German flame thrower attacks

[MBrockway]

As promised in the last post, here from the 8th Canadian Infantry War Diary is the 8th CIB's Operational Report for the 01-04 Jun 1917 German attack on Mount Sorrel and the Zillebeke Sector, which fighting Bob has claimed is not mentioned in the Canadian War Diary ...

 

 

Bob is correct though that there is no mention of Flammenwerfer.  Accurate reports from the Canadian front line garrison did not reach Battalion and Brigade HQ, where the total losses of complete posts and the loss of a good section of front line is put down primarily to the most intensive artillery and trench mortar barrage these men had seen up to that point.  Presumably the trenches were actually captured by the German Pioniere including the FW troops as Bob describes, but this was not known up the command chain further back.

 

 

 

[MBrockway]

9 hours ago, bob lembke said:

I am going to refer to an action involving the Canadians in June 1916, where I studied the various Allied war diaries in great detail.

I would think that the Canadian forces in 1916 were closely allied and modeled after the British Army, similar procedures, record

keeping, largely same culture and ethnic stock. I have picked this, again, because of my study of I think all of the relevant war diaries.

 

 

Bob,

I agree with you that record keeping practices in the Canadian Expeditionary Force were "closely allied and modelled after the British Army, similar procedures, record keeping" etc.

 

We have demonstrated that the records in the Canadian war diaries for the specific action you have picked as a test case are in fact detailed and extensive and that you are wrong when you assert that the fighting and losses, both of ground and of men, are either completely omitted or glossed over in the records for this 02 Jun 1916 action.

 

By extension, you can take it likely that Allied records for many of the other actions you have cited are more detailed than you have realised.

 

I am 100% respectful of your knowledge of the German sources with which you have given me personally and others here on the Forum very great help, but would you concede that perhaps your engagement with the Allied sources, particularly the Allied war diaries, does not appear to have reached the same depth of familiarity as your work with the German sources?

 

My personal experience has been that generally ALL modern armies keep roughly the same type and quantity of documentary records.  When I fail to find documentation in a source with which I am not familiar, my usual position as a scholar is not that such documentation does not exist, but rather I have so far failed to find it.

 

I rather suspect each of the examples of Actions with deficient Allied records you have given higher up could be demolished as effectively by those who are specialised in the records for those Actions as I have just done for the 06 Jun 1916 Canadian action you chose as the main evidence for your perceived phenomenon.

 

Certainly ten years ago, digital access to these sources was non-existent.  Even digital access to catalogues where presence of the material could be identified was very limited.  It is very understandable therefore that your earlier work could have missed the depth of the Allied source material.

 

My perception is that Allied records of German attacks that successfully overran and captured Allied positions are necessarily thin on detail.  The soldiers who could have given the detail were either dead or captured and communications with the front line would have usually broken down.  When information did flow back from the front line, that was usually a good indication that enemy action had not successfully overrun the front line!

 

Where a German attack or a larger German offensive was successful, inevitably the information in the Allied records about exactly what had happened in the front line areas is often confused, contradictory and short on detail.  The classic Fog of Battle phenomenon.  Look at the British war diaries for the Kaiserschlacht or the Cambrai German counter-attack for example.

 

Conversely when the Germans were on the back foot under successful British offensive action, I suspect the German equivalents of war diaries also break down in a very similar way.  I have certainly observed that from Jack Sheldon's excellent books on the German Army using German sources.

 

What I think we need to do is abandon our preconceptions about each side's military records and supply each other the info from the records we each understand well.  In my case those of the Allies, in your case those from the German sources and your father.

 

The two perspectives combined will give a much more accurate picture of what actually happened, though historiography teaches us we can never 100% know what that was.

 

A good example of this is the tank destroyed by Flammenwerfer near Herenthage Chateau (your Castle Park Herenthage and Inverness Copse in the British accounts) in the actions of 22-24 Aug 1917 that we have discussed a few times.  Your German sources describe how 12th FW Company knocked out a tank using Flammenwerfer on 24 Aug, but the British sources make it clear that the tank was B11, 2771, “Bison”, but that it was ditched and abandoned on 22 Aug.  British sources then state it was set on fire by German artillery on 24 Aug. 

