An amateur's attempt to summarize July 1 1916

[Justin Moretti]

"On the 1st of July 1916, the British Army launched the Battle of the Somme, a battle infamous for the casualties sustained on that single day: roughly 19,000 dead; another 38,000 wounded, missing or POW. Blame fell naturally on the senior commander, Sir Douglas Haig, who stands accused even by some of his staunchest supporters of trying to do far too much with the resources available to him. Mitigating factors quoted by said supporters include the poor standard of the shells fired by his artillery - up to a third of which failed to explode, resulting in the German defences not taking the beating that was expected - and Haig himself being pressured by his French allies to kick the battle off before he was fully ready. 

"The battle - which went on for four months - is admitted by detractors and supporters alike to have been a ghastly experience for those who did the fighting, the misery being broken by two high-profile subsidiary attacks on July 14 and on September 15, the latter being the first introduction of the tank to warfare (on the British side).

"Casualties for both sides are hotly debated but the general consensus is that the Germans suffered in numbers not quite as badly as the British... with the difference that their losses were of higher-quality, more experienced soldiers. After the battle had closed down, they withdrew to stronger defences, booby-trapping and laying waste the ground they retreated over, arguably handing Haig a nominal strategic victory, albeit a pyrrhic one.

"Win, lose or draw, the British Army learned the hard way how to fight a war of this kind and by mid-1918 was almost unstoppable in the context of a short battle with modest goals, something which (unlike in 1916) it now had the logistics to sustain indefinitely, a new one starting as soon as the last had achieved its aims. A hundred-day succession of such battles helped to maul the German Army so badly that the Kaiser himself would recognize the futility of trying to continue."

[phil andrade]

Crucial to mention that the French contribution was very significant, although diminished in the initial phase on account of Verdun.

 

Indeed, the very fact of the French participation, and the striking success that it achieved, came as a nasty shock to the Germans.

 

The French suffered just under half as many casualties as the British, but took more territory and captured more prisoners over the entire twenty weeks of the battle.

Haig proved himself to be a very good coalitionist , giving great support to his Entente ally, although he was prone to making unflattering comments about them in his private correspondence .

The British casualties were disproportionately heavy and revealed the extent of their artillery deficiencies, and the prodigality of their infantry deployment was apparent in an exchange rate that favoured the Germans.

Haig’s initial misgivings proved correct, but he adhered to the task.

It’s a controversial episode in the annals of the Great War, and many of its aspects are susceptible to widely differing interpretations.

 

Phil

[Justin Moretti]

9 hours ago, phil andrade said:

The British casualties were disproportionately heavy and revealed the extent of their artillery deficiencies, and the prodigality of their infantry deployment was apparent in an exchange rate that favoured the Germans.

I am often tempted to ask myself the question: "What if everything had gone as well everywhere else as it did for XIII corps and the Ulster division (while their luck lasted)?"

The exchange rate may have favoured the Germans in numbers, but IIRC they were losing higher-quality troops. cf. von Hentig's comment that the Somme was the muddy grave of the German field army (quoted in Sheffield, The Somme, Cassell 2003).

Lloyd George can say what he likes about Haig, but he was Minister of Munitions when those 33% duds were being manufactured (to say nothing of holding back reinforcements that were badly needed for Haig's defensive battle in 1918), and I can't help but think that part of his excoriation of the high command after the war was a frantic attempt to stop the chickens from coming home to roost. LOOK, SQUIRREL!!!

 

[phil andrade]

As to the qualitative loss suffered by the Germans in the Somme fighting, the NCO cohorts were especially hard hit : so I keep reading. The backbone of the army , according to Prussian folklore 

There was also an unprecedented proportion of prisoners captured : nearly one in five of all the casualties officially tabulated by the Germans were unwounded prisoners, if the Entente claims are accurate. This speaks of deteriorating morale as well as increasing tactical prowess on the part of the Allies.

