Gaba Tepe trenches/gun-pits

[michaeldr]

Following the Gallipoli Association's Walking Tour (07-12^th May 2017)

Krithia and I were guided by Eceabat, on a couple of days private touring of the battlefield's less visited regions.

These included an area of Gaba Tepe, recently denuded by a small bush fire, revealing a landscape much as it was in 1915

 

 

This is that same area from an October 1915 aerial  [with acknowledgements to the IWM & WFA - from their map disc - similarly, also the next map]

 

 

And this is the same area (& northwards to Anzac) as given in the map illustrating Hamilton's December 1915 despatch

 

 

The pictures below show the trenches and gun-pits as found today. They appear to be old enough to be from 1915. They also illustrate that any guns placed there could enfilade both the Anzac battlefield, and provide a southern arc of fire towards the Helles front.

 

Gaba Tepe looking towards Lone Pine

 

 

Facing south towards Helles

 

 

 

 

Edited 21 May , 2017 by michaeldr

[michaeldr]

A note here of sincere thanks to our GWF Pal (Bill) Eceabat for revealing the secrets of Gaba Tepe

[michaeldr]

An example of the importance of the Gaba Tepe position is given in the Turkish GS History p.201, when the build up to the early May raid is described

see https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B5l4v9YR6fd3LVZhMDVuV2pHd2c/view

 

“In fact, Kabatepe was both a lateral surveillance position and an important firing position sheltering a small artillery group. It functioned with an effective opportunity for fire at the enemy by observing the shores of Ariburnu and the anchoring places in these waters from short range distance. Seeing that in the initial days the mixed battery here (Mantelli guns and automatic Nordenfelds) were doing very good work positioned behind this hill and that the enemy was taking precautions and avoiding them, two more Field Batteries were positioned on this hill a few days earlier.
It was not without import that the enemy wanted to stifle this nest of firepower with a strong commando raid. It was a fact that the Kabatepe artillery now, bolstered by eight more cannons, was upsetting the landing embarkation work at the Ariburnu wharf and was not affording the boarding transportation ships the opportunity to anchor and was even upsetting considerably the ease of fire for the warships on this flank.”

Edited 21 May , 2017 by michaeldr

[gilly100]

Thanks for all the images Michael. So sorry I could not be there and meet you this year. Hope you kept Bill hopping. He would like that! Bests to Bill. Miss you Bill and Eric.

Ian

[michaeldr]

Thanks for your comments Ian

I look forward meeting up with you there sometime soon

 

All the best

Michael

[verygoodboy]

Hi Michaeldr,

Geetings to you. I am very interested in your post and photo' s of the Gaba Tepe gun pits. Where were these exactly in relation to the Gaba Tepe outpost itself? TGS History says two guns only (Krupp 'Mantelli's'). Other Turkish sources (Mesut Uyar) say only one gun was working on 25 April 1915. Hard to believe one gun could have caused so much trouble. Doubtful too about the effectiveness of the two supporting Nordenfelts. Were these in the gun pits too or were they in the outpost itself with the garrison of approx.150 rifles?  Also, would these Gaba Tepe gun pits have been safe from the repeated gunfire from HMS Bacchante? Overall case I'm trying to make is that Anzac plans and objectives were bound to fail with Gaba Tepe and its guns in operation. Occupation of Third Ridge would have been impossible with Gaba Tepe enfilading its entire length.

Best regards Victor Bennett. My initials are VGB, which my mother told me stand for 'very good boy'. That dear lady and the rest of the family have not allowed me to forget it, though my behaviour seldom lived up to it!         

[Eceabat]

One has to take into account that the positions on Gabatepe, including observation and infantry trenches, gun pits and communication trenches wide and deep enough to allow for guns to be moved from one side of the headland to the other without being observed from the sea, were expanded greatly during the seven months of the fighting at the Anzac sector. 

 

These positions allowed for the deployment of a modern 15 cm battery of German guns that arrived just at the end of the campaign, along with a stronger defensive array of trenches. 

