BEF 1914 - Early Disembarkation and Survivability

[phil andrade]

 

     Thanks Phil-   Again, I suspect that  these figures are slewed by  internment figures for RND (or are they? Does SMEBE distinguish between POW and interned?)   I think factoring total strength by battalion, minus casualties-then minus POWs might prove illuminating as a league table. Conventional wisdom seems to be that the Regular Army was largely destroyed by the end of 1914 but in terms of absolute manpower losses, this might have to be qualified by the POW factor.  If one had a greater chance of becoming a POW in 1914 than in the trench warfare of 1915-1917, then it might well affect survivability figures overall-that is, those who "survived" the war, even if returned from captivity.

     As a moot point, it may well be that as from 11th November 1918, more pre-war regulars had survived the war by being early POWs than had survived by serving throughout.

GUEST,

 

The figure I cited was for August 1914  only : the RND contingent was in the October phase, wasn’t it ?  So I would be confident in asserting that internment is not a factor in that month .

 

The retreat from Mons and the big knocking about at Le Cateau entailed the capture of thousands of British prisoners , captured in large part as they straggled along the way, many being exhausted and demoralised.  A whole battalion was surrendered without a shot being fired at St Quentin in one notorious episode.

 

The 1914 figures in SMEBE have something of a wing and a prayer flavour about them : hardly surprising given the shock and chaos of the opening encounters....it might well be that many of the eight thousand BEF soldiers who were posted as POWs in the August fighting were wounded, or dying.

 

I took a look at CWGC figures for the period 12 -31 August 1914, France and Belgium, and saw that just under 2,300 deaths from all causes are registered : this from a total of fourteeen thousand casualties.  This would - I believe -  include those who died in enemy hands.  

 

For March 1918, the figure is in excess of thirty five thousand - more than one fifth of the month’s total killed, wounded and missing. A rather higher proportion of fatalities among the casualties than was the case in the retreat of August 1914.

 

The implications are that a significantly higher proportion of the August 1914 casualties were unwounded POWs than their March 1918 counterparts.

 

The 1918 retreat was conducted on a more consolidated basis than the first shock of 1914.  In the earlier episode the thing was more “ in the air” without the rallying points and rear supports that came later.

 

Editing here : The actual fighting of 1914 was deadly, and entailed numbers of fatalities that were shocking : not only in absolute, but also in proportionate, terms.  The french figures exemplify this ; and I’m confident that German experience would also endorse it.  For the BEF, the fighting on the Aisne in mid September , and, of course, in late October around Ypres, entailed mortality rates that really did impinge on actual survivability in the starkest way. This was compounded by high losses of prisoners, resulting in irrevocable damage.  The phrase “Death of an Army” is more than a notional one.

 

Phil

 

Phil

[Guest]

I can extract the POW figures, but I think it would be unwise to draw conclusions without providing context. The scenarios where large numbers of POWs were taken in a single day of men in the August 1914 cohorts vary considerably. During the retreat from Mons there were a number of battalion level rearguard actions that ended in disaster where significant numbers of the battalion became casualties in a single day.  I will revert with the number. 2nd Bn RMF and the redoubtable Maj Charrier springs to mind. 

 

Le Cateau also provides one scenario where two battalions lost very significant numbers as POWs. The 2nd Bn Suffolk Regt and 2nd Bn KOYLI were positioned on the extreme right flank on a forward slope with no flank protection. The flank had not been refused and was in clear sight of German artillery observers. Both battalion COs had wrongly been told it was a fight to the last and consequently both battalions stayed put and the later order to withdraw failed to reach them. They were surrounded and overwhelmed losing as many as 600 men each with very significant numbers of POWs. The regular soldiers (most incidentally Reservists) did not "choose' to become POWs by way of self preservation; they were the victims of circumstance. In this case poor command and control was a significant factor.  If memory serves the chaos in the subsequent days also saw small but significant numbers of POWs.

 

Fighting withdrawals and and retreats provided greater opportunity for losing men as POWs for the simple reason the Army was no longer in control of the field at the end of the actions.  I suspect by the time of First Ypres the proportion of POWs was significantly lower. The phase of warfare had a large bearing on possible outcomes in this period. 

