Attrition

[Foresterab]

It’s an interesting discussion and coming at it from a Canadian perspective I find that 1917 starts to be the big shift in thinking from supporting attacks and absorbing the associated casualties to planning attacks with casualties in mind.  
 

Vimy Ridge was estimated, and discussed in context of worth, on the basis of 10,000 casualties.   The decision was made to go ahead and following the “bite and hold” style offensive a cost of 10602 men was incurred.  
 

Attrition is described differently but I believe at least by this point in the war it was being considered differently than say the battles of 3rd Ypres.   For reference General Currie estimated Passchendaele would cost 16,000 men for no measurable gain - 15,654 men were casualties.  
 

Casualty numbers taken from Canadian Encyclopia online. 
 

foresterab

[phil andrade]

On 06/05/2021 at 19:32, Foresterab said:

It’s an interesting discussion and coming at it from a Canadian perspective I find that 1917 starts to be the big shift in thinking from supporting attacks and absorbing the associated casualties to planning attacks with casualties in mind.  
 

Vimy Ridge was estimated, and discussed in context of worth, on the basis of 10,000 casualties.   The decision was made to go ahead and following the “bite and hold” style offensive a cost of 10602 men was incurred.  
 

Attrition is described differently but I believe at least by this point in the war it was being considered differently than say the battles of 3rd Ypres.   For reference General Currie estimated Passchendaele would cost 16,000 men for no measurable gain - 15,654 men were casualties.  
 

Casualty numbers taken from Canadian Encyclopia online. 
 

foresterab

 

Foresterab,

 

Something remarkable in this respect caught my eye in a book I read about the Battle of Loos, two years before Third Ypres.

 

I think it was Cherry’s book .

 

If memory serves me, the medical directors of Haig’s First Army predicted it would be necessary to plan for forty thousand wounded, and they were damned near right.

 

Currie’s uncannily accurate predictions about casualties were not unprecedented, it seems.

 

The “ context of worth” that you allude to is significant.

 

Predicting the number of casualties was one thing ; assessing the value of gain that might be won by the loss of so many men was another.

 

Is this what you mean by the “ big shift in thinking “ ?

 

Phil

[Foresterab]

1 hour ago, phil andrade said:

 

The “ context of worth” that you allude to is significant.

 

Predicting the number of casualties was one thing ; assessing the value of gain that might be won by the loss of so many men was another.

 

Is this what you mean by the “ big shift in thinking “ ?

 

Phil

Hi Phil

 

Its the concept of not just estimating casualties which became, for all nations, a significant political force and source of unrest at home being evaluated vs the expected outcomes of a battle/campaign. 

It could also be argued that this was also part of the significant changes in Army and higher Entante command development as attrition losses start to be considered in context to higher overall strategy rather unit or Divisional basis losses.   Maybe this partly the source of thinking by Haig on the Somme offensive but missing the element of reality later decisions had comparing losses/land gained (no reference to this just a thought) which should the Somme been proposed in say 1918 would have resulted a very different campaign. 

 

To be fair while I can remember WW1 veterans attending Remembrance Day ceremonies I was too young to talk to the veterans at the time.   I knew a few more WW2 veterans and several more modern conflict veterans but lack much of the source material and reference to compare well most campaigns so always great to hear more. 

[PhilB]

On 06/05/2021 at 19:32, Foresterab said:

  For reference General Currie estimated Passchendaele would cost 16,000 men for no measurable gain - 15,654 men were casualties.  

 

Casualty numbers taken from Canadian Encyclopia online. 
 

foresterab

Do you mean the whole 3rd Ypres campaign (aka Passchendaele) or the two Passchendaele battles of October to November?

[phil andrade]

 

Foresterab,

 

An important letter was written while the 1916 Battle of the Somme was raging.

 

How I wish I had the source to hand !

 

The author was either Haig himself, or Robertson.

 

If memory serves me, the writer claimed that British casualties in July 1916 were 120,000 greater than they would have been if the BEF had not attacked. A significant comment, implying that normal wastage was going to cost many thousands of men anyway, and that there was a need to assess casualties in “net” terms when analysing the cost of such an offensive.

