TURKISH MACHINE GUNS AT GALLIPOLI - Part 2

[Guest]

Bryn,

 

Sorry mate but have you not been reading all the no MG comments above?

 

These all prove that allied soldiers were not seeing or hearing what they are recording?

 

But yes I bite, so who's the fool?

 

S.B

[gilly100]

On 19/08/2020 at 05:08, stevebecker said:

Bryn,

 

Sorry mate but have you not been reading all the no MG comments above?

 

These all prove that allied soldiers were not seeing or hearing what they are recording?

 

But yes I bite, so who's the fool?

 

S.B

This regarding Talbot Smith and 456 Cpl JC Weatherill at the Landing at Anzac early 25 April. From Beans notebooks and diaries.

Corp JC Weatherill

Scouts, 10Bn, D Coy with Talbot Smith

A mg was on top of Maclagans. It was on a tripod. Smith ... a Turk as they were running. We pulled it off tripod and threw it over cliff face at back about 20ft.

 

Hi Steve

 

The above is hearing, seeing, handling, dismantling and throwing a MG!!! From Weatherill DCM 10Bn  (DCM for Landing) giving his Landing account to Bean in October 1915.

Talbot Smith, his officer was MID for Landing. Read his recommendation. Very interesting.

Kindly explain these away.

Be careful not to use the 'l' word or you will get a yellow card.

Ian

[Jeff Pickerd]

C.E.W. Bean may well have noted the above, but he must have been completely unconvinced as to its veracity as to not include any mention of the machine guns’ capture, and dismantling, within the pages of the official history. It is also odd that Bean makes no mention of the role played by Pte Joseph Cook Weatherill No. 456, DCM, ‘D’ Company, 10^th Battalion, at the landing in any of the editions of the Official History, starting with volume 1 – 1921, revised second edition – 1933, through to the 12^th volume – 1941.                        Bean also indicates in the history at pages 256 – 257, that Lt Talbot-Smith led his thirty two scouts of the 10^th Battalion, landing on the tip of Ari Burnu Point, straight up onto Plugge’s Plateau under Turkish fire. Here Bean states: “From the left-hand edge of the plateau above could be seen the flash of a machine gun.” The question must therefore be asked – ‘how did Weatherill and Talbot-Smith come to be up on MacLagan’s tackling a machine gun, if Talbot-Smith had led the scouts up onto Plugge’s, and noting a machine gun out on their left? A look at the Map No.11, facing page 256, will show the impossibility of being in both places. Again another two Turkish machine guns that simply did not exist.

From Weatherill’s service record his Mention in Dispatches and award of the Distinguished Conduct Medal, as recorded in the London Gazette, 3/7/1915, can be found from pages 26, 30, 31, 38, 43, 44. The citation reads:  ‘25^th April. During operations near Gaba Tepe, for exceptionally good work in scouting and in an attack in the capture of the enemy’s guns.’

There is no mention of the capture of a machine gun, and the reference to the capture of the enemy’s guns conforms to the prime objective of the 10^th Battalion Scouts, being to locate and capture the Turkish Mountain guns up on the 400 Plateau. One would have thought that by 1921 Charles Bean would have been aware of Weatherill having been Mentioned in Dispatches and receiving the DCM for his work on the 25^th April, and to not include him in the history of the landing is strange, but there must have been a reason; possibly he had little faith in Weatherill’s story.

To turn to 1^st Lt Eric Wilkes Talbot-Smith, his service record makes interesting reading, it is a case that demonstrates the unreliability of eye witness statements, with a number of details either totally wrong or partially correct. There are seven Red Cross Wounded and Missing Statements of which four states that Talbot-Smith was killed in action at Anzac and buried there. These were totally wrong in regard to the death of Lieut Talbot-Smith, and only one makes mention of him capturing a machine gun:

 Howie L.B. No. 271, ‘D’ Coy, 10^th Bn, states killed, shot whilst capturing a machine gun, and buried on the beach 25^th April, grave marked with wooden cross. Statement taken at Al Hayat Hospital, Helouan, 29/10.15.

P. Cusack no. 1016, 10^Th Bn. Talbot-Smith shot about half way up cliff and buried on beach, grave marked with a cross. Statement taken at All Saints Hospital, Malta, 14/9/15.

