How many men can be mobilised?

[JMB1943]

As a further application of demographics to the question of a shortage of manpower of the UK, I have now had time to unearth the relevant  statistics. Bearing in mind that 18-yr olds in 1918 were born in 1900:-

For the UK in 1900,

Population                           37,000,000

Birth rate per thousand      26

Births in total                      962,000

Births of males                   481,000

Following data from “Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire”, p. 237-246 [Numbers include Dominion & Indian Troops; separate numbers for UK  only not given].

Data for the last full year of war (1917) was obtained by subtracting the number for Dec. 24, 1916 from that of Jan. 20, 1918

(A) KILLED

Officers      12,600

OR’s          220,000

(B) WOUNDED 

Officers       29,200

OR’s            595,300

(C) MISSING 

Officers         2,500

OR’s              44,300

Total (KIA/DOW/SICKNESS) deaths are (A) + (C) = 279,400

Total Wounded (B) = 624,500

SMEBE p.246 states that 1 in 1.8 of wounded are returned to service in France, i.e. 624,500 / 1.8 = 346,900 return to service and

(D) 277,600 NOT return to service.

Total loss in 1917, (A + C + D) = 557,000 

This total loss far exceeds the maximum potential input of fresh 18-yr olds, and satisfies my questions regarding the manpower shortage (a shortfall of 76,000).

Regarding the relative mobilization rates of Britain, France & Germany I would still like to know whether a largely agrarian economy can raise more men than a heavily industrialized one. Hence the requested comparison of US Civil War vs US WW2 rates.

Regards,

JMB

Edit: The Dominions (Aus/Can/Newfld/NZ) with pop. 10 million could theoretically provide an additional 130,000 men.

Edited 7 October , 2022 by JMB1943
Add info; typo

[phil andrade]

JMB,

 

USA 1941-45 mobilised 16million military personnel from a population of 133 million.

The population of the US in 1860 was 31 million, and it’s believed that ten percent of that population served in the Civil War, more than two thirds of them fighting for the Union.  There were only 5.5 million whites in the Confederate States, and perhaps sixteen percent of them were mobilised in the armies of the South.

The Soviet Union, with a population of 194 million in 1940, put about 34.5 million people into the armed forces 1941-45.

In view of these statistics- which I confess are very rough and ready - the mobilisation rates for Metropolitan France and Imperial Germany 1914-18 are remarkably high.

 

 Phil 

[JMB1943]

Phil,

Thanks for posting those numbers.

The Confederate States had essentially two industries, cotton and tobacco, so were agrarians and mobilized 16% of their men.

The more heavily industrialized US of 1941, but still with plenty of farmland, mobilized only 12%.

This single example appears to support my contention, w. r. t. the Great War numbers for Britain, France and Germany, that the industrialization which makes a modern war possible also tends to make it less sustainable.

Again, possibly an over-simplification, but I am happy to be enlightened!

Regards,

JMB

[phil andrade]

 JMB,

The agrarian South in the American Civil War mobilised a far higher proportion of  its manhood than the North: not sixteen per cent of their men, but of the entire white population of the eleven confederate states. The  North, at most, mobilised ten percent of its twenty two million people. The additional three and a half million black people had to be taken into account.

This , I would argue, was attributable to the more desperate straits that faced the South : outnumbered, conducting a more existential struggle, literally for house and hearth, with the additional determination to uphold white supremacy .

Compared with this, the North fought with one hand tied behind its back.

Does agrarian society produce men more suited to military life ?

 

Outdoor lifestyle and acquiescence in strict social hierarchy might be seen as  martial attributes.

The “ sturdy peasant soldiery” folklore applies to 1914-18 - for Tsarist Russia especially -  and it’d be interesting to see if statistical evidence could be cited to back this up.

 

 Phil 

 

 

 

 

 

Edited 7 October , 2022 by phil andrade

[JMB1943]

Phil,

A quick on-line search fails to throw up any collected statistics re occupations in the UK, but it seems like the sort of topic that may have been researched by sociologists.

