German flame thrower attacks

[Terry_Reeves]

Andy, thanks. I wonder if they will get a dose of No1 FP for their absence :-)

 

TR

Edited 16 March , 2017 by Terry_Reeves

[stiletto_33853]

Hi Terry,

 

Saw the posting about losing posts yesterday morning but FP No1 is in order, saved the images in case they went missing.

 

41st Inf Brigade diary appendices for Jan's attack night 25th/26th.

 

Andy

[bob lembke]

17 hours ago, Ellis1918 said:

Terry  I posted this earlier today but it seems to have been lost in the forum update.

 

14 Jul 1916 Bazentin Ridge - 8th Leics . Co Sjt Major Stafford reported they were met with heavy resistance and the enemy treated them severely with liquid fire , bombs and machine guns.

 

21 March 1918 Epehy - 7th Leics. The defence of Fir Support was conducted by 2 Lt Wright with about 20 men against numerous bombing attacks in one of which flame throwers were used but these were stopped on our own wire by rifle fire and the cylinders , catching light , the enemy were burnt with their own weapons.

 

From "The Tigers" Matthew Richardson and supported by War Diary entries. 

 

For 7/14/16, I only have two entries in my timeline, but both are for reported British flame attacks. An official history, written after the war, and therefore benefiting from Allied material, stated that two brigades of the Scottish 9th Division attacked at Longueval on the Somme, and that the attack was led by FW. I started a thread on this on the Forum in March 2006, and it generated a good response. 

 

The source was Schlachten des Weltkrieges, Band 21 (Battles of the World War, Volume 21), the above was on page 16. On page 21 there was mention that the 9th Brigade, 3rd Division attacked in five waves, just over 1km south of Gross=Bazentin, which is 2 km west of the other attack mentioned above. Reportedly this latter attack was with "many brought-forward MGs and flame throwers". 

 

I I have no report of a German flame attack on the 14th. At this time only G=R=P=R was using the FW as a weapon. On the Somme, in desperation, the Germans were using the FW as a defensive weapon, a very bad assignment; and I must say that from repeated reports that when the attacking forces finally overcame the flame weapon being used as a defensive weapon the exasperated attackers often killed the FW operators. 

 

In in his letters from Verdun my father described the many units streaming northward to the Somme, and expressed satisfaction at not making that trip himself. His flame company had made the most flame attacks at Verdun in the first half of the year, and probably for that reason was the only one left in the relative peace of Verdun for the second half of the year. 

 

For March 21, 1918 I have 10 pages of reports of flame actions, probably 80 or more likely 100 different reports, several might mention the same incident from different sources. 

 

For Epehy: I went through the dozens and dozens of entries for 3/21/18, and no mention of a place-name "Epehy". One platoon of FW was assigned to one regiment of infantry in the assault, so there were dozens of flame attacks on that day. 

[MBrockway]

11 hours ago, stiletto_33853 said:

43rd Infantry Brigade appendices for the attack on 24th August 1917, as it went missing thought you might like it back.

 

Andy

 

And here's my addition that I also saved ...

 

Men captured from the German counter-attack against 43 Bde at dawn on the 24 Aug 1917 were identified as belonging to 4th Sturm Battalion.  They formed the leading waves.

Other men captured were reportedly from the "9th Bavarians".  Presumably the mopping-up troops following behind the stormtrooper units.

Andy's image above is from 6/DCLI's report.  The 43 MG Coy, MGC, 10/DLI and 6/KOYLI post operation reports also mention liquid fire being used in this German 24 Aug 1917 dawn counter-attack.

The 9/RB, (they were attached to 43 Bde for this period) report states:

"  The enemy at one time used liquid fire, but we got a Lewis Gun turned on immediately.  This dispersed the operators and I believe the whole machine went up later as a very dense cloud of smoke came out of the enemy trench and seemed different to a dump going up."

 

Information from Bob also suggests that a tank knocked out in these actions on the north edge of Inverness Copse - by German artillery according to the British war diary operational reports - was in fact disabled by Flammenwerfer.  We're still cross-checking this though.  Since that is exactly the sort of information you are looking for, it is important we apply some rigour to resolving the discrepancy.

 

Mark

 

Edited 16 March , 2017 by MBrockway

[Terry_Reeves]

Thanks to all for the information so far. 