Pte McNulty No. 262, 9^th Bn Transport. States Smith was killed at Anzac about end of May. Statement taken at Malta, 17/11/15.

W. Wood No. 1837, ‘D’ Coy, 10^th Bn, stated that he had seen Lt Talbot-Smith’s gave on the beach near Watson’s Pier, had grave pointed out to him. Statement taken at Ghain Tuffieha, Malta 26/11/15.

The following two statements were partially correct except for the detail of his death.

Pte T. Leahy No. 895, ‘C’ Coy, 10 Bn, States; “On the 25^th April, the day we landed, Mr Talbot-Smith was temporarily in charge of the Machine Gun Section, although he belonged to the Scouts. I was quite near him and saw him shot through the head and actually die. He was buried somewhere on Courtney’s Hill, Anzac, but it was not possible to mark the grave at the time. Four days later we were relieved by the Royal Marines and as far as I know the ground is still held by us. Taken at 16^th Stationary Hospital, Mudros, 23 October, 15.

De Graaf, No. 726, 10^th Bn. States Smith severely wounded by machine gun fire on 25^th April. Died on Hospital ship April 26^th. Taken at Penbroke Camp, Malta July 5^th, 1915.

Details correct except for his death onboard the hospital ship and buried at sea.

Captain C. Rumball, Adjutant, 10^th Bn. Stated: “Landed 25^th April with scouts at Anzac went forward with scouts. Returned, reported, took over machine guns and advanced with battalion. He was heavily pressed. All his men killed or wounded, he continued to work gun alone. When relief arrived he was found lying across the gun. Thought to be dead, he was not moved for some hours. Later found to be living and embarked on hospital ship. Died on way to Alexandria and was buried at sea. Captain Herbert of same battalion was with him until he died. The above information was collected by the informant Captain Rumball, Adjutant of Battalion, with a view to recommendation of Lt Talbot-Smith for D.S.O. Lieut. Talbot-Smith was subsequently mentioned in despatches for conspicuous gallantry and valuable service. (D.O. No. 60). Statement taken at 2^nd Australian General Hospital, Cairo, 23/10/15.

From his service record an extract from the two page report of Base Records Office. A.I.E.F. 17^th March, 1916, written by the 10^th Battalion Commanding Officer, this gives good account of his service:

“Lieut Talbot smith on the morning of our eventful landing at ANZAC, did excellent work. He, together with the whole Battalion Scouts went ashore in the first boat and at once pushed inland to gain information, and was foremost in the bayonet charge which drove the Turks from the first hill. Early in the day Lieut. Talbot Smith took charge of the Machine Guns and continued to work one gun himself until all members of that section were either killed or wounded. He continued to work the gun until later on in the afternoon he fell mortally wounded.  I have no hesitation in reporting that no officer of my Battalion displayed greater bravery in the face of the enemy than Lieut. Talbot Smith, and no Subaltern did better work during training of the Battalion than he. The wonderful knowledge which he displayed on all military subjects, both practically and theoretically convinced me that the training which students receive at the Australian Military College, Duntroon, is sound, thorough, and comprehensive.”

Page 30 & 56 of Lieut Talbot-Smith’s service record the report gives the actual circumstances of his death at 15^th General Hospital, Alexandria, from wounds on the 30^th April (Gun shot wound to head). He was buried at the Ghatby Military Cemetery, Alexandria, Grave No. 431, on the 2/5/1915. He was evacuated from Gallipoli onboard the S.S. Lutzow to Alexandria and admitted to 15^th Gen Hosp on the 29^th April.

The last mention of Lieut Talbot-Smith by C.E.W. Bean in the official history is at page 404, and is only a reference him having been hit. Bean prior to that describes the 10^th Scouts moving onto the 400 plateau looking for the Turkish guns, and has Talbot-Smith moving across Johnston’s Jolly, pages 340-341. His movements and action as described in the reports of Capt Rumball and Colonel Weir fill in the missing period from the official history and the detail of his death. But again there is nothing to confirm the evidence of the existence of Turkish machine guns from either man that can be supported by any other evidence.

