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Remembered Today:

How many men can be mobilised?


JMB1943

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I have recently been thinking about "the lost generation" and a statement somewhere on GWF to the effect that it was NOT a generation that was lost.

This in turn had me thinking about the many comments that I have read concerning the UK running out of men in 1918.

So the issue arises of how many men can a nation put into the field/ocean/air, i.e. how many can be mobilised?

One answer to this question that I am aware of is the following, in reference to the Russian Army in 1942,

"....,since experience showed that any given country could mobilise at most 10% of its total population,..." (The Gehlen Memoirs, Reinhard Gehlen, Collins, London, 1972; p. 64).

For the GW, this 10% would be Austro-Hungary, 5.28; France, 3.97; Germany, 6.78; Italy, 3.56; Russia, 17.0; UK, 4.54 million.

From SMEBE, p.38: Exped. Forces, 2.075; Home in UK, 1.383; Total British Army, 3.563 million + 0.248 (the Volunteers) + 0.150 (POW's) = 3.961 million.

From other sources, RN, 0.415; RAF, 0.304 = 0.719 million

Grand Total = 4.78 million, which is very close to the 4.54 million predicted from the Gehlen 10% [Note that those already invalided out are not included.]

That result is therefore that about 20% of the male population is fit for military service.

What confuses me (about all of the combatant nations) is that there are all of the 14-17 year old boys waiting in the wings to be drafted at 18 yrs. If food shortages and naval blockades, shortage of raw materials etc are taken out of the equation, it seems to me that the war could have been continued for much longer if it had been necessary.

What am I missing here?

Regards,

JMB

 

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Hi JMB. That is really interesting and I don't think you are missing anything other than one thing that springs to mind. Whether relevant or not I'm not sure, but thought to mention it. What percentage of those enlisted will become casualties and therefore no longer able to fight? As the war drags on there will be an increase in sickness as well casualties caused in the course of the fighting and those taken POW. My thinking is to the German Spring Offensive in 1918 and then of course, the 100 days.  Those underage recruits may not enter service quickly enough to replace those no longer fit. 

Edited by Gunner 87
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1 hour ago, JMB1943 said:

I have recently been thinking about "the lost generation" and a statement somewhere on GWF to the effect that it was NOT a generation that was lost.

This in turn had me thinking about the many comments that I have read concerning the UK running out of men in 1918.

So the issue arises of how many men can a nation put into the field/ocean/air, i.e. how many can be mobilised?

One answer to this question that I am aware of is the following, in reference to the Russian Army in 1942,

"....,since experience showed that any given country could mobilise at most 10% of its total population,..." (The Gehlen Memoirs, Reinhard Gehlen, Collins, London, 1972; p. 64).

For the GW, this 10% would be Austro-Hungary, 5.28; France, 3.97; Germany, 6.78; Italy, 3.56; Russia, 17.0; UK, 4.54 million.

From SMEBE, p.38: Exped. Forces, 2.075; Home in UK, 1.383; Total British Army, 3.563 million + 0.248 (the Volunteers) + 0.150 (POW's) = 3.961 million.

From other sources, RN, 0.415; RAF, 0.304 = 0.719 million

Grand Total = 4.78 million, which is very close to the 4.54 million predicted from the Gehlen 10% [Note that those already invalided out are not included.]

That result is therefore that about 20% of the male population is fit for military service.

What confuses me (about all of the combatant nations) is that there are all of the 14-17 year old boys waiting in the wings to be drafted at 18 yrs. If food shortages and naval blockades, shortage of raw materials etc are taken out of the equation, it seems to me that the war could have been continued for much longer if it had been necessary.

What am I missing here?

Regards,

JMB

 

I’m sorry that I can’t recall where I read it, but I remember it clearly as a quote from a publication concerning various aspects of WW1, because it so surprised me.  It was that just 25% of Great Britain and Ireland’s male population “of military age” fought in the Armed Services during WW1. 

Edited by FROGSMILE
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JMB,

Have you seen the numbers provided in the publication ‘Statistics of the military effort of the British Empire during the Great War’?- Available to read online from ‘Internet Archive’

In addition to the fighting services there were of course also some men involved in transport and supply professions (Mercantile Marine, Dock Workers, Shipyard workers, Coal Miners etc.) and some male workers otherwise of military age deemed to have essential design and manufacturing skills who were involved in arms production industries (weapons, munitions, military vehicles, aircraft etc.).

