BEF 1915: Loos and the Kitchener battalions

[Guest]

Hello - I am about to embark on K1 and K2 research on the Western Front. Can anyone tell me; has anyone done any study on K1 and K2 battle casualties* in 1915, particularly with regard to Loos?

I have all the diaries and most regimental histories and can probably rebuild the orbat from the OH, but the attrition is of interest. If anyone has already done the hard yards in the data, it would be of interest as it will save me some considerable time. I am currently transcribing K1 and K2 which should be done in a few months..

I suspect K1 and K2 saw massive casualties within weeks of their baptism of fire in the assault, but I simply do not know the ghastly numbers. The reason for the inquiry is not a morbid quest. I have a theory, as yet unproven, that the casualties in K1 and K2 acted as the single largest deterrent for more recruits and triggered the manpower crisis of late 1915 which in turn triggered Conscription. Because Kitchener battalions were community based, the casualty lists would have had an extremely pronounced impact on towns, villages and even streets in these communities. Grief would be concentrated, and centred on the main population centres that provided the Kitchener men. The three K1 Divisions at Gallipoli saw 68% casualties within 2 weeks - worse than anything on the Western Front in 1914. I suspect the similar tactical ineptitude happened with the other half of K1 and the K2 innocents in F&F. A long range guess is two-thirds casualties within 3 months. If anyone can short-circuit the process it would be gratefully received.

Similarly if anyone has data on single K1 or K2 battalions for 1915 that they are happy to share it would be similarly gratefully received. Ditto any titles of Kitchener (K1 and K2) stand-alone battalion histories - I am slowly accumulating these. I know very little about Loos and I suspect it will be rather tragic reading if the rather dry OH is any indication.

Thanks in advance.

MG

*KIA, WIA, MIA and POW

[high wood]

Have a look at the 21st and 24th Divisions particularly the 72nd Brigade.

[4thGordons]

I found Niall Cherry's book on Loos "Most Unfavourable Ground" a good overview, not stats driven but a good overview account.

weren't 21/24 Divisions K3?

Chris

[charlesmessenger]

Martin

There were marked falls in the number of recruits coming fowards during the late summer 1915 and the government recognised a growing manpower crisis before was fought. This was aggravated by the increasing manpower demands of the rapidly growing munitions industries. I am therefore not convinced that it was Loos itself which created the crisis, especially since there had also been heavy casualties among New Army divisions in the Dardanelles.

Charles M

[Guest]

Martin

There were marked falls in the number of recruits coming fowards during the late summer 1915 and the government recognised a growing manpower crisis before was fought. This was aggravated by the increasing manpower demands of the rapidly growing munitions industries. I am therefore not convinced that it was Loos itself which created the crisis, especially since there had also been heavy casualties among New Army divisions in the Dardanelles.

Charles M

Charles - the data is quite lumpy and bounces around - doubtless for quite complex reasons. I am assuming a lag effect of at least a few weeks before the news of the casualties reached the general public. This may be an incorrect assumption. Looking at the chart below, monthly recruiting dropped -25% Month-on Month after Aug 1915 (K1's disaster at Gallipoli) but recovered, peaking in Nov before plummeting. The fall in monthly recruiting from Nov to Dec 1915 was -55%, the largest monthly per cent drop in 1915.

I wonder how long it took for the casualty data to hit home? The dates for Loos run into mid October, so allowing for a few weeks for the casualty numbers to filter back, it is possible that the full impact was not absorbed by the public until mid to late November?

SMEBE has monthly recruiting data for Regs and TF combined for the whole war (shown in the chart below). It also shows weekly English, Welsh and Scottish TF recruiting by month for 1914-15 on page 366. Using the TF recruiting as a proxy for all recruiting, TF recruiting saw a weekly low-point of 3,839 men for the week ending 15th Sep 1915 - consistent with the Sep dip in the aggregated reg and TF monthly data. In the subsequent weeks TF recruiting had a strong resurgence, hitting 13,617 in the week ending 3rd Nov and staying above 10,000 per week for the whole of November before collapsing.

It is possible that immediate bad news from the front was a kicker for recruiting, only to be tempered by the long lists of casualties filtering through in subsequent weeks. The time lag for the Loos-related casualty lists appearing in the papers would be a factor. MG

[Muerrisch]

Martin, you will know of course that changes in criteria make your bar-chart not an indicator of "willingness to serve"

Martin has transcribed for us my notes regarding criteria from "Bounden Duty and Service" , see # 9 below.

[RichardOS]

I found Niall Cherry's book on Loos "Most Unfavourable Ground" a good overview, not stats driven but a good overview account.

weren't 21/24 Divisions K3?

