Attrition

[phil andrade]

Edward,

 

Your revelation that  “ in 1917 the Enemy Personnel Committee reported to the Committee for Imperial Defence that the British were losing three men for every two Germans” is something of a bombshell for me.

 

When was this in 1917 : early or later in the year ?

 

It certainly compels me to reconsider one or two things.

 

If Haig was simply deluded in his belief that he was inflicting heavier loss on the Germans than he was sustaining, that’s bad enough : if he was in denial of information that was available, then that takes us into a more mendacious realm.  His reaction to Churchill’s Memorandum of August 1916 “...Winston’s head  is gone from drugs ! “ has always struck me as hubristic ; one could forgive a degree of wishful thinking in a commander who was so committed to a battle that was , in the National experience, unprecedented in its intensity and  carnage .  To have been appraised of authentic data that challenged his reckoning, and to have ignored it, is something else.  That’s why I’d like to know about the timing of this report.

 

Might it be that the report of the Enemy Personnel Committee was kept from him ?  If so, then that’s a damning indictment of the military hierarchy .

 

Phil

Edited 26 June , 2021 by phil andrade

[Robert Dunlop]

Throughout the discussion to date, I have been mindful of Beach's whole book as you suggest. I have incorporated insights from Occleshaw, Sheffy, and other authors, as well as primary source materials that I have studied via NA, IWM, French archives, German records, etc. Analyses of the work by Occleshaw and Sheffy, for example, have been published in other threads on this Forum. I will pick up on Beach specifically and review how his work relates to the topic of attrition, leaving aside wider considerations of British Intelligence not relevant to this thread.

Robert

Edited 27 June , 2021 by Robert Dunlop

[MikeMeech]

1 hour ago, Robert Dunlop said:

Throughout the discussion to date, I have been mindful of Beach's whole book as you suggest. I have incorporated insights from Occleshaw, Sheffy, and other authors, as well as primary source materials that I have studied via NA, IWM, French archives, German records, etc. Analyses of the work by Occleshaw and Sheffy, for example, have been published in other threads on this Forum. I will pick up on Beach specifically and review how his work relates to the topic of attrition, leaving aside wider considerations of British Intelligence not relevant to this thread.

Robert

Hi

I thinks that pages 174-181 on the Germany army in Chapter 8 'Analysis' may be useful as is Chapter 9 'Somme' which discusses casualties and morale on the German side.

Mike

[Robert Dunlop]

Thanks, Mike. That was my impression too and matches what I am working with for the moment.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

On 26/06/2021 at 10:46, phil andrade said:

It took racial and political ideologies to fight a Stalingrad or endure a Leningrad , with totalitarian regimes in existential conflict. Were such conditions extant in the Western European powers ?

Phil, the Great Patriotic War was framed in terms of racial (on the German side) and political ideologies (on both sides) but it was fundamentally a war to the finish between two sides (for the most part) that were utterly determined to see it through. Stalingrad and Leningrad were a small part of the terrible whole. Great Britain had a different ideological basis for its involvement in WW2 but was just as determined as the Soviet Union to see the war through to the end. The ideologies are not really the issue, from an attritional perspective. It is the nature of industrialised warfare between utterly determined major combatants that drives the casualty rates until such time, for a multitude of reasons, one side collapses.

Robert 

[Robert Dunlop]

On 26/06/2021 at 10:56, ilkley remembers said:

An interesting comment and at  variance with some serious academic historians who point out that it is axiomatic that the conduct of a successful attritional campaign relies on accurate intelligence of your enemies resources and reserves. 

I have re-read Beach's book in its entirety so as not to miss anything. In the Introduction, Beach noted that the accusations around Charteris misinforming Haig have detracted from a deeper appreciation of British military intelligence and its broader contribution to war effort. He sets out a series of questions that form the basis of the book. Based on a much wider and more comprehensive review of British military intelligence, Beach notes that:

Quote

"Such an understanding of the apparatus [the military intelligence system as a whole] will then permit answers to broader questions: What did the British, and in particular Haig, know about their opponent and how did they know it and how did that knowledge influence their actions? In essence, why did they know they were winning?"

