BEF 1915: Loos and the Kitchener battalions

[Guest]

Martin

Are you sure that you are not confusing K1 and K2 with the locally-raised "Pals" units of the Fourth and Fifth New Armies? K1 and K2 had infantry battalions of geographically related infantry regiments but I have never seen any evidence that these were composed of men from the relevant counties. I would be glad to be shown to be wrong if you have evidence to the contrary.

Ron

There is no confusion. It is very clear in my mind the difference between K1, K2 and Pals battalions. There is reasonably strong evidence that K1 and K2 county regiments drew the majority of their men from their local county. It simply reflected the fact that the response to Kitchener's call was immense and most Regiments were swamped from the outset. The county bond was very strong. This of course changed after conscription came in, but I am fairly confident that K1 and K2 were very centred on local populations.

If we take the 7th and 8th Battalions of the Royal Sussex Regt as typical random example of a line infantry country regiment and look at the casualty data in the first year, the vast majority of men where address is recorded, are from Sussex - in excess of 70%, which suggests that there was a high incidence in K1 and K2 for men to join their local County Regiment. Looking at the 767 casualties for the whole war and simply searching Sussex, Chichester, Brighton, Bognor generates a 45% return. I have little doubt if the data was combed around 50% would have a Sussex connection. We know the local nature of battalions became diluted after 1916 when conscription was introduced, so a 50% figure for the whole war would imply the number must be much higher for men enlisting prior to 1916. We can do this exercise again and again with other county regiments and we see similar results. I will trawl the K1 data for the 11th and 13th Divs when I have time as that data will be pretty clean given the high casualties in a short period right at the beginning of their War.

K1 and K2 were raised by the existing Line Infantry regiments, roughly one per Regiment or two per 'large' Regiment. There were 68 Regiments which raised 80 battalions for K1 and another 80 battalions for K2. Recruits poured into the local recruiting stations. 500,000 men had enlisted by 15th Sep 1914 (see earlier charts). The recruiting stations in Aug-Sep 1914 were mostly anchored in the county town halls and fed men straight to the Depots where they were consolidated (no equipment of course). The Depots become overcrowded and some record many thousands of recruits - way in excess of their requirements, hence the immediate authorisation of K2 only days later.

Once barracks and billets (and sometimes simple tented camps) became available the men were told off into groups of 1,000 or so and sent to form their battalions. Some battalions were located far from their home depot and some ended up in different counties, but the initial flood of men came from locally recruited men. There are weekly stats for every battalion. The official returns for recruits pouring into the Depots having been sent there by the recruiting stations are as follows (line Infantry, 68 Regiments)

29th Aug 1914: 36,449 recruits

5th Sep 1914: 47,308 recruits

12th Sep 1914: 61,453 recruits

A week later, on the 19th Sep 1914 the recruits had been allocated to Battalions. The system was still awash;

19th Sep 1914:

Depots (80): 25,721 recruits (New Army only)

K1 (80 Bns): 78,858 recruits

K2 (80 Bns): 69,176 recruits

It is important to remember this is barely 6 weeks after the initial call to arms. The numbers above might suggest the 160 battalions were slightly under strength however the aggregate data belies an underlying asymmetry.The vast majority of county regiments had in excess of 1,000 men. The shortfalls were mostly Irish regiments whose recruiting had stalled for political reasons. The 11 Irish battalions in K2 for example do not show a single recruit between them on 19th Sep 1914 while the 7th Lincolns (the most sparsely populated English county) had 775 men (lowest of all the English battalions) with another 1,110.men in the 6th Bn. Generally speaking the typical English, Welsh and Scots county Regiments had filled their quotas within a few weeks and still had a surplus of 25,000 men. It is important to understand that during this period another 90,000 men joined the Special Reserve and Extra Reserve battalions. This data does not include the TF either. County regiments were swamped.

One example just emailed to me: the Queen's Royal West Surrey Regt took in 3,394 recruits by 19th Sep 1914. It had taken in 1,035 men by 29th Aug 1914 - enough to form a K1 battalion. This was just 3 weeks after Kitchener's call.