 

He goes on to say that we must countenance the prospect of several hundred thousand casualties, but balance that against the possibility of really great results.

 

If any forumites can help me out here and identify the source, or tell me I’m wrong, I would be grateful.

 

The point I’m trying to make from my caravan in Dorset is that this communication would serve to show that the calculations of casualties as worthwhile or otherwise were extant before 1917.

 

Sorry if this is being clumsily expressed.  Sometimes it’s so difficult trying to make things clear !

 

Editing here  : an afterthought, Foresterab, : your Canadian perspective is crucial here .

 

In 1915 and 1916, at Second Ypres, Festubert, Mount Sorrel and the Somme , Canadian casualties had been heavy and sustained in operations which had not afforded Canadian commanders - in the view of their people- a sufficient  degree of choice or discretion regarding the role their contingents were to play, or the extent of the sacrifice that was required of them. Vimy, Lens and Passchendaele - and, ultimately, the Hundred Days - were very different from the earlier operations in this respect and this is where, I suppose, you are “ coming from “.

 

 

 

Phil

Edited 8 May , 2021 by phil andrade

[Don Regiano]

2 hours ago, phil andrade said:

sufficient  degree of choice or discretion

 

or time to prepare?

[Foresterab]

8 hours ago, PhilB said:

Do you mean the whole 3rd Ypres campaign (aka Passchendaele) or the two Passchendaele battles of October to November?

Passchendaele from a Canadian perspective is often viewed as the battles of Oct-Nov.  I realize this does disservice to the greater 3rd Ypres campaign but with Canadian Corps not entering until the bigger battles were well in place it is often viewed as a wasted effort with the mud and difficulties already well known.   Again this thinking from a smaller perspective rather than the bigger Entente picture of combined efforts and the resulting impacts upon German forces.  
 

While Vimy ridge is celebrated as a victory and key moment in Canadian identity so is Passchendaele remembered as a reason to remain under separate Canadian control.  I believe it was explicitly cited as a reason for not breaking up Canadian units and formations in WW2 despite needs in early 1940’s and UK pressures. 

[Foresterab]

6 hours ago, Don Regiano said:

 

or time to prepare?

Thank you for the reminder on the degree of planning, down to the individual soldier, that went into Vimy Ridge and other later successes.  Very different than barely briefed officers leading green recruits into the initial battles of 1915/1916. 

[Foresterab]

8 hours ago, phil andrade said:

The author was either Haig himself, or Robertson.

 

If memory serves me, the writer claimed that British casualties in July 1916 were 120,000 greater than they would have been if the BEF had not attacked. A significant comment, implying that normal wastage was going to cost many thousands of men anyway, and that there was a need to assess casualties in “net” terms when analysing the cost of such an offensive.

 

He goes on to say that we must countenance the prospect of several hundred thousand casualties, but balance that against the possibility of really great results.

 

 

 

Editing here  : an afterthought, Foresterab, : your Canadian perspective is crucial here .

 

In 1915 and 1916, at Second Ypres, Festubert, Mount Sorrel and the Somme , Canadian casualties had been heavy and sustained in operations which had not afforded Canadian commanders - in the view of their people- a sufficient  degree of choice or discretion regarding the role their contingents were to play, or the extent of the sacrifice that was required of them. Vimy, Lens and Passchendaele - and, ultimately, the Hundred Days - were very different from the earlier operations in this respect and this is where, I suppose, you are “ coming from “.

 

 

 

Phil

Good morning Phil,

 

No worries about writing from your caravan.  I'm sitting here manned up waiting for forest fires to start and in the same boat regarding references.  Your reference to "possibility of great things" strikes a cord as a relation (KIA 1918) was with the Royal Canadian Dragoons and the Canadian Cavalry Brigade.  At the time of the Somme they were not attached to Canadian units but part of the 2nd Indian Cavalry Division and held in reserve from front line duties in case of a break through to exploit "great things" which ultimately did not happen as desired.