 

It is difficult to pinpoint which of the gun pits may have been used on 25 April to emplace the two 87 mm Mantelli pieces, or the Nordenfeldts. Some of the pits are in a slight dip and maybe 80 metres in from the western most end of the headland, giving them some shelter from fire from the sea. 

 

That said, a number of the gun positions face to the north east, and clearly enfilade Second Ridge, which was held through the campaign despite this. The ability to enfilade Third Ridge from these positions is far less, that ridge being in a more easterly direction, though had Allied troops got onto that ridge line they could have come under fire from the rear were there artillery on the headland.

 

More importantly that the opportunity for enfilading fire from Gabatepe is the very clear line of sight it gave along parts of the Australian and New Zealand lines, as well as a direct line of observation into Anzac Cove, with more that half its length exposed. 

 

As I understand it, much of the Ottoman artillery to the south of the Anzac sector was further inland and to the east, concentrated around the Olive Grove area, rather than in the far more exposed position at Gabatepe. If I recall, Charles Bean wrote of fire at times being directed on Gabatepe not to beat down any artillery positions there but to hinder direct observation from the headland into the Anzac lines. 

 

Cheers

Bill

 

[verygoodboy]

Thank you Bill for the valuable insights. Yes. I was aware the Gaba Tepe guns were greatly expanded during the campaign, together with the trenches guarding them. My focus is on the initial stages, especially the first day, which was kick-started by a comment from Bean, "With a formidable position such as this on its flank and rear [Gaba Tepe] the task of the 3rd Brigade would be almost impossible."  p.226.  Where 3rd Brigade landed, put Gaba Tepe out of reach. QED, the landing made 3rd Brigade's task 'almost impossible'. Is there any clearer indictment of the landing error and its effect on Anzac plans and objectives? Moreover, that 's without getting into the issue of 'almost impossible' terrain. I've often wondered how the guys could be expected to succeed if the tasks facing them were 'almost impossible'? By the end of the first day, there were guns at each end of Third ridge, as well as in between. How on earth were the Anzacs expected to establish GHQ's holding position?  Regards Victor 

[Eceabat]

The terrain around Gabatepe and where at least part of the 3rd Bde was supposed to land and then extend right to take the headland is far less "impossible" that were the initial wave of troops did go ashore. However, once the landing went astray, there was no chance of the lost time being recovered and the position taken once the element of surprise was gone. 

 

The 3rd Bde's commander Sinclair Maclagan both had a fixation about Turkish reserves piling in from the south, and a deep concern over the extent of the objective set under the landing plans. Given that there were 12 Bns of Ottoman infantry in the vicinity, as against a maximum of 20 Bns of Australian and New Zealand troops, with no immediate reserves to hand, his latter concern was probably well justified, though his fears about a strike from the south was not, there only being a few Ottoman troops near to Gabatepe or below it. 

 

As I said in my earlier posting, it is hard to tell what of the Gabatepe defences were in existence as of 25 April and which were later additions. 

 

Cheers

Bill

 

 

[verygoodboy]

Thanks Bill. It all seems to come down to the landing error. It turned 'mission possible' into 'mission almost impossible'. Even Tom Cruise would be hard pushed to make it work. Beats me why historians like Robin Prior still claim there was no landing error. It was all a myth, according to him. And how come the landing error (if there was one) was providential, which many people still believe? Regards Victor. 

[Eceabat]

One way in which the shifting to the north of many of the boats in the first wave was providential I suppose was that the did not come under close quarters attention from the guns on Gabatepe, and the troops were further away from the 5th company of the 27th Regiment, which was camped no more than ten minutes fast march from the headland and almost right on the ridge overlooking Brighton Beach. As for the broader plan... not so much.

 

 

[verygoodboy]

But the guns at Gaba Tepe were a clearly defined first objective and did not open fire, according to the TGS History, until 05:00. Time enough for 9th Bn to deal with them? Is it just me, but I find it hard to accept the reasoning that it was providential to be spared the attention of an objective that should have been taken out in the first place? Second-wave, landing from HMS Beagle, long after all element of surprise had gone, got ashore without unacceptable casualties, from either Gaba Tepe or the enemy on Bolton's Ridge. Therefore, first wave, with surprise on their side, would surely have fared better?