 

Jeff

[gilly100]

[Jeff Pickerd]

Here again we have contradictions, but no real evidence as to a Turkish machine gun that was clearly not there. Colonel Weir was obviously reporting what he had been told, but the advance upon Plugge’s Plateau was not under heavy Turkish fire, and from what can be gathered there would have been light Australian casualties sustained at that stage of the advance. If Colonel Weir’s statement is taken as the true account it further puts doubt upon the accuracy of Charles Bean’s version of events for the landing as described in the Official History. It is also interesting that neither Captain Rumball or Colonel Weir make any mention of the Turkish machine gun in their respective later statements, March and October 1915.

As I have previously stated, the Turkish archival documentation gives positive proof that they had no other machine guns at Ari Burnu than the four guns of the 27th Regiments Machine Gun Company.

 

Jeff

[gilly100]

Sefik Aker had this to say way back near Maidos after hearing of a landing at Ari Burnu.

"Meanwhile as there was no movement order I gave the order 'let the men drink their soup quickly on the spot'. This was done and still there were no orders. The sound of gunfire continued at infrequent intervals. But between those sounds there was a buzzing noise which came out of the darkness from afar off and the melancholy and mysterious noise had a profound effect on me. This buzzing was the echo of the explosion of masses of infantry rifles and machine guns and it gave the impression that our regimental comrades far from help and consisting of a mere handful of men at Ari Burnu........ Finally at 0545 hours I received the movement order."

 

Must have been all those massed pinnace weapons that fired so continuously as they landed - not.

 

Ian

[Bryn]

About 4.30 a.m. ... The pinnace cast us off, and the order was given, ” Pull for your lives, lads !” By this time there was an increasing rattle of rifles and maxims from the trenches on the hills, and our men began to fall in that awful hail of lead. Our pinnaces opened out with their machine guns, and then we bumped bottom and leaped into the water up to our armpits, and dashed ashore, some poor fellows falling from their wounds and being drowned.” (214 Sapper (later Lieutenant) Lewis Dyson, engineer and draftsman, 1st Field Company, Engineers, extract from letter published in Murrumbidgee Irrigator (newspaper) July 1915).

[Bryn]

On 19/08/2020 at 05:08, stevebecker said:

But yes I bite, so who's the fool?

 

I think that comment makes an answer self-explanatory.

 

If anyone states that they 'have to' do this or that, but quite clearly don't do it, then they never actually "had to" do it at all.

[Jeff Pickerd]

Lt Col Sefik may well have heard the faint distant sound of gun fire emanating from Ari Burnu, it is plausible it could have been heard from the Olive Groves at Maidos, but regardless of whether he heard it or not, it does not detract from the action he took once given the order to advance to Ari Burnu by the 19^th Division Commander Colonel Halil Sami at 5.45 am, nor does it have any relevance to the case of any Turkish 7.65 mm Maxim MG09 machine guns being present at Anzac on the morning of the 25^th. Colonel Sefik knew where his machine gun company was at 5.45 am, what its deployment would be, and by 7.45 am where its offensive position was on Scrubby Knoll, after all he was the 27^th Infantry Regiments commanding officer. As repeatedly stated, the Turkish archival documentation makes it clear that there were no other Turkish machine guns with the 27^th Regiment than the four Maxims of the Machine Gun Company.

If the sound of rifle and machine gun fire was heard coming from Anzac prior to 5.45 am, by that time it would have been the sound of the eight Vickers Maxim machine guns of the 3^rd Brigade which would probably be positioned on the Second Ridge and Walker’s Ridge/Russell’s Top. The only other automatic fire would have been the sound of the two Nordenfelt guns at Gabe Tepe.

There can be all the firsthand accounts of coming under machine gun fire at landing as you like, but the fact is, there were no Turkish machine guns facing the Australian forces from the heights at Anzac until the 27^th Machine Gun Company arrived at around 7.45 am.

Jeff

[WhiteStarLine]

9 hours ago, Bryn said:

an increasing rattle of rifles and maxims from the trenches on the hills, and our men began to fall in that awful hail of lead.

With no disrespect to the Murrumbidgee Irrigator, which I am sure is a wonderful newspaper, if there were really multiple maxims up on the hills firing onto unprotected soldiers then the Australian casualties would have been horrendous.  WW1, Sino-Japanese war and many conflicts have amply demonstrated the ruthless effectiveness of the weapon.