Chris

Niall Cherry's book provides plenty of tables of casualties for Loos.. they're taken from the Official History, I believe.

eg included in the 44th Brigade's figures, 9th Black Watch casualties for 25th Sept are listed: (bracketed figures are those corrected afterwards)

Officers - 20. ORs - 672 (660). Total 692 (680).

best

Richard

[Guest]

Martin, you will know of course that changes in criteria make your bar-chart not an indicator of "willingness to serve"

I attach some notes from my "Bounden Duty and Service" which, no doubt will be jumbled by the software. If you want copy by email, just ask.

Grumpy. Happy New Year.

Thanks for the info. As you predicted it came out rather scrambled. If you would be kind enough to email it to me I will reformat it and paste it in pour encourager les autres.

I had thought that recruiting had been in a gradual decline in 1915. It seems it was not the case and a salutary reminder that one should do the numbers first. Charles' point on munitions workers etc is pertinent. Having now done the charts I am even more confused. I recall late Sep 1914 that the authorities tightened up the requirements in order to put the brakes on recruiting, only to relax it again in Nov 1914, once the backlog had started to clear. The effects can be clearly seen in the daily data (see below). The subtle changes in the recruiting criteria are of great interest. Sadly I only have daily recruiting data for 1914. Thereafter it becomes monthly.

Looking at your data I am reminded of how much smaller (height and weight and chest measurements) these men could be. I recall Bean making some rather negative comments on the British troops' physique and the product of slum dwellings. One other factor is the number of men discharged after being recruited but never making it to the front. Pre-war numbers were reasonably high as unfit (in all senses of the word) were weeded out. I have not seen data for 1914-15 but I suspect the 'recruiting' data I have is simply the numbers who bluffed their way past the 3 minute medical. MG

Edit. Note the saw-tooth profile of weekly recruiting. The dips are Sundays and the spikes are Mondays. Presumably having been harangued by the ministry on Sunday the masses were urged to join up.

[Guest]

Changes in terms of enlistment from Grumpy. With thanks. MG

[Terry_Reeves]

Monthly recruiting figure to the end of 1915 (1)

!914

August 298,000

Sept 462,000

Oct 136,862

Nov 169,862

Dec 11, 860

Total 1.186,357

1915

Jan 156,290

Feb 87,896

March 113,907

April 119,087

May 135,263

June 114,679

July 95,413

Aug 95,480

Sept 71,617

Oct 113,285

Nov 121,793

Dec 55,152

Total 1,280,362

1916

Jan 65,965

Feb 98,629

As can be seen, there is a general downward trend during 1915. The drop in Dec 1914 can be explained by Christmas as can Dec 1915.

It was this trend that caused a Parliamentary Recruiting Committee in mid-1915 to establish reliable statistics for the availability of men. in June of that year a canvass of 8 million households was carried out but less than half the forms were returned. This in turn led to the National Registration Act which became law on 15 July 1915. The register too place on on 15th August and the returns from that showed that 2,179,231 single men of military age were not in the forces. (2)

This in turn led to the Derby Scheme which also caused problems, particularly with married men who, whilst not refusing to enlist, wanted an assurance that single men would be recruited first under the scheme. There was a pressure group, The National Association of Married Men, whose members attended meetings across the country to put their case.

Aside from badged men in the munitions industries, there seems to a general reluctance to voluntarily enlist in 1915 because:

a. the war had gone on longer than people had been led to believe.

b. the above led to married men in particular to become worried about the welfare of their families if they did enlist. All this prior to the Loos battle of course.

TR

Sources

1) Statistics of of the Military Effort of the British Empire

2) CAB37/139

TR

[tullybrone]

Hi Terry,

Can't see recruiting figures for Oct 1915 in your table in the above post?

Steve

[Terry_Reeves]

Steve

Thanks, inserted now. It's the small print you know :-)

TR

[Muerrisch]

Terms and conditions apply, Terry .........

[Terry_Reeves]

Quite agree David. We could get Trading Standards involved.

TR

[Guest]

Monthly recruiting figure to the end of 1915 (1)

TR

TR - these are the same numbers used in my earlier chart (with Oct 1915 included) - see Post #5.

If you do the Month-on-Month (MoM) calcs you can see that Oct 1915 saw a +58% increase MoM, and November 1915 a further 7.5% increase MoM...November is a 70% increase over September 1915. and it was the third best month of recruiting in 1915. Leaving the euphoria of Aug-Sep 1914 aside, Nov 1915 was the fourth best recruiting month.