I’d be interested in what the findings are from this particular thread.

MB

Edited by KizmeRD
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10 hours ago, FROGSMILE said:

I’m sorry that I can’t recall where I read it, but I remember it clearly as a quote from a publication concerning various aspects of WW1, because it so surprised me.  It was that just 25% of Great Britain and Ireland’s male population “of military age” fought in the Armed Services during WW1. 

General Annual Reports of the British Army, 1913-1919

I've seen the 25% before. This one shows 22%. Either way, way over 10%.

image.png

 

Craig

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10 minutes ago, ss002d6252 said:

General Annual Reports of the British Army, 1913-1919

I've seen the 25% before. This one shows 22%. Either way, way over 10%.

image.png

 

Craig

Thank you Craig, it did seem a surprising statistic when I first saw it because there is so much rightful emphasis on the sacrifice made by the Nation’s youth, but the figures suggest a more nuanced view is necessary.  It also reminded me of the study at the behest of and cost to the government after the 2nd Anglo/Boer War, as to why so many British men were stunted, malnourished and unfit for military service.  It also casts a different light on why so many underage enlistments were accepted (via Nelsonian blind eyes) by recruiters.  It seems that little had changed in terms of the fitness of young men by 1914. 

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7 hours ago, KizmeRD said:

JMB,

Have you seen the numbers provided in the publication ‘Statistics of the military effort of the British Empire during the Great War’?- Available to read online from ‘Internet Archive’

In addition to the fighting services there were of course also some men involved in transport and supply professions (Mercantile Marine, Dock Workers, Shipyard workers, Coal Miners etc.) and some male workers otherwise of military age deemed to have essential design and manufacturing skills who were involved in arms production industries (weapons, munitions, military vehicles, aircraft etc.).

I’d be interested in what the findings are from this particular thread.

MB

Captn. RD,

The British Army numbers did indeed all come from SMEBE.

I am not so much concerned about why only 20% of male population could perform military service, but rather the idea that the combatant nations were running out of manpower.

My father, b. 1911, left school at 14 so I’ll take that as the general age for 99% of the boys. It seems to me that any nation committed to a total war could have selected at age 16 those fit enough, given them a good 24 months of military training and then off to the front at 18. This 24 months was longer than that received by the volunteers of Kitchener’s New Armies.

Those NOT selected would have been drafted into the industrial effort, to learn their skills from the older men (above 48) who manned the factories and ship-building yards.

I am by no means advocating such a continued bloodshed, but I am confused regarding the “shortage of manpower” situation in 1918.

It may be that my analysis is overly simplistic.

Regards,

JMB

 

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8 hours ago, ss002d6252 said:

General Annual Reports of the British Army, 1913-1919

I've seen the 25% before. This one shows 22%. Either way, way over 10%.

252,

I’m afraid that you mis-read my original post.

The quote is “10% of the total population “. not 10% of the male population.

Regards,

JMB

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Twenty per cent of the total population is a decent rule of thumb. 
 

Take a look at Metropolitan France, population 1914 : 39.6 million, total mobilised 1914-18 was  7.9 million. Near as damn it, one in five.

 

Likewise Germany, from a total population of 66 million, put 13.25 million under arms.

 

These are not precise, there’ll always be niggles and disputes, but the figures are pretty convincing if you seek a general survey of two belligerents exerting themselves to the utmost.

 

British mobilisation was not so complete : 6 million from a population of 45 million.

 

Again, rather rounded figures, but consistent with a nation in arms that managed to keep back a rather higher proportion of its manpower in reserved occupations than its Franco German counterparts.

 

Phil

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Phil,

My impression that the major difference between the French/British mobilization numbers is due to the fact that the British economy was heavily industrialized, whereas the French was still largely agrarian.

The French were therefore able to conscript many more men, and always had (even before hostilities) a very large standing army.

Regards,

JMB

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Might it be said that for France, right from the outset, it was a more existential struggle, with all out effort right from the outset ?

The British people were not exposed to quite the same intensity of war, until the Battle of the Somme.