 

Putting the two sides' accounts together helps us realise that what in fact is likely to have happened was tank 2771 was abandoned by its crew on 22 Aug, but then the empty tank was incorporated as a useful strong point by the infantry of 10/DLI on 23/24 Aug.  They may even perhaps have managed to get its machine guns back into action.  12th FW Coy and No 6 Sturm Battalion encountered the tank, now manned by some infantry from 10/DLI and being used by them as a static, fixed defensive position, during the dawn attack on 24 Aug and neutralised it with a flamethrower.  British sources further away reported the abandoned tank as set on fire by the German artillery barrage, which was happening at the same time.  Presumably if any of the 10/DLI were still at the tank when the FW attack went in, they were killed and unable to correct this, and if they successfully fell back, would have had little interest in reporting the fate of an already abandoned tank hulk.

 

Putting the two sides accounts together reveals that the tank kill claimed by 12th FW Coy was a tank already out of action for at least 36 hours and, perhaps more useful for Terry's research going forward, that German Flammenwerfer attacks were misreported in the British accounts as fires caused by German artillery - the Canadian 02 Jun 1916 reports I posted above do not mention FW, which you have made clear were definitely in action, but do make extensive reports of very effective German artillery and trench mortar work.

 

Mark

 

 

Edited 3 April , 2017 by MBrockway

[bob lembke]

3 hours ago, MBrockway said:

 

As this assertion about losses being routinely left out of British and Commonwealth war diaries is so completely contrary to my own experiences reading those same war diaries, I thought it worthwhile checking the war diary of 4th Canadian Mounted Rifles for 02 Jun 1916.

 

    Note: Here MBrockway put several pages of fascimile war diaries:

 

Judge for yourselves, but it seems to me that in contrast to Bob's assertion, there seems to be a great deal of information about both the fighting and the heavy losses sustained by the battalion.

 

The only claim that seems to be accurate is that Flammenwerfer are not mentioned.

 

Bob - are these the sources on which you have built your thesis about the Allied war diaries?

 

Mark

 

Mark;

 

I did the work and inspection of Canadian war diaries in 2005. I am working from sketchy notes that I put down at that time

and brief entries into spreadsheets listing engagements, one listing the about 53 FW engagements in the "Successes" 

spreadsheet, a second "Engagements" spreadsheet listing about 300 FW attacks that I have significant information

about. The latter I forgot about years ago and just rediscovered yesterday.

 

A word of explanation. I am losing the use of my legs due to two distinct neurological problems. My wife and I live in a four

story house built in 1860, to house 11 black servants who worked in a nearby "great house". Two of the three staircases

are narrow winding staircases built in 1860 for these servants, without railings or other conveniences. The master BR is

on the third floor, the kitchen in the finished basement. I can no longer walk up or down the stairs, but must pull myself up

and down with my arms, which fortunately are quite strong. But my brain no longer communicates much with my feet.

 

So about four years ago I suspended my Great War studies and renovated a six unit building that I own that I was niglecting.

(One unit was occupied for six years by a cat, who was hardly paying his fair share of the rent.) By building five gorgeous

kitchens myself (with a helper), and renovating a sixth and several bathrooms, I have tripled my net income, and in a few months

I will have quadrupled it. Not bad for deciding to increase your income in the your mid-70's. I still do construction work most 

days, but I have to usually work from a chair, and if I lie on the floor to do low work I need a helper to get back up.

 

But now I have the income to buy a house with an elevator in Center City Philadelphia, which by necessity will cost in the very

low seven figures.

 

Now I am back at my Great War studies, and now have started grinding out two or three books. So I have lost touch with a lot

of my work. The material on the attack on the Canadian 8th Brigade was done in 2005. I do not know what form the war diaries

were in, digital, if they were the handwritten versions or the typed, or some other form. You can see that above I cited the exact 

ration strength and casualties, to the man, for the Canadian 1st and 4th Mounted Rifle Battalions.

 

Of course I miss-spoke, saying that the diaries did not mention fighting. It was a nonsensical assertion, when I stated that one

battalion lost 21 of 22 officers, the other 19 of 21 officers. (Is that right? again, from memory.), there clearly was fighting of

remarkable intensity. What my comment might have mentioned was that there was no mention of FW fighting.

 

However, these war diaries still are curious. The attack included 20 Klief, which were a bit larger than the Wex, which was about

to be adopted, and the Klief I think had a bit more oil capacity and range. At any rate, either projected a stream of flame, burning oil, 

and especially dense black smoke about 90 foot in length, spreading out at the end to about 15 foot by 15 foot, plus additional 

billowing dense black smoke. (Five different flame oils were used. A cheaper one for training, a special low-smoke oil for tactical 

situations where lower visabilty was desirable, a blend for even more and denser smoke, etc.)

