Did the British army know that the Poziers to Serre sector was the most heavily defended in the Somme ?

[Simon Cains]

Before July 1st, had the British army realised that the Germans had their strongest defences on the ridge from Poziers to Serre ? ( the Schwerpukt).   Air reconnaisance could see all the trenches and redoubts, geology maps showed they could dig bunkers straight into the chalk, and logically the Germans would want to hold the ridge.  By contrast opposite XIII Corp to the south-east there was thick clay, not so good for bunkers and overall less defense, so that part of the attack was very successful.

I wondered if the planning was something like the German attack on Verdun; pick a place that the enemy HAD to hold without retreating, make it a "mincing machine" ?    Otherwise it does all seem a bit like General Melchett trying to explain why they would attack where the enemy is strongest ...     Thanks very much.

[Hedley Malloch]

AIR there had been a reconnaissance raid on Toutvent Farm, a German position just north of Serre, which told the British about the strength and depth of German positions. But execution of strategies is not always 'rational' determined by the facts on the ground; by this time British Army command was firmly wedded to the idea of the type of attack which took place on July 1 and 'bad' news of the sort posited by your question would not have been seen as helpful in GHQ. If you want a modern equivalent look at how the Post Office's senior management greeted the news that Horizon was not working. 

Another view might be that the British were wedded to the idea of some sort of mass attack in the Somme area by the need to help the French at Verdun. Haig never thought that the Somme was a good idea; the war would not be won or lost there. Unlike Verdun, Bapaume was on the high road to nowhere. For him, Flanders was a much better battleground. But he had no choice; his political masters had decreed that he had to be part of a joint attack mounted by the British and the French - and that meant the Somme.

You raise the point about the relative success of the attacks in the south-east. My understanding is that much of this was due to the fact that here the British army was supported by French artillery which was much better than its British counterpart in the north-west.

 

[Robert Dunlop]

There is no question, IMHO, that the British understood fully the significance of the high ground around Thièpval and to the north of the Ancre. Today this would be known as Ground of Tactical Importance. Even without photographs, the terrain maps were a very strong indicator to anyone with military training. 

The planning was driven by the boundary between the British and French armies, given the agreement for the combined operation. It was not driven, so far as I am aware, by the notion of picking a place that the Germans had to defend. In reality, the Germans had to defend everywhere.

Robert

Edited 3 April by Robert Dunlop

[Ancre1917]

I was just reading Jack Sheldon’s Fighting the Somme: German Challenges, Dilemmas and Solutions, and came across this quote from Haig’s diary:

“Joffre pointed out the importance of our getting Thiepval Hill … I was considering the desirability of pressing my attack on Longuval … at this General Joffre exploded in a fit of rage. He could not approve of it. He ordered me to attack Thiepval and Pozières … The truth is the poor man cannot argue, nor can he easily read a map. “
Page 97 (Kindle edition)

Richard

[Ancre1917]

Sheldon goes on to say that the decision to concentrate in the south: “was arguably the greatest mistake General Haig made during the entire battle. To shift the emphasis to the British right flank simply played into the Germans’ hands …”

He says this about Joffre: “He definitely could read a map, could spot a Schwerpunkt when he saw one …”

Ibid., 97-98

His account of the German panic and their efforts to retake the Schwaben redoubt on 1 July 1916 are brilliant.

Yes, the British realised the importance of Thiepval, but did they understand what the Germans felt about it?  The fact that it was left alone for nearly three months whilst the British fought their way there from the south perhaps tells us they didn’t understand the concept of Schwerpunkt. Perhaps if Thiepval had been attacked relentlessly in July and August, the Germans would have been forced to defend it to the hilt, and their losses would have become unsustainable much earlier. 

Richard

[PhilB]

The distribution of Regular, New Army and Territorial divisions on 1/7/16 indicates that the Serre to Pozières sector was seen as critical. Three regular divisions were employed there. I’m not sure whether Haig viewed Territorials or New Army as more reliable. 
 

[Robert Dunlop]

On 03/04/2024 at 10:32, Ancre1917 said:

...the British realised the importance of Thiepval, but did they understand what the Germans felt about it?  The fact that it was left alone for nearly three months whilst the British fought their way there from the south perhaps tells us they didn’t understand the concept of Schwerpunkt. Perhaps if Thiepval had been attacked relentlessly in July and August, the Germans would have been forced to defend it to the hilt, and their losses would have become unsustainable much earlier. 