 

When I read through the battles of the Great War it seems to me there is almost three phases upon which battles were fought:

1) early 1914-1915 - reactionary to German advances and/or marked by localized battles at best a Corps level.

2) 1916-1917 - grand strategy battles based upon attempted coordination between Entente forces either to support (relieve pressure on defending forces) or to try to break through.   You also see a change in leadership in many units due to either casualties and/or performance as the lessons of the early war are absorbed.

3) 1917-1918 - A grand strategy still exists but rather than focus upon a broad blunt front the concept of concentrated bite and hold battles to force Central Power forces to react over a broad front to wear out units.  This is only achievable due to the logistics and manpower advantages Entente forces held by the this stage but is significant. 

 

I acknowledge there are many excellent examples from all nationalities that would contradict my 3 phases thinking and it's not meant to disparage those who took part.  Casualties alone are not the only score but are the one that reminds us at home.  From a pure casualty perspective the "100 days campaign" for Canada was by far the most costly with ~20% of the Great War casualties occurring in this period and a 46% casualty rate during the battles (45,853 of ~100,000 men).   However being on the offensive, combined with the obvious progress, meant that there was support for this type of attrition politically as long as the war ended fast.  

 

To support your quote I can easily see discussions over the impact of 120,000 casualties by Robertson/Haig occurring at very high levels but if the trade off was the grand breakthrough to end the war I see the "attrition" being supported politically and especially with the thousands of new Kitchener battalions raised action was expected to be undertaken.   A horrifical cost for the United Kingdom and allies to learn from but learn they did and I like to think those lessons saved lives in future planning. 

 

foresterab

[phil andrade]

Foresterab,

 

Regarding the first phase of the war that you identify in 1914-15, wouldn’t you ascribe to the entente offensive in Artois in early summer 1915, and even more the huge Champagne-Artois effort in the autumn of that year, the attributes of very major strategic operations ?

These were battles of immense scale and entailed hundreds of thousands of casualties in a matter of weeks. Far from local affairs, these !  I suppose they were inspired by the needs of coalition warfare, and were designed in large measure to take pressure off the Russians who were being knocked about dreadfully.

 

Phil

[PhilB]

I rather think that the consideration and planning of attritional warfare is done at levels above Corps Commander if it’s done at all.

[phil andrade]

Of all the principal  belligerents, Germany was surely least reconciled to attritional warfare , for obvious geo strategic reasons.

 

It’s ironic that Falkenhayn is cited as one of its main proponents.

 

This might be a popular distortion, because the enigmatic nature of the man’s record tends to conceal the provenance of his most notorious  endeavour at Verdun.

 

Perhaps it’s fair to say that he was resigned to  the reality of the attritional warfare, and sought to practice it in the most effective manner that limited  manpower and material resources allowed. 

 

Blockade (obviously) and diplomacy can be practiced as forms of attrition, too, especially if accompanied by effective intelligence, espionage and propaganda. 

 

Would it be accurate to state that in these fields the Allies achieved  a comprehensive and early attritional ascendancy ?

 

Phil

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[PhilB]

23 minutes ago, phil andrade said:

 1/ Of all the principal  belligerents, Germany was surely least reconciled to attritional warfare , for obvious geo strategic reasons.

 

  2/ Would it be accurate to state that in these fields the Allies achieved  a comprehensive and early attritional ascendancy ?

 

Phil

 

 

1/ A good reason for the Allied Powers to pursue out and out attrition from the start?

2/ What are your reasons for thinking this, Phil?

[phil andrade]

 PhilB,

 

In terms of blockade and other forms of economic and financial measures, the Allies did engage in attritional warfare from the start.

 

As to the conduct of military operations, I’m struggling to make a coherent suggestion, other than to cite the trope that everyone was going all out to win quickly before a fatal equilibrium conferred a worst of all worlds situation : deadlock combined with fighting of awful intensity.

 

I’ll try and make a better post after a walk along the seafront  and a cup of coffee !