The British and Dominion troops also incurred  casualties that must have had a huge impact on morale.  I know that there was a significant development in the Ancre battles of October 1916, when British soldiers actually deserted to the Germans.  Haig became agitated by this and resorted to endorsing the use of the death penalty : something he was loathe to do.

That said, only about two or three percent of the British casualties were unwounded prisoners of war : the corollary being that the number of killed was extremely high. The Germans achieved at least a two to one superiority over the British in terms of inflicting fatalities, in my opinion. The French achieved a much better result in this regard.

I’m anxious to emphasise that the Somme can only be properly appreciated in its overall strategic context, with the huge Brusilov resurgence making havoc in the East and bringing Romania in on the Allied side. This, with failure at Verdun and the impact of the Blockade after the High Seas Fleet failed to knock the Royal Navy off its perch at Jutland, made the Somme an especially unbearable ordeal for Germany.

The German War Loan failed for the first time in October 1916, and the Somme had something to do with this.

 

Phil

 

 

 

 

 

 

Edited 20 March by phil andrade

[Justin Moretti]

18 minutes ago, phil andrade said:

the casualties officially tabulated by the Germans

I know Terraine was fond of pointing out that:

1) The German soldier had to be more than slightly wounded to end up recorded on the casualty lists.

2) The same British soldier could easily be counted twice, if he were lightly wounded in the morning and grievously wounded or killed later that day.

20 minutes ago, phil andrade said:

I’m anxious to emphasise that the Somme can only be properly appreciated in its overall strategic context

This is true, but most English-speaking laypersons these days aren't going to care much for what the French and especially the Russians were doing. They're going to see the British effort in isolation and concentrate particularly on Day 1.

[phil andrade]

Ah ! That old chestnut that thirty percent needs to be added to German casualty figures to apply the same criteria for slight wounds that are applied to the British.  The most egregious example of distortion, in my reckoning.

 

You’re too right in your view regarding the British perception of the Somme. Who cares about the foreigners ?

 

Phil

[Old Forge]

Hi @Justin Moretti, I think you've made an admirable attempt to sum up a vast subject. As you say, and the responses you've received reiterate, it's not something that can be 'summarised' and any version of events will challenge some views. 

Just to reply regarding John Terraine's accounting of casualties. Where he tried to 'bend' his interpretation of the figures towards a more favourable gloss on the British experience, his real target was to challenge the prevailing 1960/70s British myopia about losses, which were generally attributed (in the 'Lions led by Donkeys' view) to incompetent generalship. He wasn't really using it to say 'we won'. His main substantive arguments about the Great War stand the test, and it's interesting how many subsequent historians seem to ignore him rather than engaging with his views.

On the Somme specifically, he'd point out that the attack isn't at a time or place of the BEF's choosing - and 1st July 1916 must be understood as the 132nd day of the Battle of Verdun. Jonathan Bailey would argue that it's the high tide of a short-held belief in the ability of artillery to destroy, rather than neutralise. As the self-appointed leader of the 'Dig Lloyd George up and shoot him' Party, I'd say the ongoing lack of suitable munitions, as mentioned above, is a subject in its own right.

What is your intended audience for your summary?

All the best,

Richard

[phil andrade]

Hi Richard,

Thanks for coming to the party !

Regarding the casualties, James Edmonds was,  of course , the culprit for the inflation of German figures to a level that made the battle look like an attritional victory for the Allies.

I honestly believe that John Terrain was uncomfortable endorsing the Edmonds presentation , and I reckon he compromised himself by so doing. I am in agreement with you regarding the important role that Terrain played in revising the very unfair view of Haig’s generalship, and I owe him a lot for his cogent and persuasive take on the Great War.

 I refuse to buy his rendition regarding the acceptability of Edmonds’s figures, but will happily be persuaded otherwise if I see reliable data in support of his claims.

 I note that Haig was adamant that the commencement of the Battle of the Somme inaugurated a battle that raged unceasingly until the Armistice, and that, as such, it can be interpreted as part of a mighty, planned and ultimately triumphant struggle that vindicated his strategic and tactical precepts.

