Outflanking the Western Front

[jdajd]

I think the use of the word momentous was wrong, but I could not think of another. What I meant was that just because a tactic or device failed or did not perform up to heightened expectations does nto mean it should be abandoned. As an example I used the use of gas by the British at Loos where because of prevailing wind conditions much of it blew back at the British. Had the high command taken the if at first we don't succeed quit approach gas as a weapon would have been abandoned by the British. The tanks exemplify this as well. Haig had huge expectations for the tank, but when they were first used on the Somme they did not break the German line opening the way for the cavalry. New tactics and ways of coordinating attacks had to be established before they would truly be successful. I know this a very simplistic approach as there are other considerations, but as Domsim stated what if the British had given up after or even during the Somme. The "failures" on the Somme were what turned the BEF into a better fighting machine capable of turning one of the most complete collapses on the Western Front into a march to victory.

Just because an amphibious landing was unsuccessful in 1925 did not mean that it could not be successful in 1916 or 17 or 18, just more thought and planning would have to go into it.

[Robert Dunlop]

One General Sir Henry Rawlinson, who worked in collaboration with Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon. The latter's account is contained in 'The Dover Patrol 1915-1917'. Bacon was in no doubt that the attack would have been successful. In September 1917:

'A conference was held at GHQ, at which I urged that, in default of the Army reaching Roulers, we should carry out a modified operation - sieze the coast merely [?!*!] from Middelkerke to Nieuport, destroy the one hundred odd guns installed in that corner, and give the Navy a chance of landing heavy guns at the Palace Hotel to reach the Zeebrugge lock and Bruges dock. Of this, however, the Commander-in-Chief did not approve.

But as General Sir H Rawlinson was quite prepared to carry out the main operation before dawn if there was good moonlight, the Commander-in-Chief approved of this being done. Everything was, therefore, kept ready for the project all through September and half of October. The only difference it made to us was that the glare of the phosphorus-burners would be apparent; but this, extending over a length of three miles, did not worry me. After the enemy had appreciated that the glare was approaching, it would have been impossible for him, in the twenty minutes only that would elapse up to the time of landing, to take any active measures to forestall the attack.

On October 15th the 1st Division was ordered to move from the coast, and the operations were abandoned for that year. Disappointment and gloom settled for the time on us all!'

So he wrote a poem:

'The Dream

Slowly move the ships in darkness piercing through the inky night -

Monitors lashed close together, pontoons reaching out of sight.

Eighteen thousand men assembled, chafing at the progress slow,

Wait the aim of their ambition, wait for the time to strike the blow.

Breezes soft blow warm, for summer with its heat has scarcely gone;

There will bear our shelt'ring smoke-cloud, and blot out the fleet at morn.

Light-buoys gleam and mark the turnings for our passage to the beach -

Ships now swing and head the pontoons for the points they hope to reach.

Roar of guns at shattered Nieuport, Westende batteries reply.

See the shore attack in progress lights with glare the neighbouring sky.

Star-shells burst and light our vessels with the brilliance of their rays,

But our smoke spreads sweeping shorewards an impenetrable haze.

Dawn now tints the former darkness; blackness changed to ashy grey,

Marks the near approaching advent of that long-awaited day.

Bursts of firing from the smaller monitors on either beam,

Shells from batteries soon answer, heralded by vicious scream;

Then our twelve-inch join the clamour, hurling death at point-blank range.

Each man grips his rifle firmly, final whispers interchange.

Tanks are throbbing, engines warming, ready for that classic climb -

Minutes never passed so slowly; seconds seem long hours of time.

Then at last faint shock and grating, one great rush, and one great cheer,

As the tanks and living columns in the smoke-cloud disappear.

But that shout our dream has ended; broken is our reverie -

Wake to find that we've been dreaming of what never now can be.

Cruel fortune rudely shattered that matured and cherished scheme-

All that might have been has faded. Nothing left us but a dream!'

Still, Bacon did manage to get one of his plans fulfilled - the blocking attack at Zeebrugge.

Robert

[PhilB]

Quote:- But as General Sir H Rawlinson was quite prepared to carry out the main operation before dawn if there was good moonlight,

It`s not clear from this, Robert, whether Rawly was in charge of the whole operation, the Western end or whether he`d actually be there on the beachhead? Phil B

[domsim]

'A conference was held at GHQ, at which I urged that, in default of the Army reaching Roulers, we should carry out a modified operation - sieze the coast merely [?!*!] from Middelkerke to Nieuport, destroy the one hundred odd guns installed in that corner, and give the Navy a chance of landing heavy guns at the Palace Hotel to reach the Zeebrugge lock and Bruges dock.  Of this, however, the Commander-in-Chief did not approve.

