Why was Allenby successful in the desert

[armourersergeant]

I find myself asking that can a man change so much that he can perform below average in one area of war and yet excel in another.

Allenby, bullish and unapproachable, was an average ,if that , commander on the Western Front, yet he excelled in the desert.

If we say that he used the officers (Chavuel, Meinetzhagen etc) and conditions around him , then why did he not do so on the WF.

If we say that his training and outlook was best suited to open warfare then by definition we can almost say that his performance on the WF was not really his fault as he had not had the experience and training to cope with it.

He seems to have shown an aptitude to use others around him and subterfuge to gain what he wanted in the desert, with less resources than he had in say 1917 Arras. Why did he not use what he had, not encourage those around him, accept advice etc on the WF?

What i seem to be thinking, and saying very badly, is that is Allenbys success justification for the reasoning that most Commanders on the western front, just felt hopelessly out of their depth with the war they were forced to face and often did not cope. Yet when he was put in a war he understood he showd all the 'brians' he had to adapt his own thoughts and use the resources he had around him. thus just because he did not cope on the western front does not make him a bad commander.

Or is this just too simplified an answer?

[michaeldr]

Arm,

I have a niggling feeling that we have covered this before, however there is no harm in that

You said, “just because he did not cope on the western front does not make him a bad commander.” It seems to me that there could be more than a few candidates for that dose of faint praise, not just Allenby. Where the Bull scored however was in his incredible good luck. I do not think that it is enough to say that as a cavalry man the terrain in Palestine suited him or that he used the officers around him to better effect. Nor am I certain how this will help you resolve your question as to whether “most Commanders on the western front, just felt hopelessly out of their depth with the war they were forced to face and often did not cope” however I would like to offer for consideration the fact that Allenby had a huge advantage in Palestine because of his access to impeccable intelligence and that basically he knew exactly where his enemy was and what he was up to, throughout the campaign.

The following is from a letter in Allenby’s hand dated 14 July 1919

“The death of Aaron Aaronson deprived me of a valued friend and of a staff officer impossible to replace. He was mainly responsible for the formation of my Field Intelligence Organisation behind Turkish lines…His death is a loss to the British Empire.”

Allenby was similarly fulsome in his tribute to Alexander Aaronson [awarded the DSO]

“The name of Aaronson will through the ages be remembered as that of a family who, with entire disregard of self, endured all – even martyrdom – in the cause of Civilisation and Humanity; and whose courage and devotion were largely instrumental in carrying that cause to final success.”

Allenby is here referring to the Nili spy ring and in particular the reference to martyrdom is to the sister of the Aaronsons, Sarah. The spies were in contact with the British through a supply ship, the ‘Monegan,’ which sailed regularly to a point off the coast near Atlit. Eventually German submarine activity in the area made direct contact with the ship impossible and so carrier pigeons were used. One of these pigeons was captured by the Ottomans when it came down in a Turkish Army camp. The Nili used a code made up of Hebrew, Aramaic, French and English and it took the Turks some time to crack it, however eventually they did and Sarah Aaronson was arrested at her home in the village of Zichron Yaacov. She was tortured there for four days before it was decided to take her to the Turkish/German HQ at Nazareth. Sarah then persuaded her captors that her blood stained clothes would make a bad impression on the local population during her journey across country, so she was given permission to change her dress. In her bathroom she took a hidden pistol and shot herself; I understand it that took her some further days to eventually die.

Major General George Macdonogh, Director of Military Intelligence at the War Office speaking at the RMA Woolwich in 1919 said

“Someone who is looking from the sidelines, lacking knowledge about the situation, is likely to think that Allenby took unwarranted risks. That is not true. For Allenby knew with certainty from his intelligence (in Palestine) of all the preparations and all the movements of his enemy. All the cards of his enemy were revealed to him, and so he could play his hand with complete confidence. Under these conditions, victory was certain before he began.”

Raymond Savage, Deputy Military Secretary to Allenby, said in 1924

“It was very largely the daring work of young spies, most of them native of Palestine, which enabled the brilliant Field Marshal to accomplish his undertaking so effectively.”

Brigadier General Gilbert Clayton wrote

“We owe the lives of 30,000 soldiers to the NILI.”

Info from ‘Agents of Empire’ edited by Anthony Verrier and from ‘Heroes of Israel’ by Chaim Hertzog

Regards

Michael D.R.

