from the same individual can appear to contain assertions that seem diametrically opposed. As you rightly point, some of the differences may arise through attempts to maintain morale or, as was the case when tanks appeared, to downplay high-profile issues. I can't speak to Rupprecht's rationale for the statement about lower casualties but his behaviours point to his concerns about the wider attritional impact of Third Ypres beyond the relative decrease in casualties compared to other defensive battles.

 

Robert

[phil andrade]

The German high commanders appear to have been more unrestrained in their acknowledgement of the ordeal suffered by their troops in the war of attrition in France and Flanders.  Falkenhayn wrote with some emotion about the astonishing steadfastness of German soldiers contending against great material and numerical odds in the Franco British offensive of September 1915.  The lamentations of Ludendorff and Hindenburg about the horrors  of the Somme and Passchendaele are emphatic and reiterated.  

Were they doing this to justify their make or break offensive of 1918, or was it a sense of confidence that allowed them to speak more freely about the awful burden of containing these Entente attacks ?

 

Haig is generally silent about the enormity of the British casualties, preferring to dwell on the damage his men inflicted.

 

There is a very telling exception in an emotional reflection on the ordeal of the Somme which he wrote in early 1917.

 

Petain, the “ defeatist”, also gave  a legendary depiction of the impact of Verdun when he compared the youthful vigour of the men he saw going “ up the line” with the shattered  state of those survivors he witnessed shambling back.

 

The charge that Haig and others were indifferent to casualties might be attributable to these omissions of explicit outbursts.

 

I’ve always taken exception to the use of that word “ indifferent”, preferring to use the word “ reconciled”.

 

Phil

Edited 24 June , 2021 by phil andrade

[phil andrade]

On reflection, my post above fails to acknowledge that the German commanders were writing most of this in their post war memoirs, when it was easier to indulge in the more emotional depiction of what had happened.

 

The entries in Haig’s diaries are bound to be more constrained since they were not endowed with the same hindsight.

 

Phil

[MikeMeech]

Hi

 

For interest, below is an extract from the 35th Division 'Intsum' dated 1st July, 1917, reference captured letters relating to the German call up of youths of the '1919 Class':

 

 

Mike

 

[ilkley remembers]

2 hours ago, phil andrade said:

The entries in Haig’s diaries are bound to be more constrained since they were not endowed with the same hindsight.

 

Depends which version of the diary I suppose

[ilkley remembers]

2 hours ago, MikeMeech said:

For interest, below is an extract from the 35th Division 'Intsum' dated 1st July, 1917, reference captured letters relating to the German call up of youths of the '1919 Class':

 

A small number of youths from the 1919 class were posted to the Ypres sector in 1917 to fill in gaps allegedly caused by the removal of more experienced and skilled men to assist with the harvest in Germany. Charteris used these reports to suggest incorrectly that the use of this class was indicative of a widespread manpower crisis in the German Army. This intelligence and other rather dubious assessments were used by Haig to justify his view that the war could be ended in 6 months and to effectively forestall Lloyd George's desire to withhold reinforcements to the Western Front and to instead to prioritise secondary theatre's.

 

Charteris frequently extrapolated small samples like this in order to provide Haig with the analysis which he wanted to hear ie that attrition (wearing out in his words) was in fact working and that the Western Front should therefore remain as the primary focus.

[phil andrade]

Edward,

 

You’re right, I think.

The discussion we’ve already had about Sasho’s research and the revelations of Jonathan Boff concerning the age of German prisoners compared with British soldiers commemorated in CWGC data adds weight to your argument.

 

Information from documents found on German dead or prisoners was extrapolated in a manner that flattered the aspirations of the boss.

If a company was identified, it was evidence that an entire battalion  was engaged  : a regiment deployed indicated that the whole division had been through the fire.

 

Thinking this way allowed Haig to believe that German casualties were double the number that they actually were.

 

This is my supposition, I must admit: if anything reinforces it, the best example I can think of is  Charteris’ answer to the question of why the number of German prisoners was not greater in the Third Ypres fighting:

 

” We are killing the enemy, not capturing him .  “

 

Phil

Edited 25 June , 2021 by phil andrade

[ilkley remembers]

Yes Sasho’s work is interesting and to some extent highlights the vicious cycle of declining quality of the manpower resources available to the Germans in the final two years of the war. A feature that also applied to the British and the French armies on the Western Front over the same period. This was of course the inevitable result of attritional warfare which probably came as less of a surprise to the Germans and the French than it did to the wholly unprepared British. Given that casualty rates favoured Germany for much of the war it seems odd that a strategy of attrition was pursued with so much vigour by the Entente when logically it was likely to be self defeating. A lack effective intelligence gathering and analysis is, I would posit, the prime reason why the French and to an even greater degree the British were incapable of breaking the attritional conundrum which the Germans had imposed in 1914 and which led directly to the criminal wastage on the Somme at Ypres and the Nivelle Offensive.