 

MG

Edited 17 December , 2017 by Guest

[phil andrade]

Martin,

Yes, the brief investigation I’ve just made makes your point very clearly....

 

SMEBE : Battle casualties August 1914, 14,000 ; prisoners,  8,000 ; CWGC deaths for France/Belgium, 2,300.

 

SMEBE : Battle casualties October-November 1914, 55,000 ; prisoners, 7,200 ; CWGC deaths for France/Belgium, 17,300.

 

The lethal nature of the autumn  Flanders fighting is all too apparent.

 

Editing : putting it as a rough and ready assessment, in the August fighting the prisoners outnumbered the dead by three and a half to one ; in the autumn battles the dead outnumbered the prisoners by nearly two and a half to one.

 

Phil

Edited 17 December , 2017 by phil andrade

[Guest]

6 hours ago, phil andrade said:

Editing : putting it as a rough and ready assessment, in the August fighting the prisoners outnumbered the dead by three and a half to one ; in the autumn battles the dead outnumbered the prisoners by nearly two and a half to one. Phil

 

One wonders why the 'Retreat From Mons' was a general Battle 'Honour'. It seems to be a fairly costly waste of the UK's very limited resources. 

[phil andrade]

1 hour ago, QGE said:

 

One wonders why the 'Retreat From Mons' was a general Battle 'Honour'. It seems to be a fairly costly waste of the UK's very limited resources. 

 

What’s a pig for if you can’t put lipstick on it ?

 

Now I’m  already beginning to repent of that comment  !

 

Phil

[Muerrisch]

I am uneasy with the "Death of an Army" label for 1914.

 

Death by any conventional definition includes cessation of function.

 

The British Army did not cease to function. However it managed to keep going and fighting, it certainly was not dead. 

 

I am not sure if the matter has been studied, so suggest very diffidently that the regimental and corps ethos personified by the surviving regulars and regular reservists was vital. The true scale of losses seems to have been understood by the battered remnants, who appear to have soldiered on in the expectation of prevailing.

[Guest]

Death of an Army is not the same as death as in mortality.  The aim of warfare is the disablement from resistance of your enemy-either by inflicting casualties or knocking the foe out by other means. The warfare of 1914 was qualitatively different to 1915 onwards- that of 1914 was similar to the only war experience of a European war that the Staff instructors usually had to go on-that of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71- Similar in many ways to the British experience of 1914- a war of movement punctuated by quite savage and costly engagement.

    I do not seek to belittle the achievement or the martial actions of 1914. War is an extended and deadly caprice- Some units will be slaughtered-especially in the rearguard actions-while others take fewer physical casualties but a war of movement means more running hither and thither  and more prisoners. Personally, I think the POW factor in the demise of the old Regular Army of 1914 is underrated and must be factored in as well as physical casualties-all contributed to the severe dislocation of the old army by Christmas 1914. But the 2  factors-physical casualties and POWs do not seem to get factored in together and all I suggest is that it is about time that both were "league tabled" to see the overall effects of losses from all causes to units in 1914. A concentration on just physical casualties distorts the memory.

 

     Wexflyer-I do not suggest that men of the Regular Army chose,en masse, to become POws-It is jsut the way that the fighting of 1914 panned out. As hot war engagements were unpredictable-and measured by substantial martial spiirt, then that suggests that the British Regular units would fight when they could.

[phil andrade]

Martin’s research suggests that one third of all the men who disembarked in mid August 1914 were dead by the end of the war.  The great majority of these perished in the first twelve months.  We might legitimately assume, then, that one quarter of the entire August 1914 contingent was dead within the year ; perhaps another one fifth had been taken prisoner - Guest is right to remind us of that.  Add on the permanently disabled through wounds or illness , and the destruction - within a year - of the best part ( ie more than two thirds ) of the entire force that disembarked is a statistical truth. 