Richard, you have raised several important points. Thank you.

To the best of my knowledge, the British did not have direct access to what the German command felt. There were scattered indirect clues, based on prisoner interrogations, etc. Some of the information was shared by Charteris in his intelligence reports. Mostly, however, the British acted upon the axioms drilled into them about the importance of high ground, etc. 

One implicit understanding was that the Germans would react preemptively if they detected the build-up to a major assault. To mitigate this risk, Haig ordered major deception operations across the sectors controlled by the British Army. GHQ O.A.D. 910 issued on 22 May 1916, for example, requested that:

"Army Commanders will explain fully what progress has been made (vide Proceedings of the 7th meeting - OAD 291/7, dated 21/2/16, and 11th meeting - OAD 291/11, dated 3/4/16.).

First Army - with regard to dummy preparations for an offensive, such, for instance, as advancing trenches, saps, etc., towards the hostile lines, construction of dummy trenches, gun emplacements, etc., with a view to deceiving the enemy.

Second and Third Armies - with regard to preparations for offensive operations on the selected fronts of the attack, and elsewhere dummy preparations to deceive the enemy."

I have mentioned in another thread how Von Falkenhayn refused to transfer units from OHL reserve to the German army command in the Somme sector. He was concerned about a major British attack in the Arras sector. It is reasonable to assume that the two issues are casually related but I have no clear evidence to confirm this.

Further information to follow...

Robert

[Ancre1917]

Thanks Robert. That the British would not have had access to how the Germans felt is true, but they would have studied Clausewitz at staff college, I would assume, or have read his work independently. So, they would have had an understanding of the importance of the Schwerpunkt concept to the whole German idea of how to fight a battle. I think the point Sheldon is making in the book sited above is that the Germans focused their efforts on the area they felt was vital to their interests around Thiepval. One reason why they didn’t have so many resources concentrated south of the river was that this area was not as important as the high ground to the north. The French could advance as far as they liked in the south, but would eventually have to cross the Somme- a virtually impossible task if it the crossing was contested. 
Richard

[Robert Dunlop]

Thanks, Richard. 

I will address the issue of what the British knew about German military doctrine separately. For now, I suggest respectfully that it was what the Germans did that was more important, rather than the why they did it. This distinction is important. The rationale for making this distinction comes from studying (as one example) how the German army did or did not implement the evolving defensive tactics masterminded by Von Loßberg, starting in the Autumn of 1915. The problem was not unique to the German army of course. Rawlinson's failure to plan for exploitation of success in the Battle of Neuve Chapelle (which infamously led to the sacking of GOC 8th Division as the scapegoat) is an example, where generally acknowledged principles were not applied fully in practice. I raise this example because it illustrates why General Haig focused extra attention on this part of Rawlinson's Somme offensive plan, ensuring that the same 'mistake' was not repeated from a planning perspective.

Schwerpunkt was not a single point (Punkt) on the whole Western Front. Rather, as you know already, it was a concept of focusing effort. As such, the concept applied at multiple levels. I referred to Von Falkenhayn in my initial reply of the issue of what the British knew. This is because he, as the Supreme Commander of German Army, was paying attention to a different level of Schwerpunkte (plural). In the lead up to the Somme, Verdun was the main focus of his offensive efforts on the Western Front. From a defensive perspective, Von Falkenhayn focused his attention on the Arras sector, likely exacerbated by the deception actions of the British Army in that sector. As a result, he denied OHL reserves to the Somme sector. It is important to note that Schwerpunkt was not a magic answer, i.e. not a guarantee of German success. There are many examples, Von Falkenhayn's decision being one, where the concept led to the taking of risks with force concentration which then exposed other sectors due to consequential weaknesses.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

The British plans for the Battle of the Somme evolved over many months. Almost from the time of assuming control of the Somme sector, British commanders  at all levels were asked to analyse and propose plans for their respective sub-sectors. By April 1916, General Rawlinson (GOC British Fourth Army) was able to submit his first comprehensive plan for a wide frontage British attack alongside the French forces. At the time he submitted the first plan, the French were located south of the Somme River. It was known, however, that the French would likely transfer 1-2 divisions north of the river.

