Did the British army know that the Poziers to Serre sector was the most heavily defended in the Somme ?

[Simon Cains]

5 hours ago, bmac said:

Let's be clear that the original idea for an attack on the Somme came from Joffre in late December 1915 and was aimed at an area well south of the river, i.e. about the Saint Quentin to Amiens road, and down to the town of Lassigny, a front of c.30 kms. Haig was invited to consider an attack on Third Army's front somewhere between Arras and the Somme but, initially, Joffre thought the area between Ransart and the Ancre most suitable [AFdGG, Tome IV, Vol 1, Annexes Vol. 1, Annexe 63, page 153.] After fighting alongside the BEF at Loos there was no great enthusiasm on the part of the French to do it again. On the other hand, given the widespread view the British were failing to pull their weight in the fighting, they wanted the BEF to launch a major offensive concurrently with the French one almost anywhere.

Such an attack north of the Ancre would have included the area attacked by the French in June 1915 which moved the German line back from about Toutvent Ferme to the Heidenkopf and Redan Ridge. It was as a result of this attack that a great deal of work went into strengthening the German defences north of the Ancre. The British were aware of the nature of the defences, the numerous deep dugouts, etc., in the vicinity as several were entered by trench raids between Gommecourt and Beaumont Hamel well before the 1st July. In the week immediately prior to the offensive, however, almost every raid failed in this sector which should have told 'higher authority' something wasn't quite right.

It was not until sometime in the spring, and after the Verdun fighting started to erode the French commitment on the Somme, that the idea of an attack 'jointif' astride the Somme became the plan and, even then, there was reluctance on the part of the French, i.e Fayolle, commanding VIe Armee, to have troops north of the river advancing east between Maricourt and the right bank of the Somme. Progressively, as the troops available to Foch/Fayolle were steadily reduced, the front south of the Somme moved further and further north until it ended up running south from opposite Frise to Soyecourt. Xe Armee, however, was ordered to prepare an offensive along the abandoned front down to Lassigny partly as a deception and partly 'just in case'.

There was, however, a time when the initially unhappy and reluctant Foch decided that crossing the Somme south of Peronne was a possibility. On 16th March he proposed a plan involving three armies which would attack south of the Somme and cross the river between Cizancourt in the north to Offoy in the south [AFdGG, Tome IV, Vol. 1, Annexes, Vol 2, Annexe 1282, page 457.] In total, the plan involved 44 French divisions (one north of the river) and 12-15 British divisions, on a front of 53 miles (85 kms). He demanded 1,069 heavy and 1.908 field guns and 836 trench mortars. Verdun saw to that idea, especially after fighting spread to the left bank of the Meuse in early March. Eventually, and after much toing and froing, only two French divisions attacked north of the river and two Corps d'armee to the south.

Leaving to one side the argument over Thiepval, several French officers believed the attack south of the river was one of the great lost opportunities of the war. Had they driven south and rolled up the German lines whilst Xe Armee simultaneously attack west-east a major tactical victory might have ensued. Two factors intervened: Foch and Fayolle's very deliberate, and therefore slow, artillery led tactics, and Haig's determination to attack north out of Montauban in pursuit of the attack on Bapaume. For nearly two days south of the Somme there were very few organised German defences facing north from the old front line and east to the Somme, Berdoulat, commander of the 1er Colonial Corps, was keen to attack south but, instead, the advance stopped as troops were relieved. In addition, German batteries north of the river were able to bombard his units because the French advance east towards Hardecourt, Hem-Monacu, etc., was stopped whilst the British attacked at a 90 degree angle northwards and, therefore, away from this line of attack.