 

So, a typical Klief or Wex flame/smoke stream, the coherent body alone, had a volume of about 10,000 cubic feet of smoke, flame,

and flaming dark splattering oil. Each Klief team had one projector nozzle and hose and associated plumbing, but two sets of flame

oil and compressed nitrogen tanks. When one set of tanks were exhausted, the second could be attached in seconds with quick-

connection couplings. So in this attack we must assume that about forty streams of flaming oil, smoke, and flame, each of 10,000

cubic foot in the body, plus additional swirling black smoke, were generated by the FWs, each lasting about 90 seconds.

It was also possible to turn the flame projection on and off a few times, and the nozzle operator carried a supply of igniter devices

that could be swapped out when each burned out, so the visible display would be prolonged.

 

The text of the diary has several mentions of the Germans bringing up machine guns, or starting to employ trench mortars. How

could the various observers report these deployments, but not mention dozens of these extraordinary displays on the battlefield?

I am not suggesting anything, a specific causality, but just that it is very odd. The war diary entries seemingly describe the two

battalions and their positions as being almost utterly destroyed, but clearly about half of the two battalions were captured, not

killed, as the diary entries imply. Probably the high number of captured was not apparent at the time.

 

But clearly what I stated was incorrect, and 12 years on I cannot tell why I made that notation, which is inconsistent with the

rest of the material, which clearly indicated considerable fighting. 

 

Anyone know of UK troops being present at Kemmelberg? There was mention of British trench mortars firing in support of the

French troops, which would suggest that there might have been British infantry about. For light infantry to charge fixed positions

uphill, and in one hour and ten minutes to capture 8200 POWs, 233 MGs, and 53 cannon suggests an impressive shock effect, 

which an estimated 132 light FWs would certainly provide. The loss of 15 flame troopers indicate extensive flame assault. Clearly

the French defense suffered a dramatic collapse, which was sometimes caused by a large FW attack. 

  

 

[MBrockway]

17 hours ago, bob lembke said:

I have another engagement, a German attack at Kemmelberg, also in Flanders. The defenders were mostly French, but I know that at least

some UK troops were there. Elite Bavarian mountain troops attacked uphill, with four companies of FW (for once I don't have a number, but

it could have been 132 light FW). The battle lasted from 6 AM to 7:10 AM, and 8200 POWs were taken, 233 MGs and 53 cannon were taken,

and the best observation point in Flanders was captured. Clearly, substantial forces of other arms were employed, but approximately 132 FW,

and the loss of 15 FW Pioniere, indicate a large FW role in the fighting. Substantial territory and prisoners taken in a literal uphill battle very 

quickly is characteristic of a large FW role, the shock of a large FW presence not only stuns the defenders, but is a great morale support for

the attacking troops. (This is a major factor in the value of FW leading an attack, which I have not even mentioned, but could probably write

50 pages on from memory.) I can mention major examples of this effect.

 

5 hours ago, bob lembke said:

Anyone know of UK troops being present at Kemmelberg? There was mention of British trench mortars firing in support of the

French troops, which would suggest that there might have been British infantry about. For light infantry to charge fixed positions

uphill, and in one hour and ten minutes to capture 8200 POWs, 233 MGs, and 53 cannon suggests an impressive shock effect, 

which an estimated 132 light FWs would certainly provide. The loss of 15 flame troopers indicate extensive flame assault. Clearly

the French defense suffered a dramatic collapse, which was sometimes caused by a large FW attack. 

 

 

An idea of the date for this Kemmelberg action would really help us answer that Bob.  Even an approximation would save us considerable legwork

[bob lembke]

Oh, sorry of me. I think I had mentioned the date in the earlier post, but should have mentioned it again. 

 

The attack was on April 25, 1918. It was by no means solely a FW attack, it utilized 250 batteries and 96 straffing aircraft. But about 132 light FW was quite an effort, probably one of the three largest FW attacks in the war. 

[bob lembke]

As I think more about it, I am further puzzled by no mention of FW in the extremely detailed Canadian war diaries and

event documentation. As I have said, the FW Pioniere had a variety of tricks to give themselves the few seconds to

be able to sprint within range of the first line trenches. A major one was to fire several streams of fire and smoke diagonally

across the battlefield, creating walls of fire and especially dense black smoke across the battlefield, behind which other

FW teams would sprint forward and fire their weapons into the trench. Once several teams were within range of the front line, 

the defenders, at least to the front, would usually break. I have read account after account of FW teams advancing over 

terrain littered with various articles of burning enemy clothing, torn off by defenders no longer defending, but locomoting 

rapidly to the rear.