 

 

[phil andrade]

Edward, Those words you use “ which the Germans had imposed “ are crucial.

 

 The awful attrition was not what the Entente wanted : it’s what it got.

 

Imagine walking in Joffre or Haig’s shoes. A nightmare.

 

Phil

[PhilB]

I assume that Edward meant accidentally imposed since the Schlieffen plan was not intended to end in attrition?

[phil andrade]

German failure at The Marne afforded them a significant consolation : the choice of the ground to be selected and consolidated as they retired.

 

In that sense, there wasn’t anything accidental in the imposition of attrition.

 

So say I  : but I do say silly things, especially after a glass or four of Malbec !

 

Phil

[ilkley remembers]

34 minutes ago, PhilB said:

I assume that Edward meant accidentally imposed since the Schlieffen plan was not intended to end in attrition?

Phil (B), I did mean attritional because after the failure of manoeuvre the German high Command were happy to settle on Plan B, a version of siege warfare anchored in the north by the sea and in the south by the Alps and where the western Allies could be held whilst they dealt with the real enemy, Russia. Sadly, for Germany, their intelligence failed to realise the structural weakness of Austria-Hungry and  willingness of Italy to change sides. The Germans had in fact prepared pre-war for failure of the Schlieffen Plan so after the demise of manoeuvre attrition was the next option. Clausewitz would, no doubt, have approved of a holding war of 'friction' in the west whilst dealing with the main enemy in the east. 

 

 

[phil andrade]

An important feature of this attritional warfare on the Western Front is the significant part of the duration of it that was consigned to so called “ quiet periods”, or “ stabilisation”, as the French described it in their narrative.

It would be a mistake to understate the toll that these periods exacted.  During these, the Germans were able to utilise their advantage by inflicting disproportionate loss : their ability to exploit superior ground ( Messines - Wytschaete, for example) made the lapses between the Allied offensives more deadly for the Franco British soldiers than they were for the Germans.

 

This is an example of how the Germans were able to “ impose” attrition on the Allies.

 

They could exert constant pressure, enjoying the advantage of occupying Franco Belgian soil whilst doing so.

 

Is this aspect of the war overlooked by critics of the Entente generalship ?

 

Phil

[PhilB]

1 hour ago, phil andrade said:

 

Is this aspect of the war overlooked by critics of the Entente generalship ?

Phil

From what you say, Phil, the Germans inflicted more casualties on the Entente both during battles and in the “quiet” spells between - in fact, all the time! How would defenders of Entente generalship explain that?

[Robert Dunlop]

17 hours ago, ilkley remembers said:

A lack effective intelligence gathering and analysis is, I would posit, the prime reason why the French and to an even greater degree the British were incapable of breaking the attritional conundrum which the Germans had imposed in 1914 and which led directly to the criminal wastage on the Somme at Ypres and the Nivelle Offensive.

I respectfully disagree. The prime reason was the fact that it takes 4 years (Kitchener predicted 3) or more (as in the case of WW2) to wear down an alliance of enemies to the point where they cannot go on. The 4 years takes a heavy toll on casualties, irrespective of the accuracy or otherwise of intelligence, which battles are fought and what tactics are used. If the Soviet Union had not borne the brunt of casualties in WW2, cf with the UK and Dominion forces, then we would be praising the 'light' casualty numbers in WW1 compared to what we could have lost in WW2 without the Great Patriotic War being fought.

Germany did not impose an attritional war. The war was attritional from the moment it started. German imposed a defensive strategy on the Western Front, initially in order to pursue a breakthrough in the Ypres sector and then the elimination of Russia on the Eastern Front.

Robert

[phil andrade]

47 minutes ago, PhilB said:

From what you say, Phil, the Germans inflicted more casualties on the Entente both during battles and in the “quiet” spells between - in fact, all the time! How would defenders of Entente generalship explain that?

Most of the time, rather than all of it.

The Germans enjoyed the advantage of terrain, which they exploited mercilessly.