After the war a Lt. Col. Jacques Gallini wrote in Essai de rupture du front en 1916 - les attaques des 1er 2 et 3 juillet dans la Somme:

“Why, under such conditions, did the VIe Armée not do more and kick open the door which it had opened so well on 3^rd July in the early afternoon? Because its leader (Fayolle), prudent and methodical, did not want to commit himself to chance and preferred to wait for the arrival of new information, to decide in full knowledge of the facts on the exploitation of the success of his first-level units. It thus enabled the enemy to pull themselves together, to call on all available elements in the immediate rear of the battle, to throw them into places where the front had given way, to dig new trenches, to organize their fire zones, so that on the 4^th, when the Corps Colonial set off at 5 p.m. to reach the road from Belloy to Deniécourt, which was its objective, it found an adversary on guard...

Where should one seek the cause of the procrastination which caused such unfortunate effects? In the lessons of the war. Twice previously, in 1915, the French army found itself in a similar situation. In Artois and Champagne impetuous attacks had ruptured the enemy’s front line and then the assault waves had died in front of unrecognized positions. These memories were fresh in the minds of the High Command when it prepared for the Battle of the Somme. To prevent the control of operations from eluding it again, to retain the choice of the moment to exploit success, it had restricted all units to a rigid schedule."

Thank you for that essay, just the perspective I was looking for.  So many books about the Somme just stop all maps and discussion at the limit of the British sector.  But my great uncle was at Montauban on the 1st, so I am interested in that area and its potential.

Edited 11 April by Simon Cains

[Ancre1917]

Simon

If you haven’t read Jonathan Porter’s masterly account of the actions between Maricourt and Mametz, it’s well worth the money. There’s a link to the book and a review by Chris Baker here

https://www.naval-military-press.com/product/zero-hour-z-dayxiii-operations-between-maricourt-mametz1st-july-1916/

 

Richard

[Simon Cains]

15 hours ago, Ancre1917 said:

Simon

If you haven’t read Jonathan Porter’s masterly account of the actions between Maricourt and Mametz, it’s well worth the money. There’s a link to the book and a review by Chris Baker here

https://www.naval-military-press.com/product/zero-hour-z-dayxiii-operations-between-maricourt-mametz1st-july-1916/

 

Richard

Hi yes I bought a copy of that a few years ago.  Certainly excellent detail on the preparations on the XIII Corps sector, and the first 24 hours.  But I am also interested in the bigger picture including the French, and the arguments over the next few days. I see he has already written a second volume covering as far as Mametz, and planning to write the rest of the Somme ( British sector).

[bmac]

I have a book about the French attack on 1st July 75% complete which I hope to finish next year. It has taken a back seat to a 2-volume account of the planning of the British/French attack I hope to have out later this summer (along with four other books on non-Somme WW1 subjects and another out this month). I started to do a series of books progressively covering the front for the 1st July and started from the north but, after the two about Gommecourt (Pro Patria Mori & A Lack of Offensive Spirit?, 2008), and the one about the VIII Corps (Z Day, 2014), I got diverted onto other projects. I wish Mr Porter well with his endeavours.

In the meantime, if there is anything specific about the French planning and their delivery of the attack on 1st July you want to know please feel free to ask and I will see what I can do. The two books about the planning and the one about the French run to 2,200+ pages currently so there may well be an answer in there somewhere. :-)

[Ancre1917]

I can certainly recommend bmac’s book : Lack of Ofensive Spirit?  Its attention to detail is second to none, especially in the personal  information that’s included. It’s an indispensable guide to anyone who is investigating this northern part of the battle on 1st July.  I’ve also read Pro Patria Mori, but I’m mostly interested in the North Staffordshire regiment. 

Jonathan was writing volume 3 on the la Boiselle area the last I heard. Again, that’s an area of interest to me as the village was taken by 19 (Western) Division that included 8 NSR. I haven’t heard how he’s getting on, unfortunately.

Elizabeth Greenhalgh’s  Foch in Command Cambridge 2011 has two chapters on his work preparing for and fighting the Somme. There’s also a section in her book The French Army and the First World War Cambridge 2014.  I’ve also used the Michelin guide: Les champs de bataille - Somme to get around the area. 
Richard

[Robert Dunlop]

On 11/04/2024 at 12:01, bmac said:

There was, however, a time when the initially unhappy and reluctant Foch decided that crossing the Somme south of Peronne was a possibility... Eventually, and after much toing and froing, only two French divisions attacked north of the river and two Corps d'armee to the south.