Rawlinson did not use the word Schwerpunkt, which is not surprising, but he used terms such '...important tactical points...' In his first plan dated 3rd April 1916, Rawlinson labelled his second section in the 'letter' as 'TACTICAL FEATURES THAT AFFECT OUR PLANS' (emphasis in the original). Here is the content of that section:

Quote

3. The valley of the ANCRE is a topographical feature of considerable importance, dividing up our line, as it does, by an obstacle over which communications are somewhat difficult.

4. The high ground around POZIERES is most important, is it gives the enemy a marked advantage in command and observation and covers from view a considerable part of his second line of defence.

5. The terrain throughout this area is very undulating, with the result that observation of the enemy's front system and defended localities is good almost all along the line. This, however, does not apply to many portions of the enemy's second line.

6. The valleys behind our lines furnish good artillery positions for a large number of guns, many of which can be brought up comparatively close to our front line.

These valleys, and also the THIEPVAL, AVELUY, AUTHUILLE and BECOURT woods, afford good assembly places for reserves.

7. The German defences consist of a front system and a second line. The latter is at a distance varying from 2,000 to 5,000 yards behind the front system. Parts of it, though not actually out of range of our guns, will be difficult to deal with, as they are only observable from the air.

8. There are a considerable number of strongly fortified villages both in the front system and between it and the second line of the German defences.

Of these MAMETZ, FRICOURT, LA BOISSELLE, OVILLERS, THIEPVAL, ST. PIERRE DIVION, BEAUMONT, and GOMMECOURT form part of the system.

CONTALMAISON, POZIERES and SERRE are defended localities between the front system and the second line.

All of the above are well within the range of our heavy guns and howitzers, most of those in the front system are within range of heavy trench mortars.

9. Both the front system and the second line are well wired. Most of the wire along the front system can be observed from our observation posts, but the greater part of the wire in front of the second line can only be observed from the air. The ground lends itself to the construction of well concealed flanking defences, and dugouts of any depth can be constructed.

10. The undulating nature of this country must often force the enemy to place his 77 mm. batteries in forward positions to avoid dead ground, unless he makes up his mind to rely entirely on machine gun defence in certain localities.

11. Within the enemy's lines are certain points which will be of great tactical importance as observation posts in dealing with those parts of the second line which are not now visible.

Of these the principal ones are:-

(a) The ridge running North from FRICOURT to POZIERES, past FRICOURT FARM and ROUND WOOD.

(b) X.9 Central.

(c) Spur in R.33.c.

(d) High ground just East of THIEPVAL, R.26.c & d.

(e) Spur North of THIEPVAL, R.20.c.

(f) Ridge North-West of BEAUCOURT. Q.6.d.

(g) SERRE and L.25.a

Points 4., 8. and 11. are particularly pertinent as evidence pertaining to the British perception of the Schwerpunkt of the German defensive plans in the Somme sector.

Robert

[Ancre1917]

Thanks Robert. That’s a very thorough analysis. 
Richard

[Robert Dunlop]

Thank you, Richard.

Returning to Rawlinson's 3rd April draft plan, he proposed the following in his "OBJECTIVES SELECTED FOR THE OPERATIONS" (again, emphasis in the original):

Quote

I place great importance on the capture of POZIERES and CONTALMAISON as starting off places for any further advance that may be undertaken against the enemy's position in front of the MARICOURT salient.

Coupled with this interpretation of the Ground of Tactical Importance, Rawlinson proposed the following "DEFENSIVE FLANKS":

Quote

17. On the South there is no doubt that the MARICOURT salient itself affords a good defensive flank for the attack in its initial stages, and should therefore be made use of for this purpose.

The attack on MAMETZ and FRICOURT will require further protection and the defensive flank must be extended from the salient, to secure a hold on the spur running West from MONTAUBAN, so as to prevent the enemy enfilading the attack from this direction.

The Southern defensive flank therefore can be very suitably placed from A.8 Central to X.29.d.

18. On the North two alternatives suggest themselves.

(I) To include the GOMMECOURT salient and the high ground between that place and PUISIEUX.

(II) To include as far North as SERRE and L.25 central.