Possibly trawling the unburnt service files (about 1 million) at TNA would yield the numbers, but that would be a fearful task.

For Aus/Can/NZ, the complete set of GW service files exist, but being young countries with relatively low industrial bases,  the results would, I believe, come back with a very strong bias to the outdoors life.

Regards,

JMB

Edited 7 October , 2022 by JMB1943

[phil andrade]

JMB,

 

On reflection, I’m convinced that industrialisation was an essential aid to mobilisation.

Millions of men had to be moved - mobilised - by rail and road. They had to be fed, clothed and equipped using industrial methods of production and preservation. The farmers produce the food, but the factories make the cans to keep that food safe to eat. The transport conveys that food and equipment to the soldiers, and sustains them in the field for months or even years. The machines do the work that frees men up to be mobilised. Women can replace men in factories, and older men can fill the gaps too.

Forgive me, I’m stating the obvious, but sometimes the obvious is overlooked.

Look at Germany in the Great War : more men mobilised in proportion to population than any other of the main belligerents, with the possible exception of Metropolitan France ….. this, I suggest, reflects the high degree of industrial development that went hand in hand with flourishing agriculture. Blood and Iron doesn’t work so well without industry.

Then there was Russia : mighty agriculture but relatively undeveloped industry, fewer than ten percent of its population mobilised 1914-17 ; in 1941-45 the proportion was doubled, and I would argue that this is in part attributable to greater industrialisation.

The South in the American Civil War bucks the trend, but my belief is that this was because the southern male had “ more skin in the game “ than his northern counterpart, especially because that skin was white.

 

Phil

Edited 8 October , 2022 by phil andrade

[phil andrade]

18 hours ago, JMB1943 said:

As a further application of demographics to the question of a shortage of manpower of the UK, I have now had time to unearth the relevant  statistics. Bearing in mind that 18-yr olds in 1918 were born in 1900:-

For the UK in 1900,

Population                           37,000,000

Birth rate per thousand      26

Births in total                      962,000

Births of males                   481,000

Following data from “Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire”, p. 237-246 [Numbers include Dominion & Indian Troops; separate numbers for UK  only not given].

Data for the last full year of war (1917) was obtained by subtracting the number for Dec. 24, 1916 from that of Jan. 20, 1918

(A) KILLED

Officers      12,600

OR’s          220,000

(B) WOUNDED 

Officers       29,200

OR’s            595,300

(C) MISSING 

Officers         2,500

OR’s              44,300

Total (KIA/DOW/SICKNESS) deaths are (A) + (C) = 279,400

Total Wounded (B) = 624,500

SMEBE p.246 states that 1 in 1.8 of wounded are returned to service in France, i.e. 624,500 / 1.8 = 346,900 return to service and

(D) 277,600 NOT return to service.

Total loss in 1917, (A + C + D) = 557,000 

This total loss far exceeds the maximum potential input of fresh 18-yr olds, and satisfies my questions regarding the manpower shortage (a shortfall of 76,000).

Regarding the relative mobilization rates of Britain, France & Germany I would still like to know whether a largely agrarian economy can raise more men than a heavily industrialized one. Hence the requested comparison of US Civil War vs US WW2 rates.

Regards,

JMB

Edit: The Dominions (Aus/Can/Newfld/NZ) with pop. 10 million could theoretically provide an additional 130,000 men.

Thanks for this effort, JMB.

The population of Britain and Ireland was pretty well two thirds that of Germany, and a comparison of those British figures of births in 1900 shows harmony with that table of German males  reaching 18 that I pitched earlier in the thread.

The casualty figures you cite are for the British Empire, not just for Britain - a point you acknowledge .  Recovery of wounded and return to service are controversial. I think the figure of 1:1.8 that you cited is for active front line service. A higher proportion of men were returned to “ some form of duty “, which implies behind the lines activity. 
 

If you could specify UK casualties only, and allow for this recovery of wounded variant, you might show a rather more favourable balance for the maintenance of manpower in the army.