The Kitchener battalions were formed in any barracks, tented camp or hutted camps that were available, which meant that these men could end up far from their home depot. For example the K1 battalions that formed the 11th (Northern) Div were all send to Belton park in Grantham, miles from their Regiments' depots. My local battalion - the 7th (Service) Bn Royal Sussex Regt was formed in Chichester but was quickly sent to Colchester. This is sometimes a source of some confusion as we occasionally see battalions allegedly 'raised' miles from their county. It simply shows where they were initially posted.

I am familiar with the pals battalions and have no doubt their 'local' character was stronger - as were many TF units, however I think K1 and K2 had very strong local representation.

Any mistakes are mine. MG

Sources: WO 114 Weekly Return 1914

CWGC

Edit: 6th Lincs: 121 of 194 Gallipoli casualties where an address was recorded show Lincolnshire. (62%). This was the English county regiment that struggled the most against low population density yet still managed to have nearly two-thirds 'local' men'. A further 30 (15%) men from this cohort were from the eastern side of neighbouring Nottinghamshire. Given the low density and rural nature (also likely impacted during this period by the harvest) I suspect this will be a good benchmark for the minimum number of local men in an English K1 battalion.

[westkent78]

Martin,

With regard to the RWK I'd generally agree with your supposition that K1 and K2 men were largely drawn from the normal catchment area of the regiment, Kent and South East London. Looking at the casualties in 1915, perhaps a few more men from London in K2 (7th Bn) than had occurred in K1 (6th). But as far as RWK goes K2 was largely unaffected by Loos, and K1 escaped at least until October in the case of the 6th. Now for K3 and the 8th Bn on the other hand, Loos was an absolute catastrophe and there were still plenty of Kent and London recruits involved there, but you do run into many more men from outside the South East in the casualty lists compared to 6th or 7th Bn.

In my experience the casualty lists seem to have taken about 3 months to appear in the papers for the Other Ranks, but perhaps the Telegrams moved quicker. Many of 8th RWK were listed only as missing and a decision on their deaths appears to have been presumed only in September 1916.

You'll have to account for what appear to be K1, and possibly K2 men, drafted into the Regulars too. Seeing plenty of those erroneously entered on the 1st RWK 1914 roll who were making it out to F&F in late 1914 and early 1915.

Best regards,

Matthew

[Guest]

Martin,

With regard to the RWK I'd generally agree with your supposition that K1 and K2 men were largely drawn from the normal catchment area of the regiment, Kent and South East London. Looking at the casualties in 1915, perhaps a few more men from London in K2 (7th Bn) than had occurred in K1 (6th). But as far as RWK goes K2 was largely unaffected by Loos, and K1 escaped at least until October in the case of the 6th. Now for K3 and the 8th Bn on the other hand, Loos was an absolute catastrophe and there were still plenty of Kent and London recruits involved there, but you do run into many more men from outside the South East in the casualty lists compared to 6th or 7th Bn.

In my experience the casualty lists seem to have taken about 3 months to appear in the papers for the Other Ranks, but perhaps the Telegrams moved quicker. Many of 8th RWK were listed only as missing and a decision on their deaths appears to have been presumed only in September 1916.

You'll have to account for what appear to be K1, and possibly K2 men, drafted into the Regulars too. Seeing plenty of those erroneously entered on the 1st RWK 1914 roll who were making it out to F&F in late 1914 and early 1915.

Best regards,

Matthew

Thanks Matthew. It is all useful stuff. Thank you. I am ever mindful that the experiences of one Regiment might well differ from others.

One other thing to consider is that there was a difference between the men who attested/enlisted in Aug/Sep 1914 and the men who went overseas in with K1 from May onwards. In the rush, the medicals were not particularly stringent and in the subsequent weeks of training many were weeded out. I have done some preliminary work on the pre-war Regulars as a benchmark and for every man who enlisted in the recruiting year of 1913 some 7.05% were discharged before starting their training and another 7.30% were discharged withing 3 months of enlistment (Line Infantry), meaning under normal circumstances 14.35% of recruits never made it to three months. On a nominal strength of 1,000 that is 143 men.

