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Remembered Today:

Gaba Tepe trenches/gun-pits


michaeldr

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I respectfully disagree. The overall mission failed because Sari Bair and Third Ridge were not taken in an aggressive push. It appears to have been a fear of a large body of troops moving up from the right flank that paralysed the earliest command decisions, not Gaba Tepe per se (though Gaba Tepe was part of the threat). At least one Ottoman regiment could have approached the landing force from that direction but it did not - it moved to occupy Third Ridge in support of the regiment that focused on Sari Bair. The primary role of Gaba Tepe on 25th April was to cover landings on Brighton Beach. This role was further emphasised by the positioning of Captain Sedik's mountain gun battery, which covered Brighton Beach from the northern flank. The latter artillery threat was neutralised by poor situational awareness and decision-making by Captain Sedik, who was in a much better position to neutralise the ANZAC landings. His battery was quickly neutralised in turn by the Australians when he failed to re-position it. The other major artillery threats, such as they were on April 25th, took up positions on the high ground overlooking Second Ridge; they were not sent to Gaba Tepe. Similarly the machine guns once they started to arrive. 

 

Once the overall mission failed, it is then possible to look back and say that 3rd Brigade's failure to eliminate Gaba Tepe made its mission 'almost impossible'. But that is a retrospective view IMHO.

 

Robert

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I would never suggest that the Allied landing at Ariburnu failed because of the failure to capture Gabatepe, my point is that retention of the headland did serve not only as part of the threat but as also as a contributing factor - one of many - in the Allied failure that day.

 

While the Ottoman artillery was not sent to Gabatepe on 25 April or subsequently, it did utilise observation from that position, again making Gabatepe part of the solution. At least some of the artillery that came into action that day was sited to the south of the beach head, not to its east facing Second Ridge, with a number of 9th Division's batteries initially camped inland from where the Kum Hotel is now located, some six kilometres from the Ariburnu position. 

 

The initial Ottoman reserves that arrived on the battlefield were the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 27th Regiment, whose 2nd Battalion had picketed the coastal areas in the sector, deploying around Third Ridge before 8:00 am, then moving into contact along the central part of Second Ridge. It was not until some time later that the next wave of reserves, the 57th Regiment of Kemal's 19th Division, began arriving on the battlefield, some close to Chunuk Bair and other elements further south, shutting the door to the planned Allied advance further up the Sari Bair hill range. 

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Yes, I agree that the perceived threat from Gaba Tepe, and the 'south' more generally, was an important contributor to the failure to advance up Sari Bair and to occupy Third Ridge as soon as possible after the landings in the early hours of the morning. The role of Gaba Tepe grew in significance as the campaign developed, though in the context that Sari Bair was controlled by the Ottomans as well. As noted before, significant naval gunfire support was directed on the area in the build-up to and execution of the Battles of Lone Pine and Sari Bair for example. This reinforces your point about the value of retaining Gaba Tepe. It is interesting to note that some authors attribute the Ottoman focus on counter-attacking Lone Pine, to the relative exclusion of countering the threat to Sari Bair more fully, to a concern about an Allied landing on Brighton Beach and attack on Gaba Tepe.

 

On the morning of the 25th April, however, the delays in attempting to occupy Sari Bair and Third Ridge were not due to enfilade fire from Gaba Tepe or to artillery fire directed by observers there. 

 

Robert

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"On the morning of the 25th April, however, the delays in attempting to occupy Sari Bair and Third Ridge were not due to enfilade fire from Gaba Tepe or to artillery fire directed by observers there."

 

I totally agree.

 

So many factors contributed to the failure to attain the high ground, confusion on the part of the Allies; shortcomings in command and control and the swift; and well organised response from the defenders, especially Sefik Aker, commander of the 27th Regiment who fixed Allied attention on the northern end of the position, turning Sinclair MacLagen's fears of an attack on his right flank into a self fulfilling prophecy, being among them.

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