Churchill made a convincing case when he stipulated that one third of men classified as wounded were lost to the army for good.

editing : I’ll do some heavy lifting myself here and investigate the U.K. casualties for 1917. I’d be surprised if they were more than three quarters of the figures from that SMEBE tabulation.

 

 Phil 

 

 

Edited 8 October , 2022 by phil andrade

[kenf48]

As far

18 hours ago, JMB1943 said:

I would still like to know whether a largely agrarian economy can raise more men than a heavily industrialized one.

The United Kingdom (excluding the Dominions but including Ireland) in broad terms drew initial recruits for Kitchener's first 100.000 from the traditional recruitment pool of  unskilled labourers or manual workers who, in 1911 formed 76% of the population. In the summer of 1914 many of these men were unemployed.  The shock of early middle class volunteers at their attitudes and behaviour was well documented. The second tranche or 'pals' and the locally raised battalions came mainly from the lower middle class or clerical professions the latter being a mere 4.5% of the occupational groups in 1911 and therefore disproportionately represented in recruitment in the 'voluntary' period. In 1914 there is little doubt Great Britain was an industrialised nation in 1911 over 6% of the occupied workers were engaged in coal mining, or over one million men.  The numbers of miners who enlisted eventually caused consternation  that  a 'cap' was put on recruits from the industry until 1917 when the call was for 500,00 men to be released from the industry.

In January 1915 during a debate in the House of Lords the following figures were cited, in essence expressing the lack of volunteers who were coming forward from the agricultural counties.  These communities were remote from world affairs and whether it was correct or not the implication for these country folk was the war was not their concern.  In spite of the apparent lack of volunteers agriculture in 1911 only accounted for 8% of the occupied population in Great Britain.

You may find this extract from the debate of interest:-

"It has been pointed out in the course of these discussions that the industrial resources of the country for the maintenance of these great armies in the field have been enormously taxed, and that the presence of men in our arsenals, shipbuilding yards, steel factories, and in all the factories which have to deal with the clothing and feeding of the troops, is just as essential as the sending of fresh reinforcements to Sir John French. I think that the statistics which I shall give will surprise the House as to how much has been taken from the industrial portion of the kingdom and how comparatively little from the agricultural portion. Beyond that I think it needs some little investigation as to how far some of the agricultural portions of the kingdom have had from the Government the support which they ought to have had in order to induce men there to come forward.

§ The figures that I shall quote are not up to date, but they are official figures furnished to the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee. I have not had an opportunity of conferring with the Secretary of State for War, but lest he should have any desire that the numbers should not be given I propose to state simply the percentages of recruits raised per 10,000 of the population, so that there may not be any power of exact discrimination by those who read them. The figures are remarkable. From August 4 to November 4, the first three months of the war, the southern district of Scotland furnished 237 recruits per 10,000 of the population, and stands at the head of the list. Then come Warwickshire and the Midland Counties, with 196 per 10,000 of the population; next come Lancashire etc., with 178 per 10,000 of the population; London and the Home Counties, 170 per 10,000 of the population; Yorkshire, Durham and Northumberland, 150 per 10,000 of the population; Cheshire and part of Lancashire and the neighbouring Welsh counties, 135 per 10,000 of the population; the North of Ireland, which, in order to avoid any sort of political 'bias, has been made to include also Dublin, Wicklow, Carlow, and Kildare, 127 per 10,000 of the population; Notts and Derbyshire, 119 per 10,000 of the population. Then I come to the agricultural counties. In the 352 North of Scotland the number of recruits was 93 per 10,000 of the population; in the West of England, 88 per 10,000, in the East of England, 80 per 10,000; and in the South and West of Ireland, 32 per 10,000 of the population."

https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/lords/1915/jan/08/army-reinforcements

A subsequent debate in January of the following year, discussing the Military Service Bill raised similar issues, especially in respect of Ireland where it was pointed out there had been no National Registration as in Great Britain and therefore the population data regarding potential soldiers was five years old and therefore of little value.

https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/lords/1916/jan/11/recruitment-statistics

[phil andrade]

That’s a wonderful reference, kenf48, thanks.