 

That is not to be complacent about the enormity of the British contribution, especially since, as you say,JMB, the large standing army syndrome was alien to the them, while the continental peoples were accustomed to it.

When he assumed command of the BEF near the end of 1915, Haig made a chilling comment that the loss of one tenth of the military population of the nation would be a price worth paying for the defeat of Prussian militarism.

 

He was quite good at arithmetic, and his assessment was all too near the mark.

Using my criterion of one fifth of the population, there would have been nine million male  Britons of military age of whom eight  per cent or more were killed.

 

Phil

 

 

Edited by phil andrade
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If all you've got left in the bag is the annual class of youths reaching military age, then you are running out - and dependent on the vagaries of demographics.  Germany called up the Class of 1919 a year early.

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There is also the question of the proportion of males of military age who are exempted from service by infirmity of various sorts.

 

One authority on military statistics, researching the record of the American Civil War, reckoned that one fifth of the men were unfit for military service and thus exempted.

 

This had caused consternation in Britain in the Second Boer War, when an alarming number of potential recruits were found to be too feeble to pass the physical fitness tests.  This was one of the reasons for the social welfare reforms financed by the budget of 1906.

Contemporary British commentary remarked on the grand physical prowess of German recruits and there was , I think, something of Social Darwinism implicit in these observations.

Bearing these demographic constraints in mind, the Franco German mobilisation of 1914-18 is mind boggling.

 

Phil

 

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A rough and ready bit of research, using Niall Ferguson's tabulations in his PITY OF WAR, Table 35, page 299, tells us that both France and Germany mobilised four fifths, approximately, of all males aged 15 to 49 in 1914.  This conforms rather well to the  statement made by the American authority who investigated the statistics of the American Civil War ( William Fox, REGIMENTAL LOSSES IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, page 552 and footnote),  but he used the age remit of 18 to 45.   The numbers of youngsters coming forward to military age in the four years of war was obviously incorporated into the calculations, as was the number of men who became too old to serve during the duration of the war.

 

In the case of Britain and Ireland, the difference is significant : using the criteria that were cited by Fergusson, it appears that fewer than three fifths of the men in the age cohorts 15 to 49 in 1914 were mobilised.  The inclusion of Ireland was bound to distort the ratio, because support for the war was hardly flourishing in the Emerald Isle.

 

Phil

 

 

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On 04/10/2022 at 12:10, phil andrade said:

Twenty per cent of the total population is a decent rule of thumb. 


Take a look at Metropolitan France, population 1914 : 39.6 million, total mobilised 1914-18 was  7.9 million. Near as damn it, one in five.

Likewise Germany, from a total population of 66 million, put 13.25 million under arms.

British mobilisation was not so complete : 6 million from a population of 45 million.

5 hours ago, phil andrade said:

A rough and ready bit of research, using Niall Ferguson's tabulations in his PITY OF WAR, Table 35, page 299, tells us that both France and Germany mobilised four fifths, approximately, of all males aged 15 to 49 in 1914.  This conforms rather well to the  statement made by the American authority who investigated the statistics of the American Civil War ( William Fox, REGIMENTAL LOSSES IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, page 552 and footnote),  but he used the age remit of 18 to 45. 

In the case of Britain and Ireland, the difference is significant : using the criteria that were cited by Fergusson, it appears that fewer than three fifths of the men in the age cohorts 15 to 49 in 1914 were mobilised.  The inclusion of Ireland was bound to distort the ratio, because support for the war was hardly flourishing in the Emerald Isle.

Phil

Phil

Phil,

I appreciate the the amount of digging that you have done to pull up these numbers.

It makes me wonder if Gehlen’s 10% total population [20 % of male population] in 1942 is a reflection of Germany’s increased industrialization from 1910 to 1940.

Do you have numbers to enable a comparison of US mobilization in the Civil War vs WW2 ( I deliberately omit WW1 due to the late & limited US involvement).

Regards,

JMB

Edited by JMB1943
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JMB,

The upshot of my cursory survey of the figures for 1914-18 is that a nation might have 25% of its total population consisting of males between the ages of fifteen and forty nine, but this is notional as a pool of military manpower. The actual mobilisation managed to get 20% of its total population into the armed forces, and this is apparent from the Franco German record.  I’m struck by the harmony of this with the statement of Fox regarding the American Civil War, which stipulated that exemptions of one kind or another deprived the armies of about one fifth of all males of military age.

