An amateur's attempt to summarize July 1 1916

[Old Forge]

11 hours ago, phil andrade said:

Given such uncannily accurate predictions in other battles, the apparent failure to do so for the opening of the Somme offensive demands explanation.

A good few factors contributing to this terrible day have already been raised in the OP and subsequent responses. One that hasn't been mentioned yet is the unfortunate necessity of using a large number of New Army units, most of them for their first time in an attack. Given Kitchener's rejection of carefully laid pre-war plans for expanding the army in time of war, his K1, K2 etc were not very well trained - hence the 1st July reliance on the destructive power of artillery rather than exploitation of its neutralising effects to enable manoeuvre. The Kitchener battalions were yet to learn the role of initiative, exploitation etc. Too much of their training in England was self-conducted and focused on trench-to-trench operations, rather than open warfare. When plans broke down, they tended to sit tight and send back for new orders - ditto when opportunities opened up. Hence, subsequent training and support materials would focus on fostering initiative, thinning out the attacking numbers, keeping operations fluid and 'not stopping to organise a set-piece' (eg IGT's Training Leaflet 13 - ‘Soft Spots - an Example of Minor Tactics’, a post-facto gathering in 1918 of good practice from different formations). 

As an example, The War the Infantry Knew gives a fascinating account of 2/RWF's capture of High Wood in August 1916, and its subsequent loss. The three Kitchener battalions of 2/RWF's brigade had 'crowded into' the attack in the morning and been repulsed with heavy losses. 2/RWF, in support, had most of its rifle power away on carrying duties when it was ordered to take over the attack. After recces and orders, the 300 men not away on fatigues took High Wood less for one small corner. They were then relieved by the rest of the brigade. The wood was lost to a counterattack shortly afterwards.

John Buckley ('Monty's Men') makes the point that battalion losses in Normandy were on a par with those on the Somme. But, they're not remembered the same way because, in 1916, the casualties came from the same streets, towns and villages. Policy in WW2 deliberately filled battalions from wider geographies, to minimise the impact on communities at home.

Cheers,

Richard

[phil andrade]

Were battalion losses in Normandy on a par with those on the Somme ?

This is a claim that is being widely accepted.

 

A brief survey convinces me otherwise.

 

Dreadful losses in the rifle companies in 1944, no doubt about that.

 

But those cohorts comprised such a small percentage compared with their 1916 counterparts, that the overall battalion impact  must’ve been markedly worse on the Somme.

 

Phil

[Robert Dunlop]

18 hours ago, Old Forge said:

...battalion losses in Normandy [are] not remembered the same way because, in 1916, the casualties came from the same streets, towns and villages. Policy in WW2 deliberately filled battalions from wider geographies, to minimise the impact on communities at home.

You make a very important point, Richard. We should also keep in mind that the Somme was the first major sustained campaign of its type by the British Army in history. It recalibrated expectations around the scale of losses that can occur in major wars. The wider social implications of the losses incurred in Normandy must be seen in this light too. 

I have often said that if Britain had had to bear the brunt of the fighting in WW2 in the way that the Soviet Union did then we would be lauding the WW1 generals for the 'light' number of casualties sustained. 

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Other contributors to this Forum have reinforced the point that the Somme was an Anglo-French offensive. Although the proposed French contribution was scaled back due to the ongoing Verdun offensive, the French sector was almost as long as the British one (see attached battle map from Wikipedia).

The BEF learned several lessons from the 1915 battles. One lesson was the importance of a very wide attack frontage. This helped offset the powerful defensive capabilities of artillery for one thing. Flanking fire in enfilade was a very serious problem with narrow frontage attacks. The frontage of the British sector was significantly greater than Loos for example (which is overlaid on the Somme map at the same scale).