Nearly four fifths of all B.E.F. battle casualties on the Western Front for the entire war occurred on and after the 1st of July 1916.

Up until that date, French casualties there exceeded the British by  a ratio of roughly five to one; thereafter the British casualties exceeded those of the French by a significant margin.

Small wonder that British people still view the Somme as the nation’s unique martyrdom.

 

Phil

 

[Old Forge]

Thanks Phil, agreed. The arguments about casualty figures have always seemed a little specious. John Terraine made some broader points, though, which hold good. One was that the rates at battalion level were, overall, in keeping with both the US Civil War and the Second World War. FWIW, over 20,000 Lancastrian's were killed at Towton in 1461, and over 8,000 Yorkists.

My beef with the 'unique martyrdom' trope is that it goes hand in glove with World War 2 being 'Our Finest Hour'. It was very disappointing that, despite all the good intent, the Great War centenaries became, inevitably, The Somme and Passchendaele. After that there was scarce a mention until Armistice Day 2018, when the sackcloth and ashes came out again. At the same time, the BBC was churning out endless films about Dunkirk, Churchill, potato peel pies et al - great films, yet an inner voice says, 'give the bl**dy needle a shove!'

Cheers,

Richard

Edited 22 March by Old Forge

[phil andrade]

You and I agree on quite a lot, Richard !

It does seem to me, though, that Terrain was a bit too eager to play down the carnage of 1914-18. The pendulum swings too far, sometimes. As for Towton, how much credence should we place in the accounts of Medieval chroniclers ?

 

The American Civil War certainly provides ample evidence of its bloodshed in the regimental casualty figures. The worst hit regiments in the Union army suffered a total of twenty per cent of their entire muster killed or mortally wounded in battle in their  service throughout the war. Likewise their confederate counterparts, with the corollary that the smaller numbers of Southerners entailed a greater proportion of their soldiers being exposed to such loss. You’ll find, I’m sure, that many British and Dominion battalions in the Great War suffered significantly higher percentages of killed than that, and the impact was amplified by the sheer scale of the war. On the Western Front, 1914-18, one in eight of all soldiers deployed by the British Empire were killed in battle, and the great bulk of these deaths - well in excess of four fifths - were infantrymen who accounted for fewer than half of the total number who served there. The mitigation was the much lower mortality from disease, which had killed twice as many as battle in the American Civil War.

There were episodes in the Second World War when losses in the rifle companies nearly rivalled those of 1914-18, but the relatively small number of troops so exposed diminished the impact in overall terms.

The point is made excellently by John Ellis in his magisterial study , but even he, in his emphasis on how ghastly the experience of Second World War infantrymen could be, commented that the Western Front of 1914-18 was a “ Golgotha of unrivalled proportions”.

He obviously referred to British experience only .

Phil

 

 

[Interested]

One of the dimensions briefly touched in in previous posts here, was the approach of sending in the British troops in first, and the French troops in later, which is reflected in the numbers of casualties.  Do we know how often this approach was used?

[phil andrade]

My guess is that this was a feature unique to that day. The French achieved spectacular surprise, not least because the Germans hadn’t expected that the French were in a condition to launch such an attack. They’d believed that Verdun had done its work. 
 

The success of the French that day was predicated on skilful deployment of artillery - heavy guns and mortars especially- and flexible and effective infantry tactics. Fayolle’s Iron Corps comes to mind. Good soldiers, good commander and surprise. If attacking later compounded those advantages, then small wonder that that was an attribute of the French success.

 

The number of French casualties that day was exceeded by the number of German prisoners they captured. It was a phenomenal performance.

 

Phil

Edited 22 March by phil andrade

[Interested]

I thought General Foch sent the British infantry in first on a number of occasions, especially after the mutiny. but I've not studied this in depth.

[phil andrade]

Doesn’t sound plausible, given Haig’s resolute stance against Joffre who was determined to press the British to maintain their offensive on the Thiepval Spur after the frightful repulse of the first day. Haig repudiated that request, and deployed the British follow up in the southern sector instead.