 

Phil

 

 

[Guest]

On 17/12/2017 at 23:12, phil andrade said:

Martin’s research suggests that one third of all the men who disembarked in mid August 1914 were dead by the end of the war.  The great majority of these perished in the first twelve months.  We might legitimately assume, then, that one quarter of the entire August 1914 contingent was dead within the year ; perhaps another one fifth had been taken prisoner - GUEST is right to remind us of that.  Add on the permanently disabled through wounds or illness , and the destruction - within a year - of the best part ( ie more than two thirds ) of the entire force that disembarked is a statistical truth. 

 

Phil

 

 

 

      Phil-  I would guess your figures are broadly correct. It does illustrate a further manpower strain of 1914-if I read it right. Conventional wisdom is that the junior officer stock is the most vulnerable part of an army in a war of attrition and heavy casualties-You are killing off the seed-corn of your senior officer stock of years to come. Of course, the  same applies to the senior NCO stock.

     But a small doubt- conventional narratives are that the grinding down of the Regular Army gave way to grinding down of the Territorials through 1915. If you blink, then you miss a part.  Not sufficient attention is given to the topping up of Regular battalions from reservists -both on initial despatch to France and Belgium-and for the 2 months of September-October 1914 when it looks like the stock of reservists was the major source (or was it?) of replacement manpower before the first Territorials were up to snuff. It is a truism that many/most Regular battalions on home posting were routinely understrength.  I for one do not know what the percentages were of the casualties to "Regular" battalions in 1914-August in particular-who were recently returned reservists-ie that the "Regular" battalions were not quite the fully-formed "Boys of the Old Brigade" of historical myth-and that there was a great deal more of scratching around even in the first few weeks and first divisions that went off- Anecdotally, a few of the earlier officer casualties locally were men of no previous regular or TA experience but were commissioned to bring battalions up to full strength. I did some work on A and S casualties in 1914 for a lady asking about a forebear and was surprised at the number of reservists who had been pitched in at the deep end. I think that POw numbers colour the historical narrative of losses to the Regular Army-and the myth of its heroic destruction- while the use of reservists in the crucial first 3 months has also received insufficient attention. See if we can push Martin for some stats. Basically, the Regular Army-ie the BEF of August 1914-was not that Regular-while the POW losses were a knock-out as powerful as physical casualties.

[Muerrisch]

The aim of warfare is the disablement from resistance of your enemy-either by inflicting casualties or knocking the foe out by other means.

 

Really? Not according to Clausewitz, or indeed Caldwell [to cite extreme ends of the scale], or any other doctrine that I have read.

 

Is this what was taught in Sandhurst in 1913?

 

 

Edited 18 December , 2017 by Muerrisch
brevity

[Guest]

38 minutes ago, Muerrisch said:

The aim of warfare is the disablement from resistance of your enemy-either by inflicting casualties or knocking the foe out by other means.

 

Really? Not according to Clausewitz, or indeed Caldwell [to cite extreme ends of the scale], or any other doctrine that I have read.

 

Is this what was taught in Sandhurst in 1913?

 

 

  Answer to your question- No idea.

 

       But I do believe that the broad brush of European warfare from the Renaissance has been the gradual escalation of the infliction of casualties rather than the disablement of your opponent-which is not the same thing.  Killing the maximum numbers of your enemies is not a long-standing tradition in European warfare. I recollect Michael Howards excellent small book "War in European History" is good on this subject-as well as the pendulum theory that warfare has swung from advantage being with the offensive to the defensive and back again across the centuries.

    Im not getting into a mini debate on Cluauswitz- save to say that my understanding is that total victory does not neccessarily mean total destruction.

[Guest]

Prisoners of War. The distribution of POWs was very uneven for the infantry. As mentioned upstream there were operations in certain phases of the War when the risk of becoming a POW was higher. By way of illustration here are the1st Bn Cameron Highlanders (highest fatalities in 1914), 2nd Bn Royal Sussex Regt (which had the closest to 'average' fatalities during 1914), and the 2nd Bn Suffolk Regt (one of the lowest fatalities in 1914 but annihilated at Le Cateau)

 

.............................................................1st Cohort.........Fatal.....%..........POW......%

1st Bn Cameron Highlanders........1.096.................482......44%........54........6%

2nd Bn Royal Sussex Regt ...........1,020..................327......32%.......19.........2%

2nd Bn Suffolk Regt..........................990..................153......15%......529.......53%

 

Clearly having half the original cohort taken as POWs (at Le Cateau) within two weeks of disembarking, dramatically reduced the fatality ratio for this battalion. From a commander's perspective whether a men were fatalities or POWs, both categories were Permanent Casualties and needed to be replaced. From this perspective, the permanent casualties in the form of fatalities and POWs were greatest for the 2nd Bn Suffolk Regt at 682 or 69% of the original cohort.