 

Phil

[PhilB]

5 minutes ago, phil andrade said:

 PhilB,

 

In terms of blockade and other forms of economic and financial measures, the Allies did engage in attritional warfare from the start.

Phil

But the Grand Strategy was not one of attrition, though there were elements of it, as in the naval blockade (which was a knee jerk reaction in the wars of that time)?

[phil andrade]

6 hours ago, PhilB said:

But the Grand Strategy was not one of attrition, though there were elements of it, as in the naval blockade (which was a knee jerk reaction in the wars of that time)?

 

 

The words I used “ ...everyone was going all out to win quickly...” certainly bear out what you say, in terms of the outset of hostilities.

 

When that “ fatal equilibrium “ was established, then attrition came to the fore as very hard to avoid.

 

How best to apply it ?  The soldiers and statesmen were out of their depth then , and I certainly feel out of my depth now !

 

I wish that I could venture a convincing opinion, but it’s too difficult.

 

 

Phil

 

 

 

 

 

 

[Foresterab]

8 hours ago, phil andrade said:

 PhilB,

 

In terms of blockade and other forms of economic and financial measures, the Allies did engage in attritional warfare from the start.

 

As to the conduct of military operations, I’m struggling to make a coherent suggestion, other than to cite the trope that everyone was going all out to win quickly before a fatal equilibrium conferred a worst of all worlds situation : deadlock combined with fighting of awful intensity.

 

I’ll try and make a better post after a walk along the seafront  and a cup of coffee !

 

Phil

Good morning Phil andreade and PhilB,

 

The comment upon blockade also made me think of another concept or attrition lesson from South Africa.   Again an area I know little about and have only briefly read about but given this was the major set of experience for most officers of the BEF and others (AIF, CEF etc.) and drove much of the inter-war reform would attrition, viewed in reducing the ability to wage war, been a lesson learned.  

 

I realize the use of the civilian concentration camps was controversial even at the time of the South African war but the resulting pressures it placed upon the Boer Kommando units in terms of reducing their ability to resupply and function did play a role.   To take the concept of naval blockade as economic/strategic objective fits with the history of the Royal Navy going back to the Napoleonic Wars where by reducing the ability of an opponent to concentrate forces/economies/resources to offset a smaller field presence.   So I can see a combination of both attrition of military units combined with attrition of the ability of a nation to support a conflict being used in tandem.

 

However I will fully acknowledge this is thinking to make attrition viable as a concept and ignores the fact that control of movement, whether by land or sea, allows you to force an opponent to react to your actions and hopefully maintain the pressure to achieve a goal.  While searching for a reference I ran across an article talking about the need for sufficient mass and clarity of objective to make a success attack but also the need for surprise to be effective (http://www.holf.org/warcollege2009/node/14) which to me matches why a battle like the Somme might have been fought (Objective. Mass. Offensive. Security (partially), Friction, Unity of Command (from a high command perspective) but not the aspects of Surprise. Security (partially), Maneuver (although this was planned to occur), Economy of Force or Unity of Command (at least down to lower ranks).   I then compare this to later campaigns where greater logistical superiority was combined with a more objective view of needed force vs. objective and while things are not perfect more aspects are going in the force on offensive...I think of the German March 1918 offensive as a large mass, targeted, well planned attack that failed due to lack of mass to protect flanks, replace formed units via Friction losses, and maneuver due to outrunning logistics.  

 

"I rather think that the consideration and planning of attritional warfare is done at levels above Corps Commander if it’s done at all."

 

To PhilB's comment above about the level upon which attritional thinking would have been practiced is key.  I'm a civilian background but deal with forest fires as part of work and have learned there are excellent strategic thinkers who think big and think well...but are barely function in a line leadership capacity.  And the opposite is true...great line leaders but can not think at a higher level, multi-fire/region/district level.   Now try to think of the leadership of Division and higher level formations and how many are known as "line leaders" and how many are "big picture"...Is this in part the difference between Sir John French and Sir Douglas Haig?   From a Canadian perspective Sir Julian Byng was critical to filling the initial liaison role between the BEF and the Canadian Corps  during Vimy Ridge until replaced by a now more experienced Arthur Currie yet the scale did not change but the degree of autonomy did to allow the combined Entante forces to maintain a set of multiple, limited offensives in the later part of the war and grind Central Power forces down.  To "keep up the skeer" as Bedford Forrest described it (okay he was a racist but it's a good quote) and not allow for recovery/replacement of units and in turn not just defeat units but to shatter them and truly attrite them.

