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Remembered Today:

TURKISH MACHINE GUNS AT GALLIPOLI - Part 2


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millward_landing_helles_account.jpg.e0b83f915052c21f7e48f88cd5fa45a6.jpg

 

From account describing the landing of the Lancashire Fusiliers by Captain C A Millward, Indian Army. GSO3, 29th Division, aboard HMS Euryalus off W Beach.

National Archives' reference CAB-45-259.pdf

 

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  • 2 weeks later...

Another on W Beach landing on 25 April 1915. Article by a Jamie Booth in Academia

 

"W Beach consisted of a narrow strip of deep powdery sand, some 350 yards long and from 15 to 40 yards wide. On either flank of the beach the ground rises to high cliffs, and in the centre there are gradually rising ridges of sand dunes. The beach had received careful attention from the Turko-German engineers, and elaborate barbed wire defences had been erected. In addition to this, the Turks had constructed entanglements concealed under the sea surface of the shallows. The Turks were well dug in, and well-armed with machine guns concealed within holes in the cliffs. Indeed the Naval bombardment in prelude to the attack at W beach made little impact therefore making the job of taking the beach near impossible. (Princess Catherine Radziwill et all, circa 1920, pg 771).

The Lancashires, embarked from the Euryalus on eight strings of boats, towed abreast by eight steam picket boats made for the shore.  It is apparent by the first-hand accounts at the time that the Turks lay in wait for the Lancashire’s until they unleashed their attack that cost the lives of so many local men. Major Willis of the Fusiliers, one of the regiment’s recipients of the Victoria Cross spoke of the apparent lack of opposition right up until the boats were about to land on the beach:

“Not a sign of life was to be seen on the peninsula in front of us...it might have been a deserted land we were nearing in our little boats. Then, crack! The stoke oar of my boat fell forward, to the angry astonishment of his mates”.

Under a hail of murderous fire the Lancashires disembarked their boats. Of particular interest is the account of Captain Clayton who was present at the initial landing and it highlights the grim reality of the task bestowed to the 1st Battalion:

There was tremendously strong barbed wire where my boat landed. Men were being hit in the boats and as they splashed ashore. I got up to my waist in water, tripped over a rock and went under, got up and made for the shore and lay down by the barbed wire. There was a man there before me shouting for wire cutters. I got mine out, but could not make the slightest impression. The front of the wire by now was a thick mass of men, the majority of whom never moved again…The noise was ghastly and the sights horrible. I eventually crawled through the wire with great difficulty, as my pack kept catching on the wire, and got under a small mound which actually gave us protection. The weight of our packs tired us, (the average weight of a British private’s accoutrements was about 60 1bs. The official history points out that it is a well-known fact that the optimum weight for a man to carry is one third of his own weight. On average, a British recruit weighed 132 1bs and was therefore grossly overloaded) (Ellis, 1976, pg 33) so we could only gasp for breath. After a little time we fixed bayonets and started up the cliffs right and left. On the right several were blown up by a mine. When we started up the cliff the enemy went, but when we got to the top they were ready and poured shots on us” (Lancashire Fusiliers Website, 2012)

This source is particularly useful as this account was written just after the landings, as in fact, Captain was killed at Gallipoli six weeks later. (James, 1965, pg 118).

Interestingly, more official contemporary accounts do not encompass such harsh realities, in contrast, with a somewhat political motives, much is said of the “glory” of the landings. Indeed in the antique book circa 1920, The History of the Great War, a much more glorious account is recorded for the benefit of the reader:

The whole mass of Khaki clambered upwards and went with a deep roar of sound charging down the first Turkish trench that was enfilading the beach. With their bayonets flashing they went right in with an irresistible rush, using the cold steel with such effect that in a moment the Turkish infantry were on the run”.

This account has a common theme with many books of the day- they do not dwell upon the number of men killed, nor those injured. Indeed in this particular account there is no mention of the great number of Fusiliers who lost their lives on that fateful day. The furthest the book goes is to say is “a long line of men were mowed down” and “men fell in dozens”.  In fact, the Lancashire Fusiliers lost on W beach landing 6 officers and 183 men killed 4 officers and 279 wounded and 61 men missing, a total of 533 casualties. Furthermore, it can be said that the “deep roar” of the troops in their charge may be hard to imagine if Captain Claytons account is to be considered- it appears that such would be impossible as many were “gasping for breath” due to the weight of theirs packs and the physical difficulties in getting on the beach...."

 

No machine guns? With their rifles and their faith?

 

Ian

 

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  • 1 month later...

It has now been twelve months since the original topic was locked and this new part two opened. Since that time there has been nothing posted that relates to the question of whether there were any Turkish machine guns emplaced at Anzac the morning of the 25th April 1915 to oppose the landing. I would recommend to any reader who has not already done so, to go back and read the original thread.

Despite assertions that there was to be much more information yet to come to prove that there were Turkish machine guns firing on the beaches from around 4.30 am, as reported by numerous Australians in letters and diaries, and recorded in the official Australian history, and also in the majority of unit war diaries; for the ANZAC sector there has been nothing added further from that already put forward within the original thread. It has also been asserted that, yet to be presented new information from Germans sources would further substantiate the source and positioning of those machine guns, so far none of that has yet to happen.