Both would form suitable flanks but (I) involves a front of attack of some 26,000 yards, which is more than the force available [at the time of writing] can deal with satisfactorily.

(II) will give a front of 20,000 yards and will give a very strong defensive flank in every way. It will at the same time allow me to retain sufficient troops in had to relieve those Divisions which may suffer heavily and thus enable me to maintain a sustained offensive.

I propose therefore to make (II) my defensive flank to the North.

In summary, Rawlinson proposed an attack on the German Schwerpunkt, as highlighted by Jack Sheldon, in early April 1916.

Robert

Edited 5 April by Robert Dunlop

[Robert Dunlop]

As a supplementary, Rawlinson noted:

Quote

19. As already pointed out the enemy's defences consist of:

(I) Front line system

(II) Defended localities between the front system and the second line.

(III) Second line.

As regards (I) most of the wire in [the] front system can be dealt with by field guns and trench mortars and should afford no serious difficulty as regards wire cutting.

There should also be enough howitzers and heavy trench mortars available to destroy a portion of the defences themselves.

The same applies to the defended localities [Thiepval, etc] which can be pulverised with heavy howitzers.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

19 hours ago, Ancre1917 said:

I think the point Sheldon is making in the book sited above is that the Germans focused their efforts on the area they felt was vital to their interests around Thiepval. One reason why they didn’t have so many resources concentrated south of the river was that this area was not as important as the high ground to the north. The French could advance as far as they liked in the south, but would eventually have to cross the Somme- a virtually impossible task if it the crossing was contested.

Richard, returning now to your important point with regards to the perception that Haig should have persisted with the attacks on the German defensive Schwerpunkt, General Haig reviewed Rawlinson's plan and made numerous notes in the margins. With regards to the objectives, Haig commented: "Montauban itself very important".

General Kiggell, Chief of the General Staff, followed up with a formal reply (OAD 710/1, issued on 13th April 1916). The following paragraphs are pertinent to this discussion:

Quote

The SERRE - MIRAUMONT spur offers a strong defensive flank and its possession will be of great assistance to your attack, on the left bank of the ANCRE, against the high ground between POZIÈRES and GRANDCOURT, where it is important to gain as much ground as possible on the first day in order to facilitate the later operations.

Simultaneous activity against the GOMMECOURT salient, designed to hold the attention of the enemy's artillery and reserves on that side, is advisable so far as it can be arranged for. The Third Army will probably be able to give some assistance of the same nature further to the north.

Possession of the MONTAUBAN spur will be of considerable value in preparing for the subsequent attack of the enemy on the heights to the north of it, and it would probably be easier to gain this spur on the first day of the attack rather than later on. Possession of MONTAUBAN village and the BRIQUETERIE would give a strong defensive position on your right provided the knoll north of HARDECOURT and the spur from MARICOURT wood to CURLU are simultaneously secured. There is every reason to suppose that the French would undertake the attack on these last-mentioned features, and it is possible that their artillery may be able to help in your attack on MONTAUBAN and the BRIQUETERIE.

Several points emerge from these paragraphs:

• Agreement by GHQ with the proposed Serre - Miraumont flank was based on the significance of the left bank (north) of the Ancre river to maintaining a hold on the main Ground of Tactical Importance, which was south of the river;
• Gommecourt was seen as a way to fix German resources north of the river. What was not predicted is that the German command would actually transfer more resources to this area from the Montauban and sectors to its south; and
• By this time in April 1916 there was evidence that French forces would be involved north of the Somme.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Shortly afterwards, Kiggell issued OAD 710. This document went on to confirm the involvement of the French army contiguous with the British:

Quote

(i) The attack is to form part of the general offensive, to be made in close cooperation by the British and French forces on the western front.

(ii) The inner flanks of the French and British attacking forces will join, at the outset, about MARICOURT [i.e. north of the Somme river]. From the point of junction the front of your attack will extend to about HEBUTERNE [north of the Ancre]; that of the French forces to the OISE [river, south of the Somme].

The Ground of Tactical Importance was repeated in the next section:

Quote

(iii) Your principal effort in the first instance will be directed to establishing a strong defensive flank on the spur from SERRE (inclusive) to MIRAUMONT and to capturing and securing the high ground about POZIÈRES and the spurs running thence towards BEAUCOURT-sur-ANCRE and GRANDCOURT towards FRICOURT. 