March 1915 saw a +30% MoM increase and May a + 13% MoM increase.... which perhaps illustrates it was not a steady decline and some periods bucked the trend.

Perhaps more importantly:

in 1914 1,186,000 men volunteered

in 1915 1,280,000 men volunteered

in 1916 1,190,000 men were conscripted

in 1917 821,000 men were conscripted.

in 1918 493,000 men were conscripted to Amistice Day.

Roughly speaking there were 2,467,000 volunteers and 2,504,000 Conscripts. Numbers will differ due to rounding.

Looking at the chart on post #5 the data is clearly very lumpy. If the Dec 1915 dip was explained by seasonal factors, it is worth noting that Oct and Nov 1915 were better recruiting months than all but three months in 1916. To strip out seasonal factors one might look at Year-on-Year comparisons. Nov 1916 the govt recruited 38% fewer men than Nov 1915. ...in fact in 1916 the Govt only managed to recruit more men YoY in only five of the twelve months.

MG

[charlesmessenger]

I wonder if the spike in November 1915 was caused by men registering under the Derby Scheme.

Charles M

[ss002d6252]

A slightly different ordered dataset but you can see by numbers re the enlistment in to the 5th,6th,7th,8th and 9th DLI.

The data is a bit crowed (especially with the 6th DLI) but gives an idea on the change in numbers against time. From August 15 onwards there was a very noticeable drop off in those who had enlisted for immediate service (Derby men not being numbered until they eventually joined up)

Craig

[Guest]

I wonder if the spike in November 1915 was caused by men registering under the Derby Scheme.

Charles M

Charles - It is not clear how one can identify men spurred by the Group Scheme against the others simply volunteering. As you know the Group Scheme didn't require enlistment (although that was the primary aim of course), but its secondary aim was to register men and their age, and occupation. It was not a particularly subtle prelude to conscription. The Derby Scheme (or Group Scheme) was considered a failure and was a contributory factor to bringing Conscription forward: Hobson's choice: 'Volunteer, other wise we will force you to enlist'.

One might argue in the face of 1914 casualties (way over double expectations) that Kitchener knew in 1914 that conscription would be required. Britain was facing an industrialised nation with a massive conscript army. Is there any indication from contemporary archive material that anyone in authority thought Britain could fight a three year* continental war against Germany without conscription? It might not have been aired publicly in early 1915, but the sheer magnitude of the casualties would surely have made this obvious.

The required number of recruits was a function of casualty expectations. The authorities expectations for casualties were way short of the unfolding reality. How anyone could plan for a three-year conflict unless he knew he had the necessary manpower (enshrined in an act of parliament) is something I find difficult to accept. Kitchener (and many others) understood very early on that it would be long and bloody.

To my mind capitulation must have happened on or immediately after 9th May 1915. It was, up to that date by far the worst day for the British Army. The chart below is most interesting as its shows the line infantry casualties on adaily basis through 1914-1915. At what stage did the authorities realise Conscription was necessary I wonder?

At this stage in the war there were three wounded or missing for every fatality.....on 9th May the British Army lost nearly 4,000 men killed in a single day which meant there were probably close to 16,000 battle casualties that day. Over the 8-9th May 1915 that number becomes 5,300 fatalities or over 21,000 men. More than a Division's worth. In a single day. It is more sobering when we consider that Gallipoli was underway and 2nd Krithia was unfolding. In terms of order of magnitudes these two days in France and flanders were four times more costly than anything that had preceded them. If the British Army could lose a Division's worth of men in 48 hours, it must have created some panic in Whitehall.

* terms of enlistment: 3 years or the duration.

MG

Source: CWGC data for the British Army in France and Belgium

8th May 1915 France and Belgium: 1,387

9th May 1915 France and Belgium: 3,919

....................................................... 5,306

[Terry_Reeves]

The Derby Scheme was a particular problem it seems to me. There were many men whose service was deferred, in some cases into 1917. The problem is knowing whether the deferred attestations were included in the monthly statistics or were they included in the month that they were called up or indeed were they included in both?

With regard to Martin's post (15) highs and lows will appear in any set of figures but it seems important to me to look at them as a whole. Compare the figures for the first few months of the war with those for the whole of 1915 and there is a decline. Using the the August to December figure of 1,186,357 for 1914 against the first 5 months of 1915 - 612, 433 ( not quite exact in terms of weeks admittedly) the gradual slide, with some peaks, is apparent. Understanding the decline is a very different matter. Unfortunately most of the figure available for the Derby Scheme concentrate on single men. I have not found not found figures for available married men, nor how many declined voluntary enlistment under the Derby Scheme, but I believe given the opposition to this until all available single men had enlisted was significant, with many preferring to wait for conscription.

