Outflanking the Western Front

[PhilB]

It`s always assumed that the Western Front was not outflankable because it was anchored at both ends by physical features. The Germans carried out a very effective action at Nieuport at the northern end and any advance there would not lay open its northern flank to enfilade, especially if covered by the Royal Navy. Could any stategists out there explain why going "round the top" was never an option? Phil B

[Paul Reed]

A seaborne landing was contemplated by the British along the Belgian coast; the 1st and 42nd (East Lancs) Division trained for it. But it never happened due to the extensive German gun batteries around Knocke, and elsewhere. There was an article about this in a back issue of Alf Peacock's Gun Fire magazine, in the 1980s?

[squirrel]

Weren't the Navy none too keen on the idea?

[Paul Reed]

I believe so; they also developed huge 'landing craft' and modified tanks so they could cross sand and climb seawalls (a la D Day 27 years later), but the craft were very slow and vulnerable: there is no doubt in my mind this would have been a costly failure if attempted.

[bernardmcilwaine]

i have a photo somewhere of a tank practicing climbing a sea wall,so they must have been contemplating it,i think gallipoli kept springing to mind,i dont think they had the knowhow on how to land a large enough force in one go,but they did practice landing tanks,one failed sea assault is bad enough,two assaults is criminal,bernard

[PhilB]

I wasn`t thinking of a seaborne landing, though. I was thinking of a land attack at the northern end of the line aimed at breaking through while being supported by naval gunnery. Then, of course, the cavalry goes through the G in gap, swings right and rolls up the German line. I can just see H*** sweeping his hand over the map as he says it! ! While Rawlinson looks doubtful. Phil B

[Paul Reed]

The reason a land attack in the northern area was not considered was due to the terrain. It is not favourable for an advance, and much of it was flooded following King Albert I's order to flood the Yser plain in 1914. That is why a seaborne landing was considered, so troops could landed in ground further up that coast that was better for an exploitation.

[squirrel]

m13pgb

do i detect the merest hint of cynicysm in your posting?

Still reckon the Navy weren't up for it though.

[PhilB]

I see from Robert Dunlop`s article here http://www.1914-1918.net/BATTLES/hush/hush.htm that the proposed landing on the coast was in support of a breakout. This indicates that a breakout was considered practicable in this area? Phil B

[CROONAERT]

. There was an article about this in a back issue of Alf Peacock's Gun Fire magazine, in the 1980s?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Yes. It was in the third series, number 11 and was a reprint of General Dobbie's account of the preparations for an amphibious assault on the Belgian coast in 1917, along with notes about the troops who were to be involved. The next issue (3rd Series, number 12) contains the account of Admiral Bacon from his book "The Dover Patrol" which also includes details of an earlier proposal (1915) for an attack on Ostend. It also includes a pull-out of the Coastal Sections and diagrams of the Pontoon and Monitors designed to be used.

Thwere were also several other mentions in later editions.

I believe that G.H.Smith is in the process of re-printing certain editions of "Gun Fire".

Dave.

[Robert Dunlop]

The problems of outflanking the Entente were exposed in the last phase of the Race to the Sea. As the Germans followed the Belgian Army down the coast they came under very heavy naval gunfire from the British Navy. This, plus the flooding and the stubborn defence by the Belgians, prevented the Germans from breaking through.

Once the front stabilized, the newly-formed Marinekorps Flandern set about defending the coast. Various gun batteries were installed, including heavy naval guns. The latter were positioned to defend the ports, such as Ostend. The British attempted to attack the ports in an attempt to neutralize their use for U-Boats. Monitors were used but the German heavy batteries could engage them at ranges that made the monitors' fire ineffective.

The German attack on Nieuport was not designed as an attempt to breakthrough. The Marinekorps realised that the French, who usually occupied the sector between Nieuport and the sea, had been replaced by the British. There was a long-standing fear of seaborne invasion. The change was rightly guessed to be the fore-runner of such an attempt. So the Marinekorps attacked the Nieuport bridgehead and effectively neutralized it as a land-based jumping off point. The Yser was too wide to permit a full-blown assault by the British on the Germans once the bridgehead had been significantly reduced.