Beach goes on to highlight, quite correctly from an academic perspective, the limits of the scope of his book. He notes that: "...how [the British] perceived their enemy should have been a major determinant in actions against them" but provides a caution that military intelligence was not the only driver: "[Military] intelligence... cannot become a catch-all explanation for the BEF's conduct". Beach chose not to focus on what was actually happening within the German army, though he does include several such perspectives.

Throughout the book, it is clear that the British did not have accurate intelligence about German resources and reserves. Beach deliberately did not compare and contrast this other military intelligence organisations, such as the French and American, but I would venture that the picture was similar. The understanding of German reserves, for example, was always incomplete, i.e. not accurate. Yet the Entente went on to attrit the German army to the point where it collapsed. 

Beach does not make an explicit link between military intelligence and the concept of attrition as losing fewer men than the enemy. Except, perhaps, in the second-to-last sentence in the Conclusion:

Quote

"In January 1918 the Canadian view of intelligence was articulated succinctly by an intelligence staff officer who told a visiting American that 'our past fighting has impressed upon all units that too much attention cannot be paid to intelligence... [it] has meant for us, all the difference between success and failure and has saved many lives'."

I will pick up on this with some further analyses of Beach's book.

Robert

[phil andrade]

1 hour ago, Robert Dunlop said:

Phil, the Great Patriotic War was framed in terms of racial (on the German side) and political ideologies (on both sides) but it was fundamentally a war to the finish between two sides (for the most part) that were utterly determined to see it through. Stalingrad and Leningrad were a small part of the terrible whole. Great Britain had a different ideological basis for its involvement in WW2 but was just as determined as the Soviet Union to see the war through to the end. The ideologies are not really the issue, from an attritional perspective. It is the nature of industrialised warfare between utterly determined major combatants that drives the casualty rates until such time, for a multitude of reasons, one side collapses.

Robert 

Robert,

 

Echoes of Scott F Fitzgerald’s Tender Is The Night have prompted me to think about this.

 

Apart from the scale and intensity of industrialised warfare, the attritional aspects beg the question as to the nature of the people who are involved in it.

 

The absolute terror implicit in the Stalinist and Nazi regimes allowed for coercion that was beyond the remit of western, liberal democracies.

 

I mustn't divert into the counter factual, and my musings mustn’t deflect from the more disciplined reviews of Occleshaw etc.

 

It might be instructive to reflect on how different nations reacted to the scale of the casualties : here there is scope for pertinent discussion about the war of attrition on the Western Front.

 

Phil

[Robert Dunlop]

Phil, there is a danger in going down the path of ascribing attributes to specific wars. It could prevent a connection being made between major industrial wars in general, such as the American Civil War, World War 1, and World War 2. If attrition associated with massive numbers of overall casualties is a feature of all such wars then the issue of a specific ideology is a potential distractor. Given that all three examples covered a spectrum of ideologies, governing regimes, democratic or totalitarian processes, etc, then there must be deeper, more fundamental forces at play. FWIIW, it behoves us to attempt to understand such forces because, if generalisable, we need to be on the alert to avoid similar happening again (if only we could).

Robert

[PhilB]

1 hour ago, Robert Dunlop said:

 Given that all three examples covered a spectrum of ideologies, governing regimes, democratic or totalitarian processes, etc, then there must be deeper, more fundamental forces at play. FWIIW, it behoves us to attempt to understand such forces because, if generalisable, we need to be on the alert to avoid similar happening again (if only we could).

Robert

In my mind it also raises the question of what the onus is upon a Head of State when faced with projections of such suffering for his/her subjects. Support the military unquestioningly or intervene for their subjects’ protection? Particularly pertinent in WW1 as the two heads were closely related and, presumably, could liaise through diplomatic channels.

[phil andrade]

Just two heads closely related, Phil ?

George, Nicky, Willy and Franz Joseph were all on parade.

 

Republican France took one of the worst beatings.