It really does make it difficult to reach hard and fast conclusions, doesn’t it ?

As for JMB’s tabulation of 1917 casualties, I’ve just consulted the CWGC database and found that the total deaths for all the British Empire, all services and all fronts, from all causes, was 297,522 for the entire year. Of these, 227,522 are consigned to the UK. That’s 76.56%.  I know as a matter of fact that the UK remit for CWGC  includes men from the mercantile marine and the Native Carrier Corps - two or three of my namesakes are thus, none of them British - but all are consigned to the UK. I understand that all deaths from the Crown Colonies and dependencies are attributed to the UK.  These are not included in that table from SMEBE.  With this in mind, I’d suggest that three quarters of all the irrecoverable casualties implied in the SMEBE figures should be applied to Britain and Ireland, which would yield a permanent loss of 418,000. This seems to come out on “ the right side”  for the 481,000 British males coming of age , but I’m confounded by my own discovery that one fifth of the birth cohorts were exempted as unfit, and that the British did not dip as deeply into available manpower as did their continental counterparts anyway.  The arithmetic didn’t look so healthy after all.

 

Phil

Edited 8 October , 2022 by phil andrade

[JMB1943]

Kenf48 & Phil,

Thank you both for providing these numbers.

One problem with the data from the Jan. 1915 debate is that they refer to volunteers (only; no conscripts yet) whereas the total mobilization issue covers both volunteers and conscripts.

Another problem with the data that Phil and I quote is the data.

My tabulation of birth rate/population/killed etc that I made earlier is good in the sense that I am not conjuring numbers out of a hat, but the birth rate is just that and does not account for the slight excess of female births and the ever-present infant mortality. Were there 481,000 males of 18 yrs ready to be inducted? Nowhere near! Blind, deaf, feeble-minded, physically weak…..all are excluded.

Similarly even the population figure seems to vary (37, 40, 44 million) depending on where I look.

This mobilization question has a LOT of moving parts and nuances that I was not aware of previously.

I still don’t know for certain whether a more agrarian society can mobilize a larger military than can an industrialized society!

Regards,

JMB

 

Edited 8 October , 2022 by JMB1943

[kenf48]

As a matter of interest this analysis which is self explanatory was syndicated by many UK newspapers in September 1917.   This example from the Millom Gazette dated 21 September 1917 (courtesy of BNA on FMP):-

A valuable source for statistical information for Great Britain between the wars is Statistical Abstract 70 (1927).  I can't find it online for free but  Statistical Abstract 68 (1908-1922.i.e excludes the 1921 census data is available here

As the abstracts are produced by the UK Government they are the most reliable data available for the period under review.

 

 

[JMB1943]

Kenf48,

This an interesting piece, because it quotes estimates from different sources about different times but it is worth looking at those numbers more carefully.

Mobilized….whole of trained forces = 4,500,000 (about 6.6% of total pop.)

Germany has called up additional …= 6,000,000 (about 8.8% of total pop.)

passed-into her armies………………..= 10,500,000 (about 15.5%of total pop.)

These numbers all seem to be in the expected range from from our various posts.

However, the last sentence is difficult to accept at face value.

”Out of every 14 Germans of mobilizable age, 10 or 11 have been forced into the Army…..”

That is a mobilization of (70% men) 35% of the total population.

The phrase “Our own Expeditionary Force” indicates that the writer is a British journalist, and you have to wonder from whence came 10/11 out of every 14 German men were fed into the Army.

If he conjured the number out of thin air as purely anti-German propaganda, well he would not be the first.

But if he had friends in high places in the British Govt., that is a different matter.

I must admit that I would like to see an independent confirmation of that last sentence in the article.

Regards,

JMB

 

[phil andrade]

JMB,

 

Seventy per  cent of men of mobilisable age does not equate to 35% of total population, since the  cohort is confined to those of a certain age range.