With the English translation release of Klaus Wolf’s, ‘Victory at Gallipoli 1915, The German-Ottoman Alliance in the First World War’, a perusal of this work from chapters 7 & 8 for details of any German involvement at Anzac, or for confirmation as to whether there is any detail to support the existence of Turkish, or German, machine guns opposing the landing at Anzac from 4.30 am, 25th April has returned a negative answer. Chapter 8 deals exclusively with the defence arrangements of the Turkish 27th Infantry Regiment at Ari Burnu, and that being in accord to the archival Turkish documentation and other published works that deal with the subject. There is no evidence put forward to show any German involvement from below Headquarters of the 5th Army, apart from Major Wilhelm Willmer the commander of the Gallipoli Bursa Gendarme Battalion guarding the Suvla Bay/Anafarta area, and even that Battalion was not present on the morning of the 25th having been relieved by the 3rd Battalion, 77th Regiment of the 19th Division. There were no German officers or men attached to Esad Pasha’s 3rd Corps.  There are only two references to Turkish machine guns being positioned at Ari Burnu, and the first is found at page 117, Chapter 8. Here Klaus Wolf notes: “That this sector was secured by the 2nd Battalion of the 27th Regiment under the command of Major Izmet Bey.”  He also further adds that Lt Col Sefik had his other two battalions at Maidos. All of that is well documented from Turkish sources. At this point he relates the following, “The defence planning for the entire Ari Burnu section was described by the commander of the 3rd Battalion, Major Halil Bey: "2nd Battalion: defends Ari Burnu and Gaba Tepe area. 7th Company of the 3rd Battalion, 9th Mountain Artillery Regiment, with half a machine gun company in position on the heights behind Ari Burnu and third Battalion and Ari Burnu Company and Gaba Tepe field guns are under the command of the 2nd Battalion’s commander. Half the machine-gun company select their positions so that the northern beach of Ari Burnu-Gaba Tepe area can be covered by their arc of fire." It should be noted that the commander of the 3rd Battalion of the 27th Regiment was Major Halis, not Halil. Wolf’s English translated book continues to name the 3rd Battalion commander as Halil throughout the chapter, which must be a translation error as the passage quoted was drawn from Harvey Broadbent’s book ‘the fatal shore’, page 43, and it is clearly referenced as Major Halis. It is also important to note that Major Halis was describing the defence situation prior to the 25th April, the 23rd/24th April before the 3rd Battalion returned to Maidos with the 27th Regiment Headquarters on the night of the 24th after finishing night manoeuvres, arriving at around 2 am. The 27th Regiment War Record confirms that. The next reference to machine guns at Ari Burnu by Wolf is found at page 121 where he describes: “The 27th Regiment continued to defend its position from the second and third line positions, with three machine guns in support, and repeatedly launched local counter –attacks. Although these troops were completely exhausted by the previous night’s exercise and the hours spent in defence, they were able to hold on until reinforcements arrived.” Here it gets a little confusing, that statement is clearly combining the remnants of the 2nd Battalion and the 1st and 3rd Battalions after they had arrived at the Third Ridge around 7.45 am. Wolf has elements of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions facing almost 4000 Australians around 6.00 am at page 120, but described Lt Col Sefik correctly having his 1st and 3rd Battalions back at Maidos, page 117, before starting their march to Ari Burnu at around 5.30 am. The 3rd Battalion cannot be in two places at the same time. Those two battalions 1st and 3rd were the reinforcements, and the 27th Machine Gun Company, with its four guns, came with the 3rd Battalion. This book is undoubtedly well researched and extremely useful to the history of the German involvement in Turkey, but it was first published in German in 2008, long before Harvey Broadbent, in conjunction with the Macquarie University would publish the Turkish archival records for the Gallipoli campaign in 2015. For a far more concise account of the Ottoman defence on the 25th April the book by Professor Mesut Uyar, ‘The Ottoman Defence against the ANZAC Landing, 25th April 1915’ is recommended, another book published in 2015.  

The original topic, consisting of 57 pages of 1422 posts, running for just over fourteen years, dealt in depth to both sides of the question with a progression of valuable new information being submitted, and interesting and well informed comment, and in my opinion it would seem that the no case for the morning of the 25th April at Anzac had been overwhelmingly substantiated by the time of topics closure.  As early as post 11, on the 8th June 2007, page 1 of the original thread, the post by Kurt1959, details of the Turkish machine gun Companies, with four guns each, of the 25th & 27th Turkish Infantry Regiments is stated, and also the fact that the 26th Regt had no machine guns at that time. That information would later be confirmed by the Turkish war history, archival documentation, and Turkish English translated works being published, and confirmed by the Macquarie University research being published in 2015. The post also gives details of the earliest deployment of the German Naval machine gunners from the battleships ‘Goeben’ and ‘Breslau’ to the Gallipoli front on the 3rd May 1915, 8 machine guns and 44 personnel under the command of 1st Lt Boltz.

This was the answer to any German machine gun involvement at Anzac on the 25th April, and to a large extent the actual answer to the overall question, but regardless the debate went on for the next 14 years.

The publish books by Hasan Basri Danisman, April 2007. Professor Haluk Oral, December 2007. Harvey Broadbent, 2015. Chris Roberts, 2015. Professor Mesut Uyar, 2015, and as well as the 1978 published ‘ATASE’ Official History (English translation 2015) that would further substantiate the Turkish deployment of the 27th Infantry Regiments machine gun company on the morning of 25th April, with the CO Lt Col Sefik at about 7.45 am deploying his four guns on both sides of Scrubby Knoll, two guns under the command of Lt Halil to the south, and the other two guns on the north side under the command of Deputy Officer Saadet. Later Saadet’s two guns would be positioned further to the right on Adana Spur at around 4.30 pm.