A simultaneous attack should be made on the enemy's trenches from FRICOURT eastwards to the point of junction with the French. In this area MONTAUBAN and the ridge running thence to MAMETZ, as well as the BRIQUETERIE south-east of MONTAUBAN are very important features which should be captured and secure as early in the operations as you find possible with the means at your disposal. Their possession will be of considerable tactical value to us in the second stage of the [operations].

(iv) After gaining the ground described above, your next efforts must be directed to capturing, by attacks from the west and south, the GINCHY - BAZENTIN-le-GRAND ridge and then pushing eastward along the high ground towards COMBLES in order to cooperate with and assist the French army on your right in effecting the passage of the River SOMME.

As your advance progresses eastwards it will be essential to establish and maintain a strong line of defence on your left (outer) flank, joining up with the line which you will previously have established above POZIÈRES.

(vi) Operations subsequent to those outlined above must depend on the degree of success gained and on developments which cannot be foreseen. But the object will continue to be to prevent the enemy from re-establishing his line of defence and to exploit to the full all opportunities opened up for defeating his forces within reach.

In the original version of the document, Kiggell added a handwritten note after "...defeating his forces within reach". The addendum was: "..., always, however, with due regard to the need to assist the French Army to effect the passage of the R. Somme".

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

22 hours ago, Ancre1917 said:

The French could advance as far as they liked in the south, but would eventually have to cross the Somme- a virtually impossible task if it the crossing was contested. 

Richard, I would like to address this point next. It needs a re-read of the French Le Groupe d'armées du Nord (GAN) war diaries and related primary sources. This will take a bit of time. As a general note, however, your point about contested river crossings is correct.

Robert 

[Robert Dunlop]

The following information was published in "Instruction général personnelle et secrète pour MM. les généraux commandant les VIe, IIIe, et Xe armées" on 2nd May, 1916 by General Foch, GOC Le Groupe d'armées du Nord (GAN). The opening paragraph reads:

Quote

With a view to undertaking a combined Anglo-French offensive on both sides of the Somme, a group of French armies will operate south of the Somme to support the first major objective of the combined offensive, which is the Bapaume-Péronne-Ham road.

Note that Péronne and the road leading to Ham lie east of the Somme river, as illustrated by the black line in the attached map.

Foch went on to specify that the northern-most French army in GAN:

Quote

...may be required to play a predominant role: it would need to operate jointly with the British Army, and with progressively increased French forces, to push in the direction of the Bapaume-Péronne road, in order to facilitate the passage over the Somme of the other two GAN armies [designated Central and Southern Armies respectively] that would be halted in front of this river upstream [i.e. to the south] of Péronne.

The French Official History added the following footnote:

Quote

As General Foch specified in his secret note of 13 April [i.e when Rawlinson and Haig were formulating the British plans for the Somme offensive], the aim of the manoeuvre [by the Northern Army in GAN] was to support the Franco-British forces operating north of the Somme to reach the first major objective of the Bapaume-Rancourt-Péronne-Ham road and the French forces [south of the river] to reach the Somme upstream of Péronne. The presence of Allied forces in the region of Rancourt would facilitate, if required, a turning movement towards the south, with a view to facilitating the crossing of the Somme, south of Péronne.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

On 02/04/2024 at 21:02, Ancre1917 said:

I was just reading Jack Sheldon’s Fighting the Somme: German Challenges, Dilemmas and Solutions, and came across this quote from Haig’s diary:

“Joffre pointed out the importance of our getting Thiepval Hill … I was considering the desirability of pressing my attack on Longuval … at this General Joffre exploded in a fit of rage. He could not approve of it. He ordered me to attack Thiepval and Pozières … The truth is the poor man cannot argue, nor can he easily read a map. “

 

On 03/04/2024 at 10:32, Ancre1917 said:

Sheldon goes on to say that the decision to concentrate in the south: “was arguably the greatest mistake General Haig made during the entire battle. To shift the emphasis to the British right flank simply played into the Germans’ hands …”

He says this about Joffre: “He definitely could read a map, could spot a Schwerpunkt when he saw one …”

Picking up on these points made by Jack in his book, it is quite possible that the final comment is correct. The discussion about Schwerpunkte, which referenced the different perspectives of von Falkenhayn at OHL level versus von Below (GOC German 2nd Army on the Somme), can be applied to the Anglo-British side as well. Rawlinson's focus was the British Fourth Army. This meant focusing on the high ground astride the Ancre river, as we have seen in the documentation quoted above. From Haig's perspective, however, the combined Anglo-French operation demanded higher-level considerations in relation to concentration of effort. These considerations became more significant with the failure to take the Ground of Tactical Importance around Thiepval, Pozières and Beaumont Hamel. 