 

Phil

[Justin Moretti]

On 22/03/2024 at 06:12, Old Forge said:

What is your intended audience for your summary?

Australians, Brits and Canadians I interact with on a different forum, and Canadians I interact with in real life who are not well read on the subject.

On 22/03/2024 at 13:16, phil andrade said:

It does seem to me, though, that Terrain was a bit too eager to play down the carnage of 1914-18. The pendulum swings too far, sometimes

Sometimes it needs to swing. To listen to the teachers at my school, you'd be forgiven for thinking that the only German who died in World War 1 was Manfred von Richthofen, and even then you'd (somewhat unseriously) be inclined to believe that it was Snoopy who killed him. I was literally 30 years old before I was aware of the Battle of Amiens and all that followed it. I wanted to take that copy of To Win a War I'd just finished reading, go back in time to my school days and shove it very hard up their left nostrils. 

 

Edited 26 March by Justin Moretti

[PhilB]

On 22/03/2024 at 19:41, phil andrade said:

 after the frightful repulse of the first day. 

Phil

Frightful is rather a mild word, Phil, for a catastrophic day, arguably the worst in British military history. To what extent do you consider that Haig`s friendship with the King helped him survive it in post?

I have, in the past, read an official critique of the first day enumerating about 10 reasons for the failures but I can`t find it now. (None of them blamed the CinC) Do you know where it is?

[Old Forge]

15 hours ago, Justin Moretti said:

Australians, Brits and Canadians I interact with on a different forum, and Canadians I interact with in real life who are not well read on the subject.

Good luck with that, Justin.

Richard

[Robert Dunlop]

On 19/03/2024 at 23:46, Justin Moretti said:

"The battle - which went on for four months - is admitted by detractors and supporters alike to have been a ghastly experience for those who did the fighting, the misery being broken by two high-profile subsidiary attacks on July 14 and on September 15, the latter being the first introduction of the tank to warfare (on the British side).

Here are some additional thoughts as you refine the summary. Firstly, I wonder if it is worth revisiting this observation. The fighting was a 'ghastly experience', of that there is no doubt. My Grandfather served in the First World War and, unlike many other veterans, he shared his experiences. I remember sitting at his feet while he recounted ghastly experiences. These experiences were not related to the Somme though; he did not arrive in France until late 1916. He talked about Messines, Third Ypres, etc. I respectfully submit that all war is a ghastly experience. The Somme was no different in that respect IMHO.

Perhaps it is the first-time scale of the losses that adds an emotive tinge to the concept of 'ghastly experience'? For each soldier involved, the personal experience was 'ghastly' in terms of the very narrow personal experience as well as the sense of losses across the parent unit. The Somme-wide perspective, however, only became apparent in the days/weeks/months after the event. Another way to think of this relates to the overall cost of war. I have argued previously that all major wars between totally committed belligerents will exact a heavy toll in the final analysis, regardless of how individual battles and campaigns play out. Let's say, for the sake of argument, that the July 1st attack was scaled back by 50%. Half of the soldiers who were lost on the day would, arguably, be 'saved'. Likewise their German counterparts. While these men would have been 'saved' on the day, they would have been lost at some later point in the war unless Britain decided it did not want to fight. And that was never a realistic option.

I have some additional comments on the size of the battle, which I will post when I get the chance.

Robert

[PhilB]

5 hours ago, Robert Dunlop said:

Let's say, for the sake of argument, that the July 1st attack was scaled back by 50%. Half of the soldiers who were lost on the day would, arguably, be 'saved'. Likewise their German counterparts. While these men would have been 'saved' on the day, they would have been lost at some later point in the war unless Britain decided it did not want to fight. And that was never a realistic option.