Anyone who has reconstructed nominal rolls for war raised units will be acutely aware of the scores of gaps in the number sequences, which is perhaps some indication of the wastage between attestation and embarkation. At a rough estimate I would suggest wastage approaching 20% would not be surprising. These men would have to be replaced and this is where (Ithink) some of the dilution starts. We know that some regiments in highly densely populated areas had large surpluses of men and we know some regiments had shortfalls. The 2001st volunteer who missed K1 and K2 of his local regiment might have been easily tempted, along with his comrades, to volunteer to transfer to a regiment with a shortfall. It is fairly easy to see how block transfers happened and we can of course see these occasionally in the casualty data. For these and other complex reasons very few regiments were completely recruited from locals, although I have seen data on Scottish Highland regiments and battalions that demonstrated their extraordinary ability to stay at least 'Scottish' in the main.

Home Counties regiments will always capture a decent proportion of Londoners. We also need to be mindful that addresses don't necessarily reflect 'home' in that men living and working, say, in London, might return to their home county to enlist. I have some databases where place of birth, residence and enlistment are all different, so it is not always an exact science. That said, there is enough weight of data to be fairly comfortable that K1 and K2 started with the majority of their men from their designated regimental recruiting districts.

I think it is an accepted fact that K3 onwards saw less homogeneous battalions (with the exceptions of Pals battalions) and after conscription it was rather the luck of the draw.

Ref Kitchener men in F&F in 1914 early 1915. As you doubtless know many were in fact time-expired men who re-enlisted so were not really raw recruits. I have one in the 2nd Bn R Sussex who was a pukkah K1 raw recruit. He was SAD and he had a charge sheet as long as your arm. I wonder if he was sent out early (half trained) simply to get rid of him. Another story. MG

[David Ridgus]

Thank you for this Martin, Fascinating stuff as ever. I had not realised the drop off in October 14 was engineered by the authorities. That will certainly change the way I teach one part of the Home Front.

David

PS After your destruction of my fondly held beliefs about Smith Dorrien and Le Cateau last autumn I was anticipating your gimlet eye falling on 1915!!

[Guest]

Thank you for this Martin, Fascinating stuff as ever. I had not realised the drop off in October 14 was engineered by the authorities. That will certainly change the way I teach one part of the Home Front.

David

The Govt's problem in early Sep 1914 is that it had too many recruits and nowhere to put them. It really had little choice when deciding to apply the brakes. The cumulative chart is quite telling. One can clearly see the deceleration and the subsequent re-accelration in November when the brakes were taken off. Credit where it is due - Grumpy kindly provided the exact dates and Army Orders, and reminds us that the willingness to enlist is not wholly reflected in the charts.

One thing that is becoming very clear (to me at least) is that the need for conscription for a continental war was understood years in advance.

[Guest]

Martin

Are you sure that you are not confusing K1 and K2 with the locally-raised "Pals" units of the Fourth and Fifth New Armies? K1 and K2 had infantry battalions of geographically related infantry regiments but I have never seen any evidence that these were composed of men from the relevant counties. I would be glad to be shown to be wrong if you have evidence to the contrary.

Ron

Ron - further to my previous response here is a quote from the 3rd (Reserve) Royal Sussex Regt ledger from Aug 1914:

" The Battalion gradually rose to 2,000 being recruited from all Stations in Sussex,Recruits all being sent through the Depot"

Subsequent to this on the formation of the 10th (Service) Bn (K4) some 487 men were sent from the 3rd Bn on 31st Oct 1914. Thereafter Kitchener recruits were sent direct from the Depot.

[Keith_history_buff]

On 08/01/2015 at 11:29, Guest said:

Charles - the data is quite lumpy and bounces around - doubtless for quite complex reasons. I am assuming a lag effect of at least a few weeks before the news of the casualties reached the general public. This may be an incorrect assumption. Looking at the chart below, monthly recruiting dropped -25% Month-on Month after Aug 1915 (K1's disaster at Gallipoli) but recovered, peaking in Nov before plummeting. The fall in monthly recruiting from Nov to Dec 1915 was -55%, the largest monthly per cent drop in 1915.