During this long running discussion much has been made of men being able to distinguish the difference in sound between rifle fire and machine gun fire coming from the Turkish defenders at Anzac Cove. I would contend that issue has been more than adequately dealt with during the long running discussion. There are several recorded personal accounts describing the sound of hearing machine gun fire at the landing, whether rightly or wrongly, but the question that still remains, can those reports be accepted as factual in light of the original Turkish reports of their defence structure? In the Australian official history C.E.W. Bean makes the first mention of machine gun fire with the landing at page 253, and that being from the No 3 tow steam picket-boat of C & D Coys of the 9th Bn under the command of Major Salisbury on the extreme right landing in Anzac Cove. According to Bean the steam picket-boat after releasing the tows backed out and began firing at the gun flashes from above on Plugge’s plateau.  From Chris Roberts ‘The Landing at Anzac 1915’, page 90 of the revised edition 2015, is quoted Sapper John Moore of the 1st Field Company, “Then CRACK, every man’s heart gave a jump. I know mine did. Then crack, crack, crack, a few seconds, then a continuous volley. This in turn was added to by the vicious spilling crackling of machine guns.” What we don’t have with this statement is, just where was this sound of machine guns coming from; from the shore, or from the maxims of the picket-boats? Lance Corporal Mitchell describes the sound of the maxim from the picket-boat to his right as “Woof – woof – woof came her throaty bellow making a great contrast to the tapping sound of the foe’s small arms.”

There is however a striking anomaly to the reports of hearing machine gun fire as the advance of the first wave of Australian units at Anzac unfolded, and that being the almost silence to the reports of hearing the fire of any of the A&NZ Army Corps machine guns as they went into action. This omission is even more striking when one considers that by 4.45am there were 8 machine guns ashore of the covering force, (two guns each per the 9th, 10th 11th and 12th battalions of the 3rd Brigade); admittedly this was up to fifteen minutes after the men of the first wave had landed at Anzac Cove, approximately 4.30 am; and just when any of those machine guns were first brought into action is unknown, but there is still a problem of just what the accounts of hearing machine gun fire, the coming under machine gun fire, and the capture of machine guns/parts, were in accuracy when the lack of heavy casualties on the beach, no unit records of machine guns being captured, and the apparent ‘after the fact’ reports written in unit war diaries; all are in conflict to Turkish records stating there were no machine guns covering the landing at that time. By 5.50 am a further 6 guns are ashore, and from 6.15 am the remaining 10 guns from the battalions of the 2nd and 1st Brigades have landed.  From this point on the Australian forces have 24 machine guns either in action or able to be brought into action, and from 9.00am onwards the machine guns of the NZEF would be ashore. The Turkish records claim the 27th Regiment had 4 machine guns at Maidos that would not arrive at Anzac until approximately 7.40 am at the earliest. It would be more than plausible that men would hear machine gun fire, but it would not have been from Turkish machine guns in those early hours of the landing when the above Turkish accounts are taken into consideration.

To follow the progression of reports of Turkish machine guns as described in the official history by C.E.W. Bean up until the time that Lt Col Sefik positioned his four machine guns of the 27th Regiment on both sides of Scrubby Knoll, around 7.40 am, Bean makes ten references:-

1 – 1 machine gun north of Ari Burnu   p. 254.

2 – 1 MG on Ari Burnu or Plugge’s Plateau    p.  254.

3 – 1 MG foothills 500 yards to the left of the 11th Bn landing   p. 256.  Fire from this gun had ceased. P. 259.

4 – 1 MG at Gaba Tepe (this would be the Nordenfelt gun)  p. 266.

5 – 1 MG lower reaches of Walker’s Ridge or ridge behind the Fisherman’s Hut. (approx 7.00 am.)               P. 268 270.

6 – 1 MG some height beyond Walker’s Ridge.  P. 271 272.

7 – 1 MG on Battleship Hill. (Approx 9.00 am, but if correct more likely to be after 10 am with the arrival of the 57th Machine gun Company)  P. 288.

8 – 2 MG’s above Fisherman’s Hut.  P. 327.

9 – 2 or 3 MG’s near the Cup (approx 7.00 am.)  p. 341 342.

10 – Machine gun fire from the Third Ridge between 8 & 9 am. (These are the four guns of the 27th MG Company) P.347.

On close examination of these reports it becomes apparent that those guns - I, 3, 5, 6, & 8 are one in the same out in the north. This leaves use with a possible 2 Turkish machine guns facing the landing from the heights above Anzac Cove, and 3 on the 400 Plateau up to 7.40 am, two more than the Turkish forces claim to have had for the 27th Regiment encamped at Maidos, and an additional six machine guns they make no claim to possessing. As with all other accounts of Turkish machine guns, up to, and after that time, other than pertaining to the four guns of the 27th Machine gun Company on the Third Ridge, all of those accounts obviously cannot be correct. It must be remembered that Charles Bean was not ashore on the 25th April, all of his descriptions of machine guns were drawn from the accounts of others, either on the subsequent days, or years later.

Even if it were so the Australian forces had a superiority of machine guns over that of the Turks from virtually the outset of landing, and one is left wondering; just what did happen with such a superiority of fire power when so little of its use is recorded up until around 8.00 am?

Even then only the two guns of the 9th Battalion under the command of Lt J. W. Costin on Lone Pine above the Cup get a mention in the Australian official history. The 27th (Ottoman) Regiment War Record also references the 1st / 27th Battalion’s advance on the 400 Plateau being hampered by machine gun fire coming from the direction of Merkeztepe (German Officers Ridge, MacLaurin’s Hill) Kanlisirt (Lone Pine) and two unknown positions in between from around 8.00 am, which would seem to indicate not only the 9th MG Section, but the guns of other Battalions. The machine guns of the 8th Battalion on Bolton’s Ridge, which apparently did not open fire until the 26th, have details recorded for most of the afternoon.  This would lead to the following questions.

Which battalion guns did go into action, at what places, and at what times during the early hours of the landing, if at all?  

Were those machine guns claimed to be heard more likely to have been the fire of Australian machine guns, as well as the ones aboard the steam picket boats?

Why did so many men record; hearing, seeing, capturing machine guns when they were clearly not there?

 The Australian reports of hearing the fire of machine guns on the 25th are also matched by some Turkish accounts of hearing machine gun fire in the early hours of the 25th, Australian machine gun fire.

The question has been asked – “where did these imaginary machine guns come from?” to this the suggested simple answer is, “anywhere they could find them”.