 

Sometimes a FW attack would be set up by troops digging saps forward say 10 or more yards toward the enemy, sometimes

open saps, sometimes roofed (Russian?) saps, at the end of which large FW would be assembled, consisting of perhaps three

large tanks of fuel oil, one or more tanks of nitrogen propellant, and a hose say  25-30' long to the nozzle device. At the right

moment operators sprung out of their sap ends and ran forward, within seconds firing the larger device, sending a larger stream

of smoke and fire, maybe 120' long and 20' in diameter at the end. These would usually be fired diagonally, erecting a barrier

of about 20,000 cubic foot in diameter (vs the roughly 10,000 cu ft of the Klief or Wax).

 

If the attack was not to include the use of large FW, a similar tactic would usually be employed by the first light FW teams, firing

diagonally to provide cover for other FW teams, plus the grenadiers, light MG teams, and sometimes 40 lb trench mortar teams

of the FW companies. No one had rifles, possibly a few carbines; one reason my father killed his company commander was

because he wanted the men to carry bayonetted rifles, and insisted in providing rifles and enforcing bayonet drill.

 

Given the above, how can the Canadian war diaries describe the Germans bringing up MGs, and not notice streams of smoke

and fire with a volume of 10,000 cubic feet extending across the battlefield? Not worth mentioning? The diaries report the front

defenders and defenses being utterly destroyed by artillery fire, but the Germans took about 600 POWs, half unwounded.

(German combat reports almost always made a distinction between the two.)  Perhaps the stubborn Canadians held their

positions till they were forced to surrender, rather than running as the sensible and light-footed French. 

Edited 3 April , 2017 by bob lembke

[MBrockway]

Bob,

The Canadian reports make it clear that visibility forward was very poor with the front line lost in a cloud of dust and smoke, which the Canadians state was caused by the intense and concentrated artillery barrage.

 

This effectively screened the front lines from the rear areas.

 

Flammenwerfers would only make this worse, but since the FW troops were the other side of the German barrage's smoke/dust cloud, the Canadians further back may not have been able to differentiate the flames from the FW from the exploding HE of the barrage.  You yourself have described how the Stosstruppen made tactical use of the FW to lay down smoke screening for the bombers & other assault troops.

 

Machine guns coming into use on the other hand would be audible and there's a good chance some of the MG fire would have been indirect barrage fire against the Support and Reserve trenches and the inter-connecting communications trenches.  With the rat-tat-tat audible and shot falling nearby, it is not surprising the Canadians mention the MG, but it does not mean they saw them..

 

I rather suspect the trench mortars were probably also detected by their distinctive sound rather than the Canadians visually spotting German TMB's being pushed forward.  The front line troops were very familiar with the sounds of artillery and had an extensive vocabulary to distinguish them - Jack Johnsons, coalboxes, whizzbangs, minnies etc.

 

It helps if one imagines oneself standing in the Canadian Support area and thinks what would be perceivable in the few hundred yards ahead in a battle situation, rather than assume the records omit certain things because of some sort of conspirancy against mentioning German FW successes.

 

Mark

 

[MBrockway]

51 minutes ago, bob lembke said:

The diaries report the front defenders and defenses being utterly destroyed by artillery fire, but the Germans took about 600 POWs, half unwounded.

(German combat reports almost always made a distinction between the two.) 

 

I've already posted the following from the Canadian war diary (see top right corner) that makes it clear the Canadians estimated men captured were ~600 and that the Canadian war diaries also differentiated between captured wounded and unwounded.

 

I don't really get your point here.

 

20 hours ago, MBrockway said:

Likewise the relevant Brigade war diary - that of the 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade - is very open about the heavy losses, containing this Communication from the divisional commander (OC 3rd Canadian Infantry Division)  ...

 

For the whole division that's total casualties of 2,573, of which an estimated ~600 were POWs (wounded & unwounded) leaving ~2,000 killed, wounded and missing.

 

For 4/CMR, this Divisional CO's communication in the 8th brigade war diary is completely open about the fact that there were only 23 OR's and 1 officer untouched after the 02 Jun 1916 action.

 

Again, this does not seem to support Bob's assertion that the Allied war diaries were inaccurate.

 

 

 

[bob lembke]

Your observations are sound. 