 

It would be possible to add those medically discharged, although I believe the medal rolls are less reliable in this category as some failed to differentiate between 'Discharged Medically' Unfit and plain 'Discharged' The 2nd Bn Suffolk Regt had an additional 75 men 'Discharged' and not one 'Discharged Medically Unfit', which seems so unlikely as to be almost impossible. For this reason I have avoided this comparison. 

 

MG

 

Edited 18 December , 2017 by Guest

[Muerrisch]

 

  Answer to your question- No idea.

 

       But I do believe that the broad brush of European warfare from the Renaissance has been the gradual escalation of the infliction of casualties rather than the disablement of your opponent-which is not the same thing.  Killing the maximum numbers of your enemies is not a long-standing tradition in European warfare. I recollect Michael Howards excellent small book "War in European History" is good on this subject-as well as the pendulum theory that warfare has swung from advantage being with the offensive to the defensive and back again across the centuries.

    Im not getting into a mini debate on Cluauswitz- save to say that my understanding is that total victory does not neccessarily mean total destruction.

It really is not good enough in a serious thread to come up with a novel exposition of "the aim of warfare" and then walk away from it. However, I respect your need to not discuss it further.

[Guest]

28 minutes ago, Muerrisch said:

It really is not good enough in a serious thread to come up with a novel exposition of "the aim of warfare" and then walk away from it. However, I respect your need to not discuss it further.

 

    Don't knock me  matey-  Just keeping the thread on topic. If you want a thread on "What did Clausewitz really men?", then get off your your fundament and start one

[Muerrisch]

 

    Don't knock me  matey-  Just keeping the thread on topic. If you want a thread on "What did Clausewitz really men?", then get off your your fundament and start one

I am not your matey.

 

I respect your need to take the matter no further.

 

Please PM me should you wish, thus keeping the thread on topic.

 

 

[Derek Black]

On 17/12/2017 at 23:12, phil andrade said:

Martin’s research suggests that one third of all the men who disembarked in mid August 1914 were dead by the end of the war.  The great majority of these perished in the first twelve months.  We might legitimately assume, then, that one quarter of the entire August 1914 contingent was dead within the year ; perhaps another one fifth had been taken prisoner - GUEST is right to remind us of that.  Add on the permanently disabled through wounds or illness , and the destruction - within a year - of the best part ( ie more than two thirds ) of the entire force that disembarked is a statistical truth. 

 

Phil

1st Btn Black Watch 13/08/1914
O.R. initial cohort 1,153

277 Permanent losses by the end of 1914 - 24%
231 Dead - 20%
34 PoW - 2.9%
12 Discharged - 1%

458 Permanent losses after 12 months - 39.6%
336 Dead - 29%
34 PoW - 2.9%
89 Discharged - 7.7%

713 Permanent losses by 11/11/1918 - 61.8%
446 Dead - 38.7%
34 PoW - 2.9%
233 Discharged - 20.2%

(no doubt cases of discharged men are not recorded in the star rolls. Not included are several deaths and discharges ocurring after 11/11/1918. The PoW number looks static, but it is not. There are PoW deaths which are in a later Dead total, later PoW's top up the number to 34)

Derek.

[phil andrade]

Derek,

 

Thank you for providing that tabulation.

 

It rather dispels my assertion that two thirds of the entire disembarked force from mid August 1914 was out of action after twelve months.

 

I suppose that if this Battalion had sustained a loss in POWs that reflected the general experience of the BEF in 1914, the  34 posted by the end of 1914 would rise to around 150....but the 1st Black Watch were conspicuously successful in not yielding prisoners.

