The Kaiser’s Spring offensive

[dah]

We had a presentation at a recent WFA branch meeting about the ‘last 100 days’. It was an excellent talk with questions and answers afterwards.

Only when driving back home, did I realise that the content and direction of the talk and subsequent questioning was almost all slanted towards the defects in the German plan – and to show evidence that the British army had become the finest fighting force in the field.

There was no credit given to the Germans for achieving the type of large-scale breakthrough on the Western Front that we (the allies) had tried and failed several times in the preceding years – at huge loss of life.

How would ‘our’ history portray the Somme or 3rd Ypres offensives if one of them had achieved the same scale of breakthrough and deep penetration into enemy-occupied territory……but then had been beaten back? Isn’t it equally likely, in those circumstances, that we’d have run into the same problems that the Germans encountered…..outrunning artillery support and supply lines, losing sight of the strategic objective etc etc ?

I say…..YES, we would have run into similar issues, made mistakes of a similar significance (not necessarily the same). And, I’ll bet a penny to a pound that ‘our’ history would paint as glorious a picture of such an outcome as possible. We’d be praising our innovative tactics in breaking the stalemate, in the superior fighting spirit of our troops etc etc.

We won the war – so we get to write the history. And that history, I feel, does not give due credit or respect to the worthiness of our enemy…particularly in the case of the spring offensive of 1918.

Shouldn’t we be able to (temporarily) set aside the scale of our own loss and other patriotic instincts and give full credit to the Germans !!!

David

[PhilB]

I have great sympathy with your post, David. I do wonder how the Germans, after a dazzling advance, without significant help from tanks, in March-June 1918, were able to be pushed back relentlessly on a broad front just a few weeks later. What had changed so much in their army? Phil B

[Desmond7]

Phil - Is it too simplistic to say that the 'best' of the German army became casualties in the advance?

On the main question .... I think facts speak volumes and it is very clear that the German breakthrough was unprecedented in the war. When senior commanders issue 'Backs to trhe wall' orders you JUST KNOW the proverbial has hit the fan.

So - German performance at a tactical level gets (generally) a straight 'A' in the early day/s of the offensive. Their troops seemed to show a great deal of initiative and junior leaders demonstrated skills which would be equally well applied by their 'descendants' in the Wehrmacht.

But there is no getting away from the higher level strategic question. The offensive was a gamble with all the odds stacked against it.

It failed ... and I'm sure there are many on this forum who could argue convincingly that it was BOUND to fail.

So .... credit for the original STORM .... but like a typhoon, it blew itself out.

Now I'm heading for the nearest shell-hole.

[andigger]

So .... credit for the original STORM .... but like a typhoon, it blew itself out.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Yes Des you are correct, but I think David's point is that in comparison over the previous 3.5 years the allies were never able to develop an offensive that gained more than a few yards at the very best, never mind one that ended miles ahead of the starting point. What the Germans accomplished was remarkable, but I think ultimately their success is lost to the anals of defeated causes throught out history.

Andy

[Paul Reed]

There was no credit given to the Germans for achieving the type of large-scale breakthrough on the Western Front that we (the allies) had tried and failed several times in the preceding years – at huge loss of life.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

The Germans were not able to achieve this level of breakthrough either without substantial loss. I believe on 21st March alone they suffered more than 30,000 casualties, for example.

[Desmond7]

Andy - I agree that the Victors write the history but I would also contend that, for WW1 afficianados, the impact of the March Offensive is well known.

However, I do have a theory as to why the battles of this period of the war are (generally) dimly remembered by broad history enthusiasts and most certainly the general public.

It runs like this :-

1. The British were dealt a tremendous blow by the Germans and not only lost ground but, more importantly for folk memory, they lost a lot of prisoners. I know the numbers of POWs from by home town could be counted on the fingers of two hands up until March 1918. On and immediately after that date the POW figures rocket!

2. Thus was there an element of shame as well as shock to contend with for those affected by the battle? My own Grandad was one of those captured - and a good job too!

3. So, in post war memory, the 'counter-attack/Germans running out of steam/Backs to the wall' becomes the issue which receives the greatest focus.

Thus - The Somme, Ypres etc are the battles most remembered by the average British citizen. Not because they were even remotely as successful as the German offensive, but because of the scale of slaughter!!! Weirdly, if there had been more KIAs on the British side, as opposed to POWs, the Kaiser's Battle would probably be better remembered?