 

Sometimes, briefly a FW was fired straight up, which must have been spectacular. This was sometimes used for signaling. 

 

I I just found a book I had forgotten about, a recent history of the Alpinkorps, the alpine division that attacked at Kemmelberg. I skimmed the entry for 4/25/18, and many descriptions of FW in the storm. Among the many POWs were "a French and An English regimental commander". Of course the description of the English CO is literally incorrect. Also mentioned is the capture of an "English concrete barracks". So the captured terrain must have been at the junction of the French and UK lines. 

 

So so that must have been the largest FW attack to ever have hit UK forces. I do not know the UK units involved. 

[bob lembke]

I wrote the above outside in daylight, and didn't see half of which was in front 

of me. 

 

At the beginning of this I remarked that, in 2005, I looked at UK war diaries, and found them not a good source for describing FW attacks, perhaps because in a large successful FW there might not be witnesses to what happened. For example the attack at Caillete Wood, where two FW companies inhaled a French brigade, and the two regimental and one brigade HQs got out a total of one sentence of phone warning, leaving French command clueless and suspecting treachery and perhaps mass desertion. 

 

I I have no idea what war diaries were available then, how I got to see it (not at Kew). But the Canadian example to some degree proves my point. They suffered a major attack, two battalions were almost utterly destroyed, and the extensive war diary entries, which are commendable, does not mention that they bore a major but not stupendous FW attack. I guess everyone in the front lines was lost or captured. I also am surprised that the dense black smoke and streaks of flame were mistaken for the dust and dirt thrown up by impacting shells. But of course the barrage had probably been walked further on as the attack progressed, and the fire streams and darker smoke could not be made out. 

 

So I think that you can see why l found them only helpful to a point. 

 

 

[28juni14]

Herr. Lembke,

Forgive this message for being "off-topic".  I wanted to call your attention to a response I recently made to your earlier inquiry on the Zeebrügge topic.  I believe you will find my response was the last post.

MFG

28juni14

[MBrockway]

It is certainly very inconvenient when the evidence fails to support a thesis!

[MBrockway]

2 hours ago, bob lembke said:

Your observations are sound. 

 

Sometimes, briefly a FW was fired straight up, which must have been spectacular. This was sometimes used for signaling. 

 

I I just found a book I had forgotten about, a recent history of the Alpinkorps, the alpine division that attacked at Kemmelberg. I skimmed the entry for 4/25/18, and many descriptions of FW in the storm. Among the many POWs were "a French and An English regimental commander". Of course the description of the English CO is literally incorrect. Also mentioned is the capture of an "English concrete barracks". So the captured terrain must have been at the junction of the French and UK lines. 

 

So so that must have been the largest FW attack to ever have hit UK forces. I do not know the UK units involved. 

 

19/Lancashire Fusiliers, a pioneer battalion, were digging a communication trench towards the west side of Mount Kemmel (= Kemmelberg) when the the German attack went in on the E side on 25 Apr 1918.

 

The German troops reached them after an hour or so and they took heavy losses.  The German worked around both flanks until they were surrounded.  The Battalion commander, Lt.-Col. J. Ambrose Smith, was wounded and missing presumed captured.   Losses were approximately 350-400 killed, wounded and missing.

 

The regimental history mentions tear and mustard gas shells and a powerful infantry assault ... but no flamethrowers I'm afraid.  There may be more in the 19/LR battalion war diary, but another Pal will need to check that.

 

The bulk of the German attack fell on the French forces who had recently taken over Mount Kemmel to allow the British some relief after the initial phase of Operation Georgette.

 

I think a Royal Engineers company may have also been involved, but I'm still checking that.

 

Mark

 

 

 

 

 

[MBrockway]

The Official History Operation Georgette map for 25 Apr 1918 shows 456th Field Company, Royal Engineers in the Mount Kemmel (=Kemmelberg) area, but I don't have Ancestry access.

 

Unlike 19/LR, they do survive to appear a little further back on 26 Apr 1918, so they may have avoided the FW steamroller.

[bob lembke]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Incidentally, one of the officers probably fighting at Mount Kemmel was a (probable) Hauptmann Erwin Rommel.  A few months before, he 

led his battalion of three companies at the Battle of Caparetto, and his unit captured about 10,000 extremely badly motivated Italian troops 

and 82 cannon. For many years I thought that my father was in that battle, as he told me anecdotes from it, and my father's Flammenwerfer=

Kompagnie was at the battle, but checking his documents, my father was again in hospital due to a bad wound from Verdun that spit bone

for over 10 years. (Yes, I do have a piece of my father's left upper arm bone. The ultimate war souvenier.). His couple of anecdotes did not

specifically place him there, and he must have heard them from his comrades who were there. The Italians collapsed so quickly that they

did not have time to set up FW attacks.