The French successes on July 1st, both north and south of the Somme river, brought Foch's plan into sharper focus. His original plan had been to reinforce success north of the Somme. The goal was to outflank the German defenders on the eastern side of the river, centred on Péronne. It should be noted that this approach was repeated by the Australians in 1918. Thus the Schwerpunkt of Foch's approach was the northern bank of the Somme, which is where British Fourth Army had also succeeded on 1st July.

It is possible, therefore, that Haig was not referring to Joffre's reading of the Thiepval sector of the map but to Joffre's misreading of the alternate combined Anglo-French Schwerpunkt further south.

Robert

Edited 6 April by Robert Dunlop

[Simon Cains]

On 03/04/2024 at 10:32, Ancre1917 said:

Sheldon goes on to say that the decision to concentrate in the south: “was arguably the greatest mistake General Haig made during the entire battle. To shift the emphasis to the British right flank simply played into the Germans’ hands …”

He says this about Joffre: “He definitely could read a map, could spot a Schwerpunkt when he saw one …”

Ibid., 97-98

His account of the German panic and their efforts to retake the Schwaben redoubt on 1 July 1916 are brilliant.

Yes, the British realised the importance of Thiepval, but did they understand what the Germans felt about it?  The fact that it was left alone for nearly three months whilst the British fought their way there from the south perhaps tells us they didn’t understand the concept of Schwerpunkt. Perhaps if Thiepval had been attacked relentlessly in July and August, the Germans would have been forced to defend it to the hilt, and their losses would have become unsustainable much earlier. 

Richard

Hi thanks Richard.  Did Sheldon suggest how Theipval and the rest of the ridge could be taken ?  Given that months of preparation and a week of bombardment  had only led to the greatest loss in the British army in one day and no ground held ?  Certainly the Ulsters had done very well briefly, if that could have been repeated along the line somehow. Did they only succeed because they had crept up to the German line before the barrage lifted ? 

 But perhaps if there had been a big breakout to the east, the Theipval ridge could have been surrounded and cut off without having to be taken directly.  Delville Wood and High Wood are on a continuation of the Theipval ridge.  Reinforcing success seems to be a fairly common approved military tactic.   Although again if the aim was attrition rather than territory, then it would make some sense to keep bombarding the Germans on the ridge that they could not afford to give up ( except they had the near-impregnable deep chalk bunkers ...).

Edited 8 April by Simon Cains

[Simon Cains]

On 01/04/2024 at 12:33, Hedley Malloch said:

AIR there had been a reconnaissance raid on Toutvent Farm, a German position just north of Serre, which told the British about the strength and depth of German positions. But execution of strategies is not always 'rational' determined by the facts on the ground; by this time British Army command was firmly wedded to the idea of the type of attack which took place on July 1 and 'bad' news of the sort posited by your question would not have been seen as helpful in GHQ. If you want a modern equivalent look at how the Post Office's senior management greeted the news that Horizon was not working. 

Another view might be that the British were wedded to the idea of some sort of mass attack in the Somme area by the need to help the French at Verdun. Haig never thought that the Somme was a good idea; the war would not be won or lost there. Unlike Verdun, Bapaume was on the high road to nowhere. For him, Flanders was a much better battleground. But he had no choice; his political masters had decreed that he had to be part of a joint attack mounted by the British and the French - and that meant the Somme.

You raise the point about the relative success of the attacks in the south-east. My understanding is that much of this was due to the fact that here the British army was supported by French artillery which was much better than its British counterpart in the north-west.

 

Sorry what does AIR mean ?  I see The First Day on the Somme mentions that bunker at Toutvent farm, captured by the French in 1915 and later used as a British company HQ, so there was plenty of chance to examine it, not a last-minute discovery.   Quote - "It would seem that the existence of this model of a German-type dug-out was not noted by anyone concerned in the planning of the coming attack".