[armourersergeant]

Michael, I am sure we have covered this before, as often there are no knew questions just different takes and angles of the same one.

Besides i tried using the search but did not bring up what i was looking for.

Surely it is easy to say that he was lucky, he was well delivered by his officers and so on. But would it then have been the same if Haig or Rawlinson had gone out and taken over the role? Did Allenby not show any originality of his own, show incite, that he had not on the Westrn Front.

Allenby was possibly left to his own devices and this may have released his alegedly shy nature to deminish and thus the confidence was able to expand as he was not subordinate to a higher emmidiate command as on the western front with Haig who i believe he was 'cool' with.

You have mentioned the Nili ring, something that i have not heard of, was this around when Archie Murray was in charge and did he use this intelliegence? How much had things changed since Murray had been in charge and did Murray lay the ground work for Allenbys victories?

I know i am going of question a bit but what the hell

regards

Arm

[Guest bonza]

Australian Light Horse

[Guest British Frontier]

Negativity is rife i c. Weren't the turk's using their arab spies too ?? And besides it's one thing having inteligence but another thing skillfully employing an Army and tactics against what you have to face. You need a capable commander to conduct these battles and Allenby did that. That's why Michael is missing the point as he likes to find fault and diminish peoples attributes.

[Malcolm]

Maybe because he had a damn good Army and didn't have Haig et al telling him what to do.

Aye

Malcolm

[Guest bonza]

it's one thing having inteligence

Michael is missing the point as he likes to find fault and diminish peoples attributes.

My money's on Michael.

I'd like to change my answer to "The Desert Column"

Bluey got sent up to HQ with a message. He tracked down the right office, threw an impeccable salute & reported "Message for the Intelligent Officer". "You mean Intelligence Officer, my man. This is the Army, you won't find any..."

Bluey got a packet of fags for his trouble.

Aye Aye & ooRoo

Pat

[Guest bonza]

You have mentioned the Nili ring, something that i have not heard of,

Michael, Arm.,

Me neither. Please don't limit yourself to specifics, How about giving us the good oil on the War in the Desert?

regards

Pat

[michaeldr]

Arm & Pat,

The advantage which the Nili provided has been compared to the breaking of the Enigma codes in WWII.

I will work something up over the weekend and get back to you a little later with a few more details.

Best regards

Michael D.R.

[domsim]

The intelligence story of the Palestine is certainly a fascinating subject. I highly recommend anybody interested to read Yigal Sheffy's book 'British Military intelleigence in the Palestine 1914-1918 published in 1998. It is a mine of information and presents a comprehensive picture of the depth and sophistication of the intelligence activities in this area.

Dominic

[Robert Dunlop]

I would second Dominic's suggestion. Yigal's book places the Nili in a much broader context.

Robert

[Nick]

Interesting. Intelligence counts for a lot that's for sure.

I have to start by saying that I don't know a great deal about Allenby's role on the Western Front but I would ascribe his success in the East to a number of factors. Not least of which would be:

a) A steady deterioration in the overall quality and organisation of the troops opposing him. This would include communications, supplies and co-ordination as well as levels of leadership and morale.

The steady improvement of the troops and officers working for him - most particularly the ALH, Cameliers etc - and importantly the Yeomanry who by 1918 were very different to the guys who were seen at Katia two years earlier

c) He had more troops than Murray had, enabling him to pin (or even push!) in one section of the line whilst assaulting in another. Murray, it might be argued, was never sufficiently strong to enable him to do that.

d) The Turks in Palestine, unlike the Germans on the Western Front, were less able to maintain a single, strong defensive line. Problems with wire etc didn't help. This inevitably led to weak points which the Bull was able to exploit with his mounted troops. He was able to fight the flexible war that eluded campaigners on the western front.

e) Changing air superiority was able to, in some way, restrict the air recon capabilities of the opposition while improving his own.

f) The relative weakness of Turkish Artillery (when compared to the Western Front) meant he was able to group and attack without risk of western front level casualties.

g) Perhaps greater command autonomy than was available on the western front.

I think another interesting question is - was it Allenby who made the difference, or could anyone taking over after 2nd Gaza and given the resources that Allenby was have achieved the same? Did that fact that he was a Cavalry general make any difference?