Operation Hush was designed to outflank the German positions along the Yser. The coastal defences were still formidable. The aim was for the British breakout from Passchendaele to create a threat to the coastal sector. The seaborne landings could then take place, supported by a breakout from Nieuport. Phil has already pointed to the articles on this - there is a related article on the German attack known as Operation Beach Party.

Any German breakthrough on the coast would have been severely hammered. Naval gunfire support was nasty. Although the earliest landings at Gallipoli were not as well supported, once observers were ashore the naval gunfire could decimate Turkish infantry attacks. It quickly forced the Turks to move, and often attack, mainly at night. Even then, if the naval vessels could get search lights onto the attack......

The only realistic way the Germans could have gained more coast would have been to turn the position at Ypres. This would have rendered the Belgian line untenable. The Entente would have had to re-establish positions well down the coast and all of Belgium would have been lost.

Robert

[jdajd]

i,one failed sea assault is bad enough,two assaults is criminal,bernard

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Not to dispute the ability or inability to pull off an amphibious assault, I just find your last line strange given the context of WWI.

It seems to me that an attempt to try something different and failing is no less criminal than trying the same thing over and over and failing time and again.

JMHO

Jon

[Jack Sheldon]

Further to the point about the difficulty of crossing the Yser and advancing east, there is an excellent 1:5,000 map, dated 24 Jun 17 in the regimental history of Marine Infantry Regiment 1, which shows that the defensive position to the east of the river was a truly formidable obstacle. Anchored on the dunes and the villages of Lombartzijde and Westende and very heavily, no make that extraordinarily heavily, wired and prepared for defence, this zone was extensively sub-divided and fully developed to a depth of five kilometres in such a way as to be able to repel attack from the sea or across the river. The difficulties for an attacker, posed by this arrangement and from the flooding to which Paul has alluded were so great that it is no surprise that no such attack was ever seriously contemplated.

Jack

[PhilB]

As formidable as the Hindenburg Line canal defences, say? Phil B

[Jack Sheldon]

Phil

In its way, yes, but for different reasons. The approaches to the Yser would have made it very difficult to assemble an assault force and because the water was flowing, the improvisations used on the canal would probably have been inadequate for the crossing, which would have complicated things even more. Once across, I do not think that concrete featured as much, but the field fortifications were very well developed and the wiring plan, as I mentioned, was very complex. There was belt after belt of it in places.

Jack

[PhilB]

What you say, Jack, implies that the Germans made special attempts to fortify the line along the Yser. This would indicate that they thought an attempted breakthrough there was likely and strategically dangerous? In other words, they were trying hard to ensure that the Western Front was not outflanked? Phil B

[Jack Sheldon]

I think that that is mostly fair comment. Any boundary or flank is inherently weak, but my reading would be that strenuous efforts were made by the German army to stregthen the area and so render an attempt at forcing the Yser position unlikely.

Jack

[Guest]

Not to dispute the ability or inability to pull off an amphibious assault, I just find your last line strange given the context of WWI.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Surely the whole point is that Gallipoli demonstrated in 1915 that the British were rankly incometent when it came to opposed landings. Admittedly 1915 was the year of British incompetence and things improved from 1916 onwards, but it does mean that before they could attempt an opposed landing they needed to come up with something better. This is what the British did in every other department after 1915.

[jdajd]

No, I understood the point, just not the reasoning. I've read all the above posts and again am not disputing whether a landing would have been impossible. My contention is that a second attempt would be no more "criminal" then repeated attempts at frontal assaults with minimal gains. If one looks at most tactics on the Western Front the beginning was never as momentous as the end result. For example by the "criminal" reasoning the British experience with gas at Loos should have resulted in abandoning gas as an effective weapon. The same could be said of the first use of the tanks. Admittedly, some gains were made, but they were not as great as they could have been if tanks were properly used as at Cambrai. My point was that if at first you don't succeed try to find a way to do so don't jsut abandon the idea. Maybe someone could have invented the Higgins boats long before WWII even started.