 

We could go on, Bill, back and forth, probably for the rest of our lives, but I thank you most sincerely for sharing your valuable insights with me. I am much wiser because of them. Now back to lockdown here in Cape Town, where we have two of our six grandchildren living with us in the garden cottage. A bonus, of course, but like most things in life, it comes at a price, as I type this with a two-year-old tugging at my sleeve!

 

For the record, I don't know where they get 'Lance Corporal' from. I've never been in the army. One of my first books as a child of 12, was "With Lee in Virginia", and I've been a military-history nut ever since. For example, how many people do you know, have waded across the river Alma (with their boots around their neck) as the Guards did in 1856? This was much to the horror of my taxi driver, by the way, who had to wait until his fare had then climbed up the hill to the Russian position and back. After three visits to Gallipoli, I will not be returning there, although the place haunts me still. Explain, if you can, the sudden drop in temperature I experienced in 40-degree heat, as I tramped around in between Pope's Hill and Dead Man's Ridge  You and yours keep well now, Bill. Cheers for now, Victor.   

[Robert Dunlop]

The terrain of key importance was Sari Bair ridge, not Gaba Tepe. You can tell this from the Ottoman response to the landings - get to Hill 971 and Chunuk Bair, plus occupy Third Ridge in support. The ridge was a key objective for the landing force too. Gaba Tepe was important as the flank guard covering the main beach landing area. But it was vulnerable if the high ground was occupied early by the ANZAC forces. As noted above, the failure to take Sari Bair in force and to take Third Ridge was due to command inertia, not actual enfilade fire.

 

Robert

[Guest]

Mate,

 

Yes as the 77th Regt arrived late in the day, and held the area thought out the campaign.

 

The only major attack against the 77th Regt, was by the 5th ALHR 2nd ALHBde supported by the 7th ALHR.

 

Otherwise the 77th did most on the attacking early in April and May, after that it did only small local attacks.

 

S.B

[verygoodboy]

Oops....sorry for my earlier typo. Should read 1854, not 1856. Gentlemen, this debate started with Bean's comment, "With a formidable position such as this on its flank and rear [meaning Gaba Tepe] the task of the 3rd Brigade would be almost impossible."  (Australian Official History, Volume I, p.226.) 3rd Brigade's task was to take a covering position on Third Ridge (Gun Ridge) from Chunuk Bair down to and including Gaba Tepe. Therefore, Bean's contention is that taking and holding such a covering position would be 'almost impossible' with Gaba Tepe in Ottoman hands in flank and rear. Let's assume no indecision and inertia, and pose a counterfactual that 3rd Brigade did manage to occupy Third Ridge from Chunuk Bair downwards. At that early hour, it still would have been Anzac infantry v Ottoman artillery at Gaba Tepe. Do you think that would have been a fair fight?  

[Bryn]

Since the 3rd Brigade objective included holding Gaba Tepe ('Third Ridge (Gun Ridge) from Chunuk Bair down to and including Gaba Tepe'), then logically, had the brigade achieved its initial objective, the problem of the guns there would already have been resolved.

 

Part of the 3rd Brigade's task was, as you said, to clear Gaba Tepe 'and any guns upon it', and this was to be done by two companies of the 9th Battalion ("MacLagan assigned to the first two companies of his right battalion-the 9th-the duty of swinging to their right immediately after landing, and rushing the battery on the neck of Gaba Tepe, a mile south of the landing-place" - Bean Vol 1 p226 ). Bean is saying that without that occurring, the brigade's task would have been 'almost impossible.'

 

The 'mistake' in landing was not in the overall position the entire force landed, but which units within the force landed where and the subsequent disorganisation caused by *individual units* not landing where they were supposed to have. A and B companies of the 9th Battalion (the ones tasked with clearing Gaba Tepe) landed under Plugge's Plateau, a long way from 'the right' where they should have been landed on Z Beach.