 

The Tsar’s intervention had fatal consequences for millions, and for himself and his family.

 

Phil

 

 

[PhilB]

So do you consider that the Head of State has no obligation to attempt to minimise the suffering of his citizens/subjects? Whether he’s capable of weighing the suffering against the costs of losing the war or negotiating a peace is another matter!

[phil andrade]

PhilB,

Regarding heads of state....

Didn’t Franz Joseph’s successor - on or shortly after his accession- try to intervene and broker some kind of peace before the Austro Hungarian Empire collapsed ?

 

Attrition on the Western Front is our topic, but there’s much we might say about the impact on Austria, and how that was to amplify the strain on Germany, whose head of state was notoriously keen on pressing on with militaristic aspirations.

 

Phil

 

 

Edited 28 June , 2021 by phil andrade

[phil andrade]

What a great thread this has been !

It speaks volumes that I took my eye off the ball in a breathtakingly exciting football match to correct an error in a post I’d pitched a few minutes before.

 

All honour to you, PhilB, for kicking it off all those years ago; and let me pay tribute to you, too, Edward, for your heartfelt contribution : as for you, Robert, where would we be without your profound knowledge, and the authority of your research and the way you share it ?  To see the input of Sasho , with his meticulous studying and the perspective it brings to our forum, is truly uplifting.

Today’s  a special date, 28 June : Sarajevo in 1914 and The Hall of Mirrors in Versailles five years later....two shots followed by five years of attrition !

 

Phil

 

 

 

 

 

 

[PhilB]

Thanks Phil. Do you have any comment on this (by Andy Hollinger, USA) from the first page of this thread?

 

 

  PhilB said:

Do you mean there are no rules for attritional warfare? Since it`s a possible state in any conflict, surely the Staff Colleges must teach something on it? Phil B

 

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

I doubt there is a course at West Point, Sandhurst or any advanced War College called "Attrition 101" meaning the name has a dirty ring. In all my military training or reading all I've ever heard taught was how to win fast, sweeping victories. One studies Chancellorsville not Petersburg ... 

[phil andrade]

“ ...the name has a dirty ring.”

 

That’s the long and short of it....those  words being apt, since prolongation of war is perceived as undesirable at best, detestable at worst.  Attrition tends to be associated with endurance and exhaustion, which smacks of prolongation.

 

As if attrition was the abnegation of generalship ;  in reality, it’s surely an integral part of warfare, and, as such, needs to be properly countenanced and prepared for, and the requisite training accepted and put into effect.

 

Phil

 

 

 

 

 

 

[phil andrade]

Adding an afterthought to what Andy Hollinger wrote, citing Chancellorsville as the ideal victory in contrast with the protracted horrors that developed one year later, it might be noted that Chancellorsville was brutal head on stuff.

Lee committed his men to direct frontal assault against strong northern defences, and on 3 May 1863 some of the southern units suffered extreme casualties that were to compromise their performance at Gettysburg exactly two months later.

Brilliant victories can still exact a bloody toll from the winners.

 

Phil

[Robert Dunlop]

3 hours ago, phil andrade said:

Brilliant victories can still exact a bloody toll from the winners.

In more ways than one, Phil. Nivelle's 'brilliant victories' around Verdun in late 1916 led to the view that a war-winning formula had been found. Even more significant were the perceived 'brilliant victories' of the German counter-attack at Cambrai, the assault across the Riga, and Caporetto. News of these victories buoyed the spirits of German soldiers in advance of the Spring offensives, enabling many soldiers to mitigate the war-weariness accumulating through the experiences of Third Ypres (as well as Verdun, the Somme, and Arras). 'Brilliant victories' help fuel the process of attrition, by maintaining the cognitive biases in favour of keeping a war going (c.f. with Wunderwaffen ["Wonder Weapons"] in WW2 as well) and by enabling soldiers to keep fighting on. 