[PhilB]

And presumably the British commanders were not keen to dwell on the fact that the Germans had achieved the breakthrough that the the British brass had failed repeatedly to achieve? Phil B

[paul guthrie]

Well the offensive took them out of their fortified positions, used up their best men and horses and left them much weakened when they stopped. It was quite a gamble but they were sure going to lose the war anyway. The USA did not bring about a victory which would not have happened otherwise but had Germany lasted til 1919 they would have faced a very formidiable US Army IF it could solve its terrible logistics problem.

[andigger]

The USA did not bring about a victory which would not have happened otherwise

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

A fine example of a double negative.

A+ for presenation and execution - KY Dept of Higher Learning

[paul guthrie]

A fine example of a double negative. 

A+ for presenation and execution - KY Dept of Higher Learning 

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Afraid you got me there Andy! And where are my lard discount coupons!

[John Milner]

The Germans managed to "breakthrough," what they did not manage was what all the armies had been attempting for three years, the "breakout."

If an army does not "breakout" it stays where it is or goes back the way it came.

John Milner

[PhilB]

A fine example of a double negative.

Not quite sure, A. Are you saying this is good or bad grammar? (Or good/bad) It actually reads quite well to me although it is a DN! Phil B

[andigger]

Phil, It all depends on where you're from if its good or bad grammar. It reads fine to me, although being familiar with several languages I was quickly able to identify Kentukian in its native form.

Andy

[paul guthrie]

Phil, It all depends on where you're from if its good or bad grammar.  It reads fine to me, although being familiar with several languages I was quickly able to identify Kentukian in its native form.

Andy

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Andy what the hell is a Kentukian?

Your favorite Kentuckian! We all gotta come from summers!

[6th Shropshires]

Did the Germans breakthrough, yes the British line fell back but they never breakthrough in strengh at any rate. Gough planned for the line to give, he know if he fort until the last man on the first line of defence, then the Germans would have indeed breakthrough, and that there would be no real supports at hand until the third or forth day of the start of the battle to stop the breakout. I think the German troops were poorly handled by their high command.

Annette

[6th Shropshires]

On thinking about this one- the British/Allies never breakthrough either during the last 100 days. It was more of a pushing of the line back, the diffence between the German attacks of Spring and the Allied attacks of the last 100 days was that the Allied used their brains and did not let the attacks run out of range of their Support net work, after an attack had run out of steam in one place then the allies struck in other. Where as the Germans just kept driving at the weak spot, which just formed a very big salient, with their supplies haveing to travell a long way to get to the front line units. Then when they did try at another part of the line it was to late, they should have attacked in the north as soon as the Somme attack showed no sign of a real breakthrough, they should have stopped by the 24th or 25th, dug-in, then hit up north or farther south but I am not a general so could be talking through my a**

Annette

[Mark Hone]

The German Spring Offensives achieved remarkable tactical succeses but lacked clear strategic objectives in most cases. They seemed primarily to be attempting to inflict a psychological blow to the allies which would induce an allied command collapse (akin to the 1940 Blitzkrieg). However they couldn't sustain the momentum of the assaults and ended up simply advancing into cul-de-sac salients, outrunning their supply lines. They did come close to strategic success on a couple of occasions , for example almost panicking the British into abandoning Ypres and falling back to Dunkirk after the capture of Mount Kemmel, but more by luck than judgement. Despite the supposed rout of Fifth Army etc the British supply infrastructure held up extremely well. a very interesting talk I attended a couple of years ago demonstrated that the while German food and ammo ran out quickly the British supply lines went into overdrive. One telling feature was that even at the worst moments of the retreat British battalions could rely on at least one cooked meal a day while the Germans were forced to resort to looting from an early stage. All of this meant that despite the apprently huge territorial gains, overall German victory remained illusory.

[andigger]

There was no credit given to the Germans for achieving the type of large-scale breakthrough on the Western Front that we (the allies) had tried and failed several times in the preceding years – at huge loss of life.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

My 2 cents... Lets remember part of David's original thread... why is the initial German success not given more credit, or more widely recognized as at least a partially noteworthy achievement? After 3.5 years of drop down, drag out fighting to the death the Germans were able to muster the energy and resources to knock the BEF back several miles. A feat never before accomplished to that date in the war.