Robert

I take your general point, Robert, but the OP referred to 1/7/16. Surely you`re not suggesting that the overall war of attrition justifies the squandering of so many men on that day? (estimated 60,000 Allied v 20,000 German casualties)

[Justin Moretti]

32 minutes ago, PhilB said:

I take your general point, Robert, but the OP referred to 1/7/16. Surely you`re not suggesting that the overall war of attrition justifies the squandering of so many men on that day? (estimated 60,000 Allied v 20,000 German casualties)

I think this is the wrong way of looking at it. I very much doubt Haig got up in the morning and said "I feel like getting the better part of sixty thousand men killed or wounded today". I think he had every expectation that things would go as well across the board as they did for XIII corps, and the only correct thing to do is to talk in detail about exactly what went wrong and why.

[Robert Dunlop]

5 hours ago, PhilB said:

I take your general point, Robert, but the OP referred to 1/7/16. Surely you`re not suggesting that the overall war of attrition justifies the squandering of so many men on that day? (estimated 60,000 Allied v 20,000 German casualties)

The God of War always demands high numbers of dead and wounded, regardless of when these occur. We have attached a particular emotional significance to the losses on July 1st 1916 but, in the grand scheme of things, the same number of men would have been lost at some point. The problem with focusing on July 1st is that we can lose sight of the far bigger issue. In our narrow perspective, we think that maybe the attack should have been more limited or maybe another general would have been less profligate or... maybe... maybe... The bigger issue is that war on such a grand scale between multiple countries, none of whom will give up, has terrible consequences in both the short- and longer terms.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

5 hours ago, Justin Moretti said:

I think this is the wrong way of looking at it. I very much doubt Haig got up in the morning and said "I feel like getting the better part of sixty thousand men killed or wounded today". I think he had every expectation that things would go as well across the board as they did for XIII corps, and the only correct thing to do is to talk in detail about exactly what went wrong and why.

Haig held multiple scenarios in mind, ranging from complete failure through to aggressive exploitation if the German defenders suddenly collapsed completely and fled the battlefield. He studied subordinate commanders' battle plans in detail; it is not uncommon to see Haig's handwritten notes in the margins for example. The various units in the British Army had contingencies for complete failure, with potential German counterattacks, through to multiple lines of objectives, each of which had to be defended in case no further advance was possible. Some units had specific tasks related to exploitation. 

It is not the case that Haig only thought about a stunning advance to Bapaume and beyond.

Plans were put in place for huge numbers of casualties as well, by comparison to previous British attacks.

Robert

[phil andrade]

In regard to casualties, if I’m properly informed, the initial reports of British casualties for the first day suggested a total of sixteen thousand.  This was adjusted up to forty thousand for the first two days, whereupon Haig remarked that this could not be considered unduly severe considering the scale and intensity of the fighting. It took months- or years- before the total for the first day alone was compiled  : 57,470, including 19,240 confirmed fatalities and 2,152 missing who couldn’t be accounted for. 
 

Phil

[Stereoview Paul]

"The first casualty of war is the truth"

Numbers have been used by all sides to justify or support action, there were several occasions where the allied command message was to hold or reclaim lost ground "at all costs" and certainly this was done with inadequate weapons, ammunition and communications systems although all were to improve during the war.

In the heat of a battle it is impossible to keep a tally - if you could at what point should it have been enough? It is too easy for us future armchair warriors to claim we may have done things differently, at the time there were even mixed messages to frontline commanders from GHQ.

[phil andrade]

The first casualty of war is truth ?

 

How about the plan ?

 

The previous large British offensive, at Loos  in September 1915, was also under Haig’s control, in his capacity of C-i-C First Army.

He was accurately served by his medical services, with a predicted need for facilities to evacuate and treat forty thousand wounded. In the event, this estimate was remarkably accurate.

Even more striking in its accuracy was General Currie’s reckoning that the capture of Passchendaele in the autumn of 1917 would cost his Canadian Corps sixteen thousand casualties. He was within two and a half percent of the actual figure.

 

Given such uncannily accurate predictions in other battles, the apparent failure to do so for the opening of the Somme offensive demands explanation.

 

Phil