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

In the prelude to the Somme battle, Beach notes that GHQ Intelligence "managed to maintain a fairly good picture of the German reserves opposite the British Front in the four months prior to the Somme". He provides further details, some of which have been presented earlier in this thread. Namely, the focus of German reserves on the Sixth Army front opposite Arras plus the rotation in of reserves engaged previously at Verdun. The latter corresponded with the start of the Brusilov offensive, which had a major impact on the Eastern Front. In mid-June, GHQ picked up reports that subsequently went on to suggest other reserves were being sent to bolster the Eastern Front.

Beach adds that Haig recorded this conclusion in his diary on 16th June and then "the following day GHQ issued the first of their infamous 'cavalry breakthrough plans'." Beach goes on to comment that the transfer of reserves became "less clear" by 20 June 1916 but that "the second and more ambitious of the 'cavalry breakthrough' plans was issued [the following day]". He concludes by noting that GHQ Intelligence failed to pick up the late influx of German reserves to the Somme area just before the battle commenced.

Beach appears to be careful, quite rightly, not to draw a direct causative link between the GHQ Intelligence feeds and the issuing of 'cavalry breakthrough' plans. There is a temporal association but previous analysis in this thread of the decision-making process leading up to 1 July shows that:

On 07/07/2006 at 22:17, Robert Dunlop said:

...Haig "invite[d] [Rawlinson's] attention to remarks on the use of cavalry made by the Commander-in-Chief at the Conference of Army Commanders... on the 18th March [published in OAD 291/9]. Opportunities to use cavalry, supported by guns, machine guns, etc and infantry, should be sought for, both during the early stages of the attack and subsequently. So far as possible, probable opportunities should be foreseen and all possible preparations made beforehand to enable them to be taken advantage of."

The concept of 'breakthrough' [exploitation of collapse of the enemy] was raised early in the planning process. It reflected, in part, Haig's concern about Rawlinson's failure to exploit what happened in the first hours of the Neuve Chapelle battle, which has been discussed elsewhere on this Forum. 

The implicit inference from Beach's comments is that Haig developed unrealistic views of German weaknesses, thereby corrupting a subordinate's battle plan and causing unnecessary losses. Any such inferences align, moreover, with the question posed at the beginning of the book in the Introduction: "In essence, why did they [the British, and in particular Haig] think they were winning?" [my emphasis]. Beach drew attention to the prevailing orthodoxy on the 'cavalry breakthrough' issue by labelling it as "infamous" but did not examine the background 'evidence' more rigorously. This is not a criticism; it was not in the scope of the book. It behoves us to examine the temporal links more carefully. With respect to the Somme, I have argued that Haig did not think he was winning as such. He knew about the detailed plans for the battle that were based on the other military intelligence functions and operations at division- and corps-levels. Jonathan Porter's two-volume series on the British XIIIth and XVth Corps includes fabulous details about what they [Corps HQs] '[knew] about their opponent, when and how they [knew] it and how... that knowledge [influenced] their actions". Porter's work amplifies Beach's analysis of this whole dimension of British military intelligence. As I have noted before, both Corps [as with the other corps involved, including the French] planned for complete failure as well as varying degrees of success up to and including the furthest limited objective on day one.

As an aside, it has been noted before in this Forum that the French also brought cavalry divisions into the Somme area with the explicit intent to exploit any collapse of the German army (aka. "breakthrough") south of the Somme river.

Robert

[phil andrade]

4 hours ago, Robert Dunlop said:

In more ways than one, Phil. Nivelle's 'brilliant victories' around Verdun in late 1916 led to the view that a war-winning formula had been found. Even more significant were the perceived 'brilliant victories' of the German counter-attack at Cambrai, the assault across the Riga, and Caporetto. News of these victories buoyed the spirits of German soldiers in advance of the Spring offensives, enabling many soldiers to mitigate the war-weariness accumulating through the experiences of Third Ypres (as well as Verdun, the Somme, and Arras). 'Brilliant victories' help fuel the process of attrition, by maintaining the cognitive biases in favour of keeping a war going (c.f. with Wunderwaffen ["Wonder Weapons"] in WW2 as well) and by enabling soldiers to keep fighting on. 