For ANZAC, the morning of the 25th April, the actual answer to that question is, ‘nowhere, for they were not there, and never existed’.

Jeff    

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I rather enjoyed Murray Ewen's article in the Winter edition no.145 of The Gallipolian and his findings. Information that others missed. And I dunno how Frederick Ashton 11Bn, made POW in the afternoon of 25 April, so eloquently described being brought before German officers at a machine gun post, clearly delineating between German and Ottoman troops as his captors. The door is far from closed on this, with more research required. Each to his own Jeff.

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Gilly,

 

I am sorry but Murray's is not that good and still to many gaps where he just does not fill in any of these gaps. He poses some good questions but can not fill in the answers?

 

Germans at Chanakale and the Dardenelles defences, has been spoken of before. while there were a number of Germans in these defences and at HQ's, they just were not all around the Ottoman Army at that time or in fact at most of the war.

 

The 3rd Corps appears to have a history of non Germans around, I have found none there (or briefly) in 1915 or in Oct 1917 at Beersheba, where these German pop up in our records.

 

Just because a soldier said he saw a German does not mean he was a German?

 

Germans wore the Ottoman Uniform when in Ottoman units, they only wore there own uniforms when in German units.

 

Sorry but still no smoking gun, only a well argued comments by Jeff.

 

S.B

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The fact remains that none of these accounts have been disproved. Claiming to know what a soldier in 1915 recognised or did not recognise is arrogance.

 

If Ashton reported Germans, then they must have been in German uniform, or he heard them talking or they spoke to him. You can't 'logic' his account away with statistics regarding numbers of Germans when that information itself is not complete. What would his motivation have been years later when he gave his statement on being repatriated from Turkish captivity? if he was, as is suggested, lying about there being Germans AND a machine gun present, I don't pretend know his reasons, and nobody else should be pretending to either.  His account deserves to be taken seriously - same as all the others - until it's proved wrong. Disproven account by account - not a blanket 'didn't happen - they didn't know what they were talking about' - and move on.

 

It's interesting that in this entire thread, nobody who claims 'no machine guns' ever seriously attempts to debunk the 'hard' ones. Just to spell it out, that means beyond endlessly repeating 'didn't happen' or claiming to know what they heard and what they didn't recognise.

Edited by Bryn
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Bryn,

 

Yes you can because how can you prove he saw what he said he saw? Just saying it does not make it so?

 

"on March 24, Enver suddenly agreed to the creation of a special Dardanelles defense group, henceforth to be known as the Fifth Army, and simultaneously offered its command to Liman. The general "assented at once." The next day he left Constantinople for his new command post on the Gallipoli Peninsula, taking with him a small number of German officers and his trusted Ottoman chief-of-staff, Lt. Col. Kazim Bey.53 For the next 10 months Liman was to serve uninterruptedly as the commander-in-chief at the Gallipoli front."

 

He maybe correct, a German officer/s may have been visiting the area when the man showed up as a PoW?

 

But to say because a wandering German officer/s were there at that time, that Germans were all over the place make less sense?

 

But again we go in circles

 

I have mentioned before the number of so called accounts by Good Light Horse soldiers/officers in Palestine seeing Germans all over the place, leading so called counter attacks or manning MGs. meaning that an Ottoman/Turk would never do that? racizum at its best.

 

S.B

 

Edited by stevebecker
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Jeff,

I believe you may have missed, or overlooked certain snippets of information within Klaus Wolf's book, Victory at Gallipoli.

On p.225 Klaus wrote; "With the Allied landings on 25 April, German soldiers were also directly involved in the fighting on land, especially the Naval Shore Detachment of the Mediterranean Division."

 

Referring then to Lt Boltz 's 44 man detachment in May, Klaus goes on to say; "With its two machine gun sections, the Detachment was in action from 3 May 1915 in the south of the Peninsula and suffered the highest losses."

 

It is clear that Klaus has delineated between these two events, one having occurred on 25 April, the other on 3 May.

 

In my article in the Gallipolian under the heading 25 April 1915 - Kaba Tepe, Ari Burnu, Sedd el Bahr I quoted my German research from the Bundisarchiv in Freiberg; " To support the weak attacked Turkish Army, the fleet sent all entbehrlichen (dispensable) machine guns with German troops from the Goeben and Breslau in the Dardanelles to serve the V Army. This was an essential reinforcement for the Turkish troops. It made severe damage to the enemy which different reports show."

 

The points I would like to make here are these; firstly both Klaus's and my research these German naval personnel who made up the Naval Shore Detachments are referred to as soldiers, not sailors. I don't know why this is so, but I would hazard a guess and say this; like the naval detachment which landed on Direction Island on 14 November 1914 from the German cruiser SMS Emden, these men were proficient in the use of small arms, being pistol, Mauser and tripod mounted machine guns. Therefore, when deployed ashore they effectively operate as soldiers.

 

Furthermore, the statement that these German troops were from the Goeben and Breslau I believe is misleading. Although they were crew members from these two ships, at the same time they were serving on ships of the Turco - German Fleet. In the case of the Torgut Reis and Barbrosa Hayreddin  I believe the role these ships played on 25 April 1915 in the Helles and Anzac sectors greatly aided their defence.  Both these ex - German battleships it is known stored a generous compliment of older pattern German Maxim machine guns in their armories. Unfortunately so far, I been unable to access any information concerning the Torgut Reis but I am confident it will be forthcoming.

 

It was also mentioned in my article that a German Naval Shore Detachment equipped with six machine guns were involved in the fighting alongside Lt Boltz and his detachment on or around 3 May 1915. However, this new information failed to raise a response from the gallery despite the fact communiques between the V Army and the Barbaros Hayreddin were quoted as evidence.