[PhilB]

If one looks at most tactics on the Western Front the beginning was never as momentous as the end result.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Could you expand, j? Phil B

[domsim]

i have a photo somewhere of a tank practicing climbing a sea wall,so they must have been contemplating it,i think gallipoli kept springing to mind,i dont think they had the knowhow on how to land a large enough force in one go,but they did practice landing tanks,one failed sea assault is bad enough,two assaults is criminal,bernard

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

I don't agree with the idea that because Gallipoli was a failure that no more amphibious landings should have been contemplated. If one accepts the consensus of opionion amongst military historians these days, that the British armed forces were on a steep learning curve during the First world war, then the idea of dropping such landings after one (admittedly costly) reverse seems unrealistic. What would have happened if the High command gave up after the Somme in 1916, no ultimate victory in 1918? Or if the allies cancelled D-Day because of the failure at Dieppe?

I think if one compares the preparations made for Operation Hush in 1917 with those made for Gallipoli in 1915 one can clearly see lessons learned particularly in terms of provision of specialised landing craft and the innovative use of tanks (an idea suggested by Haig himself). Of course the operation was cancelled so we shall never what would have happened, but I think this was a well planned (or as well planned as it could be at that time) and bold idea. Reading the memoirs of troops of the 1st Division they felt their training had been comprehensive and pertinent.

I suspect the landings would have failed but not for want of training, equipment or imagination.

I will now shut up.

Cheers

Dominic

[Robert Dunlop]

An opposed amphibious landing is a tough exercise. This was recognised before the Gallipoli landings. Given the time and resource constraints, the broad plan for the landings was not bad. There was quite a decent amount of naval gunfire support. The multiple landings kept von Sanders guessing.

But, oh the command and control once things got underway!! Especially reinforcing failure at Cape Helles. Once the landings had succeeded in getting men ashore, the whole problem with Gallipolli lay in the nature of static trench warfare. No different from the Western Front, broadly speaking.

Lessons had been learned for Operation Hush. It was only going ahead if the German rear areas were threatened. Thus, had the British reached the Passchendaele Ridge sooner and then begun an advance into the surrounding countryside, Operation Hush would have been launched. As it happened, the Marineskorps Flandern found their heavy artillery assets were stripped away as Third Ypres ground on. Something similar might have happened had the British managed to make more progress on the landward side before the landing. The other notable feature was the preparations for screening the landing. Tons and tons of phosphorus were to be released as clouds of smoke, particularly on the flanks. Aerial dominance would have been essential for the British. The big German naval batteries relied on aerial observers to help them engage British monitors and other naval vessels that were tens of miles away.

Would Operation Hush have been successful? Possibly, but there is no doubting that an amphibious assault is very risky. At least the operation was called off when the requirements for success were not met.

Robert

[PhilB]

Presumably Operation Hush would have been of no use unless there had been a rapid expansion and breakout from the initial landing.

With the failure of command at Suvla fresh in mind, who would have been the Oi/c on the spot and how would static trench warfare have been avoided? Phil B

[Robert Dunlop]

The idea was to create a deep penetration into the German coastal defences. The attack would link up with a breakout from the Nieuport salient. After the Marinekorps attack, the chances of the latter happening were negligible. To enhance the mobility of the landing force, 1st Division's assets were supplemented with tanks, 13th and 17th Cyclist Battalions, and 3 motorised machine gun batteries. In truth, the tanks were there to help secure the beachhead, engaging the machine gun and other emplacements in the immediate vicinity of the landing.

Supposing the landing had succeeded in getting most of the amphibious forces ashore. I think it is possible that the sizeable force would have secured a foothold. But a breakout would have been unlikely. The Marineskorps Flandern were very highly trained to respond to such a scenario. They would have contained the landing. Cyclists and the MMGs were unlikely to roam freely in the German rear areas. A stalemate could only be prevented by the threat to the Germans' line of retreat. If this threat was severe, some of the Marinekorps would likely have been siphoned off to contain the breakout from Ypres. Once 1st Division's landing was contained, the Germans would probably have had to conduct one of their withdrawals. Plenty of high quality machine gunners as rear guards whilst the remainder of the German forces slipped away under cover of darkness. Then the step-wise withdrawal of the rear guards.

Naval gunfire support would have played a minimal role in supporting the landings. So long as the big naval guns could be used then their effects on the flanks and rear areas would have been significant. However, if the big German batteries were not silenced or made blind, then the British Navy would have had to back off.

Robert

[PhilB]

Thanks, Robert. And the commander of the landing force - was he named? Phil B