Robert

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

As Robert's quote shows very well the main purpose of this operation was not to achieve a decisive break through and roll back the German frontline, but to deny the use of Ostend and Zeebrugge as U boat and destroyer bases to the German navy (allied merchant shipping losses to U-Boats were of great concern after the introduction of unrestricted submarine warfare by the Germans in January 1917). To achieve this Bacon wanted to put a couple of 18 inch naval guns in the Palace Hotel at Westende from where they could shell both the ports and make them unusable for the German Navy.

I like Bacon he was definitely a big gun man, a good example being the Dominion Battery at Adinkerke which carried on a duel with the Tirpitz battery just south west of Ostend.

Cheers

Dominic

[Guest]

My contention is that a second attempt would be no more "criminal" then repeated attempts at frontal assaults with minimal gains. 

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

What is with this "criminal" stuff? It only applies if you think the British really were lions led by donkeys, which modern scholarship shows to be a rather ridiculous position.

For the British to have carried out an opposed landing in Flanders would have entailed a collosal production of lift capacity and logistics capability, plus the development of sound tactics for the operation. Just look at how hard it was to get it right in WWII. Taken all in all, it would have involved a major subtraction of resources from the existing land campaign.

And don't forget that they would have had to do it in the face of German air superiority, which by late 1917 and 1918 (and before?) had already become a factor in every operation.

In 1914-18, the fact is that the British only had the capacity and ability to make an unopposed seaborne landing.

[Guest]

Dominion Battery at Adinkerke

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Do you happen to know precisely where it was located in Adinkerke?

[PhilB]

As Robert's quote shows very well the main purpose of this operation was not to achieve a decisive break through and roll back the German frontline, but to deny the use of Ostend and Zeebrugge as U boat and destroyer bases to the German navy

Dominic

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

I assumed that the whole object of getting round a flank was to roll it up. Or in this case, a double whammy in that you get the U-boat pens as well. Was it thought, then, that rolling up was not possible even if you got round the flank? Phil B

[domsim]

Do you happen to know precisely where it was located in Adinkerke?

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Angie

It was at St Joseph's Farm just outside Adinkerke and is mentioned in Christopher Paige's article on the landing here:

Great Landing

I have seen photographs of the battery but can't remember where. Hope this helps

Cheers

Dominic

[jdajd]

What is with this "criminal" stuff? It only applies if you think the British really were lions led by donkeys, which modern scholarship shows to be a rather ridiculous position.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Criminal was not my quote, I was questioning the use of the term in one of the earlier posts, which now that I am rereading it again I may have misunderstood:

"i have a photo somewhere of a tank practicing climbing a sea wall,so they must have been contemplating it,i think gallipoli kept springing to mind,i dont think they had the knowhow on how to land a large enough force in one go,but they did practice landing tanks,one failed sea assault is bad enough,two assaults is criminal,bernard"

I do not subscribe to the lions/donkeys as nothing is ever simply black and white. Obviously there were good AND bad generals on both sides, but when in history has this not been true?

BTW I meant 1915 not 1925, but I guess that was obvious given the context.

[Robert Dunlop]

Operation Hush was a combined Navy-Army operation. General Rawlinson was responsible for the Army bit. He was GOC Fourth Army, which was responsible for the coastal sector as well as 1st Division. Rawlinson's Chief-of-Staff, Major-General Montgomery, was also involved in the high level planning. Most of the detailed Staff work fell to Colonel McMullen. The HQ for the actual landing would have been the British 1st Division HQ. Maj-General Strickland was GOC 1st Division at this time. I am unclear whether he would have landed. There was to have been a 'GOC's party, about 19 officers, 40 other ranks'.

Not long after Gallipoli, Admiral Bacon had contemplated a landing near Ostend. Hunter-Weston and Colonel Aspinall were consulted 'and the conferences strengthened our ties with General Headquarters in France. What we learned of the military side of the problem stood us in good stead when we prepared for the Great Landing jointly with Sir H Rawlinson in 1917.'

I have attached a map of the proposed immediate objectives for the landing. You can see that the second objectives were not that far inland. 'Another scheme was also prepared in which the original was modified so as to be merely a jump to destroy the guns and hold Westende without a further advance along the coast being mediated.'

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

And here is a picture of the countryside just inland from the dunes, near Middelkerke.

Robert

[PhilB]

Thanks, Robert. I thought that after the lack of drive at Suvla, there might have been a thrusting general in command of the landing party. Looks like rolling up the line or otherwise exploiting the flank penetration was not a serious part of the plan? Phil B

[Robert Dunlop]

Phil, safest to say that this wasn't the immediate priority. Admiral Bacon mentions that one hope was that the Germans would so concentrate on containing or eliminating the landing that they would get trapped by an encirclement from the breakout off the Passchendaele Ridge. I think it was also hoped that the landing would accelerate a withdrawal. This would have resulted in 'exploitation' but not in the sense that you are referring to, ie an active pushing back.

Robert