 

On p.160 Klaus wrote; "The German Naval Shore Detachment was reinforced and Lt Boltz together with three other officers, 150 men and twelve machine guns set off from Istanbul on 27 July for the Dardanelles front. The Detachment was no longer a purely German unit, as 80 Turkish sailors had been added to their ranks."

 

Of Lt Boltz's 44 man detachment I wrote; "It was also stated that an additional two machine guns had been accompanied by Turkish personnel. "These machine guns were Hotchkiss, and were as we can now confirm, were manned by Turkish sailors. This would indicate these weapons had been removed from any one of several Turkish gunboats. Again there was no response from the gallery, despite the fact this information had never been previously mentioned. There was also a lack lustre response when it was mentioned that a Hotchkiss machine gun had been captured on Plugges Plateau by 10th Battalion's scouts on the morning of 25 April.

 

Finally on p.213 dated 9 January 1916 Klaus quoted a message of thanks from Liman von Sanders to the Kaisor; "I beg, Your Excellency and the Fleet, to express the sincerest thanks to the Fifth Army for the excellent support we have always had from the Fleet throughout the fierce battles from the German Naval Shore Detachment through all eight and a half months."

 

It is interesting that Liman says eight and a half months which from 25 April 1915 to 9 January 1916 is eight months, two weeks and 1 day. If it had been from 3 May 1915 to 9 January 1916 it would have been depending on how it's calculated, approximately eight months and five days.

 

Klaus Wolf's Defence career I believe has kept him extremely busy over recent years. Therefore, I think the man can be excused if some of the information in what is now the third reprint of his book is a little outdated. Nevertheless, his work is an important addition to the Gallipoli narrative and although not expecting too much, I was pleasantly surprised and enjoyed the read. 

 

I have never met Klaus Wolf nor have I ever exchanged information from him. all the same I find it interesting that even though we are on opposite sides of the globe we appear to be on the same page. This is most likely because our research material has been sourced from Frieberg. Obviously Klaus did his own research, where as  I, at a not inconsiderable personal expense, engaged a professional researcher in Germany.  There were some benefits and new information was uncovered, but sadly I had to call 'time out' my quest for the elusive 'Holy Grail' simply due to the expense. Also, there was no guarantee that my researcher had not missed the crucial information I was seeking.

 

I am nevertheless heartened to learn that between Klaus and I, we have located sufficient evidence to justify further research into this subject which I have no doubt this will be the case.

 

In closing, it seems that after the cat has been thrown in amongst the pigeons it is a cop out to insist that others do all the hard yards to find answers we seek.

 

The evidence which has been provided by those who were there, our official reports and the massed knowledge of this forums members greatly outweighs any kangaroo court judgements.

 

And as for Steve's continued refusal to believe that our soldiers actually saw what they said they saw, well, I think most of us, especially Bryn, have read more personal accounts than most people have had breakfasts. Therefore one soon becomes adept at telling when someone is telling a porky pie.

 

Rockturner

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Rock,

 

I am sorry you feel all allied accounts are correct but all (?) Ottoman and Germans accounts are not?

 

But lets deal with your reasons? (I have not read Wolf's book as yet so that may change);

 

These German sub units in the Dardenelles Defences were part of the Sdr-Kdo (Sonderkommando Usedom), or as part of the Germans sent under Usedom to help the defences.

 

These came under two souses

 

Admiralstabsoffizier beim Marineoberkommando in Der Türkei - 26 officers and 432 men or (Sonderkommando Usedom 700 men Sailors and Coastal Defence Specialists 9-14) 

 

These were the men mentioned in the Navy units and shore defences.

 

These men manned the defences during early 1915 and throw out the war both in and out of the water.

 

No MG units are shown anywhere until Boltz formed his unit in May 1915 

 

I notice you mention;

 

"German Naval Shore Detachment equipped with six machine guns were involved in the fighting alongside Lt Boltz "

 

I show the Naval Shore Det manning a number of post in the Dardenelles but not running around with MG's (I maybe wrong)?

 

A number were killed like;

 

Gorzelski Eduard    ObMaat deR Marine     SMS Breslau (Midilli) - Landungs-Abtl - Naval Shore Det - in Fort at Sigindere - Sdr-Kdo (Sonderkommando Kaiserliche Marine Türkei)     1915-    (born at Bujakow KIA 4-6-15) Anf. Juni 1915 (begining of June 1915) reported killed by Artillery at Sigindere 
 

So I need to check how they were used

 

But I am unsure what you are getting at as no where were German MG' units running around the Dardenelles before May 1915?

 

The reason they did that and the so call Ottoman Naval MG Units was the shortage of this weapon after the Allied landings?

 

So we still have nor found these units (MG units) before that date, so Allied accounts of MG's all over the beaches can not be maintained.

 

Or are you saying Wolf and other Turkish accounts are wrong but your accounts are not?

 

S.B

Edited by stevebecker
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"at Anzac I made the most diligent inquiries and then found that the poor chap had been hit on the Torpedo Boat whilst actually supervising the disembarking of his men and watching that they did not expose themselves when stepping from the deck on to the ladder.  The enemy was pouring in a heavy shrapnel and machine gun fire on to the boats, they had to get ashore, and someone with a big heart had to superintend, a man with a cool head and a brave heart only was of any use and Corporal A. J. McDonald was the man." (extract from letter from Major J.F. McCall, 1st Field Company, Australian Engineers.

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1 hour ago, Bryn said:

made the most diligent inquiries

So, this means McCall was not actually an eyewitness to McDonald's death.  The CWGC place McDonald as 5th Battalion which were in the second wave and the ABC's event timeline record the principal cause of casualties in the 2nd wave as shrapnel (which clearly was devastating and there is no doubt that McDonald was a very brave man in an exposed position).

 

Quote

04:54 Asim orders the Howitzer Battery to target the second wave of troops as they make their way to shore. This strategy leads to many casualties from airborne shrapnel explosions.