 

Intrigued at the omission of wounded from the figures : there must have been several hundred cases of wounds in 1914 alone, and even if the great majority were returned to active service,  there would still have been several dozen permanently incapacitated .  Viewed in that light, the figure of 12 discharged baffles me.  

 

Editing here : does memory serve me if I mention that there were some battalions at First Ypres that were surrounded and subjected to attacks in which the enemy gave no quarter ?  If so, then perhaps this unit was one such, and suffered an extraordinarily high proportion of killed with relatively few wounded, and a surprisingly small number taken prisoner .

 

 

Phil

Edited 19 December , 2017 by phil andrade

[Guest]

On 12/18/2017 at 09:37, QGE said:

Prisoners of War. The distribution of POWs was very uneven for the infantry. As mentioned upstream there were operations in certain phases of the War when the risk of becoming a POW was higher. By way of illustration here are the1st Bn Cameron Highlanders (highest fatalities in 1914), 2nd Bn Royal Sussex Regt (which had the closest to 'average' fatalities during 1914), and the 2nd Bn Suffolk Regt (one of the lowest fatalities in 1914 but annihilated at Le Cateau)

 

.............................................................1st Cohort.........Fatal.....%..........POW......%

1st Bn Cameron Highlanders........1.096.................482......44%........54........6%

2nd Bn Royal Sussex Regt ...........1,020..................327......32%.......19.........2%

2nd Bn Suffolk Regt..........................990..................153......15%......529.......53%

 

Clearly having half the original cohort taken as POWs (at Le Cateau) within two weeks of disembarking, dramatically reduced the fatality ratio for this battalion. From a commander's perspective whether a men were fatalities or POWs, both categories were Permanent Casualties and needed to be replaced. From this perspective, the permanent casualties in the form of fatalities and POWs were greatest for the 2nd Bn Suffolk Regt at 682 or 69% of the original cohort.

 

It would be possible to add those medically discharged, although I believe the medal rolls are less reliable in this category as some failed to differentiate between 'Discharged Medically' Unfit and plain 'Discharged' The 2nd Bn Suffolk Regt had an additional 75 men 'Discharged' and not one 'Discharged Medically Unfit', which seems so unlikely as to be almost impossible. For this reason I have avoided this comparison. 

 

MG

 

 

     Martin-   Interesting stuff.  I put up the notion of POWs being another factor as they were,indeed, permanent losses- and just a much a headache to Brigade, Division, and Army staff officers charged with keeping the numbers up to snuff. The POWs of 1914 do not seem much represented in the popular literature- Retreat to Mons, Old Contemptibles,etc.  2 small things that may be worthy of comment  ( having looked at Derek Black's tabulation for the Black Watch)

 

1)  War losses are different-BUT over a 4 year period (the length of the war), then there would have been some amount of churn in a peacetime battalion-so I suppose that percentage ought to be set against the wartime losses-just to remind us that no battalion was static anyway  I suspect there was a fair amount of churn between 4th August 1914 and the arrival of any battalion in France and Flanders thereafter- removal of the obviously unfit or transfer to "base details", the influx of reservists to bring up numbers-and,of course, the extent of loss to provide some stiffening to Territorial and New Army battalions of the same regiments- Not seen any figures for that anywhere.  (And I would take a flying guess-for reasons of practicality- that the return of "reservists" to the Colours was  gradated- that the most recent reservists were the most likely to be used to bump up numbers for battalions going to France).

 

2)  Transfer within a regiment. The splendid lists on LLT of each regiment show the service battalions and the odds-and-sods battalions beyond that. Again, I suspect that effective real loss to frontline units was masked  somewhat by transfer to  secondary battalions which would never get into the fighting-the static guard battalions for example. With a large number of the local casualties that I potter away at, then there was very frequent transfer between battalions of the same regiment. I think 4 different battalions of the same regiment is the record so far. And not infrequently the pattern is wounded with a regular battalion (or frontline), transfer to  home battalion, then posting to another frontline battalion of the same regiment as depots were swept for drafts. So another small statistic that may be buried away somewhere- the number of 1914 men in a Regular battalion who survived the war but in another battalion of the same regiment. It makes consideration of whether "wounded" are permanent losses- as so many continue to serve in another battalion subsequently. But loss to the original battalion of 1914 is what we are at-so again, another disrupter to functioning of a battalion.

