Failure at Messines 1917

[Gus1914]

Hello, I wonder if anyone has ever seen documents that record what measures the High Command would have taken in Flanders with regards to Third Ypres had Plumer not succeeded at Messines...?

 

Also, if nothing is recorded what are your opinion on: A green light for Third Ypres had Messines failed...

 

Whilst we're here... what are people's thoughts on the time period between 14 June 1917 - 31 July 1917... Did the swift victory at Messines actually hinder the launch of Third Ypres.  Personally I don't buy things like the delay was due to factors like the movement of guns.  So, was the delay a mistake, what are your thoughts please...?

[phil andrade]

Hello Gus,

 

Just looking at a few different books provides an array of opinions about the whys and wherefores of the delay.

 

Six weeks of ideal weather conditions passed by.

 

Didn't Gough show dissent about deploying his force in a supplementary attack ?  Something about reluctance to put his troops into another salient ; also the French army on the northern sector not getting deployed quickly enough.....a few things more can be thrown into the pot.

 

I note that the initial brilliant success of the Messines attack was compromised by too many troops being crowded forward afterwards, where they were hit by friendly fire as well as the German response.  This was redolent of Arras a couple of months earlier : superb start, dismal subsequent phase.  Then there was the dire condition of the French army which must have been unsettling : that, and an innately unenthusiastic outlook from the British Cabinet, a panicky Admiralty and, very important, a dangerous and reflexively skilful enemy quick to respond with a new form of poison gas and organise vicious local offensives in the dunes around Nieuport .

 

These are things I'm just throwing into the pot to try and mitigate the case for Haig, and make the delay seem  more understandable.  There was, I daresay, an innate rigidity in British tactics that the Germans always commented on and this, combined with the fragility of the situation regarding the French morale and the suspicions of the British Cabinet, combined to stultify the momentum and account for failure to exploit.

 

I have to say, though, that it really does look like a chance was missed, and that those six weeks were to cost an awful lot. 

 

Phil

[Gus1914]

Thanks for the reply Phil... It's an interesting period in my opinion... Could I just ask you what were the books that you had a look in please?

[AOK4]

I would even say that Messines was not the success the British always claim it to be. At a time when the German defences were completely overrun, much more should and could have been done to exploit the initial success.

The Germans were very happy that the British didn't advance beyond the set objectives and that the few rushed in units were able to consolidate against a quite passive opponent. They were also very happy with the time the British gave them to stiffen the defences around Ypres until late July...

[Gus1914]

Very interesting AOK4... I read somewhere that a lot of German Divisions were moved in to the area post Messines / Pre Third Ypres...  I'm going to start recording things better as I can never remember where I read things...!

[sassenach]

The late Lyn Macdonald said in her book "They Called it Passchendaele" that after Messines "in the back areas, where hundreds of thousands of men had been gathered in preparation for the coming offensive, the soldiers of Great Britain, her Empire and her Allies were virtually on holiday."  

[bierast]

1 hour ago, AOK4 said:

I would even say that Messines was not the success the British always claim it to be. At a time when the German defences were completely overrun, much more should and could have been done to exploit the initial success.

From the narrower viewpoint of Generalkommando XIX. Armeekorps it looks like an unalloyed catastrophe for the defenders. I'm quite convinced that it was the reason for poor General von Laffert's fatal heart attack on 2nd July.

You are of course quite right that it could have been much worse, both from the German and narrower Saxon point of view (if the XIX.AK's organic Saxon divisions hadn't been relieved by those poor Bavarians just in time after they were severely mauled by the preliminary bombardment, it would have been one of the very worst slaughters in the history of the Royal Saxon Army!).

[phil andrade]

2 hours ago, Gus1914 said:

Thanks for the reply Phil... It's an interesting period in my opinion... Could I just ask you what were the books that you had a look in please?

 

 

Delighted to have made a contribution, Gus.

 

In candour, I'm just opining on the basis of limited and rather basic knowledge, and I formed my interpretation on a quick glance through Cyril Falls's  history of The Great War, John Terraine's  Haig, The Educated Soldier and Gary Sheffield's The Chief.....knowing that these three are inclined to support - or promulgate -  the more favourable views of Haig.

 

It's significant that Terraine, the doyen of the pro Haig school, is surprisingly critical of Haig for the six weeks of delay.