 

Males under the age of 18 or over the age of, say, 45, are not included.

 

Sixty six million people implies fifteen or so million  men of the right age, of whom seventy percent, or 10.5 to 11 million have been mobilised.

 

Am I missing something ?

 Phil 

Edited 8 October , 2022 by phil andrade

[JMB1943]

Phil,

You are absolutely right!

I am the one missing something…..thanks for picking up on that.

1 hour ago, phil andrade said:

JMB

Males under the age of 18 or over the age of, say, 45, are not included.

Sixty six million people implies fifteen or so million  men of the right age, of whom seventy percent, or 10.5 to 11 million have been 

 Phil 

66 million ==> 15 million men in age range 18-45.

How is this arrived at? Is it from a normal (or other type of) distribution?

Regards,

JMB

 

[phil andrade]

25 minutes ago, JMB1943 said:

Phil,

You are absolutely right!

I am the one missing something…..thanks for picking up on that.

66 million ==> 15 million men in age range 18-45.

How is this arrived at? Is it from a normal (or other type of) distribution?

Regards,

JMB

 

JMB,

The statistics that I’ve seen compiled for population of the belligerents indicate that males between the ages of fifteen and forty nine comprise about 25% of total population.

The highest rates of mobilisation accounted for roughly one fifth of the total population.

 

Germany attained that level 1914-18, with 13.25 million men mobilised from a population of sixty six million.

 

 Phil 

[JMB1943]

Phil,

Thanks for that!

So 70% of 25% = 18% of males = 9% of total population, which is where we came in with Gehlen’s 10%.

But your numbers 13/66 = 20% of total population.

Why the discrepancy?

I suspect a typo in the numbers quoted by the journalist!

Should possibly read 10/11 of every 40 men, i.e. about 25%

Regards,

JMB

[phil andrade]

1 hour ago, JMB1943 said:

Phil,

Thanks for that!

So 70% of 25% = 18% of males = 9% of total population, which is where we came in with Gehlen’s 10%.

But your numbers 13/66 = 20% of total population.

Why the discrepancy?

I suspect a typo in the numbers quoted by the journalist!

Should possibly read 10/11 of every 40 men, i.e. about 25%

Regards,

JMB

There are sixty six million Germans. Among these , about one in five are men aged between 18 and 45.  Rather more than 13 million. Of that pool of men, 10 or 11 out of every 14 have been mobilised, which is about 75%,  perhaps 80%.  Hence the 10.5 million, which is 16% of the total population. This is in September 1917. The huge battles of 1918 are yet to come. By the end of the war, 13.25 million will have served at one time or another, or 20% of the entire population.

I’m beginning to doubt myself now !

 Phil 

[JMB1943]

Phil,

I know the feeling--first I calculate in my head, then with pen & paper, then I check that with a calculator!

Time to put this thread to bed, I think.

Thanks for your very active participation, which has helped me to see things more clearly.

Regards,

JMB

[phil andrade]

14 hours ago, JMB1943 said:

Phil,

I know the feeling--first I calculate in my head, then with pen & paper, then I check that with a calculator!

Time to put this thread to bed, I think.

Thanks for your very active participation, which has helped me to see things more clearly.

Regards,

JMB

JMB,

Please let me say something before we close this..

We’ve tied ourselves in knots and overlooked an obvious feature. 
 

The  writer of that article you cite alluded to 10.5 million Germans having passed through the army at that point in the war, when it still had more than one year of duration ahead .

He then alluded to ten or eleven men out of fourteen of mobilisable age having been taken into the forces.  There you have it : the 10.5 million out of the fourteen million who would be available by dint of their age as the war ran its course.

The twenty per cent of population is a retrospective calculation, assessing the number who served at one time or another throughout the war as a proportion of the total population at the outbreak.

 

The ten per cent of the population that you allude to as a benchmark, in reference to Gehlen, is the figure at a GIVEN TIME.