 

3) The massive growth of the service providers during the war-  esp. Labour Corps and RASC. I have already suggested that the Labour Corps was,effectively, industrial conscription as retaining men in the Army who were not fit for frontline service (esp volunteers for "duration of war") was  really "state direction of labour", albeit somewhat  disguised. Now, if the Labour Corps-in particular- grew during the war, does this mean that the frontline battalions actually-percentage-wise- spent more time in the frontline as the war progressed-as some of those tasks that occupied battalion time in 1914-1915 were taken over by the expansion of the Labour Corps. Just a thought-  as my general reading of war diaries as and when I have to read them suggests that as the war progresses, there is a much harsher regime of frontline and training regimes than earlier in the war-where frontline battalions might spend more "turns" just on trench building or repair-or on salvage. Thus, -in short- as the war progressed-did "frontline" battalions actually spend proportionately more time in the frontline??

 

 

[Derek Black]

3 hours ago, phil andrade said:

Derek,

 

Thank you for providing that tabulation.

 

It rather dispels my assertion that two thirds of the entire disembarked force from mid August 1914 was out of action after twelve months.

 

I suppose that if this Battalion had sustained a loss in POWs that reflected the general experience of the BEF in 1914, the  34 posted by the end of 1914 would rise to around 150....but the 1st Black Watch were conspicuously successful in not yielding prisoners.

 

Intrigued at the omission of wounded from the figures : there must have been several hundred cases of wounds in 1914 alone, and even if the great majority were returned to active service,  there would still have been several dozen permanently incapacitated .  Viewed in that light, the figure of 12 discharged baffles me.  

Those who were wounded but did return to the btn, are of course not recorded.
Discharge dates could be months after a serious wounding. 1 man wounded on the 30/09/1914 was discharged on 12/12/1914.

Transfers to other units don't really get going until mid 1915, including groups to garrison btns, where men with debility not enough to merit a discharge would have been sent.

 

Editing here : does memory serve me if I mention that there were some battalions at First Ypres that were surrounded and subjected to attacks in which the enemy gave no quarter ?  If so, then perhaps this unit was one such, and suffered an extraordinarily high proportion of killed with relatively few wounded, and a surprisingly small number taken prisoner .

 

Phil

 

[Guest]

 

     Martin-   Interesting stuff.  I put up the notion of POWs being another factor as they were,indeed, permanent losses- and just a much a headache to Brigade, Division, and Army staff officers charged with keeping the numbers up to snuff. The POWs of 1914 do not seem much represented in the popular literature- Retreat to Mons, Old Contemptibles,etc.  2 small things that may be worthy of comment  ( having looked at Derek Black's tabulation for the Black Watch)

 

1)  War losses are different-BUT over a 4 year period (the length of the war), then there would have been some amount of churn in a peacetime battalion-so I suppose that percentage ought to be set against the wartime losses-just to remind us that no battalion was static anyway  I suspect there was a fair amount of churn between 4th August 1914 and the arrival of any battalion in France and Flanders thereafter- removal of the obviously unfit or transfer to "base details", the influx of reservists to bring up numbers-and,of course, the extent of loss to provide some stiffening to Territorial and New Army battalions of the same regiments- Not seen any figures for that anywhere.  (And I would take a flying guess-for reasons of practicality- that the return of "reservists" to the Colours was  gradated- that the most recent reservists were the most likely to be used to bump up numbers for battalions going to France). Average requirements for Reservists for regular Line infantry were around 600 for the original 'Home' based battalions. Overseas battlions required far less, in the order of 150-200  - despite being at Peace Establishment they needed to weed out unfits and add 1st Reinforcements. In general Reservists were 'draded, those having left most recently being the most desireable and the old 3 & 9 men the least. Intermixed by the Special Reservists. There is a long and very detailed thread on this and an article in Stand To that provides the forensics. New Army K1 took 15 regular NCOs and were supplemented with time expired re-enlisted men. 