The build-up to the Somme battle was very clear, given the extensive preparations that were needed to support a major campaign. The scale of the preparations posed several major dilemmas for the German High Command. On the one hand, the German command level responsible for the Somme sector was increasingly concerned about the huge threat in that sector. Von Falkenhayn, on the other hand, was focused not only Verdun but also on a perceived threat of a major British offensive in the Arras sector. Von Falkenhayn refused to provide significant reinforcements to the Somme sector, which exacerbated the concerns of the Somme sector command.

Several writers have lamented that Gommecourt and Serre were included in the British attack on July 1st, 1916. Whether knowingly or not, the threat to these sub-sectors on the Somme front played a key part in forcing the hand of the German Somme sector command. Few realise that Serre was the scene of an important French attack in 1915. The French made significant incursions into the German defences, though Serre itself was not captured. This prompted a significant strengthening of the German defences in this sector (part of the so-called 'learning curve' if you will). It seems highly likely that the memory of this  played a key part in the decision of the German Somme sector command to shift resources from the southern end of the sector to reinforce the defences in the Gommecourt and Serre sub-sectors. It should be noted that the transfer of artillery batteries was of secondary benefit to the area immediately south of the Ancre. The transfers were forced by the failure of Von Falkenhayn to provide additional reinforcements and by the gamble locally to focus the defensive Schwerpunkt on the northern end of the Somme sector. These decisions combined to enable the British success in the Montauban sub-sector and the French successes along the length of their sector.

Jack Sheldon's book 'Fighting the Somme: German Challenges, Dilemmas and Solutions' catalogues the desperate measures that were required to stabilise the Somme in subsequent weeks. Few recognise that the French successes on the Verdun battlefield, with the recapture of much of the ground lost in the first half of 1916, and the German 1917 retreat to the Hindenburg Line were heavily influenced by the Somme campaign.

Robert

[Justin Moretti]

6 hours ago, Robert Dunlop said:

I have often said that if Britain had had to bear the brunt of the fighting in WW2 in the way that the Soviet Union did then we would be lauding the WW1 generals for the 'light' number of casualties sustained. 

"Consider, if you will, a stabilized front in the Second World War. France does not fold and the Western Front is renewed in 1940."

[phil andrade]

Ironic, isn’t it, when we countenance the prospect of the shattering defeat of the Franco British forces in the summer of 1940 saving hundreds of thousands of British lives?

 

Phil

[Justin Moretti]

3 hours ago, phil andrade said:

Ironic, isn’t it, when we countenance the prospect of the shattering defeat of the Franco British forces in the summer of 1940 saving hundreds of thousands of British lives?

 

Phil

Leaving the Russians to fight the Sommes and the Passchendaeles, as Terraine argued. 

[Robert Dunlop]

On 19/03/2024 at 23:46, Justin Moretti said:

"On the 1st of July 1916, the British Army launched the Battle of the Somme..."

Here are some suggested edits in italics with explanatory notes in italicised square brackets [ ], FWIIW:

"On the 1st of July 1916, the British and French Army armies launched the Battle of the Somme., aThis battle is infamous for the British casualties sustained on that single day: roughly 19,000 dead; another 38,000 wounded, missing or POW. BVery often, discussion of this battle is focused on blaminge fell naturally on the senior commander, Sir Douglas Haig., who He stands accused even by some of his staunchest supporters of trying to do far too much with the resources available to him. Mitigating factors quoted by said supporters include the poor standard of the shells fired by his artillery - up to a third of which failed to explode, resulting in the German defences not taking the beating that was expected [it is true that many shells were duds, with photographs often illustrating unexploded projectiles fired from heavy- and super-heavy guns, but the far bigger artillery problems were: the lifting of barrages in many sectors (but not all) when the infantry left their trenches not when they arrived at the German trenches; and the relative ineffectiveness of counter-battery fire in most (but not all) sectors] - and Haig himself being pressured by his French allies to kick the battle off before he was fully ready [though not really a factor IMHO, as the same problems such as those just described for the artillery preparation would likely have applied]. 