 

As the mass casualties did not happen (thankfully, from an Australian viewpoint) and the Turkish records cannot vouchsafe for these weapons in their ORBAT and the Australian troops were not eyewitnesses to them (but sincerely believed what they heard firing were machine gun fire) then we run the risk that repetition of folklore will reach some pivot point where it is accepted as fact.  

[Derek Black]

11 hours ago, WhiteStarLine said:

With no disrespect to the Murrumbidgee Irrigator, which I am sure is a wonderful newspaper, if there were really multiple maxims up on the hills firing onto unprotected soldiers then the Australian casualties would have been horrendous.  WW1, Sino-Japanese war and many conflicts have amply demonstrated the ruthless effectiveness of the weapon.

 

As the mass casualties did not happen (thankfully, from an Australian viewpoint) and the Turkish records cannot vouchsafe for these weapons in their ORBAT and the Australian troops were not eyewitnesses to them (but sincerely believed what they heard firing were machine gun fire) then we run the risk that repetition of folklore will reach some pivot point where it is accepted as fact.  

 

 

I've followed the discussion of this topic for years and have myself nothing evidence wise to contribute.

 

However as the above has mentioned, it had always seemed to my mind the casualties would have been far far higher were machine guns deployed against the landings.

 

Derek.

[emrezmen]

On 16/08/2020 at 13:03, emrezmen said:

     As we have the topic revived again, I'd like to bring my earlier post to your attention.

(My English was a little bit sloppy in that one but I guess it will work out anyway)

 

Cheers

 

I would like to share all maps available in the war diary of 27th Regiment showing defensive deployment at Anzac on different dates (already shared some of them). Hope it will be useful for all interested. First, I have to say that I realized after a long time that I misunderstood the numbers on the third map in my first post (above). You can find my explanation below.

 

Situation on 17 March 1915. Note the whole 1st Battalion (with machine guns) on Second Ridge.

 

27 March 1915. A MG Platoon between Arıburnu and Kaba Tepe. Reserve companies deployed immediately behind the frontline.

 

Deployment of the entire 9th Division on 31 March 1915. A couple of Nordenfelts on beaches south of Kaba Tepe and near Krithia.

 

1 April 1915.

 

24/25 April 1915. This is the map I was talking about. The numbers are for the map’s key and did not represent the unit names. "5" on the right side for example says "A platoon from 4th Coy". Unlike maps from previous dates, there is no MG or Nordenfelt symbol on any beach. Note Captain Sadık’s battery at Lone Pine.

 

Map showing route taken by two battalions of 27th Regiment on 25 April. Note MG Coy behind 3rd Battalion. Garrison at Kaba Tepe, Muharrem's platoon at Plugge's, Hayrettin's platoon at Fisherman's Hut and Capt. Sadık's guns at Lone Pine are all shown but not a single MG Platoon or Coy on any beach.

 

First deployment of two bns, MG Coy and mountain guns.

 

Situation when 57th Regt conducted its attack.

 

Recapture of guns at Lone Pine.

 

Situation at night.

 

27 April 1915. Note MGs at Johnston's Jolly and Mortar Ridge pulled back by Şefik.

 

 

Edited 12 September , 2020 by emrezmen

[Guest]

Mate,

 

Intersting and follows what we have been saying here.

 

The early maps (March) would be how any officer would plan his defences with the limited forces he had, by showing how he would deploy his forces at that time.

 

Pre planning and deployment of resources is all what an Officer would do.

 

These maybe the reason Aussies are finding MG parts, as these were the pre landing sites if the Regt was in there trenches.

 

But we landed before the Regt could be deployed, only one Bn (2nd Bn) was garrison and the Regt never fully deployed until hours after the landing.

 

But again I don't known why we (aussies soldiers) are reporting MGs where there were none, shock of action other guns firing around the area, could all led to misunderstandings.

 

The old joke about the AK 47 is distintive, is just that, in combat all you hear is noise and that being loud and blends into all other noises, yes MGs can be heard, but what MG that is, ours or there's when the bullets are whizing over head?

 

S.B

[Jeff Pickerd]

Thanks Emre for taking the time to post those maps in time sequence, very helpful for a picture of the overall events.