 

2)  Transfer within a regiment. The splendid lists on LLT of each regiment show the service battalions and the odds-and-sods battalions beyond that. Again, I suspect that effective real loss to frontline units was masked  somewhat by transfer to  secondary battalions which would never get into the fighting-the static guard battalions for example. With a large number of the local casualties that I potter away at, then there was very frequent transfer between battalions of the same regiment. I think 4 different battalions of the same regiment is the record so far. The BWM rolls are the best source for this as they usually record the battalions the man served in. And not infrequently the pattern is wounded with a regular battalion (or frontline), transfer to  home battalion, then posting to another frontline battalion of the same regiment as depots were swept for drafts. So another small statistic that may be buried away somewhere- the number of 1914 men in a Regular battalion who survived the war but in another battalion of the same regiment. It makes consideration of whether "wounded" are permanent losses- as so many continue to serve in another battalion subsequently. But loss to the original battalion of 1914 is what we are at-so again, another disrupter to functioning of a battalion. Recycling wounded, sick and injured is an extremely complesex area. This was highlighted back on post #131 I have attached the flow chart for ease. The 2nd Bn Royal Sussex Regt ledger would undermine the widely held belief that a large majority of men returned to 'front line' duty. I am not convinced that they did. The reality seems more likely to have been transferred to home based training units but not necessarily medically downgraded. 

 

3) The massive growth of the service providers during the war-  esp. Labour Corps and RASC. I have already suggested that the Labour Corps was,effectively, industrial conscription as retaining men in the Army who were not fit for front line service (esp volunteers for "duration of war") was  really "state direction of labour", albeit somewhat  disguised. Now, if the Labour Corps-in particular- grew during the war, does this mean that the front line battalions actually-percentage-wise- spent more time in the front line as the war progressed-as some of those tasks that occupied battalion time in 1914-1915 were taken over by the expansion of the Labour Corps. Just a thought-  as my general reading of war diaries as and when I have to read them suggests that as the war progresses, there is a much harsher regime of front line and training regimes than earlier in the war - where frontline battalions might spend more "turns" just on trench building or repair-or on salvage. Thus, -in short- as the war progressed-did "front line" battalions actually spend proportionately more time in the front line?? I don't know for sure. I have a number of battalion war diaries transcribed for the whole war so it would be possible to take a sample. My instincts suggest that 1914 was pretty demanding with little respite until late Nov 1914. It is only when more units started to arrive in the shape of TF Divisions and K1 Divisions in 1915 could the original 8 Divisions get some real break. One also needs to understand that the BEF had a manning crisis in Spring 1915, something that is barely touched on in any published history of the period. See separate thread. I think it is axiomatic that as ancillary corps expanded the burden on the infantry when in rest areas  diminished. The main dynamic would (I think) simply be the expansion of the Infantry formations in the field from mid 1915 onward.i.e. well before the formation of the Labour Corps.

Flow chart for wounded, sick and injured. What is intriguing about the chart below is to follow the Wounded. Of every 10,000 men hospitalisedin France and Flanders, 4,272 were Wounded. Of these 4,107 (96%) were evacuated to Blighty. Compare this to the 4,412 Sick (per 10,000 hospitalised) only 1,206 were evacuated to the UK (25%). Nearly 75% of the sick were recycled....the point is that the non-fatal battle casualty data is heavily skewed. Wounded men who were hospitalised were almost certain to be sent home - the famous 'Blighty Wound'. This process involved being struck of battalion rolls and if they recovered meant being sent to a Reserve battalion and then on to a front line battalion. I have done no analysis on the probability of man who fully recovered from wounds  being returned to  his original battalion. It is difficult to find the necessary data. 

 

If the Royal Sussex Regt ledger is any guide, an change of battalion usually meant the man had been a casualty between postings. 

 

The other interesting aspect is that only 2.97% of hospitalised men died. An incredible survival rate. 