The Mantelli gun, capable of firing three shells per minute, cannot reach those ANZACs who have already landed, but in support of the howitzers it bombards the approaching boats.

 

 

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From page 42 of the original thread

 

This regarding Talbot Smith and 456 Cpl JC Weatherill at the Landing at Anzac early 25 April. From Beans notebooks and diaries.

Corp JC Weatherill

Scouts, 10Bn, D Coy with Talbot Smith

A mg was on top of Maclagans. It was on a tripod. Smith ... a Turk as they were running. We pulled it off tripod and threw it over cliff face at back about 20ft. It was in the corner in ... and we had seen the flashes..... mg in the knoll close down to.....

Now the dots represent Beans shorthand so I can't explain the gaps.

Weatherill was DCM and MID for the Landing, his recommendation alluding to the capture of 2 guns and some prisoners. He survived the war. More to come on 10Bn Landing shortly, but we found this tucked away in an obscure file. Now, the nay sayers can ask their usual questions, but it is quite definitive and confirms tripod mounted mgs, which is correct.

 

Once again, and again - explain this one away with your usual alacrity. These two did some great work at the Landing, including the above, but yeah, nah didn't happen, not possible, he lied!!!!!!!!!!!!!

 

Ian

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On 13/08/2020 at 11:22, Jeff Pickerd said:

, but there is still a problem of just what the accounts of hearing machine gun fire, the coming under machine gun fire, and the capture of machine guns/parts, were in accuracy when the lack of heavy casualties on the beach, no unit records of machine guns being captured, and the apparent ‘after the fact’ reports written in unit war diaries; all are in conflict to Turkish records stating there were no machine guns covering the landing at that time.

 

Very well written Jeff.  The WW1 and WW2 attacks by unprotected soldiers into machine guns sited to cover beaches, rivers and other approaches show that unprotected troops experience horrendous casualties opposing them.  The growing body of scholarship by Turkish speaking historians able to read contemporary documents shows that these machine guns were not at the landing itself.  "Ottoman Defence Against the ANZAC Landing" (Australian Army Campaigns Series) [Uyar, Mesut] is a peer-reviewed book typical of this approach.

 

Finally, to continue to read emotive phrases e.g. he lied!!!!!!!!!!!!! or yeah, nah didn't happen, seen in post #37 and in earlier posts, suggests that sadly this thread is not always distinguished by peer-review and scholarship .... 

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15 hours ago, WhiteStarLine said:

So, this means McCall was not actually an eyewitness to McDonald's death.  The CWGC place McDonald as 5th Battalion which were in the second wave and the ABC's event timeline record the principal cause of casualties in the 2nd wave as shrapnel (which clearly was devastating and there is no doubt that McDonald was a very brave man in an exposed position).

 

 

 

 

WhiteStarLine:

 

McDonald was 1st Field Company Engineers, NOT 5th Battalion Infantry. You'll note that the spelling of the 5th Battalion man's name is MacDonald with an 'a' following the M. It clearly states that his name was McDonald without an 'a' following the M. Somebody more cynical than me might assume you chose A J MacDonald over A J McDonald because that would strengthen the 'no' position. Personally I doubt that you'd do that deliberately, so assume it was an honest mistake.

 

McCall stated, "The enemy was pouring in a heavy shrapnel and machine gun fire on to the boats". Nowhere does McCall specify that McDonald was killed by mg fire. He might have been killed by mg fire, but Major McCall does not say that, so McCall cannot be dismissed on the basis that he did not witness McDonald being hit. McCall is merely making a general observation that explains why McDonald was doing what he was doing.

 

Generally:

So does Major McCall get automatically added to the long list of people who could not possibly have recognised the sound of a machine gun? Nobody so far has ever offered any substantial argument as to why Commander Dix, Lieut-Colonel Clarke, Lieutenant Heighway, Corporal Weatherill, Captain Millward, etc etc etc could not recognise the sound or muzzle-flash or sight of a machine gun.

 

These witness accounts cannot just be erased because you THINK they're wrong. Prove it.

 

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47 minutes ago, Bryn said:

Somebody more cynical than me might assume you chose A J MacDonald over A J McDonald because that would strengthen the 'no' position. Personally I doubt that you'd do that deliberately, so assume it was an honest mistake.

Hi Bryn,

 

Thanks for a prompt and courteous reply.  The link I cited spells his name just as you did,so I cannot see where your confusion stems from:

 

Post #35.

18 hours ago, Bryn said:

and Corporal A. J. McDonald was the

 

You even quote my own post that spells his name twice as you do.

 

16 hours ago, WhiteStarLine said:

McDonald's death.  The CWGC place McDonald as

 

You are quoting soldiers who heard the sound of weapons and assumed they could identify them - this does not meet the strict criteria for an eyewitness and at least one thread post from a member with combat experience and author of a peer-reviewed book has pointed out.  

 

I will return to this thread when peer-reviewed research is cited - I note some of the names posted in this long, circular thread have been posted on more than one occasion by the same person - an endless cycle of reinforcing a myth ...

 

image.png.3524b3e08fb8ab95a2bbc8f8a9ca3ffd.png

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The name was MCDONALD. You posted details of MACDONALD. They're not the same.

 

132 Corporal Alexander Joseph MCDONALD, 1 Field Coy Engineers AIF. Died of wounds at sea aboard Clan McGillivray, 25/04/1915, aged 30. Grave: Shrapnel Valley Cemetery.

 

555 Private Alexander John MACDONALD, 5th Battalion AIF. Killed in action at Johnston's Jolly, Anzac, 25/04/1915, aged 22. No Known Grave.

 

The fact is that your source gets MacDonald's name wrong. A quick check of his Service Dossier would show this.