It also proves that there were no other mountain guns or machine gun on Pine Ridge.

 

Jeff

[gilly100]

The dismissal of the likes of Derham MC, Whetherill DCM, Mason DCM and many others accounts that clearly recorded the events of that day is mind boggling at best. The inability to question further, similarly so. The German contribution at Gallipoli has largely been sidelined by the Turks, period.

 

Ian

[Jeff Pickerd]

The inability to question further, what exactly? If it is to find out where the extra machine guns came from, who manned them, where they went to, and if there were any German personnel at Ari Burnu on the 25^th April, the answers to those questions cannot be found, for none of those existed. If on the other hand it is to substantiate the accuracy of the recorded stories of the like of Derham, Weatherill, Masson, etc, when it comes to Turkish machine guns at the landing, again such accounts just don’t stack up to the true situation when the Turkish and German records are taken into account.

The German contribution to the Gallipoli campaign may well have been largely overlooked by the Turkish historians, but for the events at ANZAC on the morning of the 25^th April, both the Turkish and German historical records are in accord to the fact that there were only the troops of the Turkish 27^th Regiment present that day, and to the fact that there were no other machine guns than those four guns of the 27^th Machine Gun Company available. Here again from the original thread posted by Kurt1959, post 11, on the 8^th June 2007, page 1, must be brought forward, as I stated in my post of the 13^th August - This was the answer to any German machine gun involvement at Anzac on the 25^th April, and to a large extent the actual answer to the overall question.

If one wishes to do some serious searching for the German involvement at Gallipoli, Klaus Wolf’s book ‘Victory at Gallipoli, 1915’ is a good starting point. For the ANZAC sector Chapters 7, 8, and 10 will reveal most of the answers. There are other members of this forum who have copies of this book, or have had access to its pages, and if there is anything from within that manuscript that details any form of German involvement at ANZAC, or supply of machine guns to the Turks at Ari Burnu, on the 25th April 1915, I’m sure someone would have jumped at the opportunity to so inform us.

 

Jeff

[Guest]

Mate,

 

You say "The dismissal of the likes of Derham MC, Whetherill DCM, Mason DCM and many others accounts that clearly recorded the events of that day is mind boggling at best"

 

We give you accounts by Aker and a number of Turkish officers and German accounts, all say the same thing.

 

I can only say "accounts that clearly recorded the events of that day is mind boggling at best"

 

Stay Safe

 

S.B

[Bryn]

When was Aker's account written again?

[Bryn]

On 29/08/2020 at 21:15, WhiteStarLine said:

With no disrespect to the Murrumbidgee Irrigator, which I am sure is a wonderful newspaper, if there were really multiple maxims up on the hills firing onto unprotected soldiers then the Australian casualties would have been horrendous.  WW1, Sino-Japanese war and many conflicts have amply demonstrated the ruthless effectiveness of the weapon.

 

As the mass casualties did not happen (thankfully, from an Australian viewpoint) and the Turkish records cannot vouchsafe for these weapons in their ORBAT and the Australian troops were not eyewitnesses to them (but sincerely believed what they heard firing were machine gun fire) then we run the risk that repetition of folklore will reach some pivot point where it is accepted as fact.  

 

 

It is accepted as fact - has been since the day in question. Has anyone found an account by a soldier who landed at Anzac, Helles or Kum Kale who later disputed it in the years following?

It's therefore up to those saying 'no' to prove that case and that can't be done by completely ignoring witness statements and adding 'in my opinion..,' or 'I think...' OR by taking cheap shots at newspapers as if they made the story up, rather than printed an account by someone who was there.

[Jeff Pickerd]

When was Aker's account written again? That's a very easy question to answer, Canakkale - Ariburnu Savaslari ve 27 Alay (The Ariburnu Battles and the 27th Regiment) was first published in the Askeri Mecmua (Military Journal), Turkish General Staff, in 1935 after Sefik Bey retired in 1931. All of the material published in his book was derived from his extensive reports written up during the campaign and recorded in the 27th Regiments War Diaries. I suppose you are trying to make the case that his account of the battle would have been corrupted by the passage of time from the actual events of 1915, but that argument will not hold up when it is established that what he recorded was from his original 1915 reports.