 

The chart is re-calibrated for 10,000 non-fatal casualties based on proportional data from History of the Medical Services: Statistics

 

[Guest]

9 hours ago, phil andrade said:

Derek,

Thank you for providing that tabulation.

It rather dispels my assertion that two thirds of the entire disembarked force from mid August 1914 was out of action after twelve months.

Phil

 

The OH 1914 chapter "Retrospect" claims around one Officer and 30 men from each battalion's 'originals'  were still standing at the end of 1914. We have a good handle on the killed: around 25%-30% meaning another 65% - 70% were invalided.

 

MG

[phil andrade]

 Thanks, Martin.

 

Why have virtually all the wounded gone off the radar in Derek’s table ?

 

If only 89 men had been discharged by the end of 12 months, the implications for the recovery and return of the wounded are amazing.

 

Editing : just seen your earlier post.

 

The minimal death rate among wounded admitted to hospital could be testimony to the abandonment of severe cases on the battlefield : they perished and were counted as missing until their fate could be ascertained ?

 

The medical statistics for 1914 BEF indicate an overall death rate of just over six per cent of all wounded admitted to medical facilities : this would include aid posts and CCS.  I suppose the men who got to the base hospitals were endowed with a better chance of survival.

 

Phil

Edited 19 December , 2017 by phil andrade

[Guest]

1st Bn Cameron Highlanders 1914 Star roll.

 

11.3% 'discharged'* or whom 4.5% were medically discharged. This does not included Dicharged to commission or Discharged Termination of Engagement 1st or 2nd Period

11.1% transferred to other units, mostly training units and Garrison Battalions  or Labour Corps.

22.4% or more than one in five men either discharged or transferred.

 

I suspect that men transferred to other units were generally medically downgraded, particularly those sent to Training units Garrison Battalions and Labour Corps units

 

What the rolls don't show is men transferred to Home based Reserve units who were medically downgraded but not discharged. 

 

* the Royal Sussex Regt Ledger (the most complete record I have) indicates that 'plain discharged was sometimes shorthand for Discharged Medically Unfit. The point is that record keeping was not always consistent. MG

 

[Guest]

1 hour ago, phil andrade said:

The minimal death rate among wounded admitted to hospital could be testimony to the abandonment of severe cases on the battlefield : they perished and were counted as missing until their fate could be ascertained ?

 

    I suspect that quite a high number of of wounded  in 1914 ended up as POW- and that the benevolent lack of mortality rate in British  hospital admissions is because the sample is slewed- those seriously wounded had to be left in a time of extensive retreats. My very first casualty for Wanstead here in the east of London illustrates this- Valentine James Smith, RFA- his unit was engaged for no-more than 20 minutes when south of the Mons Canal at Battle of Mons. He was hit by either long range bullet from an advancing  German column or by shell fragment from efficient German counter-battery work, which was not spotted. He was left and died 2 days later in a German Feldlazarett set up at Obourg, a suburb of Mons. Buried with him were 2 other DOW casualties, one of the Middlesex and one of the Royal Irish-abandoned also after Mons as the retreat came close to rout.

    I have no idea what the deaths in captivity figures were for 1914 but would take a bet that the figures are quite high compared to 1915-1917.  My background reading for Valentine Smith suggests that abandonment of seriously wounded to German captivity and treatment was the only practical choice in 1914- and seems to be well represented in the literature if you drill down- past all the 15 Rounds a Minute, Old Contemptibles, glorious retreat  stuff..

Edited 19 December , 2017 by Guest

[phil andrade]

 

 

It’s always gratifying to have one’s suspicions confirmed by the sort of research that you’ve been kind enough to share.

 

Abandonment of one’s wounded to the enemy is, apparently, very damaging to morale.

 

This was very much a criterion for victory and/or defeat in the American Civil War ; I am confident that it was also a significant factor in 1914.  

 

In this respect, I imagine that the French were especially shaken by the experience of the Battle of the Frontiers, which replicated the kind of British experience you’ve cited but on a tenfold - or, more likely, twentyfold - scale.

 

Martin,

 

Do you share my surprise at the relatively low percentage of soldiers who were discharged for medical reasons ?

 

Phil