 

I will go thru the book with the lengthy description of the Mount Kemmel engagement and see where it placed the FW there. Just rapidly

skimming the lengthy section on the engagement I noticed a good number of mentions of FW being used in the attack, and others

mentioning "fire", which could have been rifle fire or FW fire. (I was skimming too quickly to figure it out.). 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[AOK4]

Erwin Rommel was not at Kemmel. He was at that point a staff officer in Generalkommando zbV 64 which was stationed in Alasace (BTW the Württembergische Gebirgsbataillon didn't belong to the Alpenkorps during the Kemmel attack).

 

The British were only partly involved at Kemmel (with the right wing of the 9th Division (reinforced by two brigades from other divisions). The French saved the day once again for the British and had plugged the gaps in front of Ypres.

 

I was quite amazed about the alleged use of 132 flammenwerfer at Kemmel and could find no proof in the regimental histories. Infanterie-Leib-Regiment mentions they had 2 Züge of each 4 flammenwerfer at their disposal (1 Zug per attacking battalion). If we assume that each of the three divisions at the center of the attack would be similarly equiped, we could have at most 36 flammenwerfer. I could find no reference of flammenwerfer in the regimental histories of the 56. infanteriedivision that was more attacking the 9th (British) Division.

 

The French reference work about the battle "La Bataille des Flandres" by Tournès and Berthemet (which used the original German 4th Army documents which were captured by the French late 1918) unfortunately doesn't mention exact ORBATs and I couldn't immediately find reference to flammenwerfer either.

 

Jan

[bob lembke]

I will respond briefly, I am in bed at 2 AM. 

 

Yes, of course Rommel was in (CO) of the Wuerttenburg alpine battalion, not in the Alpinkorps, which was entirelyvBavarian, I think. I was very struck with his action at Csparetto. 

 

As as I have said above, I do not have an exact figure for the FW there; Major Reddemann in his history almost always said how many FW were employed, but for Kemmel he stated in his cryptic style that he dispatched four companies. A G=R=P=R company could field about 32 Wexes. I have never read of the flame regiment dispatching part of one company and part of another to the same engagement. So I guessed at 132. 

 

Reddemann, in a book of about 100 pages, managed in one way or another to mention hundreds of flame attacks, analyze them statistically several ways, and twice mention the full name and rank of each flame trooper who fell, about 800. So each engagement is usually described in a brief sentence or two. 

 

However, in 1918, as it went on, things with FW started to be done in fresh ways, culminating with the desperate distribution of FW equipment to a variety of units late in the war. So possibly he sent parts of four companies. In the Kaiserschlacht a month before the regiment was broken up into platoons to be distributed one each to many infantry regiments, perhaps they had not managed to assemble coherent companies. But he said "four companies". (I will check that. The long description of the Kemmel fight in the (recent) history of the Alpine Corps had many mentions of flame assaults in the battle. 

 

I I think we have a phenomenon going on here. Remember the parable of the Blind Men and the Elephant? That phenomenon has been going on thruout, under the surface, this entire thread. But I will try to sleep and develop the idea further. 

 

To return, sort of, to poor Terry's original concept for this thread, has any one ever found a UK war diary that actually describes a successful FW against itself. I would guess that there were about 150 FW attacks against UK units? Reddemann, who had to write a separate report for each FW attack, and scored them, even if only a Trupp with two Kliefs or Wexes, probably gave them about an average 80-85% successful score. Uniquely, at the Somme, where the rule against using FW in the defense was paused, the end result of the defensive actions was often or usuallyvfailure, when the oil ran out. So overall the success score against UK troops might have been lower than other forces. I think there were 50-60 FW actions at the Somme. (My father wrote his father that he was happy remaining at Stenay-sur-Meuse, when the other FW companies were streaming north to the Somme. Despite being wounded twice in that relatively quiet zone, compared to the Somme. 

 

So so much for writing a little. I will write more, about an elephant, when i am actually awake. 

 

Jan, thanks again for your expert, scholarly input, despite my embarrassment. 

[MBrockway]

What's the title of Reddemann's book?

 

Is it this one ...