 

Jeff

[Bryn]

There appears to be a view among some contributors that if a machine-gun is not seen, there is no evidence that it exists. Yet unsurprisingly, machine guns are usually not set up in full view of the enemy and are difficult or impossible to locate. 'Not seeing them' doesn’t prove they’re not there. The following extracts are from a quick search I did and includes accounts not just from Gallipoli, but also from other theatres in WW1 as well as from WW2 and Vietnam.
 
4 June 1915:
The artillery bombardment started early in the morning of the 4th and appeared to be more effective than previously, the French ‘75s’’ seemed to wreaking havoc on the Turkish positions. At 11.20, the barrage lifted and at noon the British and French troops went over the top along the entire front, only to find that hidden Turkish and German machine-gunners, who had escaped the artillery bombardment were waiting to massacre them.

 

On the night of 4th – 5th of June a party from the Canterbury Battalion made a sortie from Quinn’s Post, which they were holding against the enemy’s trenches, here only searated from ours by a few yards. The Canterbury men rushed the first trenches, and for the whole night long were subjected to very violent counter-attacks, being very heavily bombed and subjected to a continuous enfilade of machine-gun fire from hidden machine-guns.

 

His Majesty the KING has been graciously pleased to approve of the award of the Victoria Cross to the under mentioned Officer and Non-Commissioned Officers of the 1st Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers, in recognition of most conspicuous bravery displayed : -
Capt. (temp. Maj.) Cuthbert Bromley (since drowned).
No. 1506 Sjt. Frank Edward Stubbs (since died of wounds)
No. 2609 Cpl. (now Sjt.) John Grimshaw
On the 25th April 1915, headquarters and three companies of the 1st Battalion, Lancashire Fusiliers, in effecting a landing on the Gallipoli Peninsula to the West of Cape Helles, were met by very deadly fire from hidden machine guns, which caused a great number of casualties. The survivors, however, rushed up to and cut the wire entanglements, notwithstanding the terrific fire from the enemy, and after overcoming supreme difficulties, the cliffs were gained and the position maintained.

 

Then, seeing that his platoon was receiving intense fire from a concealed machine gun, he deliberately exposed himself to draw its fire. Thus locating its position, he attempted to destroy it with an antitank weapon.

 

Auckland and Otago Battalions were unable to carry the whole of their objectives, leaving in the hands of the Germans a triangle of which the apex was the junction of Gird Trench and Goose Alley, and two sides were portions of those trenches. These Battalions met with uncut wire, and, coming under a murderous machine-gun fire from the direction of Eaucourt l'Abbaye and Warlencourt, suffered heavy casualties.

 

A Turkish machine-gun from somewhere in the rear, perhaps German Officers' Trench, several times methodically went over those lying exposed, the overs and unders hitting up little clouds of dust. [Note that the mg’s location is NOT KNOWN].

 

It was a very steep hill, and on it the Japanese had prepared an ambush with well concealed Machine Gun and Mortar emplacements, with vicious firing lanes.

At 9.30 p.m. the Turks commenced a fierce fusillade of rifle and machine gun fire from their positions at Quinn’s and German Officers Trench, lasting for about an hour, then died down and ceased altogether at about 10.30 p.m. [Presumably the location of these mgs could be determined because they were firing at night].

 

Resistance was fanatical. Jap snipers had tied themselves to the tree branches and concealed machine gun entrenchments were built into jungle ridges covering the track. Hidden by logs leaving only slits as targets to attack, they could mow down approaching patrols.

 

On 28th October 1918, near Casa Van, Italy, when a unit on the right flank having been held up by hostile machine guns and snipers, Pte. Wood, on his own initiative, worked forward with his Lewis gun, enfiladed the enemy machine-gun nest, and caused 140 enemy to surrender. The advance was continued till a hidden machine gun opened fire at point blank range.

 

When the advance of his battalion was checked by a hidden machine-gun nest, he went forward alone, unprotected by covering fire from his own men, and worked in between the German positions in the face of fire from enemy covering detachments. Locating the machine-gun nest, he rushed it and with his bayonet drove off the crew.

The obituary includes a quote from an unknown source: “He was killed in the early morning by a hidden machine gun when actually within a few yards of the enemy position.”