I wonder how long it took for the casualty data to hit home? The dates for Loos run into mid October, so allowing for a few weeks for the casualty numbers to filter back, it is possible that the full impact was not absorbed by the public until mid to late November?

SMEBE has monthly recruiting data for Regs and TF combined for the whole war (shown in the chart below). It also shows weekly English, Welsh and Scottish TF recruiting by month for 1914-15 on page 366. Using the TF recruiting as a proxy for all recruiting, TF recruiting saw a weekly low-point of 3,839 men for the week ending 15th Sep 1915 - consistent with the Sep dip in the aggregated reg and TF monthly data. In the subsequent weeks TF recruiting had a strong resurgence, hitting 13,617 in the week ending 3rd Nov and staying above 10,000 per week for the whole of November before collapsing.

It is possible that immediate bad news from the front was a kicker for recruiting, only to be tempered by the long lists of casualties filtering through in subsequent weeks. The time lag for the Loos-related casualty lists appearing in the papers would be a factor. MG

The monthly1914-1918 data, as plotted in the chart, is from page 364, as already stated.

There is TF enlistment data on paged 365 to 366. This has been plotted as a graph and presented in the Coetzee authored paper
http://www.localpopulationstudies.org.uk/PDF/LPS74/Article_1_Coetzee_pp16-35.pdf

Also of interest within the list of sources of the aforementioned paper is:
Statistical abstract of information regarding the armies at home and abroad 1914–20

There is a copy with the IWM, one with the British Library, and a copy with The National Archives, WO 161/82.

  

On 08/01/2015 at 13:09, Guest said:

I had thought that recruiting had been in a gradual decline in 1915. It seems it was not the case and a salutary reminder that one should do the numbers first. Charles' point on munitions workers etc is pertinent. Having now done the charts I am even more confused. I recall late Sep 1914 that the authorities tightened up the requirements in order to put the brakes on recruiting, only to relax it again in Nov 1914, once the backlog had started to clear. The effects can be clearly seen in the daily data (see below). The subtle changes in the recruiting criteria are of great interest. Sadly I only have daily recruiting data for 1914. Thereafter it becomes monthly.

[snip]

MG

Edit. Note the saw-tooth profile of weekly recruiting. The dips are Sundays and the spikes are Mondays. Presumably having been harangued by the ministry on Sunday the masses were urged to join up.

I would like to know where the daily recruiting figures have come from.

 

 

 

[Michelle Young]

“Guest” was a member who died a few years ago. 

[Keith_history_buff]

It does differ from the SMEBE data. Perhaps it excludes TF enlistments?

I've attempted to record an approximation of what I am seeing on the cumulative bar chart

End of Aug 110,000
End of Sep 570,000
End of Oct 640,000
End of Nov 750,000
End of Dec 810,000

[Keith_history_buff]

It looks like Martin Gillott had been using the same source as Simkins

 

Quote

Pg 66
The highest total ever for a single day was recorded on Thursday 3 September, when 33,204 men joined the army. 52

Pg 75
12,527 men enlisted on 11 September but that was the last day on which a five figure total was registered. The following week the daily average fell to 6,382. 86

52
Daily recruiting returns submitted to the Adjutant General, 30 August to 5 September 1914, within "New Armies: Organisation", archive reference WO 162/3.

86
Daily recruiting returns submitted to the Adjutant General, 11 to 19 September 1914, within "New Armies: Organisation", archive reference WO 162/3.
 

 

Source:
 

Title	Kitchener's Army: The Raising of the New Armies, 1914-16 War, armed forces, and society
Author	Peter Simkins
Publisher	Manchester University Press, 1988
ISBN	0719026385, 9780719026386
Length	359 pages

[Keith_history_buff]

Yes, this is confirmed by Martin on the following thread