Edited by Bryn
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18 hours ago, gilly100 said:

Once again, and again - explain this one away with your usual alacrity. These two did some great work at the Landing, including the above, but yeah, nah didn't happen, not possible, he lied!!!!!!!!!!!!!

 

Ian

 

Ian,

Language like this does nothing to add to the healthy discussion of the topic at hand.


Cheers,
Derek.

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Victory at Gallipoli 1915

 

With respect to the German Military Mission (MM); The official Turkish request for the dispatch of a German general for the reorganisation of her army was finally made on 22 May 1913. The Germans decided on the commander of the 22nd Division, based at Kassel, Lieutenant General Liman von Sanders. Wolf p.15

 

The MMD (Mediterranean Mittelmeer Division which consisted of the SMS Goeben and Brelau) had been under the command of Admiral Souchon since 23 October 1913. Wolf p.26

 

After the two admirals, Guido von Usedom and Johannes Merten, together with 15 naval officers and 281 naval gunners, arrived on 25 August 1914 in Istanbul, the Special Command the Imperial Navy in Turkey (Sonderkommando Kaiserlich Marine Turkei, abbreviated 'SoKo') was formed and was placed under the command of Admiral von Usedom. Wolf p.41

 

The German naval officers and men variously assigned to the installations and batteries on the Dardanelles and immediately began training and site reinforcement. As an independent and separate formation, the SoKo did not report to either the Military Mission  or the MMD. Wolf p.42

 

On 24 March the German Fleet Commander, Admiral Souchon,  approached the War Minister Enver and asked that General von Sanders take command of the Galllipoli defence. An hour after the interview, General von Sanders was was appointed Commander - in - Chief of the Fifth Army. Wolf p.98

 

The next few quotes were found within Chapter 10 - The Three Battles of Krithia. Rightly or wrongly I believe they should have been placed within Chapters 7 or 8. Although I have added some comment and underlines I have not corrupted the information. Remembering though, with respect to Tom Iredale, this work has been translated from German into English so there could be the occasional variation in its interpretation.

 

The Turkish Fleet provided [past tense] personnel and material support for the Fifth Army. Admiral von Usedom had reported [past tense] to the Fleet Commander (Souchon) that there was a shortage of machine guns on the front lines, Admiral Souchon reacted to this and noted in the war diary of the MMD on 30 April:

 

Enemy troops landing at Kaba Tepe launched attacks on Turkish positions during the day. Barbaros (Barbarosa Hayreddin which did not join Torgut Reis until 26 April) supporting the army with direct fire. Incredibly, the Fifth Army, as Usedom reports,  lacks machine guns. I will provide [commence or continue to provide?] all that can be spared from the ships of the fleet. Wolf p.139

 

Perhaps each reader will make of this what they will. However, the date of the diary entry, the mention of Allied troops landing at Kaba Tepe and Souchon's statement that he will provide as many  machine guns as can be spared from the fleet raises the question; was this prior to, or post 25 April. 

 

German Naval Shore Detachment

The task of marine infantry was to fight on land as well as carrying out watch and gun duties on ship. This was the reason that the MMD had at its disposal a number of heavy machine guns, on which the sailors were well trained. Wolf p.139

 

I would recommend that anyone with an interest in what Klaus Wolf has to say and who hasn't purchased this book, do so.

 

Rockturner

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     As we have the topic revived again, I'd like to bring my earlier post to your attention.

(My English was a little bit sloppy in that one but I guess it will work out anyway)

 

Cheers

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Rock,

 

The Ottoman soldier/Sailors you quote

 

"The Turkish Fleet provided [past tense] personnel and material support for the Fifth Army"

 

These were attached to many German sub units during the war, they form two purposes, first to carry equipment and ammo, and the other to fill in the gaps and under study the Germans.

 

I find these men as I said all over the German and Ottoman units with Germans.

 

So finding Turkish soldiers in Boltz MG units is not new?

 

Other then the German war ships what type of MG are we seeing from the Ottoman Fleet?

 

Clearly not the Maxim type 08 we are use to, but older types from before 1900 and after, which were as old as the most of the Ottoman Navy at that time?

 

They show up as Pom Pom units at Gabatepe and Helles are as close as we can find they possibly maybe?

 

Cheers

 

S.B

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  Emre,

Thank you for putting up the link to your most significant post from the original topic, and my sincere apologies for not referencing your post outlining the details from the published war diary of the 27th Regiment (27.ALAY).

In my previous submission at - This was the answer to any German machine gun involvement at Anzac on the 25th April, and to a large extent the actual answer to the overall question, but regardless the debate went on for the next 14 years. I should have referenced your post of the 6th May 1918 as a significant addition to the answer of the overall question, again my apologies, and my sincere thanks for your continued assistance in supplying information from the Turkish records.

 

Jeff

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It is time I addressed some of the replies to my post of the 13th August, # 28.

My narrative was specifically related to ANZAC/Z Beach, or as known to the Turkish defenders Ari Burnu. It addressed the activities of the three battalions and Machine Gun Company of the Turkish 27th Infantry Regiment, 9th Division, 3rd Army Corps, the sole defenders of the right flank section of the Gallipoli Peninsula from early February, 1915. With recording that, I have not addressed the defence arrangements for the Helles sector to which German participation is recorded. I had noticed the reference to German soldiers in action on the 25th April in Klaus Wolf’s book, which would have been in the defence of the southern sectors either side of the Dardanelles, all very interesting, but that had little bearing nor significance upon the defence arrangements in place at Ari Burnu, for the Turkish records make it clear that there were no German officers or men attached to any units of the Turkish 3rd Army on the 25th April, 1915. The progression of the deployment of the 27th Regiment can found from the detailed research paper of Murat Karatus – ‘The Gallipoli Campaign with Maps’, Translated Turkish Works on Gallipoli, Macquarie University, with that study fully referenced to documents from the Turkish ‘General Staff Military History and Strategic Research’ (TGSH,) as outlined by Karatas in his list of sources, page 10 onwards. The movement of the 27th Machine gun section can be traced from the 18th March, 1915 as recorded in the Atase Archive, 27th Regiment War Record, 5338/H-10/1. The four machine guns of the regiment are the only ones referenced anywhere in the regiments history, as with their times of movement and placement, as can be seen from the documents posted by Emrezmen in the original thread at post #1362, 6th May, 2018. The various officers of the three battalions are also recorded, all of them Turkish. The two 87mm Mantelli guns and two Nordenfelt guns of the Coastal Command at Gaba Tepe were under the command of the 27th Regiment, and their placement and control is clearly recorded, as is their commencement of fire on the ships lying off Anzac Cove at 4.45 am.