[Robert Dunlop]

15 minutes ago, Simon Cains said:

Sorry what does AIR mean ?

"As I recall"

Jack does not go into any further explanation re Thiepval in his book; the detail of the British planning was beyond the scope.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

24 minutes ago, Simon Cains said:

I see The First Day on the Somme mentions that bunker at Toutvent farm, captured by the French in 1915 and later used as a British company HQ, so there was plenty of chance to examine it, not a last-minute discovery.   Quote - "It would seem that the existence of this model of a German-type dug-out was not noted by anyone concerned in the planning of the coming attack".

In Rawlinson's first draft of the plan, he referred to the issue of "Defended localities between the front system and the second line". As noted in one of my previous quotes, he named several of these localities. Rawlinson wrote: "There should... be enough howitzers and heavy trench mortars available to deal with a large part of the defences themselves [which would have included the concept of bunkers such as existing at Toutvent farm]. The same applies to the defended localities which can be pulverised with heavy howitzers". 

Rawlinson also argued for, and gained approval from Haig, a prolonged bombardment "...with an effective back barrage to prevent food and ammunition being brought forward to the front line". He noted that "...the moral effect... is no doubt very great indeed, as was proved both and LOOS and in [location not legible]. It must also be remembered that the Germans did not reinforce at LOOS even though there was a four days' bombardment".

A dual approach was put in place to deal with the strong defences: direct destruction of the 'defended localities'; and indirect wearing down of the rest of the defensive positions through interruption to logistical supply and to lowering morale.

Robert

[Ancre1917]

There’s nothing else about attacking Thiepval in Sheldon’s book that I can recall.

On pages 70-71 he says that the way the Schwaben redoubt was defended “indicates that this small, but utterly dominant, point geographically was the Schwerpunkt of Schwerpunkts (sic) for the entire Second Army”. He goes on to write, “it sat on ground of such critical importance to the defence that it was the Second Army Schwerpunkt, the focus of all resources and priority effort from General von Below downwards”. 

When you visit the area and stand on the 150m contour, you can see what he means, I think  

Richard

[Robert Dunlop]

On 08/04/2024 at 11:48, Ancre1917 said:

On pages 70-71 he says that the way the Schwaben redoubt was defended “indicates that this small, but utterly dominant, point geographically was the Schwerpunkt of Schwerpunkts (sic) for the entire Second Army”. He goes on to write, “it sat on ground of such critical importance to the defence that it was the Second Army Schwerpunkt, the focus of all resources and priority effort from General von Below downwards”.

Thank you, Richard.

FWIIW, I totally agree with your additional point about how a visit to area around Thiepval reinforces Jack's comments about the significance of Schwaben Redoubt.

While not distracting from the predominant concern re this high ground, it is important to recognise that major German efforts were directed at the junction of the French and British forces. From the British perspective, we tend to think of the success around Montauban as being a minor gain. When combined with the French advances both north and south of the Somme, however, there was a threat of turning the defences south of the Somme (as noted in my previous post about Foch's plan).

This map is from 'Schlacten des Weltkrieges Band 20: Somme-Nord, I Teil: Die Brennpunkte der Schlacht im Juli 1916'. It illustrates the major counter-attack that took place in the immediate aftermath of 1st July, 1916. The attacks were directed at Montauban, Bernafay Wood (which had been occupied in part) and Hardecourt-aux-Bois (captured by the French):

The map shows elements of two infantry divisions (28th Reserve and 12th Reserve), with 4 infantry regiments. This level of effort confirmed another Schwerpunkt, which continued during subsequent months. The battles for Longueval, Guillemont, Ginchy, and Combles, for example, were all hard-fought because of the threat posed.

Robert

[bmac]

Let's be clear that the original idea for an attack on the Somme came from Joffre in late December 1915 and was aimed at an area well south of the river, i.e. about the Saint Quentin to Amiens road, and down to the town of Lassigny, a front of c.30 kms. Haig was invited to consider an attack on Third Army's front somewhere between Arras and the Somme but, initially, Joffre thought the area between Ransart and the Ancre most suitable [AFdGG, Tome IV, Vol 1, Annexes Vol. 1, Annexe 63, page 153.] After fighting alongside the BEF at Loos there was no great enthusiasm on the part of the French to do it again. On the other hand, given the widespread view the British were failing to pull their weight in the fighting, they wanted the BEF to launch a major offensive concurrently with the French one almost anywhere.