 

"The two companies of the 9th, which should have been on the right of the 10th, had been mixed up with the 10th and with each other by the swing of the tows. The rush up the hill had disorganised them, though not beyond the possibility of restoring order. But they were without senior officers.
Major J. C. Robertson had been hit on reaching the plateau. Major S. B. Robertson, one of the 9th’s company commanders, found his way with a few of his men to the far left and was killed later in the day on Baby 700. The colonel [Lee] was not on the plateau." (Bean Vol 1 p263).

Bean is scathing of Colonel Lee in his diary. He wrote that 'he could not face the fighting at the landing.'
 

[verygoodboy]

Greetings Bryn,

 

Very interesting what you say about Major S.B. Robertson and 9th Bn. When i was last at the IWM in London, I was sifting through the Bush Papers (again) and came across this letter from Captain Metcalf. As you know, Metcalf had been the midshipman in charge of No. 2 Tow who finally owned up, after 55 years, to making two unauthorised course alterations to the north as the first-wave flotilla ran in to the shore. He wrote to Bush, who had been in charge of No. 8 Tow, as follows:

 

“I am sure your diagram is incorrect with regard to No. 1 Tow. No. 1 Tow landed several minutes (say between five and ten) after my tow, and was to the north of me as Major Robertson and his two platoons of the 9th Batt. got mixed up with the 11th Battalion, when the rest of the 9th (Nos. 2, 3 & 4 tows) were some way up the hill. [Plugge’s Plateau.].” (letter Metcalf to Bush dated 04/02/1973)

 

A few months later, Metcalf wrote to H. V. Howe, who had been an 11th Bn lance corporal in No. 10 Tow, affirming the same opinion, only more forcefully, disagreeing with Charles Bean on the issue:

 

“Dr. Bean’s story about No. 1 Tow coming right back from the north end of the flotilla to find his right place at the beach close south of where I had been, and gone, is a flight of the imagination. If that had been the case, A Company 9th Battalion would have joined up in support of B Company and not got mixed up with the 11th Battalion.” (letter Metcalf to Howe dated 08/05/1973)

 

I believe Metcalf here got a bit confused about A and B companies, because Major S. B. Robertson’s 9th Bn company was B Company, not A Company, but I also believe this explains how Robertson and his men managed to end up in the fighting on the far left flank, when the rest of 9th Bn fought throughout the first day on 400 Plateau on the far right. The Australian Official History confirms that Robertson and his men scaled the heights near the Sphinx, and were involved later in the battle for Baby 700.(Vol. I, p. 283)

 

Metcalf was convinced that Lt. Cdr. Waterlow’s tow, (No.1 Tow) with Robertson and his 9th Bn men, ended up on the extreme left. Vice Admiral Sir Aubrey Mansergh, who had been the midshipman at the helm of Waterlow’s steamboat, confirmed that he “circled round the rear of the other tows and came up on the port flank.” (extract from letter from Mansergh, attached to letter from H.V. Howe to Admiral Longley-Cook, dated 16/04/1970)

 

To add credence to this, in his diary, Waterlow says he "dashed straight for the frowning cliffs", which is more descriptive of the terrain near the Sphinx than the terrain below Plugge's. Landing on the far left, Robertson and his 9th Bn men could not have been further away from their key objective, Gaba Tepe and its guns on the far right. He and most of his men fought and died in the subsequent battle for Baby 700, miles away from where they were supposed to be. The Royal Navy had not exactly covered itself in glory at the Dardanelles. It failed to renew the naval offensive after the far from decisive repulse of 18 March. Now it botched the army's first attempt at landing.

[Robert Dunlop]

In addition to Bryn's clarification, Bean's comment was written in retrospect after the failure to capture Sari Bair and Third Ridge on day one. Had the terrain of key importance been taken and held then, even if the two companies of 9th Battalion had not performed the right flank guard role adequately, the defenders of Gaba Tepe would have been under observation and directed naval gunfire support. Furthermore, the guns at Gaba Tepe were not sufficient to cover very much of Third Ridge. If the ridge had been taken in force then the enfilade fire from Gaba Tepe would not have been decisive.