 

TR

[bob lembke]

I finally looked at my "GRPR Successes" spreadsheet, perhaps the first time I have seen it in five years. Evidently I added some more engagements since I sort of memorized the totals. As I said, my criterion for including an engagement was a good statistic for the number of soldiers captured. I did not exclude any engagements where the results were poor. I did drop about three battles on the Eastern front that simply were too large, even though many FW were used and their use was important. I did include one large engagement where 101 FW simply caved in the Russian front, leading to the loss of 400 sq km. 

 

Here are are the summary statistics. 53 engagements. POWs captured: 67,390 in those 53 engagements. In 27 of these engagements, 914 MGs captured. In 11 engagements, 504 cannon captured. In nine engagements, 143 mortars captured. In 13 engagements, 431.8 sq km captured (400 on the Duna in 1917 in Russia.) One tank knocked out in one of the engagements. 

 

GRPR losses:  121 killed, one died in hospital. (I am sure that other men wounded in these engagements also died in hospital, but in most cases the records are such that the engagement in which the man was wounded is not identified. On the other hand, the "killed" includes a number of "missing" who presumably died but we're not recovered.)

 

I I assure you that my standards of scholarship are high. I am an economist and an engineer, but I was privately tutored in historical research by a Columbia University historian. In the above study, if the data for an engagement was questionable, I simply excluded it. Of course the above 53 flame attacks included most of the more successful German flame attacks of the war. Still, the results above are remarkable, so much so that I have mostly sat on them, fearing the reaction that a superb student of the war like "AOK4" expressed. 

 

I am, in a second post, going to discuss the attack at Verdun where a FW attack simply inhaled a French brigade; four flame troopers were lost in an attack by 63 FW. 

[bob lembke]

The FW attack on the French 29th Infantry Division at Malancourt Woods; 3/20/16. 

 

I have in my timeline a lot of material on this attack; here I am only using the line of statistics from my "Successes" spreadsheet and my memory. 

 

An attack by 63 FW (two companies) of GRPR on a brigade of the French 29 th Infantry Division. The brigade just collapsed. The brigade HQ got out a one sentence warning phone call to their commanders, something like "the Germans are here." Two regimental HQ and the brigade HQ and the commanders and staff were captured. The total haul was 2883 prisoners, including 58 officers. 25 MGs, 12 cannon, and 18 mortars were captured. The brigadier general was an ethnic German, and the French command, puzzled by the inhaled brigade, suspected treachery. 

 

GRPR losses; four flame troopers. 

 

Incidentally, the veteran's association of the flame regiment was very active 15 years after the war. I have materials from a meeting in the early 1930s attended by Reddemann and the Crown Prince, whose skull and crossbones was worn by every man of the regiment.  After the war    Reddemann personally published materials with the name of every lost man of the regiment. If Reddemann had tried to soft pedal the losses, not mentioned some of the dead, played down the losses, God knows what the veterans of the unit would have done. 

 

After the the war my grandfather challenged another reserve officer, who was also both rich and famous, to a duel to the death with automatic pistols, for something dishonorable he had done during the war. When father first told me, I thought it was a joke. My father replied: "Certainly not. Your grandfather was an excellent shot, and fully intended to kill the son of a bitch!"

 

The other officer refused the challenge of a duel, and was expelled from the Reserve Officers' Association for refusing the challenge. My grandfather had maneuvered the wealthy officer into a courtroom, and produced a six figure uncashed check that the officer or his agents had offered my grandfather to pass as acceptable a large batch of defective and dangerous artillery ammunition from the wealthy officer's ammunition factories. 

 

I am sure Reddemann's Death Roll is complete, except for one man. 

[MBrockway]

5 hours ago, MBrockway said:

Information from Bob also suggests that a tank knocked out in these actions on the north edge of Inverness Copse - by German artillery according to the British war diary operational reports - was in fact disabled by Flammenwerfer.  We're still cross-checking this though.  Since that is exactly the sort of information you are looking for, it is important we apply some rigour to resolving the discrepancy.

 

Mark

 

 

Further searching reveals this Flammenwerfer tank "kill" has already been debated here .

 

See these posts ...

 

With Robert Dunlop speculating very plausibly that the tank attacked by flamethrower was the abandoned B11 "Bison" now being used by infantry as cover and being mistaken as its crew by the Germans ...