 

ILet me consult one or two more books on my shelves, and I’ll try and answer your questions.

 

 Phil 

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2 hours ago, JMB1943 said:

Do you have numbers to enable a comparison of US mobilization in the Civil War vs WW2 ( I deliberately omit WW1 due to the late & limited US involvement).

 

That would be off topic for the GWF

On 01/10/2022 at 22:38, JMB1943 said:

If food shortages and naval blockades, shortage of raw materials etc are taken out of the equation, it seems to me that the war could have been continued for much longer if it had been necessary.

I think you have answered your own question - this hypothesis falls firmly in the "what if" category of history which is a pretty futile exercise. War, as recent events have shown is not only conducted by soldiers but is, as Clausewitz declared "War is a mere continuation of policy (or politics) by other means".  Statistical analysis of the moobilisation of combatant nations is merely just one of the factors.  The contribution of the Royal Navy blockade to shortening the war, for exanple if you like the atomic bomb on Japan, is a historical fact.  Both events shortened the war.  As a matter of  fact all the Continentsl nations had large standing, conscript armies.  Russia withdrew from the war after the 1917 revolution, wars are not won by soldiers alone, battles are won and lost by them but the political consequences of the outcome are of little consequence to the men on the ground. The Great War ended in 1918, but wars and confilcts created by that seismic event continued for many years after.

Having said that I have previously posted this table which more or less accords with the original statement as to the numbers mobilised in the UK:-

Table enlistments.jpg

Source  A Nation in Arms Beckett & Simpson

 

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Just on the issue of 17 18 year old waiting to be drafted: there will be a degenerative affect on these number because they are not breeding. On that basis it is inevitable that manpower will decline and run out.

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2 hours ago, kenf48 said:

That would be off topic for the GWF

I think you have answered your own question - this hypothesis falls firmly in the "what if" category of history which is a pretty futile exercise.

Kenf48,

I am sorry that you think that question to be off-topic for GWF, considering the context in which it was raised.

If it were a question purely out of the blue, I would have to agree with you.

However, it is a natural extension in view of my contention that higher mobilisation rates are possible with largely agrarian economies, than with a more industrialised society.

The US in 1862 (largely agrarian) and 1940 (highly industrialised) are the ideal mobilisations to compare in the present context.

My original question concerned the oft-quoted "manpower shortage" facing the combatant nations in 1918, and a consideration of whether it was real or not.

The issue of mobilization rates arises directly out of the "what if" (or "exercise in futility", as you will) historical scenario that I am trying to get to grips with. The fact that the German Army on the Eastern Front in 1942 was using mobilization rates to estimate the number of divisions that the Russian Army could actually put in the field, is proof of this.

The answer to my original question is, I believe, that a manpower shortage only exists if there is an insufficient number of trained reserves available to fill the gaps left by those killed and invalided out; apparently, this was the case in 1918.

I'll have a run through SMEBE to find some relevant numbers to convince myself that casualties did, in fact, exceed potential reserves available.

Regards,

JMB

 

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1 minute ago, Mick M said:

Just on the issue of 17 18 year old waiting to be drafted: there will be a degenerative affect on these number because they are not breeding. On that basis it is inevitable that manpower will decline and run out.

Yes, in the VERY long run, but these 18 yr olds were born in 1900 and subsequently. 

The birth rate, if it falls at all, will only be affected in 1915 and onwards, so any degenerative effect will be very delayed.

Regards,

JMB

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9 hours ago, JMB1943 said:

Kenf48,

I am sorry that you think that question to be off-topic for GWF, considering the context in which it was raised.

If it were a question purely out of the blue, I would have to agree with you.

However, it is a natural extension in view of my contention that higher mobilisation rates are possible with largely agrarian economies, than with a more industrialised society.

The US in 1862 (largely agrarian) and 1940 (highly industrialised) are the ideal mobilisations to compare in the present context.

My original question concerned the oft-quoted "manpower shortage" facing the combatant nations in 1918, and a consideration of whether it was real or not.