Andy

[Desmond7]

If we examine the scenario where the Germans are attempting to bring about a 'collapse in the Allied command' (See Mark's post) ... they came bloomin' close!

And so the great 'what if' enters the debate ...

What if the French had gone with the views of the 'old stagers'? Again is it too simplistic to argue that the outcome of the war may have hinged on an outburst of defiant talk by a French general?

What if Haig had been 'high and mighty' and stalled on the issue of overall command?

Forget all the miles gained, breakthrough as opposed to breakout ..... can anyone find an element of truth in the argument above?

Not a hi-jack ... would the change in allied command have happened if Germans had not been making life EXTREMELY difficult (thus credit where credit is due)!

[6th Shropshires]

Why was German success not given more credit - I would say it was not that great a success in the clear light of day. The greater success of spring 1918 was the fact that the 3rd & 5th British Armies held up a far large force long enough for help. Many people see the 50 miles the line was pushed back and compare it with the British attacks of 1916 & 17, where the gain was not so great but the battles of 1916 & 1918 have many differents, and would take many pages of work to go into.

Des- How are you doing- If Haig had been the fool some make out, and he had been 'high and mighty' during the spring of 1918, then I think the Germans would have won the war. Haig had for-sight to see that the sitation of spring 1918 could only be saved by the French overall command of the whole of the Allied armies. Also I think if the German spring attacks had not taken place then Haig would not have handed over full controll of his Army to the French, as there would have been no need ?

Annette

[carninyj]

Though I'm not totally au fait with events at the end of WW1 from the viewpoint of the Germans, I feel one has to take into account the situation in Germany as well as on the battlefields when one is attempting to explain events. I have been led to understand that total war had left Germany exhausted by 1918 and that the Spring Offensive was a last gamble and used troops freed by the Russian surrender on the Eastern Front. The troops did fight well, though they suffered losses that could not be replaced, and pushed the Allied line back, but they never broke though in any substantial way. Moreover, the economic (& political?) collapse at home meant that they could not, without supplies of food, ammo, etc., continue the battle. That they were not technically defeated is surely the basis of the 'stab in the back myth'.

What do you think?

Carninyj

[Desmond7]

I'm in full agreement with J ...

The German army WAS clearly defeated in 1918 and, as I've said before, the Kaiserschlact WAS a gamble with overwhelming odds stacked against it. On the wider level, the German home front had been brought to defeat by the Naval blockade.

I don't want to sound war-mongerish or bloodthirsty in my history studies BUT it still remains something of a puzzle to me why the Allies (especially the French) 'went for' the armistice scenario as opposed to 'unconditional surrender'?

I dare say quite a few French top echelon would have liked nothing more than a full-blooded tilt into Germany itself? Or am I under-estimating th war weariness of the nations in conflict?

[PhilB]

Wasn`t there a school of thought that the German Navy should sail out into a "S**t or bust" confrontation with the Royal Navy as the war drew to its conclusion? A naval equivalent of the army`s big gamble. Phil B

[Mark Hone]

I think that a very interesting (and entirely plausible) historical 'what if' would have been the British decision to abandon the Ypres Salient and fall back to Dunkirk, as they nearly did when the Germans overran the Monts Des Flandres in April 1918. Had the Germans continued to advance having captured Mount Kemmel and brought Poperinge and most of the British rear areas in Flanders into imminent danger of destruction or capture...who knows?

[KONDOA]

a puzzle to me why the Allies (especially the French) 'went for' the armistice scenario as opposed to 'unconditional surrender'?

Des,

Some of the reasons stated and I believe referred to in Haigs Despatches include:

There was a fear that the German Army/Population would make a more determined defensive stand if the Allies invaded Germany.

The German Army was still esentially intact albeit in retreat and retained considerable capability of the opportunity arose.

Allied lines of communicatiuon could no longer maintain the rate of advance which would have allowed the possibility of the German forces to reoganise.

The Armistice prevented further loss of life given the above scenario.

It was further expected the German state would collapse internally which it effectively did, thus achiveing a similar result.

The Armistice therefore provided the means without the loss of life, materials and continued advance.

Germany of course losing much materially as part of the settlement process.

Roop