I'm now trying to work out which battalion was in that area when the FW counter-attack went in on the morning of 24 Aug, but proving difficult as platoons from several battalions from three different brigades had by this stage been sprinkled all mixed up all along the line.  If I get anything useful about infantry being dislodged from a tank wreck by flamethrower, I'll update here.

 

Also Terry, you may be interested in Andy's detailed topic unravelling the accounts of these 22-29 Aug 1917 actions in the various 14th (Light) Div sources here:

14th Division - Inverness Copse & Glencorse Wood

 

Andy there does an excellent job of assembling these contorted divisional, brigade and battalion sources into a single coherent narrative.

 

Mark

 

[David Filsell]

Bob,

Knowing your expertise well and respecting it - I still find the pow figures quite incredible. Whilst understanding your wish to keep a grip on all your reseasearch, can you offer and breakdown and sources?

 If so it would be appreciated lest your overall figure simply becomes 'stolen' and endlessly repeated and questioned.

Best regards

David  

[bob lembke]

I can address that, David. I am serious in saying that there is a troll who has stolen my material, by his own admission and open boasting, and already published some of it. Otherwise I might just put up the entire spreadsheet. Often I have studied a FW attack using various sources from both sides. Often I have gotten the haul in prisoners and booty from the daily morning communique from the German High Command, which I believe attempted to maintain a reputation for accuracy and reliability. I have seen correspondence between Pershing and a US three star general in which one referred to that mornings German GHQ communique in such a fashion that suggested that the statement was being accepted as a statement of fact without debate. It would often state something like: "in yesterday's action at Dead Man's Hill in the sector of the Fifth Army, the storm attack at xxxx yielded 322 prisoners, 14 MGs, and 8 field guns." However, Major Reddemann's History would have stated that "an attack by 2. Kompagnie, GRPR under Hauptmann Yyyyy had achieved success there, employing 34 light FW, but that Gefreiter Vvvvvv and Pionier Nnnnn fell." Reddemann's work rarely or never gave booty but did list the name and rank of every fallen man and the attacking unit and the # of FW employed. Then, sometimes, I find a reference in the unit history of an infantry regiment involved, or possibly in the history of the S=B Rohr there would be more data, although the author of that, von Schweren, rarely mentioned FW. 

 

In in one case, in a very successful FW attack on Dead Man's Hill at Verdun, I have about 30 pages of distilled material from perhaps ten sources, including one of the only secondary sources I have ever used. Two sources recount the narrative of an infantry Leutnant of IR 155, who was asking a brother officer for a cigarette when a "French 75" fragment tore off his right hand. He recounted, in his unit history, how a large soldier rushed up, and snapped a tourniquet about the stump, and escorted him to the rear, till they met a medic, and the soldier turned him over to the medic. The hand was flapping from the stump, hanging by a shred of skin, and the medic cut the hand off with his "butter knife", took him to the rear, and got him a stiff shot of brandy. He stated that the stranger soldier saved his life. 

 

The soldier with the tourniquet was my father, and I have a letter from my father, from hospital, describing the scene, and giving the officer's name (misspelled) and his regiment. I have four letters from my father describing the battle, one four pages long. About ten minutes after the hand incident, my father's FW Trupp charged, and another French 75 shell exploded amongst them, wounding every last man. As my father was the worst wounded, they had to stow him in a French dugout in No Man's Land, where he lay for three days before being found and evacuated. 

 

I I also have a picture of the Leutnant of IR 155, taken in 1918, taken with two brother officers; he is hiding the stump of his right hand behind his back, probably to avoid spooking wives or girlfriends of the other officers. 

 

So so in this case I have about 30 pages of material about that engagement, from perhaps 10 sources. I do not know offhand if that engagement was one of the  53 in my sample for my study. (Next time I fire up my laptop I will pull up the spreadsheet and look.) That attack is an extreme case, but I usually have several sources for one engagement, somethings from both sides of the engagement. I must always have at least two, as Reddemann never gave the # of POWs taken, and I only included an engagement if I had that number, and if I had verified the attack in Reddemann's history. 

 

So, generally, the entries in my spreadsheet are well researched, and probably every one has at least two sources, for the reason given. 