Unfortunately, the tendency to conflate large numbers of casualties with the need to blame General Haig has led to flaws in the analysis of the battle. The issue of trying to overextend the aims of 1st July is one such example. The planning was based on lessons learned in smaller battles previously. The criticism that Haig pushed, unrealistically, to reach Bapaume with cavalry has hidden the true nature of the battle plans. Earlier experience had reinforced the need for scenario planning. This meant that plans were in place in case there was: complete failure; partial success with some but not all objectives captured; and complete collapse of the German defensive line, which had occurred with the forward line during the Battle of Neuve Chapelle in 1915.

"The battle - which went on for four months - is admitted by detractors and supporters alike to have been a ghastly experience for those who did the fighting, the misery being broken by two high-profile subsidiary attacks on July 14 and on September 15, the latter being the first introduction of the tank to warfare (on the British side). Unfortunately, these admissions reflect a tendency to abstract the abhorrence related to the record number of losses on the 1st July attacks into attributing a greater level of suffering on those who fought in the battle than pertained to the battles before and after the Somme. This abstraction must be treated with caution, as it detracts from the bigger problem that all war is hell for those involved.

"Casualties for both sides arehave been hotly debated in the past, when German casualty figures were inflated. [Thanks to the meticulous analysis by Ralph Whitehead in particular, there is no debate to be had now] but the general consensusIt has been establishedis that the Germans suffered in numbers not quite as badly assignificantly fewer casualties than the British on 1st July... with the difference that their losses were of Both sides, including the French, lost higher-quality, more experienced soldiers during the Somme campaign. It has been argued that the Germans were affected more by losses, though such arguments are offered in retrospect. During the battle, the Germans had to sack Von Falkenhayn. The appointments of Von Hindenburg and Ludendorff were based on the perception that their victories on the Eastern Front, starting with the highly evocative Battle of Tannenberg, could deliver the same on all fronts. 

The Germans also had to shut down the Battle of Verdun. The French were able to not only continue fighting on the Somme but were also able to inflict a series of successful counter-attacks at Verdun, recapturing much of the ground that was lost in early 1916. After the Battle of the Somme had closed down, they withdrew to stronger the Germans had to withdraw to an shorter, stronger set of pre-prepared defences, booby-trapping and laying waste the ground they retreated over[true but probably not relevant]., The preparation of the Hindenburg Line was an enormous undertaking, which consumed vast quantities of manpower and materials [refer to Jack Sheldon's book "The German Army at Cambrai" for an excellent analysis of the impact]. arguablyIt is often argued, however, that the German retreat in 1917 handeding Haig a nominal strategic victory, albeit a pyrrhic one. Any and all successes of the Battle of the Somme were attributable to the combined efforts of Anglo-French armies. The British casualties were heavy but not cannot be considered to 'pyrrhic', given the ability of the British Army to bear a much greater burden of the fighting on the Western Front in 1917.

"Win, lose or draw, tThe British Army learned the hard way how to fight a warvery large battles of this kind. The scale of losses were unprecedented in British military history to that date. Subsequently, however, the rate of losses went on to be eclipsed by the Battle of Arras and the battles in the last 100 days of the war, for example. and bBy mid-1918 wasthe Allies, supported by the rapidly growing American Expeditionary Force, were almost unstoppable in the context of a short battle with modest goalsrotating series of battles along the length of the Western Front to maintain continuous pressure on the German army, something which (unlike in 1916) itthey now had the logistics and the leadership and strategic vision of General Foch to sustain indefinitely, a new one starting as soon as the last had achieved its aims. A hundred-day succession of such battles helped to maul the German Army so badly that the Kaiser himself would recognize the futility of trying to continue."

Edited 30 March by Robert Dunlop

[Justin Moretti]

7 hours ago, Robert Dunlop said:

Here are some suggested edits in italics

Accurate, but too long. 