TR

[Guest]

The problem is knowing whether the deferred attestations were included in the monthly statistics or were they included in the month that they were called up or indeed were they included in both?

TR

Terry - I assume 'enlistment' and 'attestation' are different here. If a man attested on the understanding he would be called up later, I have assumed this is not included in that data.. Sources (incluing the LLT) state

'215,000 enlisted while the Derby Scheme was on and another 2,185,000 attested for deferred enlistment'.

Oct-Dec 1915 saw 290,000 enlistments which is in the right order of magnitude of the '215,000' men under the Derby Scheme (16th Oct -15th Dec 1915). I am fairly confident the recruiting figures were not inflated by men whose enlistment was deferred.The only figure I would query would be the 2,185,000 and whether they all attested or were registered.

MG

[Guest]

I have not found not found figures for available married men, nor how many declined voluntary enlistment under the Derby Scheme, but I believe given the opposition to this until all available single men had enlisted was significant, with many preferring to wait for conscription.

TR

LLT indicates 38% of single men and 54% of married men not in starred occupations still managed to duck registration during the Scheme which doubtless sealed the matter. MG

Edit. It is in fact covered in great detail in Charles Messenger's "Call to Arms: The British Army 1914-18".

Edit2: Peter Simkins' "Kitchener's Army: The Raising of the New Armies 1914-18" is also illuminating on this. He reveals that Lord Milner was highly critical of Kitchener's call to arms for another 300,000, describing it as 'needlessly disorganised and wasteful....and how about the next 300,000 and the next after that?" (27th May 1915). Lloyd George no less declared that 'conscription was a question.... of necessity" (3rd June 1915).

[neverforget]

It`s quite interesting that, broadly speaking, conscription bought forth no more men than had been previously coming forward of their own volition.

This seems to be backed up by Martin`s chart on #5.

[Guest]

It`s quite interesting that, broadly speaking, conscription bought forth no more men than had been previously coming forward of their own volition.

This seems to be backed up by Martin`s chart on #5.

As Charles points out, the demands of industry were growing fast too, so Army recruiting is only part of the picture. The Govt really had the very tricky task of putting the right people in the right place. Some argued that leaving it to chance rather than have the Govt organise the allocation of skills and manpower to industry and the military was inefficient.

Interestingly a trawl of Hansard shows that Conscription had been in parliamentary debates almost continuously from the start of the war. It was seen as inevitable by some right from the start despite the initial flood of volunteers. The politician had to tread a very fine line. Even if they thought conscription was inevitable, some might not admit it in public. It was a very skilled operation 'selling' the idea to the British public. The data is interesting but does not show the whole picture.

Simkins' chapter 4 'Recruiting in Decline: Oct 1914 - May 1915' has some wonderful detail. MG

[Ron Clifton]

... Because Kitchener battalions were community based, the casualty lists would have had an extremely pronounced impact on towns, villages and even streets in these communities. Grief would be concentrated, and centred on the main population centres that provided the Kitchener men.

Martin

Are you sure that you are not confusing K1 and K2 with the locally-raised "Pals" units of the Fourth and Fifth New Armies? K1 and K2 had infantry battalions of geographically related infantry regiments but I have never seen any evidence that these were composed of men from the relevant counties. I would be glad to be shown to be wrong if you have evidence to the contrary.

Ron

[Muerrisch]

As Charles points out, the demands of industry were growing fast too, so Army recruiting is only part of the picture. The Govt really had the very tricky task of putting the right people in the right place. Some argued that leaving it to chance rather than have the Govt organise the allocation of skills and manpower to industry and the military was inefficient.

Interestingly a trawl of Hansard shows that Conscription had been in parliamentary debates almost continuously from the start of the war. It was seen as inevitable by some right from the start despite the initial flood of volunteers. The politician had to tread a very fine line. Even if they thought conscription was inevitable, some might not admit it in public. It was a very skilled operation 'selling' the idea to the British public. The data is interesting but does not show the whole picture.

Simkins' chapter 4 'Recruiting in Decline: Oct 1914 - May 1915' has some wonderful detail. MG

Viscount Haldane S of S War 23 Feb 1907:

......... with the wastage of war one feels that at the end of six months the resources of the War Office may be at an end ......... and then an appeal must be made to the nation itself

Hansard

Not exactly Conscription, and not foreseeing Kitchener's Army either, but then Kitchener's Army was raised/ deployed INSTEAD of the main body of the TF [which latter Haldane was certainly counting on].

The conscription debate was a continuum, as see Compulsory Service by Ian Hamilton , 1910