 

I added in my own attempt at empathy, reckoning that there was a lot of stuff happening in the wider war : French fragility, Russia wobbling after the first of its 1917 revolutions, and the ramifications of the U Boat warfare, which combined to give pause to anything that might be construed as too reckless.  There was a horribly suspicious British War Cabinet, for starters. Aircraft were being withdrawn because of German bomber raids on London, and that wasn't going to help exploit advantage gained at Messines.  It's hard to escape the impression that British tactics were still too rigid.  It always surprises me to read German commentary on this, even by Rommel in the Second World War.  It looks as if Haig fell between two stools, trying to placate Plumer the plodder, and Gough the thruster, and losing a good chance thereby.

 

Above all, the Germans were a uniquely dangerous enemy, and were all too able and willing to respond quickly and effectively when they suffered a local setback.

 

It must be acknowledged that " local setback" is hardly sufficient as a depiction of the  really nasty blow that the Germans suffered in the early hours of 7 June.

 

Phil

[sassenach]

Richard Holmes in The Western Front took the following view;

 

"Haig was in no position to follow the capture of Messines Ridge with a swift second blow. The government had made it clear that the main Flanders offensive was conditional on French support, and Haig knew that this would not be forthcoming on the scale for which he hoped." He goes on to say that it was not until 25 July, six days before the attack began, that Haig was formally authorised to launch it.

[phil andrade]

There's a moral in the story of Messines....

 

If you land a good punch, be damned sure to follow it up immediately : never let your opponent recover.

 

In a sense, Messines galvanised the Germans into more resilient and effective methods.  Lossberg was sent up into Flanders to help von Kuhl get IV Army into the best possible shape to deal with the huge blow that was being awaited.  The " Fireman of the Western Front" was on parade, and the intervening six weeks gave him ample chance to make his mark.

 

Ludendorff, acknowledging the severity of the defeat suffered, said it very succinctly ....the British failed to press their advantage.

 

The old saying that " a good start is half the battle" might be rather damaged if that start is not properly utilised.

 

Phil

[PhilB]

9 minutes ago, phil andrade said:

There's a moral in the story of Messines....

 

If you land a good punch, be damned sure to follow it up immediately : never let your opponent recover.

 

 

Isn`t that how Foch`s strategy won the ground war in 1918?

[phil andrade]

2 hours ago, PhilB said:

Isn`t that how Foch`s strategy won the ground war in 1918?

 

Yes. Relentless blows along the entire front. Very different circumstances from Messines one year earlier, which was a siege operation on a static front.

Flanders 1917 was terribly confined and massively concentrated in a small area. The very nature of the success was dependent on that stasis and exploitation was bound to be difficult.

I find myself struggling to get my own thoughts in order.....an interesting and challenging thread !

 

Phil

 

[Gus1914]

Interesting views Phil... The PM's green light for Third Ypres that was mentioned above by sassench is an interesting angle.  I suppose it could be argued "Who wouldn't want to hold the high ground of the Messines Ridge" however, if that attack is for flanking purposes for a much bigger attack then why launch your preliminary move without having authorisation for the main attack. 

 

"Pillars of Fire" by Ian Passingham has a short but interesting Chapter 9... 

 

On the 3rd of June 1917 Plumer had pointed out to Haig that:

 

“It is essential that the opportunity for exploiting a success should be taken advantage of at the earliest possible moment”.

 

The author goes on to write, as a follow up, Plumer had a plan to attack north and south of Bellewaarde lake with II and VIII Corps which involved the "Movement of 60 Heavy guns from the Messines front" to support his Bellewaarde adventure… 

 

Plumer who you'd think would throw caution to the wind had:

 

“Calculated that the necessary re-tasking and move of artillery and infantry and the supporting arms would be completed within 72 hours”…

 

Chapter 9 mentions the period “7 to 21 June  was “Characterised by unfortunate indecision by Haig and growing confidence by Crown Prince Rupprecht”.

[phil andrade]

Gus,

 

Another book on my shelves has been taken down and reopened after several years.

 

PASSCHENDAELE , Requiem For Doomed Youth, by Paul Ham(2016)

 

Journalistic history, very similar in approach to Leon Wolff’s Flanders Fields (1958).

 

That sounds a bit sniffy, and I have to say that it has a strong whiff of Butchers and Bunglers about it that might make it an uncomfortable read for some.

 

That said, it has some first rate attributes, and makes an enthralling read.  There is some disciplined and discerning marshalling of data.

 

The chapter immediately after that dealing with Messines is titled “ A Fatal Delay” which says it all.

 

Phil

[JeffMcN]

On 04/03/2021 at 23:30, AOK4 said:

I would even say that Messines was not the success the British always claim it to be. At a time when the German defences were completely overrun, much more should and could have been done to exploit the initial success.