 

Another possible source is one is one or another German Official Histories published by the Reichsarchiv. I have, with a few duplicates, about 110 of them, only about 25 unit histories. They also usually not mention FW, but will usually give POWs and booty. 

[bob lembke]

Knowing that all or almost all of the participants are focused on British engagements, I went through the spreadsheet and looked for engagements that were FW vs British, I think. (I do not identify the opponents, but usually know them. Appreciate that this work was done years ago.)

 

At quick scan, four of 53 seem to be attacks against the British, one possibly Australian. 

 

6/2/16. -  Zillebeke, Flanders. 533 POWs, 29 FW used, two flame troopers died. "General captured, 3rd died next day" not sure what "3rd" was from memory. Remember a British general being captured. 

 

5/6/17. -  "Bullecourt - British". 1235 POWs, 35 MGs, "partially FW Storm" three flame troopers dead,  # of FW?

 

7/10/17  Flanders - Nieuport.  1284 POWs, 2 sq km captured, 30 FW, characterized as "FW storm", 3 dead. 

"# of POWs from Bean". Australia?

 

4/25/18. Kemmelberg, Flanders. 8200 POWs  233 MGs. 53 cannon captured. called "partially FW storm" Four FW companies attacked, must have been about 120-130 FWs, 15 flame troopers dead. (Probably the second highest loss in the war.) I have at least three sources, one after the war when the German writers, General Staff officers, also used British sources and conferred with Allied officers; effort to write up WW 1 was wrapped up in 1944. 

 

So the partial box score is 11,252 POWs taken, over 268 MGs taken, at least 53 cannon taken (on 7/10/17 more cannon must have been taken), one general captured. 23 flame troopers dead. 

 

I am sure that this will generate comment. I have to admit that two of these were only partially FW attacks, but at Kemmelberg, for example, an attack by 130 FW with 15 flame troopers dead was a major FW attack. I don't remember the details of that attack after five or more years. 

[Terry_Reeves]

Bob, thank you but I have severe doubts that your  figures for POWs are the result of FW attacks.  Are you really suggesting that the FWs were directly responsible for this? I suspect the figures you quote are overall casualties for the operations mentioned. 

 

TR

Edited 17 March , 2017 by Terry_Reeves

[bob lembke]

27 minutes ago, Terry_Reeves said:

Bob, thank you but I have severe doubts that your  figures for POWs are the result of FW attacks.  Are you really suggesting that the FWs were directly responsible for this?

 

TR

 

Terry;

 

I have pointed out that when I originally evaluated the four engagements above I rated two as "FW storm" and two as "partially FW storm". The men and officers of the flame regiment distrusted regular infantry and knew that they did not understand the complex and counter-intuitive tactics used to get the FW close to the enemy first line without losses. When possible they attacked utterly without supporting infantry, and later turned the captured position over to regular forces, sometimes within hours, sometimes the next day. In every case they had to be the first line, or they would burn their own troops. 

 

Major Reddemann also rated every attack as "successful" or "not successful", and I am sure that this was included in the individual report on every attack, even by a two FW Trupp, that he had to make every month directly to the High Command, which directly allocated the assistance of this valuable resource. In a snippet l read last night, he rated the success rate of the FW attacks in one sector and time as 60%, another sector and time period he rated 93% of the attacks as "successful".

 

The classic ideal outcome was the attack at Malencourt Woods that I laid out, where two flame companies, about 350 men if at full strength, captured almost 3000 men and three complete brigade and regimental HQs in their dugouts, in minutes, and only lost a couple of men. (Flying on memory here.) The French command were absolutely clueless as to what happened. I believe that the brigade was never reconstituted. 

 

The Allies were almost without an answer to this weapon, except for pulling their front line back from the German front lines. In the first FW attacks the Germans chose positions where the trenches were about six meters apart. A couple of years later the front lines were usually something like 100 meters apart, or more. As the Germans were always outnumbered and usually on the defensive, this widening was invaluable for the entire German Army and the war effort. 

 

I I think that in two or three of the above attacks the POWs were essentially completely due to the FW troops, which were mostly machine gunners, grenadiers, and mortar crews, rather than FW operators, and absolutely no riflemen. (A few NCOs might carry a rifle or carbine.) I could study the four attacks in detail, but I do not want to waste the time. Were the 2883 French prisoners at Malancourt Woods entirely the booty of the two FW companies? Absolutely. 