[KernelPanic]

FWIW, I learned a lot more from Robert's longer version, particularly regarding the key contributions of the French. But I can see the OP's wish to keep it shorter given the target audience. Maybe something in between?

[Robert Dunlop]

Yes, I wasn't aware that there was a word limit. The revised version can be shortened. It depends on the message to be conveyed. The first version accurately reflected commonly held views on July 1st, 1916: there were catastrophic losses; it was Haig's fault; his plans were far too ambitious; and the ends did not justify the means. The second message is difficult to shorten without the background rationales. In the past, such a message gets dismissed as 'revisionist'. Perhaps things have moved on...

What is the target word count?

Robert

[PhilB]

Up at the sharp end, most survivors of 1/7/16 that I have spoken to (Mainly 11 East Lancs at Serre) complained that they were overloaded, forced to walk and that no attempt was made to rush the German line ahead of them before the MGs became established.

[phil andrade]

Forgive me for chipping in about the casualty statistics again: it’s one of the few things that I feel qualified to opine about with confidence.

We read a lot about how the British casualty rate of the Hundred Days exceeded that of the Somme.

There are caveats here that invite circumspection.

The Hundred Days entailed a more widespread series of offensives and were not compressed into a relatively small area like the Somme battlefield. 
 

More importantly, the 1918 casualty counts included a high proportion of gas cases, and the actual number of killed was smaller than it had been in the Somme fighting.

 

No complacency about the cost of the Hundred Days. The figures were indeed alarming. But if you cite the numbers killed in, say, September 1918, and compare them with their counterparts in September 1916, you’ll see that the 1916 fighting was more fatal.

 And, of course, the astonishing successes of the Hundred Days were a mitigating feature, to say the least.

 

Phil

 

 

[Robert Dunlop]

Thank you for the extra details, Phil.

I respectfully submit some alternative perspectives. Firstly, I am not sure the men who were killed or wounded on the Somme or during the Last Hundred Days would make a distinction between a relative small area like the Somme versus the widespread series of battlefields separated geographically. Each man was killed or wounded in a single spot.

Second, while I understand why you mention the 'astonishing successes' as a mitigating feature, this arguably reinforces my earlier point that it is the emotive context of the Somme which drives our perception of that battle, rather than the losses per se. I have drawn attention to the contemporaneous successes that were directly or indirectly attributable to the Somme. To take this one step further, the successes of the Last Hundred Days were built on the foundation of the Somme (and all other losses that occurred leading up to that time). There is a tendency to think that the Last Hundred Days represented an epiphany of 'learning', with generals having been slow to learn up until that point and then suddenly seeing the light. The Last Hundred Days could only occur once the cumulative losses and other problems that degraded the German Army had reached a tipping point, coupled with the massive logistics capability along the Western Front and the might of the AEF.

Robert

[phil andrade]

Robert,

 

Your points fully taken, with due acknowledgement.

The thing about the very large number of BEF casualties in the Hundred Days is the significantly lower proportion of fatalities they contained when compared with their counterparts in the same time period in 1916 or 1917. That doesn’t change the fact that an awful lot of British and Dominion soldiers died  in the succession of culminating British victories. If you survey the total BEF casualties in the month of September 1916 you’ll find the figure bears a striking similarity with the same month in 1918, but the number of deaths in 1916 exceeds the 1918 figure. You’ll find the same if you compare October 1917 with its 1918 counterpart. The reasons intrigue me, and I think they’re worthy of investigation.

 

Phil

[Robert Dunlop]

Thank you, Phil.

Your point about the difference in the proportions of fatalities versus wounded is very important. As the types and destructive power of weapons systems increased dramatically (witness the massive increase in the numbers of machine guns for example), troops 'learned' how to adapt. The constant evolution prevented casualty rates from escalating at the same rate as the increases in firepower. For example, men became more widely dispersed wherever possible. This reduced mortality from shelling with high explosive projectiles but led to the greater use of area denial weapon systems, such as gas shells (hence the greater proportion of 'wounded' from this cause').