Bernhard Reddemann: Geschichte der deutschen Flammenwerfer-Truppe. Felgentreff. Berlin-Schöneberg ca. 1933

Edited 4 April , 2017 by MBrockway

[bob lembke]

Why am I awake?

 

Yes, without looking in either my paper or computer card files, that's it. I have been doing this so long I had almost forgotten.

I cite it as "History, op. cit."

 

Certainly wish he wrote more. He must have still had copies of his individual reports on all 653 FW attacks in the war that he had to present monthly to the High Command. Published or available, that would be a trove. 

 

In in addition to commanding a large and complex regiment of about 15 companies and workshops (made many of their own weapons in France, using local materials,

to argue that they were not too big a drain on the war economy and German resources), Reddemann, I understand, edited two scientific journals thruout the war. Also a Doctor Juris. Started developing FW in 1907, Feidler, the other more techy designer, started in 1902 and was taking out patents about 1905-6. 

[MBrockway]

A digital copy if Bernhard Reddemann's Geschichte der deutschen Flammenwerfer-Truppe is available here:

Bernhard Reddemann: Geschichte der deutschen Flammenwerfer-Truppe

 

 ... but frustratingly, only the first 14 pages

 

Here at least is the Contents page ...

 

From the descriptions of its detailed analyses of the 650 or so FW attacks by these units, I was expecting a very large volume and was quite surprised to see it only has 50 odd pages.  That includes a Roll of Honour, which must take 5-10 of those.

 

Does anyone have this book and could they comment on the research value of Reddemann's tables that Bob has described?

 

Does anyone know of a full digital copy anywhere?

 

I tried the Bod catalogue, but it's offline just now.

 

Mark

 

[bob lembke]

1 hour ago, MBrockway said:

A digital copy if Bernhard Reddemann's Geschichte der deutschen Flammenwerfer-Truppe is available here:

Bernhard Reddemann: Geschichte der deutschen Flammenwerfer-Truppe

 

 ... but frustratingly, only the first 14 pages

 

Here at least is the Contents page ...

 

From the descriptions of its detailed analyses of the 650 or so FW attacks by these units, I was expecting a very large volume and was quite surprised to see it only has 50 odd pages.  That includes a Roll of Honour, which must take 5-10 of those.

 

Does anyone have this book and could they comment on the research value of Reddemann's tables that Bob has described?

 

Does anyone know of a full digital copy anywhere?

 

I tried the Bod catalogue, but it's offline just now.

 

Mark

 

 

I had transcribed the informational content of the volume into my 597 page

time line on the regiment, organized several ways that work better for me

than the book's organization, which is why for a moment I did not even recall

the title, and thought the little volume is about 100 pages. (I believe that Reddemann wrote it for a reunion in the early 1933s, and I have a picture 

of him entering the hall in company with Crown Prince Wilhelm, whose skull and crossbones personal insignia was worn by every man. (I recently had beer and pizza with Prince Fritz, the Crown Prince's grandson, and I told him same stories about when the CP, and occasionally the Kaiser as well, visited the company barracks and inspected and chatted with the men.  Fritz showed his princely background by seeming to prefer good conjac to beer.)

 

So I have't used and probably even touched the actual volume for about ten years. When I can safely make

it I will repair to my traditional card catalog and see the form and source that 

I worked with. Of course that was before. I might have a zerox. I have ordered xeroxes of several entire rare books from the National Library in Leipzig; which they do reasonably; the British Library (I still carry my BL card) refuses to copy more than 10% of a given volume. 

 

I can't recall a single table in the History. Reddemann calculated many statistics, but they were generally scattered in text, like: "the regiment conducted 64 flame attacks at Verdun between February 21, 1916 and the end of the year, and 84%

of them were successful." I have fleshed out the timeline with data from many other sources; for example my partial index or roll of the men of the regiment covers over 100 pages and I think lists about 1100 men, most of whom got there

by getting killed. So my roll of (then) living and dead troopers is twice as long as Reddemann's entire book. Of course I flesh it out with more detail when I come across a mention of a given man carrying out another action before my initial entry of the date and circumstances of his death, for example. 

[bob lembke]

Well, I looked in WorldCat, and it listed three copies in the world's libraries, paper and digital. All three in Germany.

The National Library in Leipzig (my favorite German library; was best for WW I material); the City Library of Berlin,

which also houses the collections of the Prussian Cultural Foundation: and the Bavarian Library in Munich. There

was a little trace of info that suggested that there might be a fourth copy somewhere, but mis-cataloged.