Thank you, bmac.

The possibility of turning the German defenders from the north was ruled out by Joffre in early June. He noted that the fighting around Verdun had '...obliged me to decrease the number of French forces that could be engaged initially in the Somme offensive', as you noted previously. Joffre went on to write: 'It follows that General Foch's attack frontage will barely extend past the Amiens-Péronne road to the south [i.e. the road passing through Villers-Bretonneux and south of the Flaucourt plateau. Capture of the plateau was a key objective of the French attack south of the Somme]. Furthermore, it is out of the question for Foch to achieve the previous objectives assigned to him (on the Ham [25km south of Péronne] - Péronne - Bouchavesnes [6km north of Péronne] front) with the relatively weaker forces available.'

Joffre set the following objectives for the attack north of the Somme: '...Hem, Maurepas, and the high ground to the north'.

It is important to note, however, that the Germans would not have been aware of this reduction in scope. Once the Somme offensive started, the threat of turning Péronne would have been emphasised by the efforts of the French north of the river. It is not that the Germans would have been unaware of such a threat before the battle. The threat is obvious when looking at the map.  

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

On 11/04/2024 at 12:01, bmac said:

Leaving to one side the argument over Thiepval, several French officers believed the attack south of the river was one of the great lost opportunities of the war. Had they driven south and rolled up the German lines whilst Xe Armee simultaneously attack west-east a major tactical victory might have ensued. Two factors intervened: Foch and Fayolle's very deliberate, and therefore slow, artillery led tactics, and Haig's determination to attack north out of Montauban in pursuit of the attack on Bapaume. For nearly two days south of the Somme there were very few organised German defences facing north from the old front line and east to the Somme, Berdoulat, commander of the 1er Colonial Corps, was keen to attack south but, instead, the advance stopped as troops were relieved. In addition, German batteries north of the river were able to bombard his units because the French advance east towards Hardecourt, Hem-Monacu, etc., was stopped whilst the British attacked at a 90 degree angle northwards and, therefore, away from this line of attack.

There have been many claims of 'great lost opportunities...' but the history of the war to that point (mid-1916) argues strongly against this being a valid observation. The concept of a 'major tactical victory' suggests a rapid and dramatic advance, perhaps akin to what happened in the First Battle of the Marne. The circumstances were very different. The difficulties of sustaining frontal attacks and achieving a breakthrough, let alone a breakout, were massive.

A visit to the Ablain St.-Nazaire French Military Cemetery, the largest French military cemetery alongside Notre Dame de Lorette near Arras, reinforces why Foch was conservative in his approach to the Somme offensive. 

I am not quite sure about your point re: '...Haig's determination to attack north out of Montauban in pursuit of the attack on Bapaume'. This direction of attack was well known to the French command prior to the start of the offensive, having been set out clearly in several French reports and operational orders issued to multiple levels of command prior to the offensive. Joffre stated, for example: 'It is, therefore [in light of the fact that Foch does not have the forces required to turn Péronne], pointless to decide a priori that the main effort of the British Army will be made in the area of Rancourt [due east of Montauban] - Morval [ENE of Montauban], since this manoeuvre was aimed at supporting the crossing of the Somme at and upstream [south] from Péronne. In accordance with the current situation and the goal I defined previously... the British Army shall attack from Maricourt to Hébuterne and Gommécourt with the objective of capturing successive positions... [bounded on the British right by] Guillemont [and] Ginchy [northeast towards] Flers, Sars, Miraumont'.

The point is further reinforced by the French plans for the attack north of the Somme on 1st July, 1916. Here is the map 'Dispositif d'attaque de al VIe. Armée le 1er. juillet 1916'. It clearly shows the expansion of the narrow French attack frontage to the north and to the southeast, which was a very very difficult tactical option. Given that the outcome of the British attack was not known at this time, the intent of the plan cannot be laid at Haig's doorstep IMHO.

Robert