 

You are insisting, in your first post, starting this thread, in a research model that is almost useless. You are insisting on information only from British war diaries, and have rejected my offer to give you the benefit of my 16 years of research on this, reading hundreds of sources in several languages. 

 

I have probably read a couple of dozen British war diaries of units hit by flame attacks, and found their information almost useless. They literally did not know what hit them, key officers were killed or captured, and the British command had their own untrue doctrine on FW, set even before Hooge. The troops were told that you just had to bend over, and the flame would go over you harmlessly (that might work with petrol or light oil, stupidly propelled by air or even oxygen, not by heavy oil propelled by inert nitrogen, which would cover you with burning fairly heavy oil.) They were told to fire at the operators, and the devices would explode. In 16 years and many hundreds of sources, I have only found about two occasions when that actually happened. But the British literature is full of exploding FW. 

 

Based on the 20-30 British war diaries I have read, there is little useful information, other than an attack had occurred, and I discontinued seeking out these diaries. You insist on rejecting specific information on these attacks, written up by the commander of the entire German flame effort, also one of the two inventors of the modern FW. Plus from hundreds of other sources. 

 

Who has posted any useful (or any) information from a war diary, in response to your appeal? If so, I missed it. 

 

[MBrockway]

59 minutes ago, bob lembke said:

7/10/17  Flanders - Nieuport.  1284 POWs, 2 sq km captured, 30 FW, characterized as "FW storm", 3 dead. 

"# of POWs from Bean". Australia?

 

 

This must refer to the Battle of the Dunes at Nieuport Bains on 10 Jul 1917, known to the Germans as Operation Strandfest and about which we have several detailed topics here on the Forum.  2/KRRC and 1/Northants of 2 Bde, 1st Division were the battalions engaged.  The divisional frontage of 1400yds was split equally between these two battalions with a depth of approx 600 yds between the front line and the River Yser to their rear.  The division's other battalions were all west of the river.

 

Measurements on the trench map gives a pocket for 1st Division of approx 1 sq.km.

 

Immediately south of them was 97 Bde of 32nd Division extending southwards to the major canal to the south of Lombartzyde.  32nd Div occupied a similar sized 1 sq km pocket.

 

The British positions east of the Yser that were engaged in the attack would thus tally well with the 2 sq.km. captured in Bob's figures ... except that the penetration into 32nd Div's sector was minor and quickly recovered.  Ground lost was probably more like half that claimed.

 

There were also RE Tunnelling companies (257th and 2nd Australian) in the bridgehead area, working on improving the shelters and defences - the area had only recently been taken over by the British ahead of Operation Hush.

 

This probably explains Bob's reference to Australian sources.

 

Total Allied casualties killed, wounded and missing were approx. 3,100, with 1,200 of these coming from 1st Div.  It seems plausible that ~1,200 of that 3,100 could be POW.

 

Where I tend to agree with Terry though is that ascribing all these captured British soldiers to the work of Flammenwerfer is inappropriate.  The KRRC material does mention FW troops, but it is very clear that the bulk of the success was due to artillery bombardment (including gas) where the British were either in the open trenches or at best in ill-made shelters of in sand.  there were very few concrete bunkers or other structures able to protect infantry from a barrage.  This was exacerbated by the British Divisional artillery not being properly in place before Strandfest started and counter-battery work therefore being impossible.

 

Most of the British dug-outs had already collapsed when the German marines and Pioniere FW units arrived with the British infantry often buried and unable to mount an effective defence.  The documents do not mention British resistance being flushed out of shelters by flamethrowers, nor that Flammenwerfer were a major factor in the tactical success of the enemy operation.

 

Mark

 

 

[bob lembke]

However, I am in a narrow sense venturing OT, and I will (probably) cease posting in this thread. I am cooperating with several Forum Pals off-Forum on this topic. 

[AOK4]

Hello,

 

I agree with Terry and Mark. It is not correct to give all credit for these actions only to the Flammenwerfer. Most of the actions Bob described were actions in which several arms and units were involved and where flame throwers played a role (minor or major).

 

Jan

[MBrockway]

4 minutes ago, bob lembke said:

 

They were told to fire at the operators, and the devices would explode. In 16 years and many hundreds of sources, I have only found about two occasions when that actually happened. But the British literature is full of exploding FW.