 

So, before I venture downstairs (a project), I am guessing that I got Leipzig to copy the book for me about 2003.

 

WorldCat includes digital editions. I recently researched the two biographies of a very distant relative, the first

Ceylonese Governor-General of Ceylon, Sir Oliver (he had four knighthoods), the husband of my cousin Lady

Phyllis, and WorldCat listed about 25 and 35 paper copies, and one and two digital editions. The rarer of these

two books was one written and printed in Ceylon by a family member. So if these obscure books are found 

in quantities of 25 and 35, with one and two digital editions, Reddemann's book is rare. I will try to trace down 

that possible fourth copy.

 

Probably the largest holder of digital books is the Hathi Trust, based at a US university, which must control

millions of them (They have all three of the digital books I mentioned above.), but many of their digital books

are online in a "search only" mode. you can search about it, probably search within it, but you cannot read

the book. Possibly if you belong to some institution that has some sort of subscription you can read it. It may 

be some copy write issue.

[bob lembke]

I just looked into the link that Mark put up, and what it seems to be is that the University of Stuttgart has a digital 

edition, one might say, of what seems to be the copy of the book WorldCat identified as being in Munich, or

at least the first 14 pages, some of them blank. Probably because it is not a complete digital book, but more like

a digital library index card in the form of the first several pages of the book, WorldCat ignores this "digital book".

 

I think that the Reddemann book is still under US copy write, I do not know the law in the UK. That might be a factor;

why the digital copies of the books about my cousin seem to be "search only"..

Edited 4 April , 2017 by bob lembke

[MBrockway]

4 hours ago, bob lembke said:

Well, I looked in WorldCat, and it listed three copies in the world's libraries, paper and digital. All three in Germany.

The National Library in Leipzig (my favorite German library; was best for WW I material); the City Library of Berlin,

which also houses the collections of the Prussian Cultural Foundation: and the Bavarian Library in Munich. There

was a little trace of info that suggested that there might be a fourth copy somewhere, but mis-cataloged.

 

Probably the largest holder of digital books is the Hathi Trust, based at a US university, which must control

millions of them (They have all three of the digital books I mentioned above.), but many of their digital books

are online in a "search only" mode. you can search about it, probably search within it, but you cannot read

the book. Possibly if you belong to some institution that has some sort of subscription you can read it. It may 

be some copy write issue.

 

Bod's back up now and confirms the three copies Bob's mentioned, but there is also a copy in the British Library.  None in the Bod though.

 

I also checked the NAM and IWM libraries - no copies.

 

Hathi Trust is a sore point with us on this side of the pond - we cannot download from it due to US restrictions - even using various dark arts, I have not managed to download anything.  I even set up an academic guest account at Univ of Michigan and that wasn't good enough!

 

Very frustrating as most of the books we would want are British anyway and would be freely available were they digitised over here.

 

Mark

 

[bob lembke]

I was referring to my impression gained about 12 years ago based on whatever war diaries I obtained, I have no idea what they were, how I got them. Perhaps I misspoke, there is detailed recording of fighting, but the more I look at these records I am further struck by the absence of any mention of a serious FW attack, except after the first attack, which clearly upset the command. I can see why I dropped the use of the U.K. war diaries. However, after 12 years, I may have Mis-remembered why I dropped that effort, there was no mention of FW in describing an attack that took hundreds of prisoners.

 

 What Mark has been attributing to me is now beginning to form. The  British command attitude was curious in 1915 ("Just bend over and let the flame roll over you." - Except it was not flame, it was sticky, burning heavy oil. ), their management of their own FW effort was a mess, and then there was 15 years of information deception by both Foulkes and his US protégée the aptly named Colonel Fries after the war. I have sat in my wife's university's rare book room and read the original carbons of Fries lying memos to General Pershing.

 

If we can't find an instance of a sensible description of a FW attack it will be a curious phenomenon. I will look in the Alpine Corps book and see if some of the many FW attacks it describes were against the British positions. Perhaps I will soon find the incident I mentioned, where about 20 men with four light FW knocked out a manned tank, and then took a large blockhouse and about 75 ORs and officers and seven MGs, facilitating an infantry advance and probably saving dozens of lives.  Again you note no infantry with them. My father described how they usually didn't trust ordinary infantry. But in this action(s) there were no witnesses, every UK soldier they encountered was captured or killed. So no accurate war diary should be expected. 

 

Off to my books.