The Germans were very happy that the British didn't advance beyond the set objectives and that the few rushed in units were able to consolidate against a quite passive opponent. They were also very happy with the time the British gave them to stiffen the defences around Ypres until late July...

Having spent a lot time researching Messines, and with a forthcoming book on II ANZAC's actions there, I would say that you are both right and wrong! It was largely the success it was claimed by the British - in terms of (mostly) achieving the limited objectives set for the battle, and in delivering a very nasty black eye to the Germans who basically burnt out several divisions needlessly. Von Kuhl was to state 7th June was one of the German Army's blackest days. I qualify the success as the the Caterpillar and Blauwepoortbeek gap were not taken by the British but relinquished by the Germans on 10/11 June: quibbling perhaps but omens of things to come. What is more, if the Germans had played their cards differently the result would not have been so clear-cut: they made a sequence of bad mistakes going back to the conference of 30 April.

More broadly, it was a failed opportunity. The German lines were ripe for ripping through and the thrusters' break-through was ripe for the picking! Von Laffert ordered a retirement across the Lys and Comines-Ypres canal, an order rescinded when, incredulously, they realised that the British were not going to advance past the Oosttaverne Line.

Having said that, to have advanced might have brought on disaster: II ANZAC had basically lost their part of the Oosttaverne Line by the end of the day and were only saved by the Germans believing they were already beaten. They had not broken through the Oosttaverne Line in many places and probably, due to officer loss at the least, were in no position to advance further where they had.

[JeffMcN]

On 04/03/2021 at 05:05, Gus1914 said:

Hello, I wonder if anyone has ever seen documents that record what measures the High Command would have taken in Flanders with regards to Third Ypres had Plumer not succeeded at Messines...?

 

Also, if nothing is recorded what are your opinion on: A green light for Third Ypres had Messines failed...

 

Whilst we're here... what are people's thoughts on the time period between 14 June 1917 - 31 July 1917... Did the swift victory at Messines actually hinder the launch of Third Ypres.  Personally I don't buy things like the delay was due to factors like the movement of guns.  So, was the delay a mistake, what are your thoughts please...?

I think the guns DID have something to do with it. Much of the success of Messines came from the sheer scale of and preparation of the artillery and as well considerable effort had been put into logistics and support infrastructure. Subsequent II ANZAC's disastrous experience in 3rd Passchendaele, 12 October, is, as Andy Macdonald shows, directly attributable to lack of artillery and infrastructure rather than mud. The Canadians had success when they took time off to reorganise and get the artillery up. It was not easily transferrable, apparently a 9.2 howitzer took 36 hours just to prepare for transit, let alone move and re-establish, a natural drag on operational tempo. Could the British have mounted an attack on Gheluvelt Plateau on 8 June? I am not convinced. But I am also convinced they didn't need 6 weeks to mount Pilckem Ridge!

[Gus1914]

On 21/06/2021 at 06:31, JeffMcN said:

 But I am also convinced they didn't need 6 weeks to mount Pilckem Ridge!

Hello Jeff, some interesting comments in the two posts you made above this... I would like to look in to the movements of some of the Heavy Artillery that moved from "In support of Messines" to "In support of Third Ypres... It's certainly an interesting period between the two battles...

[DarrellDuthie]

Then look for example to the guns of the Canadian Corps around Lens, sent north to the Salient in support in June and July, in one instance firing a barrage as they went (28 June I believe), leaving behind many guns whose barrels were all but useless. The various war diaries tell the story. Although the premise that Haig et al sat on their derrieres during this period is probably the angle most worthy of attention.

Edited 22 June , 2021 by DarrellDuthie

[JeffMcN]

20 minutes ago, DarrellDuthie said:

Then look for example to the guns of the Canadian Corps around Lens, sent north to the Salient in support in June and July, in one instance firing a barrage as they went (28 June I believe), leaving behind many guns whose barrels were all but useless. The various war diaries tell the story.

Could you clarify a little on that statement, please? I am not sure I understand you correctly, but it sounds intriguing! Thanks. 

[JeffMcN]

As after-thought, @Gus1914: I think you are asking the 'wrong question' at the start of this thread, although it makes for a fascinating counter-factual and so is worth asking.  Made me think at any rate!
There was absolutely no way that the British could have lost the Battle of Messines. The British superiority in men and materiel was just so overwhelming to fail when combined with understanding what went wrong at the Somme, but also lessons from Arras. II ANZAC alone had more artillery pieces in its sector than the Germans had on the entire Messines salient and the British overall close to a division against each Regiment. That combined with very limited objective - to take the top of the ridge (the Oosttaverne Line was a late non-critical bolt-on addition). As well, the Germans led by von Kuhl had already considered the likelihood of an attack on the ridge back on 30 April. They agreed that one was likely  but also determined that rather than bolster its defences by moving men up from Arras they would sacrifice it if necessary to keep the more important Arras sector. Von Kuhl also proposed Gruppe Wytschaete to unilaterally move off the ridge back to the Oosttaverne or even Flandern Line. In short, while its loss would have hurt, the Germans were not that committed to it strategically.