The Turks were holding up rags, bushes, rifles, etc., in token of surrender, and Lieutenant Wetherell then stood up and waved to them to come in. At once a concealed machine gun, manned by Germans, fired a burst at him, but miraculously did not hit him, and they then walked in with their machine gun to a different part of the line.

There was also a lack of sound intelligence on the Turkish positions, especially on the location of their gun batteries and concealed machine-gun nests. This would have been vital in assaults such as that on Kirithia.

 

Braund sent him to the beach with a message for Maclaurin : “Am holding rear left flank. Against us are two concealed machine-guns - cannot locate them.”

 

We'd only gone about 10 minutes when we heard a sustained burst of machine gun fire. We made a flanking movement and sneaked up behind a bunch of Japs, nine of them. The party of seven had walked into their hidden machine gun and had been wiped out in that machine gun burst.

 

September 23, 1943 – North of Montemarino, the 100th encountered a hidden machine gun nest.

 

The entrenched Turkish positions were deemed stronger than expected and included, ‘cunningly concealed machine guns’ which took a heavy toll on attacking infantry.

Captain Fisher had been ordered to reconnoitre the southern approach to the bridge point, but while the Regiment approached the bridge point they came under intense machine gun and rifle fire from concealed positions.

 

For most conspicuous bravery and initiative in attack. The advance having been checked by intense machine-gun fire, Lt. Tait rallied his company and led it forward with consummate skill and dash under a hail of bullets. A concealed machine-gun, however, continued to cause many casualties.

 

During an engagement Kelliher’s platoon came under heavy fire from a concealed machine-gun post fifty metres away. Five of the platoon were killed and three wounded including his section commander, Corporal W.H. Richards.

 

[WhiteStarLine]

Hi Bryn,

 

Sorry, but this post confuses concealed machine guns that every military historian agrees were on the enemy's ORBAT with the initial landing at Gallipoli where examination of Turkish records showed that they did not have these weapons available at the landing.  If you look at the terrible casualties caused by the weapons you have cited from many conflicts, you will note that the relatively light casualties for a beach invasion (including Fisherman's Hut) are at odd with the casualties from other battles where opposing machine guns were sited to fire into an attacking force.

 

There is no one I know of proposing this strawman.

1 hour ago, Bryn said:

view among some contributors that if a machine-gun is not seen, there is no evidence that it exists

 

Turkish records are the only primary source for the existence of these weapons.  Full stop.  So your 16 examples from many wars do not appear to add weight to a viewpoint that no one appears to be using ...

[Bryn]

Of course it adds weight, but only if you're actually engaged in research, rather than the automatic denial of everything that doesn't fit the narrative you've bought into. It means you can't just dismiss an account because YOU THINK the witness didn't see/hear what he was reporting he saw or heard.

 

The breathless rush to attempt to negate anything that might get in the way of blind acceptance that Turkish sources are unwaveringly accurate, complete and unchallengeable reminds me of the following quote from Professor Peter Stanley:

 

"... like a lot of Australians, he was captivated by the Turkish national epic and basically came down on that side of telling the story.”

 

https://neoskosmos.com/en/30287/the-water-diviner-slammed-at-us-release/

 

[Guest]

Bryn,

 

You say "The breathless rush to attempt to negate anything that might get in the way of blind acceptance that Turkish sources are unwaveringly accurate"

 

Can I also say that you also "The breathless rush to attempt to negate anything that might get in the way of blind acceptance that Australian sources are unwaveringly accurate"

 

You don't allow that our accounts maybe incorrect?

 

While I like to give our writers the benifit, we see mistakes coming into there accounts?

 

Yes Ottoman and German accounts also suffer from this, but you seam to forgive our accounts but not the Ottoman accounts?

 

I allow that all accounts maybe wrong so I check all, and until a unit history (BN or Bde) tells me that a MG  was captured that morning, I am inclined to say some of our accounts are incorrect?

 

But I have also used our accounts to help tell a story, like I said I ran into this problem in Palestine, where the Troops were veterns, but still made the mistake of hearing MG's when there was one, or none where a number of accounts say they were under there fire when there was no MG's for a long way off shooting at someone else?

 

S.B

[Guest]

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