 

Bob,

My impression is that the British soldiers were not told that firing on FW operators would cause the devices to explode, but rather that this would kill the man operating the device, which is rather a good way of stopping the jet of flame coming at you!  After all these brave Pioniere were not bullet-proof

 

I suspect any guidance from the British GS about exploding devices (if indeed there was any) was not really based on factual evidence, but rather intended to dent the psychological power of the flamethrower and encourage men to face FW-equipped attackers with effective suppressing small arms fire.

 

Even at the Liquid Fire attack at Hooge on 30 Jul 1915, the smaller FW attack on 7/KRRC at the north edge of Sanctuary Wood was easily repulsed by rifle fire.

 

Mark

 

[bob lembke]

Mark; 

 

i I know a lot about Operation Strandfest, the semi-humorus name the Germans gave to the attack. I studied it after I entered it into the spreadsheet, and did not recognize the entry in my spreadsheet from what I entered in it five or more years ago. 

 

And i I agree that the FW were not the decisive weapon, but the loss of three FW troops in a force of 30 FW was high, and indicates that they were in the thick of the fighting. The artillery preparation was crushing, and the attack by several regiments of German Marines, first class troops, could not be stopped. But the addition of 30 FW in the first wave was I am sure quite useful. 

 

As I said, I have already excluded three battles where many FW were in the mix from this table, and I think that I probably should exclude this one as well, or perhaps have a scoring system, and I would score the FW as at best 25% of the mix that collapsed the bridgehead, perhaps less. As you know, the British were planning an attack out of this bridgehead, and were building specialized equipment for the attack, and the German Command thought it best to strike first and eliminate the attack's take-off position. 

 

If if I did the study over again I probably would exclude Strandfest. (Roughly translates as "Beach Party"), or make the scoring system more sophisticated. But that hardly disproves that this weapon was often startlingly effective. I could also presents many combats at a more intimate scale, a few FW taking one pill-box after another, or sending a sector of the front to their heels. And the commanders of the British and US flame efforts, who in my opinion badly mismanaged their own flame efforts, spent the next 15 years spreading breathtaking lies about the effectiveness of the German FW, goading Major Reddemann to send a 18 page letter of protest to the British commander after the war. I think that this purposeful effort of disinformation, plus the poor info given to the Allied troops during the war to comfort them, has poisoned the English language literature. If this weapon was the dumbest and most useless weapon developed during  the war, as claimed by the aforementioned gentlemen, why did the Allies insist at Versailles that Germany never again have FW troops?

 

 

[Terry_Reeves]

 Bob

 

Whist you are entitled  entitled to your areour opinion,

your evidence appears to based solely on Rodderman's evidence.   Can you publish anyother 

 

source that will substantiate your claim please?

 

TR

 

 

 

Edited 17 March , 2017 by Terry_Reeves

[bill24chev]

24 minutes ago, bob lembke said:

Mark; 

 

i I know a lot about Operation Strandfest, the semi-humorus name the Germans gave to the attack. I studied it after I entered it into the spreadsheet, and did not recognize the entry in my spreadsheet from what I entered in it five or more years ago. 

 

And i I agree that the FW were not the decisive weapon, but the loss of three FW troops in a force of 30 FW was high, and indicates that they were in the thick of the fighting. The artillery preparation was crushing, and the attack by several regiments of German Marines, first class troops, could not be stopped. But the addition of 30 FW in the first wave was I am sure quite useful. 

 

As I said, I have already excluded three battles where many FW were in the mix from this table, and I think that I probably should exclude this one as well, or perhaps have a scoring system, and I would score the FW as at best 25% of the mix that collapsed the bridgehead, perhaps less. As you know, the British were planning an attack out of this bridgehead, and were building specialized equipment for the attack, and the German Command thought it best to strike first and eliminate the attack's take-off position. 