But to answer your question, given the above, if Messines had failed Plumer and his generals would have all been sent to Egypt to guard the Suez Canal and the Wazzir!  

More widely there would have been a massive crisis of confidence in the entire Flanders project as there would be no proven way to crack the salient. And more broadly again, shipping losses from U-boats were sharply reducing from the April peak so that the stated reason for Flanders - to take the U-boat ports to reduce the horrendous losses in early 1917 - were becoming increasingly irrelevant. So potentially Flanders would remain a stagnant backwater on the Western Front with offensives mounted only to pin German troops down to prevent them going somewhere else.

[DarrellDuthie]

12 hours ago, JeffMcN said:

Could you clarify a little on that statement, please? I am not sure I understand you correctly, but it sounds intriguing! Thanks. 

Not sure what to clarify. Only that on June 28 artillery from the Canadian Corps was still being ordered north to Ypres. And on that occasion fired a barrage in support of the evening's attack towards Avion, on their way. These movements were in addition to earlier ones. The official history says this about earlier artillery movements: "During the latter part of May the Canadian Corps lost to the Second Army five heavy artillery group headquarters,two heavy batteries, ten siege batteries and five brigades of field artillery." Hope that helps!

[Gus1914]

16 hours ago, JeffMcN said:

 II ANZAC alone had more artillery pieces in its sector than the Germans had on the entire Messines salient...

What numbers are we talking Jeff... I've just found the "Distribution of Artillery" forms in a War Diary.  On the 8th of June 1917 the form I'm reading is stating that Second Army had 2592 guns of varying calibre and description out of 6297 total guns in Theatre.

[JeffMcN]

10 hours ago, DarrellDuthie said:

Not sure what to clarify. Only that on June 28 artillery from the Canadian Corps was still being ordered north to Ypres. And on that occasion fired a barrage in support of the evening's attack towards Avion, on their way. These movements were in addition to earlier ones. The official history says this about earlier artillery movements: "During the latter part of May the Canadian Corps lost to the Second Army five heavy artillery group headquarters, two heavy batteries, ten siege batteries and five brigades of field artillery." Hope that helps!

Sorry. I wasn't sure whether to read the Canadians' movement north illustrated the slowness or speed of moving artillery. Field artillery would be easy to move and employ, heavy artillery much harder. But I also wonder about the speed at which an artillery plan, especially one involving a creeping barrage, could be assembled and then individual gun timetables calculated. A lot of planning would have need to have been done first. Perhaps there was - I have not looked.

[DarrellDuthie]

Yes. Your point is well taken. Don't think the contribution was to the creeping barrage as too many variables were involved, more likely the static bombardment of a trench, or counter-battery work.  However from Lens I don't think you'd have needed more than 2 days to reach the Salient. In other words, the delay between Messines and the next phase was not so much a result of logistical as other (command) issues.

[JeffMcN]

6 hours ago, Gus1914 said:

What numbers are we talking Jeff... I've just found the "Distribution of Artillery" forms in a War Diary.  On the 8th of June 1917 the form I'm reading is stating that Second Army had 2592 guns of varying calibre and description out of 6297 total guns in Theatre.

2nd Army had been promised 1,832 guns back in April. But in any case I have to say that reported numbers for men and materiel - and casualties - always have a degree of precision that belies the accuracy! I am curious to see your war diary data to compare with these (and without presuming which set is right!!)

 

	Second Army	II ANZAC
Field artillery 18-pdr, 4.5-inch howitzers	1,510	460
Heavy guns	828	235
60-pdr (or 4.7 inch gun)	198	54
6-inch howitzer	348	104
8-inch & 9.2 inch howitzer	232	64
12-inch howitzer	20	6
6-inch gun	24	4
9.2-inch and 12-inch gun	3	2
15-inch howitzer	3	1
Total guns	2,338	695

* II ANZAC also had 76 2-inch and 16 heavy trench mortars.

Data: Bean, The Australian Imperial Force in France, 1917, IV, 581; General Staff, HQ II ANZAC Corps WD. AWM 4-1/32/16 Part 3. AWM.