 

foresterab

 

 

 

[phil andrade]

Foresterab,

 

The Canadian story is a superb microcosm of how to fight to maximum effect in attritional war.  Vimy, Lens, Passchendaele and, above all, The Hundred Days : no nation made a better account of itself than Canada.

 

My interpretation of the attritional aspects of the Great War is defined largely by the importance of the much  bigger picture : what was happening at Gorlice Tarnov in May 1915 was of inestimable importance in the conduct of warfare in France and Flanders when Frenchmen strove to take Vimy Ridge ; the pressure on Russians and Serbs did much to determine the enormity of the mighty Champagne/Artois offensive in September .  Likewise, the Russian attacks at Lake Naroch in March 1916 were launched largely to help France when the Battle of Verdun was raging at peak intensity .  Nothing better illustrates this than the Brusilov onslaught, taken in conjunction with the Entente offensive on the Somme and the Italians’  exertions on their too often  overlooked sector of the conflict ; there was a  massive coalition attempt to practice attrition in terms of coordinated action across different theatres of war.

 

As to how the Central Powers were able to counter this with their own attritional efforts....that’s something that I would like to reflect on and discuss.

 

Phil

 

 

Edited 11 May , 2021 by phil andrade

[ilkley remembers]

11 hours ago, phil andrade said:

My interpretation of the attritional aspects of the Great War is defined largely by the importance of the much  bigger picture : what was happening at Gorlice Tarnov in May 1915 was of inestimable importance in the conduct of warfare in France and Flanders when Frenchmen strove to take Vimy Ridge ; the pressure on Russians and Serbs did much to determine the enormity of the mighty Champagne/Artois offensive in September .  Likewise, the Russian attacks at Lake Naroch in March 1916 were launched largely to help France when the Battle of Verdun was raging at peak intensity .  Nothing better illustrates this than the Brusilov onslaught, taken in conjunction with the Entente offensive on the Somme and the Italians’  exertions on their too often  overlooked sector of the conflict ; there was a  massive coalition attempt to practice attrition in terms of coordinated action across different theatres of war.

 

 

Some interesting points here in relation to the coordinated(ish) attacks on the Central Powers in 1915/1916 but it begs the question I suppose; that for all this expenditure of Entente manpower what was actually achieved?

Edited 11 May , 2021 by ilkley remembers

[phil andrade]

10 hours ago, ilkley remembers said:

 

 

Some interesting points here in relation to the coordinated(ish) attacks on the Central Powers in 1915/1916 but it begs the question I suppose; that for all this expenditure of Entente manpower what was actually achieved?

What was actually achieved ?

 

The continuation of the war through two more years was testimony to failure....hindsight bestows that knowledge.

 

In August 1916 things must have looked more encouraging.

 

The Central Powers were tottering under Brusilov pressure.

 

Romania joined the Allies.

 

The German War Loan was shortly to fail for the first time.

 

Falkenhayn was removed from his post and replaced with the HL duumvirate.

 

The blockade retained its stranglehold.

 

Clearly, attrition was effective : the corollary to this was the ability of the Germans to impose their own attrional measures on the Allies, the success of these being especially apparent in the collapse of Russia.

 

Phil

[PhilB]

To extend Ilkley’s point, it looks to me that the Entente powers may have been fighting a partly attritional and partly offensive war at the same time - blockades and expensive mass attacks. Does it make sense to do both? I don’t know - because there was no officially taught theory of attrition, who would know how it’s best fought? One thing I am convinced about is that it would have to be planned and directed at the very highest level, not locally.

[phil andrade]

Chantilly conferences were an attempt to plan and direct attrition at the highest level.