I fail to see what relevance Pte Frederick Ashton No. 743, ‘D’ Company, 11th Battalion, has on the question to the existence of Turkish machine guns at Anzac in the early hours of the 25th April.

From his hand written statement to the Administrative Headquarters, A.I.F. “B” Records Section, taken at London 10.12.18, he makes no mention of Turkish machine guns from within that statement. His reference to the three German officers at the knoll, which must have been somewhere above Mule Gully, would be incorrect, they would have been Turkish officers of the 1st Battalion, 27th Regiment, for there were no German officers attached to the 27th Infantry Regiment on the 25th April 1915, Jennifer Lawless in her book – ‘Kismet, The story of the Gallipoli Prisoners of War’, came to the same conclusion. C.E.W. Bean came to the conclusion that the gully Ashton had wandered into was Mule Gully, page 316, Volume 1. Charles Bean makes no mention of Ashton speaking of Turkish machine guns. From what can gleamed from Ashton’s statement, his capture would appear to be sometime after 3.00 pm if he moved up Shrapnel Gully with the New Zealanders (Auckland and Canterbury Battalions) and went into the firing line of the 1st Battalion on Baby 700, of which the remnants were forced back to the shelter of Bloody Angle some time after 2.30pm.

The 27th Regiment War Record records the capture of the first Australian prisoner by the 1st Battalion on the afternoon of the 25th April after their advance across Mule Gully, and that was Frederick Ashton. After his capture Ashton reports being taken down to the Beach, that would have been Gaba Tepe where the 2nd Battalion HQ was, from there taken back inland to what appeared to be the Turkish General Headquarters. This was in fact Lt Col Sefik’s HQ at Kemalyeri (Scrubby Knoll) where Ashton was interrogated by three officers in Turkish to no avail, then by another officer who had four words of English. One of those officers was Lt Col Sefik as can be seen from his description of the Australian prisoner: “The prisoner was a tall Australian fellow of around 22 years of age. He looked like a Western European. His uniform and equipment were in an immaculate condition. He didn’t speak any other language but English. Since we had no-one who spoke English, we couldn’t interrogate him. He looked calm but tired. We made him sit and have a rest. One of my subordinates showed him a packet of cigarettes and asked by gesture if he wanted a smoke. The young prisoner took a cigarette with pleasure. Then crossed his legs and quietly smoked his cigarette and rested. The Sergeant who brought him showed me a handful of money and said that it belonged to the prisoner. I told him to hand back the money which he did. The prisoner took the money, smiled and put it in his pocket. We sent the prisoner to Division Headquarters with his documents.” (As reproduced in ‘Kismet’, page 42, reference: M. Sefik, Canakkale Ariburnu Savaslari ce 27, Askeri Mecmua Tarih Kismi, Edition 40, 1935, Istanbul, Translated by S. Bulgu.) Ashton cannot be claimed eye witness.

With regard to C.E.W. Bean’s notes concerning the action of Cpl J. C. Weatherill  in company with Lt E.W. Talbot-Smith on MacLagan’s Ridge, Bean was obviously so unconvinced as to its likelihood to make any reference to it in the official history. Another of the machine gun stories to have no supporting evidence.

As to all other reports by other Australians of the existence of Turkish machine guns firing on the landing from 4.30 am until around 8.am, in light of the qualified Turkish records, they obviously were mistaken or just repeating stories then circulating.

 

Jeff

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Jeff, thank you. No need to apologise for not referencing/mentioning my post.

 

Third and last volume of war diaries of the 27th Regt which covers the September-December period was published last month. Now they are publishing the war diaries of the Dardanelles Fortified Zone Command. I heard 57th Regt will be the next.

 

On 17/08/2020 at 05:05, Jeff Pickerd said:

As to all other reports by other Australians of the existence of Turkish machine guns firing on the landing from 4.30 am until around 8.am, in light of the qualified Turkish records, they obviously were mistaken or just repeating stories then circulating.

 

 

As I said before to our forum pal Bernard (b3rn), I am not saying Australian soldiers were a buch of liars, but history is all about documents rather than personal accounts and Turkish documents on this particular subject are clear enough. Still, I will be looking for anything related to MGs.

 

Cheers

Edited by emrezmen
Correction
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Mates,

 

Again we dance to those quotes by Allied soldiers about MG's at the landings.

 

We (no MG's) have to prove these comments incorrect, while those Pro MGs just quote any mentions in any old book that they were shot at by a MG?

 

They give no evidence other then some poor soldier years after following the party line, (common with many of these old soldiers, when the story become truth print/tell the story not the truth) .

 

yes I go to far, many of these soldiers believe what they are seeing and hearing, that does not make it correct, surely you see that?

But no you don't, you just say, they were there, so what they saw or head is correct.

 

We on the other hand have to prove them wrong, which in many cases now is harder to do, while you don't bother to double check these allied accounts, do you?

 

S.B

 

Edited by stevebecker
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11 hours ago, stevebecker said:

We on the other hand have to prove them wrong

 

 

Not so far you haven't had to, and haven't tried to.

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