Such an attack north of the Ancre would have included the area attacked by the French in June 1915 which moved the German line back from about Toutvent Ferme to the Heidenkopf and Redan Ridge. It was as a result of this attack that a great deal of work went into strengthening the German defences north of the Ancre. The British were aware of the nature of the defences, the numerous deep dugouts, etc., in the vicinity as several were entered by trench raids between Gommecourt and Beaumont Hamel well before the 1st July. In the week immediately prior to the offensive, however, almost every raid failed in this sector which should have told 'higher authority' something wasn't quite right.

It was not until sometime in the spring, and after the Verdun fighting started to erode the French commitment on the Somme, that the idea of an attack 'jointif' astride the Somme became the plan and, even then, there was reluctance on the part of the French, i.e Fayolle, commanding VIe Armee, to have troops north of the river advancing east between Maricourt and the right bank of the Somme. Progressively, as the troops available to Foch/Fayolle were steadily reduced, the front south of the Somme moved further and further north until it ended up running south from opposite Frise to Soyecourt. Xe Armee, however, was ordered to prepare an offensive along the abandoned front down to Lassigny partly as a deception and partly 'just in case'.

There was, however, a time when the initially unhappy and reluctant Foch decided that crossing the Somme south of Peronne was a possibility. On 16th March he proposed a plan involving three armies which would attack south of the Somme and cross the river between Cizancourt in the north to Offoy in the south [AFdGG, Tome IV, Vol. 1, Annexes, Vol 2, Annexe 1282, page 457.] In total, the plan involved 44 French divisions (one north of the river) and 12-15 British divisions, on a front of 53 miles (85 kms). He demanded 1,069 heavy and 1.908 field guns and 836 trench mortars. Verdun saw to that idea, especially after fighting spread to the left bank of the Meuse in early March. Eventually, and after much toing and froing, only two French divisions attacked north of the river and two Corps d'armee to the south.

Leaving to one side the argument over Thiepval, several French officers believed the attack south of the river was one of the great lost opportunities of the war. Had they driven south and rolled up the German lines whilst Xe Armee simultaneously attack west-east a major tactical victory might have ensued. Two factors intervened: Foch and Fayolle's very deliberate, and therefore slow, artillery led tactics, and Haig's determination to attack north out of Montauban in pursuit of the attack on Bapaume. For nearly two days south of the Somme there were very few organised German defences facing north from the old front line and east to the Somme, Berdoulat, commander of the 1er Colonial Corps, was keen to attack south but, instead, the advance stopped as troops were relieved. In addition, German batteries north of the river were able to bombard his units because the French advance east towards Hardecourt, Hem-Monacu, etc., was stopped whilst the British attacked at a 90 degree angle northwards and, therefore, away from this line of attack.

After the war a Lt. Col. Jacques Gallini wrote in Essai de rupture du front en 1916 - les attaques des 1er 2 et 3 juillet dans la Somme:

“Why, under such conditions, did the VIe Armée not do more and kick open the door which it had opened so well on 3^rd July in the early afternoon? Because its leader (Fayolle), prudent and methodical, did not want to commit himself to chance and preferred to wait for the arrival of new information, to decide in full knowledge of the facts on the exploitation of the success of his first-level units. It thus enabled the enemy to pull themselves together, to call on all available elements in the immediate rear of the battle, to throw them into places where the front had given way, to dig new trenches, to organize their fire zones, so that on the 4^th, when the Corps Colonial set off at 5 p.m. to reach the road from Belloy to Deniécourt, which was its objective, it found an adversary on guard...

Where should one seek the cause of the procrastination which caused such unfortunate effects? In the lessons of the war. Twice previously, in 1915, the French army found itself in a similar situation. In Artois and Champagne impetuous attacks had ruptured the enemy’s front line and then the assault waves had died in front of unrecognized positions. These memories were fresh in the minds of the High Command when it prepared for the Battle of the Somme. To prevent the control of operations from eluding it again, to retain the choice of the moment to exploit success, it had restricted all units to a rigid schedule."