 

I agree that the actual landings disrupted the relative as well as actual positions of the landing craft. There is evidence of on-the-spot decisions being made to accommodate this. Unfortunately, the decisions seem to have been based on an incorrect appraisal of what was needed. Thus it is possible that had the order of the boats been maintained then the same command mistakes would have been made; it just would have been easier to send the 'right' units to the wrong places.

 

Robert

[verygoodboy]

Hi Robert,

Thank you very much for your thoughtful input. Do you really think Bean's comment was made in retrospect? Bean 's comment was made in the chapter detailing the Anzac plan and the sentences that follow seem to confirm this:

 

"With a formidable position such as this on its flank and rear the task of 3rd Brigade would be almost impossible. Bridges therefore informed Colonel MacLagan (commander of the 3rd Brigade) that he considered it important to clear Gaba Tepe and disable any guns upon it. MacLagan assigned to the first two companies of his right battalion - the 9th - the duty of swinging to the right immediately after landing, and rushing the battery on the neck of Gaba Tepe." (Volume I p. 226) 

 

In other words, in planning the operation, leaving Gaba Tepe and its guns intact would make 3rd Brigade's mission almost impossible. Bean is surely reporting on what Anzac commanders were thinking and planning before they landed, don't you think? 

[Eceabat]

"Had the terrain of key importance been taken and held then, even if the two companies of 9th Battalion had not performed the right flank guard role adequately, the defenders of Gaba Tepe would have been under observation and directed naval gunfire support."

 

There is the point that the Gabatepe position was under observation from the northern end of Second Ridge, which provides a clear view of the headland, as good or better than that available from Third. Despite being under observation, the directed naval gunfire was not able to prevent the Ottomans from using Gabatepe as an observation point to in turn direct artillery fire from the batteries to the east and south into the Anzac position. 

 

Perhaps the greatest contribution to the Ottoman defence on the first day and subsequently was not the fire that could be brought on the Anzac positions from Gabatepe itself but its worth as an observation point looking into the Anzac right flank and rear. 

[Robert Dunlop]

It is correct that Gaba Tepe was a significant observation point once the positions had consolidated. The key difference on April 25th is the paucity of artillery to direct onto ANZAC positions. Had Sari Bair been occupied then the Ottoman artillery would have had to take up different locations to avoid being spotted, irrespective of whether there were observers at Gaba Tepe. Just to reiterate, the Ottoman response on April 25th/26th was to protect the terrain of key importance at all costs, not protect Gapa Tepe at all costs.

 

Robert

[verygoodboy]

Bill,

Whose quote is that, in your last post?

[Eceabat]

The quote came from one of Robert's earlier postings. 

 

By no means was I suggesting that one of the Ottoman missions was to protect Gabatepe at all costs. However the failure to capture Gabatepe as foreseen in the original landing plans meant that the observers on the headland were on April 25, as well as subsequently, able to help in the efforts to protect the terrain of key importance at all costs. Fire was directed from Gabatepe from first to last. Even if parts of the Sari Bair ridge line been occupied - and held - Gabatepe would still have provided a more than handy vantage point from which to direct artillery, wherever it was sited. 

[Robert Dunlop]

I had not interpreted your comments to mean that Gaba Tepe was to be protected at all costs. The phrase was mine, designed to reinforce how much more important Sari Bair was. It is not that Gaba Tepe was completely unimportant. British and Dominion forces devoted significant naval gunfire support to suppressing the guns on that flank during campaign from 5/6 to 10 August for example. My comments are directed at the notion that, on 25th April 1915, Ottoman occupation of Gaba Tepe would have prevented occupation of Third Ridge. The failure to take Third Ridge and Sari Bair were not, IMHO, due to flanking fire from Gaba Tepe.

 

Robert

Edited 7 July , 2020 by Robert Dunlop

[verygoodboy]

Thank you Bill, Robert, I think I have a much clearer grasp of the strategic importance and role that Gaba Tepe and its guns had on the Anzac mission. In the final analysis, 3rd Brigade's failure to eliminate this threat on its right and rear, made its mission 'almost impossible' but not totally.