The issue of mobilization rates arises directly out of the "what if" (or "exercise in futility", as you will) historical scenario that I am trying to get to grips with. The fact that the German Army on the Eastern Front in 1942 was using mobilization rates to estimate the number of divisions that the Russian Army could actually put in the field, is proof of this.

The answer to my original question is, I believe, that a manpower shortage only exists if there is an insufficient number of trained reserves available to fill the gaps left by those killed and invalided out; apparently, this was the case in 1918.

I'll have a run through SMEBE to find some relevant numbers to convince myself that casualties did, in fact, exceed potential reserves available.

Regards,

JMB

 

JMB,

 

There is much to discuss here, and, yes : the record of the Great War is thrown into relief by comparing it with other wars, before and since.

 I was taken aback when it became apparent that the number of males between 15 and 49 years of age represented one fourth of a nation’s entire population . I had thereto thought the ratio was one fifth.  The revelation that 20% of that potential pool of males was probably exempted from service for various reasons was another surprise.

 

The fact that this arithmetic was identified and discussed by a veteran soldier and analyst of the American Civil War affords us the chance to see whether the Great War transcended previous experience in its mobilisation rates.  A worthy and relevant topic for GWF, I would have thought.

As to your suggestion that an agrarian society is better able to marshal its manpower for military service than an industrialised one, I am keen to investigate and discuss that, too.

 Phil 

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16 hours ago, JMB1943 said:

Yes, in the VERY long run, but these 18 yr olds were born in 1900 and subsequently. 

The birth rate, if it falls at all, will only be affected in 1915 and onwards, so any degenerative effect will be very delayed.

Regards,

JMB

And made up for by the baby boom nine months after the men who survived arrived home.

Edited by healdav
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The demographics of all this are absolutely fascinating.  If only I was better informed about the population trends in the closing decade of the nineteenth century !

Reverting to Niall Ferguson again ~ and I know we need circumspection here - let me cite a table from page 297, table 34, which gives yearly totals for German males attaining the age of 18 :

 

1914 : 670,000

1915 : 674,000

1916 : 688,000

1917 : 693,000

1918 : 699,000

1919 : 711,000

 

That’s something to behold, isn’t it ?

I focus on Germany because, of all the belligerents, it was conspicuous for mobilising an extremely high proportion of its manpower, rivalling- maybe even exceeding- France in this respect.  That certainly surprises me. I wonder whether it’s attributable to the fact that a significant part of NE France was overrun and occupied, depriving that nation of a source of recruitment.

Then there’s the question of rural versus agrarian manpower.  Germany had a large agrarian contingent, but mighty industrial structure, too. It’s also the case that German military traditions favoured the reputation of farming backgrounds : I’m sure that I’ve read that German generals did not trust townsfolk when it came to soldiering : too many socialists and Jews !  Jack Sheldon’s books opened my eyes to that.

 

This topic has a lot of life in it yet.

 

Phil 

 

 

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5 hours ago, phil andrade said:

The fact that this arithmetic was identified and discussed by a veteran soldier and analyst of the American Civil War affords us the chance to see whether the Great War transcended previous experience in its mobilisation rates.  A worthy and relevant topic for GWF, I would have thought.

What exactly is under discussion here? -  pre and post war demographics - how wars end,is it simply shortage of fighting men, or more specifically why did  the Great War end when it did - a comparison of agrarian and industrial economies - actual numbers mobilised - potential numbers mobilised - comparative studies? The original question appears to be as in the topic heading.

 

50 minutes ago, phil andrade said:

This topic has a lot of life in it yet.

Perhaps some clarification as to what this topic is about might assist understanding.

As regards the British Army Chris Baker has given a concise outline of the manpower crisis of 1918 in the British Army of the Great War did exist and the impact of politics rather than demographics on manpower in the British Army. (He also managed it without any reference to the American Civil War or WW2).

https://www.longlongtrail.co.uk/battles/the-british-armys-manpower-crisis-of-1918/

Any demographic investigation as to 'potential reserves' in 1918 must give some relevance to infant mortality and the influenza pandemic.

 

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References  to the American Civil War and the Second World War do have a legitimate place in discussion of the Great War, as John Terraine demonstrated in one of his landmark books  THE SMOKE AND THE FIRE, Myths and Anti-Myths of War 1861-1945.

 

Phil

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