The Kaiser’s Spring offensive

[PhilB]

BATTLE PERIOD OFFICERS OTHER RANKS

Somme & Lys 21.3.1918 - 31.5.1918 16,482 327,330

Somme, etc 27.5.1918 - 7.8.1918 14,708 82,959

Amiens, etc 8.8.1918 - 14.11.1918 17,841 345,376

The above figures indicate Allied losses at over 800,000 between 21/3/18 and 14/11/18. A significant factor in preferring an armistice, as suggested above. Phil B

[andigger]

Or am I under-estimating th war weariness of the nations in conflict?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Definitely, I think. By 1918 the combatant nations had had enough of the casualty lists. Perhaps their 'weariness' is most evident in the pre-WWII policy of appeasment.

Andy

[frie]

The front changed in april sometimes with a 20 km, almost 3 years of battles, 3 years of death, lost in a month... If the Germans had reached also Mont Rouge, Mont des Cats then the only option for the Britisch would be to go to Dunkirk... But the German couldn't not resist, because they couldn't replace the fallen... The French came to help the Britisch but there were big troubles between Britisch and French...

The attached picture shows a Britisch Camp -- april 1918 ---

[morse]

David Khan in his book "Codebreakers" gives an interesting not publicly known bit of history concerning the offensive.

The German Army introduced the ADFGVX cypher which intially was effectily unbreakable until a dozey german signaller received a signal in the cypher butnot having the cypher requested a rerun in aknown cypher. the resulting message was intercepted by the allies and used to crack the cypher.

this provided infomation including one important one which read Munitionierung beschleunigen Punkt Soweit nicht eingeschen auch bei Tag (Rush munitions Stop Even by day if not seen) The message had been sent to 18th Army's general Staff at Remaugies

The germans were known to favour a massive bombardment, thus the allies were told where the offensive was to come from. Reccie flights confirmed that the ammo was being moved as per the message.

Foch moved his reserves into the area in front of the 18th army forestalling any surprise.

[carninyj]

Des, somewhat belatedly I came across a couple of quotations I thought might shed light on your contention that the Germans had indeed been defeated in 1918 -

Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, Commander of German army in Flanders, in report to Chancellor Prince Max of Baden, 18th October 1918: 'Our troops are exhausted and their numbers have dwindled terribly ... Quantities of machine guns ... and artillery have been lost ... There is also lack of ammunition ... The morale of the troops has suffered seriously ... They surrender in hordes whenever the enemy attacks. Whatever happens we must obtain peace, before the enemy breaks through into Germany.'

General Ludendorff to a post-war Reichstag committee: 'After the way our troops on the Western Front had been used up, we had to count on being beaten back again and again. Our situation could only get worse, never better'.

Ludendorff also said (Ludendorff's Own Story, 1919): 'Retreating troops, meeting a fresh division going bravely into action, shouted at them things like "Blacklegs" and "You're only prolonging the war."'

I think you also said, or implied, later - apologies if it wasn't you - that the Germans surrendered conditionally. My understanding was that they surrendered unconditionally. They tried, I believe, to claim later, and untruthfully, that they had surrendered on the basis of President Wilson's 14 Points.

Carninyj

[Desmond7]

Right lads .. we are now way, way, way off the Spring offensive.

We've discussed the offensive, given credit to the Germans for major 'kicking' of British which was 'returned' in equal/greater measure. Etc Etc. Agreed?

NOW ... do we date the victory for the allies in WW1 to PRE-1914 when most of the Royal Navy's ships were built? Thus, if the Spring Offensive was a hyper-gamble .. the very ACT of going into a war which would inevitably drag in a maritime superwhooperdooper power was doomed to failure. Discuss.

Off we go

[KONDOA]

Had the Sclieffen plan been implemented as originally concieved the presence of the British Navy would have had little initial impact.

Germany would have controlled the Channel ports and thus the shipping and would have gained access to Atlantic and other ports for its own Navy and commerce.

Had they considered failure of this plan they may have been more cautious regarding the RN.

Roop

[carninyj]

Dating victory is a tough one!

Roop is right to draw attention to the failure of the Schlieffen Plan, just as Des is also right when he draws attention to the importance of the naval blockade of Germany. The former altered the nature of WW1, turning it from one in which open warfare and control of the ports offered the Germans real prospect of a quick victory - the Kaiser told his troops they would be home 'before the leaves fell from the trees', a not unrealistic view in light of the events of the Franco-Prussian War (1870/71) - to one where they had to fight a prolonged war on two fronts, a war of attrition for which Germany was economically and militarily unprepared; the latter, the naval blockade, had by 1917 caused shortages of vital food, raw materials and materiel. This was despite the real success of the Hindenburg Plan (Oct 1916) in bringing about the 'total mobilisation' of Germany's resources. Moreover, additional strain arose from Germany's need to support unreliable allies. However, like any complex situation, Germany's WW1 defeat/Allied victory has many causes, not least that German troops, excellent as they were, were unable at any point to break through Allied lines.

Manpower has to be something to do with it. Perhaps someone with the figures could tell us just how outnumbered the Germans were. The British and French drew extensively on men from their empires and that, at whatever date it tipped the balance, must mark a turning point. At what point did the German army reach its maximum manpower?

Moreover, Germany had internal political problems - Burgfrieden (peace in the fortress) had broken down by 1917; the Reichstag, though powerless, had voted in July 1917 by 212 to 126 for 'a peace of understanding and permanent reconciliation of peoples'. They stated that 'Forced territorial gains and political, economic and financial oppressions are irreconcilable with such a peace'. It could be argued that the Allies had certainly won in that they had convinced the political parties & those they represented that the war was lost by then. However, German nationalists, notably Admiral Tirpitz and Wolfgang Kapp, founded the Fatherland Party in September 1917 to rally support for an annexationist war and their party had 1 million members! Unfortunately for the Allies, these latter types, supporters of the 'silent dictatorship' of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, held sway until the collapse of summer 1918.

One cannot date Allied victory too early or say that one event had sealed fates. You have to remember too that the German military thought they were winning until about summer/autumn 1918. They had taken Russia out of the war & imposed the humiliating Treaty of Brest Litovsk; Italy was ineffective after defeat at Caporetto. Ludendorff, even allowing for 'he would say that wouldn't he', had reason to tell his men to expect victory after March 1918.

Carninyj