Robert

 

That’s a good argument, Robert.

It’s always been associated with Nivelle, but I hadn’t thought of Riga, Caporetto and Cambrai in the same light.

The last three certainly make a compelling Trinity : it’s all too understandable that the Germans were susceptible to their allure.

 

” Siren Song’’ triumphs : would that be an appropriate analogy ?

 

Phil

[MikeMeech]

3 hours ago, Robert Dunlop said:

In the prelude to the Somme battle, Beach notes that GHQ Intelligence "managed to maintain a fairly good picture of the German reserves opposite the British Front in the four months prior to the Somme". He provides further details, some of which have been presented earlier in this thread. Namely, the focus of German reserves on the Sixth Army front opposite Arras plus the rotation in of reserves engaged previously at Verdun. The latter corresponded with the start of the Brusilov offensive, which had a major impact on the Eastern Front. In mid-June, GHQ picked up reports that subsequently went on to suggest other reserves were being sent to bolster the Eastern Front.

Beach adds that Haig recorded this conclusion in his diary on 16th June and then "the following day GHQ issued the first of their infamous 'cavalry breakthrough plans'." Beach goes on to comment that the transfer of reserves became "less clear" by 20 June 1916 but that "the second and more ambitious of the 'cavalry breakthrough' plans was issued [the following day]". He concludes by noting that GHQ Intelligence failed to pick up the late influx of German reserves to the Somme area just before the battle commenced.

Beach appears to be careful, quite rightly, not to draw a direct causative link between the GHQ Intelligence feeds and the issuing of 'cavalry breakthrough' plans. There is a temporal association but previous analysis in this thread of the decision-making process leading up to 1 July shows that:

The concept of 'breakthrough' [exploitation of collapse of the enemy] was raised early in the planning process. It reflected, in part, Haig's concern about Rawlinson's failure to exploit what happened in the first hours of the Neuve Chapelle battle, which has been discussed elsewhere on this Forum. 

The implicit inference from Beach's comments is that Haig developed unrealistic views of German weaknesses, thereby corrupting a subordinate's battle plan and causing unnecessary losses. Any such inferences align, moreover, with the question posed at the beginning of the book in the Introduction: "In essence, why did they [the British, and in particular Haig] think they were winning?" [my emphasis]. Beach drew attention to the prevailing orthodoxy on the 'cavalry breakthrough' issue by labelling it as "infamous" but did not examine the background 'evidence' more rigorously. This is not a criticism; it was not in the scope of the book. It behoves us to examine the temporal links more carefully. With respect to the Somme, I have argued that Haig did not think he was winning as such. He knew about the detailed plans for the battle that were based on the other military intelligence functions and operations at division- and corps-levels. Jonathan Porter's two-volume series on the British XIIIth and XVth Corps includes fabulous details about what they [Corps HQs] '[knew] about their opponent, when and how they [knew] it and how... that knowledge [influenced] their actions". Porter's work amplifies Beach's analysis of this whole dimension of British military intelligence. As I have noted before, both Corps [as with the other corps involved, including the French] planned for complete failure as well as varying degrees of success up to and including the furthest limited objective on day one.

As an aside, it has been noted before in this Forum that the French also brought cavalry divisions into the Somme area with the explicit intent to exploit any collapse of the German army (aka. "breakthrough") south of the Somme river.

Robert

Hi

I think that any discussion on the use of cavalry can only be undertaken after reading Stephen Badsey's 'Doctrine and Reform in the British Cavalry 1880-1918' and 'Horsemen in No Man's Land' by David Kenyon, as a lot of information about use during WW1 has to be considered not necessarily 'reliable' due to various post war agendas.  Churchill also appears to indulge in some altering of views to suit an 'audience', see attached from Badsey below, but any author , particularly between the wars, must be looked at carefully:

Mike

[Robert Dunlop]

23 minutes ago, phil andrade said:

” Siren Song’’ triumphs : would that be an appropriate analogy ?

As sung by Lorelei perhaps, from the waters of Der Rhein?