 

Did the belligerents desire and design  the war of attrition ?

 

I don’t think so.

 

They were doing their best to avoid it, but, once confronted with deadlock, they were stuck with it and they had to make it up as they went along .

 

Precedents  - the American Civil War, for example- certainly bestowed lessons, but this was on a scale and intensity that defied comparison.

 

Now I’m feeling that I’m making things up as I go along !

 

My opinion is that we too readily traduce the leaders for fighting the attritional war : it was compulsion rather than choice, and they actually did remarkably well.  That’s what made this war so terrible.  It was too evenly balanced to allow for the quicker and cheaper outcome.

 

Phil

Edited 12 May , 2021 by phil andrade

[phil andrade]

On 28/10/2005 at 11:21, PhilB said:

 I assume the object of attrition is simply to kill or wound as many of the enemy as possible at least cost to yourself and ground gain seems to be immaterial. Once It had been decided that the Allies could not fight their way to Berlin, was it necessary to capture ground?

 

 

Hi PhilB,

 

You won't mind me going back all those years to look at your original post, I hope .....goodness, the time that has elapsed since then is nearly four times as long as the Great War itself !

 

Apologies if this has already been mentioned ; ground gained was an essential aspect of attrition in terms of battlefield killing.  The value of the ground was the facility it lent to observation and firepower.  A small eminence in France or Flanders might afford the enemy an immense advantage for the siting of artillery.  Capturing a  tiny piece of ground might be worth ten thousand lives if one hundred thousand are saved from the ravages of enemy fire.  Think of Messines,  Vimy, Chemin des Dames etc.

 

If, by capturing such ground, you can exploit it by inflicting disproportionate slaughter on the enemy, then the gain of ground assumes a tremendous importance.

 

Forgive me if I state the bleeding obvious.

 

Phil

[ilkley remembers]

Or to put it another way,

 

The exhaustion of British credit on the New York money markets and by extension France, hindered the Entente’s and particularly Russia’s ability to pursue the war.

 

The bloodshed of the Brusilov offensive was a major cause of loss of morale and general war weariness in Russia which in turn contributed to revolution in 1917.

 

The French army’s emotional attachment to Verdun, which Falkenhayn understood, resulted in a serious drain on available resources and directly influenced the crisis of morale the following year,

 

As Falkenhayn apparently predicted the British were required to open an attacked on the Somme which by any most parameters was a disaster.

 

Romania’s entry into the war was a dubious blessing not least, ultimately, for the Romanians.

 

Intelligence failures amongst the Western allies about the ability of the Central Powers to carry on the war into 1917 led to an over optimistic strategic view. It also certainly resulted in a wildly inaccurate assessment of the value of attrition as an offensive tactic.

 

Germany may have put out peace feelers which probably indicated war weariness but its ability to continue the fight was seemingly undiminished and the Entente clearly listened to the noise rather than read the signals.

 

For me the attritional strategy and attendant tactics of 1916 were failure (for attrition in 1917 see 1916). No decisive breakout was achieved and the conduct of the war that year only appears to have given the ‘body counters’ satisfaction.

 

Phil, ‘Duumvirate’, great word by the way; absolutely love it and will definitely use.

 

Edward

[phil andrade]

Edward,

 

Would you be willing to view some of the attritional operations mounted by the Entente in 1917 as successful ?

 

I allude specifically to the retaking of the Mort Homme sector at Verdun in the summer of 1917, and the Malmaison attack in the autumn.  These were undoubtedly local but significant triumphs that caused disproportionately high casualties for the Germans.

The same might be said of the Canadian attack at Hill 70 in August.

 

The Nivelle Offensive and  that of Haig in  Flanders were , if I’m right, predicated on breakthrough and were failures.

 

Petain was a good attritionist ; Haig was not.

 

Despite their calamitous disappointment in their attacks in April, the French succeeded in inflicting higher losses in killed/captured on the Germans in the entire year of 1917 than they themselves suffered.

 

An attritional success of sorts, I opine.

 

 

Phil