 

If if I did the study over again I probably would exclude Strandfest. (Roughly translates as "Beach Party"), or make the scoring system more sophisticated. But that hardly disproves that this weapon was often startlingly effective. I could also presents many combats at a more intimate scale, a few FW taking one pill-box after another, or sending a sector of the front to their heels. And the commanders of the British and US flame efforts, who in my opinion badly mismanaged their own flame efforts, spent the next 15 years spreading breathtaking lies about the effectiveness of the German FW, goading Major Reddemann to send a 18 page letter of protest to the British commander after the war. I think that this purposeful effort of disinformation, plus the poor info given to the Allied troops during the war to comfort them, has poisoned the English language literature. If this weapon was the dumbest and most useless weapon developed during  the war, as claimed by the aforementioned gentlemen, why did the Allies insist at Versailles that Germany never again have FW troops?

 

 

or use "Crocodile" flamethrower tanks in WW2

[Terry_Reeves]

Bill sorry, but you no doubt that realise that this about WW1.  Can I please say I say once again take a look about what my thread is about.

 

Thank you.

 

TR

 

 

 

Edited 17 March , 2017 by Terry_Reeves

[bob lembke]

In only only a small number of battles could the entire result be attributed to the employment of FW. There was another decisive FW battle at Malancourt Woods in 1915, the year before, but the one in 1916 could be fairly 100% attributed to the FW (the men did not even carry rifles), and other engagements were similar, where the FW just collapsed the front. But FW had a significant role in all of these engagements. 

 

Despite the the often dramatic results, it was also remarkable that one or more men were only killed in a minority of their attacks. Of the 653 attacks, they lost men in perhaps 250 attacks, from one to the 15 and 22 cited, both battles with spectacular results. If there was accompanying infantry, they usually also had very light losses, or none. These results are quite unusual. My father's correspondence with his father, a staff officer, is interesting; my father's arguments that it actually was a relatively safe assignment was met with disbelief. When father was wounded he was not very candid; did not mention more minor wounds, and understated the more serious wounds. 

 

But it I am trying to get out of this discussion, although I hope that it has been interesting. Perhaps someone would want to start a related thread, we are not really addressing Terry's request. The methodology of my study is hardly perfect, but it the dramatic results should be eyeopening. A weapon that allows two companies to attack a brigade and capture it in about 15 minutes, losing only a few men (was it 2 or 4?), is hardly a silly weapon. I can describe attacks that my father's company carried out at Verdun that were dramatic. But I think that Terry is going to have a stroke. Someone start a thread, I will participate. Someone have a date for a flame attack on a UK unit; get it to me and I will give you what I have. 

[bob lembke]

31 minutes ago, Terry_Reeves said:

 Bob

 

Whist you are entitled  entitled to your areour opinion,

your evidence appears to based solely on Rodderman's evidence.   Can you publish anyother 

 

source that will substantiate your claim please?

 

TR

 

 

 

 

I am trying to get away from this. 

 

Since 2000, when I found my father's and grandfathers letters, I estimate I have read material in German for near to 10,000 hours. I have worked in 11 languages in this WW I study, most of them only a bit, like reading and translating half a book by an Italian FW sergeant. (I have no Italian.)

 

i I have bought 110 German Official Histories, 60 Rangelisten, hundreds of other books. Few are in English.  I have produced two highly condensed timelines that total about 1200 pages, enough for five or more books. 

 

I have about 100 pages written by Reddemann. But he did publish in those 100 pages a list of almost every flame attack, and a list of each man who died in his regiment. So it was frequently consulted. 

 

A a friend published a book on heavy German guns, and I went thru about 50 books and book-length reports and documents and took pertinent notes. One book was in English. (By a Luxembourgisch professor.) The rest in German, French, and Flemish. 

 

Only 100 pages of source material for my work?

 

i may not have read a secondary source in ten years. 

[Terry_Reeves]

Bob

 

 I'm astonished.  I started this thread with a particular purpose -  flame attacks against the BEF. You appear to be determind that it should be something else. 

 

It is significant that you want someone else to start another thread, so why haven't you.?

 

I am happy to receive you contributions providing they are relevant to request, other than that please do not bother.

 

 

TR

 

 

Edited 17 March , 2017 by Terry_Reeves

[Guest]

The Official History 1918 Volume 1 page 203 [or 265/648 of the N & MP DVD] says (21/3/1918) " The 2/6th Manchester which had previously been driven back from the front line by liquid fire, managed to cling on to Carpeza Copse, about the centre of the zone; but the struggle continued to be severe. "

 

Have had a look on Ancestry for the 2/6th Manchester war diary but who knows where they've put it. It should be here (I think?) Click

 

Mike