Thus, at a specific time of maximum exertion , a nation of sixty six million, can field a force of 6.6 million; at the end of the war, when the overall record is assessed, twenty per cent of the entire population as counted at the start of the war would have gone through the ranks at one time or another .

Why didn’t we see that straight away ?

 

 Phil 

Edited 9 October , 2022 by phil andrade

[ilkley remembers]

On 08/10/2022 at 05:39, phil andrade said:

On reflection, I’m convinced that industrialisation was an essential aid to mobilisation.

Millions of men had to be moved - mobilised - by rail and road. They had to be fed, clothed and equipped using industrial methods of production and preservation. The farmers produce the food, but the factories make the cans to keep that food safe to eat. The transport conveys that food and equipment to the soldiers, and sustains them in the field for months or even years. The machines do the work that frees men up to be mobilised. Women can replace men in factories, and older men can fill the gaps too.

Forgive me, I’m stating the obvious, but sometimes the obvious is overlooked.

Look at Germany in the Great War : more men mobilised in proportion to population than any other of the main belligerents….. this, I suggest, reflects the high degree of industrial development that went hand in hand with flourishing agriculture. Blood and Iron doesn’t work so well without industry.

Then there was Russia : mighty agriculture but relatively undeveloped industry, fewer than ten percent of its population mobilised 1914-17 ; in 1941-45 the proportion was doubled, and I would argue that this is in part attributable to greater industrialisation.

The South in the American Civil War bucks the trend, but my belief is that this was because the southern male had “ more skin in the game “ than his northern counterpart, especially if that skin was white.

 

Levels of mobilization may be a reflection of levels of industrialization but I’m not sure that this worked in the case of Imperial Germany where productivity levels in different sectors of manufacturing were very variable.

 

Economic historians of WW1 as opposed to military historians note that whilst Germany may have been able to maximize manpower in the early days of the war, this caused significant dislocation in light industry, the service sector and agriculture which were already suffering from low productivity pre-1914.

 

Removal of large numbers of able bodied men from agriculture which was largely composed of peasant farmers meant that agricultural production in Germany actually declined during the course of the war. This was exacerbated by the alarming tendency of farmers to resort to subsistence farming practices, a feature also apparently witnessed in other continental states such as Austria-Hungary and Italy. Thus maximizing military manpower, therefore, effectively works against the states ability to successfully conduct the war.

 

It was understood in WW2, certainly in the UK, that societal mobilization was the objective not just military manpower and that the mantra should be ‘maximum effort where and when it is most wanted’ (Vickers 1942). In WW1 whilst Britain may not have been able to field armies at the same level as its continental allies and rivals it was able to equip them better and more lavishly because of abundant capital resources. In a sense it is wealth that wins wars not men.

 

[phil andrade]

1 hour ago, ilkley remembers said:

 

Levels of mobilization may be a reflection of levels of industrialization but I’m not sure that this worked in the case of Imperial Germany where productivity levels in different sectors of manufacturing were very variable.

 

Economic historians of WW1 as opposed to military historians note that whilst Germany may have been able to maximize manpower in the early days of the war, this caused significant dislocation in light industry, the service sector and agriculture which were already suffering from low productivity pre-1914.

 

Removal of large numbers of able bodied men from agriculture which was largely composed of peasant farmers meant that agricultural production in Germany actually declined during the course of the war. This was exacerbated by the alarming tendency of farmers to resort to subsistence farming practices, a feature also apparently witnessed in other continental states such as Austria-Hungary and Italy. Thus maximizing military manpower, therefore, effectively works against the states ability to successfully conduct the war.

 

It was understood in WW2, certainly in the UK, that societal mobilization was the objective not just military manpower and that the mantra should be ‘maximum effort where and when it is most wanted’ (Vickers 1942). In WW1 whilst Britain may not have been able to field armies at the same level as its continental allies and rivals it was able to equip them better and more lavishly because of abundant capital resources. In a sense it is wealth that wins wars not men.

 

That’s made me think .

 That old trope about Germany being an army with a state instead of a state with an army.

 

 Thanks.

 

 Phil