 

Damned if they did attack the Germans in those strong positions, damned if they didn’t.

 

There must have been times when the Germans were caught in bad ground, and the roles were reversed.  I’m thinking about Verdun from August to December 1916.

 

It was easier for the  Germans to relinquish bad ground in France and Flanders than it was for the Entente, for the obvious reason that virtually all of Belgium and a very large part of NE France was occupied, and Paris was so close to the Front.  As Terraine once reminded us, how would politicians in London expect their generals to act if  the Germans were dug in near Canterbury and were harassing British forces all the time ?

 

This “defensive strategy”  in France and Belgium that the Germans imposed.......is this a misnomer ?   The Germans were invaders, active and aggressive, and in possession of valuable tracts of Allied territory.  Their presence there was intolerable, not least because they rendered that hold lethal to their opponents.  Add to that the need to support Russia and other Allies in coalition warfare , and I would argue for a rather more empathetic approach to the predicament of the Entente generals, and, to a degree, a more sympathetic one.

 

Phil

 

Phil

[phil andrade]

1 hour ago, Robert Dunlop said:

If the Soviet Union had not borne the brunt of casualties in WW2, cf with the UK and Dominion forces, then we would be praising the 'light' casualty numbers in WW1 compared to what we could have lost in WW2 without the Great Patriotic War being fought.

 

 

Robert,

Gary Sheffield said that, too.

 

It troubles me a bit.

 

It took racial and political ideologies to fight a Stalingrad or endure a Leningrad , with totalitarian regimes in existential conflict .

 

Were such conditions extant in the Western European powers ?

 

I would invite circumspection.  A repeat of the Somme or Verdun fought by the sons of the 1916 men ?  Maybe, but I hope my doubts are legitimate.

 

Phil

[ilkley remembers]

1 hour ago, PhilB said:

From what you say, Phil, the Germans inflicted more casualties on the Entente both during battles and in the “quiet” spells between - in fact, all the time! How would defenders of Entente generalship explain that?

in 1917 the Enemy Personnel Committee reported to the Committee for Imperial Defence that the British were losing three men for every two Germans. even for someone with my limited mathematical abilities it is easy see that for Britain in terms of manpower the long term pursuit of the war on the Western Front was unsustainable.

 

1 hour ago, Robert Dunlop said:

The prime reason was the fact that it takes 4 years (Kitchener predicted 3)

 

Well Moltke and Kitchener would have agreed on that at least since both predicted exactly such a scenario. Kitchener, however, foresaw that large scale British involvement would not occur until 1917 when a fully trained army would take to the continent and mop up after the two prime protagonists, Germany and France, had thoroughly exhausted themselves. Niall Ferguson of course famously postulated that given the allies advantages in manpower and resources they should have been able to pursue an aggressive war to ultimate victory in just two years. Interestingly some more recent research by economic historians rather supports this proposition.

 

Edward

 

1 hour ago, Robert Dunlop said:

irrespective of the accuracy or otherwise of intelligence,

 

An interesting comment and at  variance with some serious academic historians who point out that it is axiomatic that the conduct of a successful attritional campaign relies on accurate intelligence of your enemies resources and reserves. 

Edited 26 June , 2021 by ilkley remembers

[Robert Dunlop]

Academically, it will depend on what the historians defined as 'attritional' and 'campaign'. Do you have their names, book and/or journal titles please? Don't worry about posting quotes, unless you want to. I am more than happy to track the sources down and then review. Thanks very much.

Robert

[ilkley remembers]

1 hour ago, Robert Dunlop said:

Academically, it will depend on what the historians defined as 'attritional' and 'campaign'. Do you have their names, book and/or journal titles please? Don't worry about posting quotes, unless you want to. I am more than happy to track the sources down and then review. Thanks very much.

Robert

 

'Haig's Intelligence' by Jim Beach (2013) Cambridge University Press is a good start particularly if you are interested in the workings of GHQ intelligence under Charteris and later Cox. The book has copious footnotes and references to academic texts. He has written a number of other articles in various journals including one on how intelligence influenced tank design https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0968344507084728 in 1918

Edited 26 June , 2021 by ilkley remembers

[Robert Dunlop]

Thank you very much. I have Beach's book. Was there a particular section(s) that you recommend for this discussion?

Robert

[ilkley remembers]

18 minutes ago, Robert Dunlop said:

Was there a particular section(s) that you recommend for this discussion?

Personally think that the whole book is relevant, what do you think?