Robert

[phil andrade]

Thank you Robert. It behoves me, I think, to put my suggestions to the test and, given the chance,  I’ll do just that.

 I note from some previous surveys I’ve undertaken that the 1918 casualties included more gas cases than all previous years combined, and likewise for prisoners of war.

This of course applied preponderantly to the first half of the year when the BEF was fighting desperately on the defensive.

 

But, if memory serves me, the casualties tabulated in the Hundred Days included significant numbers of “ shell shock “ cases, and also a category of wounded, remaining with units. I wonder if this implied a more modern “ enlightened “ reporting system which included men who might not have been counted in the earlier battles. It might be factored in as a feature of the extremely high casualties that were recorded in this phase.

 

Phil

[Ralph J. Whitehead]

On 20/03/2024 at 12:24, Justin Moretti said:

I know Terraine was fond of pointing out that:

1) The German soldier had to be more than slightly wounded to end up recorded on the casualty lists.

2) The same British soldier could easily be counted twice, if he were lightly wounded in the morning and grievously wounded or killed later that day.

This is true, but most English-speaking laypersons these days aren't going to care much for what the French and especially the Russians were doing. They're going to see the British effort in isolation and concentrate particularly on Day 1.

An interesting thread, it brings back memories of similar discussions from years back that touched on many of the points brought up in the comments. From what I have seen in various forums regarding this subject, it appears that the concept of Germans limiting how losses were reported as to the severity of the wound continues to the resent day.

However, I would like to just touch on the comment content shown above. In the case of how German losses were published in the VL as shown in comment Number 1, the Germans listed every single casualty ranging from Slightly wounded, remained with the regiment up to killed in action. As the first category indicates, if a man was wounded or injured yet only required treatment from medical personnel or perhaps a friend in the field and then remained with his unit. he still became listed on the VL. Of course, the level of injury and type of treatment from local medical facilities to those found in rear areas or in Germany, then dictated the level of casualty he had after his name. 

I am not sure how the British handled how the losses were published but the Germans also included men who committed suicide. Just my 2 cents as we say here. 

Ralph

[phil andrade]

Great to get you back on parade here, Ralph !

 

It’s always been my conviction that the British Official Historian was clutching at straws in his insistence that the Germans excluded their slightly wounded in their casualty returns, and that his attempts to persuade posterity were mendacious.

To argue that 440,000 should thereby be increased to 660,000 was preposterous, in my opinion. He alluded to a need- in general - to increase the figures by thirty percent: in the case of the Somme, he effectively advocated an increase of fifty percent. 
 

There was much discussion about this on the forum, which engendered excessive heat rather than light.

 I have always been appalled at the willingness of many historians and commentators to cite those figures as plausible.

Phil

[Ralph J. Whitehead]

Good to see you as well Phil, I don't visit the forum as I once did. That large casualty discussion really did ruffle a few feathers as I recall. That was one reason I became less active. I think I will go back and take another look at that old thread for fun.

 

Ralph

[phil andrade]

30 minutes ago, Ralph J. Whitehead said:

Good to see you as well Phil, I don't visit the forum as I once did. That large casualty discussion really did ruffle a few feathers as I recall. That was one reason I became less active. I think I will go back and take another look at that old thread for fun.

 

Ralph

Please do so, Ralph ! There were some unedifying aspects to the conduct exhibited in some posts, but it was informative and had a lot to offer. I think it was your baby ! 😂

 

Phil

[Ralph J. Whitehead]

You are correct Phil, I did start that thread and apparently opened a can of worms 😁.

[phil andrade]

It was actually a first rate thread, Ralph.

Within the stormy exchanges there were some real gems of information and arguments that imparted enthusiasm to reconsider tropes and to investigate further.

Phil