I am not able to check replies as frequently as I would like but remain interested in the views of others.

Regards

Nick

[KONDOA]

On the Western Front we had two of the best armies in the World facing each other on virtually impenatratable fixed fronts with no mobility and no flanks. In other words the lack of mobility and weak points resulting from mobility did not exist and thus the Western Front became what is now recognised as a war of attrition with the British learning faster than the Germans how to develop the weak points that ultimatly allow an advantage and as was proved a victory. On the other hand Allenby was removed, as already stated, to a war scenario familiar to his training and past experience with a significantly less able opponent albeit competant and in a mobile war. Yes, luck did play a part but that is the case for all leaders (Bad luck it rained at Passchendeal). Allenby was able to find the weak points and make use of them, something very few commanders on the western front were able to achieve until a significant learning curve had been endured and the resources were sufficient to apply a decisive blow on the hinge points of the weakening German line.

[Max]

Maybe because he had a damn good Army and didn't have Haig et al telling him what to do.

I think Malcolm has hit the nail on the head. A capable army commanded by a man who was geographically isolated from the over the shoulder control of both Supreme Command and Whitehall .

[Guest stevenbec]

Mate,

Can I also add that having the ability to look "over the hill" is only as good as what you then do with the view you are given.

Even then is will not win your battle if you do not have the troops, guns and what even to make use of this intell.

And of cause the same intell was aviaible to Murray as it was to Allenby but how it was used were also different.

Murray's Verdum style battles in front of Gaza the case in point.

S.B

[michaeldr]

Where the Bull scored however was in his incredible good luck. I do not think that it is enough to say that as a cavalry man the terrain in Palestine suited him or that he used the officers around him to better effect......... however I would like to offer for consideration the fact that Allenby had a huge advantage in Palestine because of his access to impeccable intelligence and that basically he knew exactly where his enemy was and what he was up to, throughout the campaign.

Arm & Pat,

As promised, herewith some amplification which you both requested. I am pleased to see that some others here are as well, if not better, informed on the Nili and so I will be happy to receive any corrections on this subject

NILI was the name chosen by the organisation for itself, however to the Eastern Mediterranean Special Intelligence Bureau (EMSIB) it was the ‘A’ organisation

The word NILI is an acronym formed from the Hebrew initial letters of a phrase from scripture which roughly translates as ‘God won’t let us down.’

Yes, Nili’s intelligence was available to Allenby’s predecessors, however the group was discounted out of hand by an intelligence unit which came very close to Pat’s joke above. In his notes Anthony Verrier states “EMSIB recruited few officers of quality. The letter-book and Diary of J. de-Vere Loder in St.Anthony’s Middle East Centre Archives reveal the plain fact that he, and several brother officers, treated EMSIB operations as a lark, a leave from ‘proper soldiering.’ Loder had been invalided from Gallipoli: EMSIB headquarters was, in the parlance of the day ‘a cushy billet.’ Thus, after the Ottoman Turkish attack on the Suez Canal when it was clear that the British lacked information about their enemy’s army and its movements the NILI decide to contact them. Alex Aaronsohn reached Cairo in July 1915 and saw Maj [later Col] Newcombe, who thanked him for his efforts but declined the offer of help. [Newcomb was an exception in that he did take his job seriously, however his approach was one-track, the Arab Revolt, and he regarded with suspicion anyone with other ideas] A second emissary, Feinberg, was sent in August/September 1915, and it was agreed to maintain contact between the British and the Nili, however that was more difficult than at first thought. The trawler meant to collect the messages failed to appear for several weeks and the question inevitably arises in one’s mind; was Feinberg sent on his way with empty promises and promptly forgotten about?

Feinberg decided to again go himself to Cairo. En route he was captured and then imprisoned at Beersheva. [Feinberg was an anglophile who while in Beersheva prison wrote a poem about an English airman who was shot by Tarabin Bedouin as he tried to prevent his crashed aircraft from falling into enemy hands by setting fire to it] He gave nothing away and was released after three weeks and the intervention of Aaron Aaronsohn, the brother of Alex, an internationally famous agronomist and persona grata with Djemal Pasha. More months passed and there were further troubles with the messenger.

In desperation Aaron Aaronsohn decided to make contact himself, getting permission in July 1916 from the Ottoman authorities for him to make a scientific research trip to Europe, his cover being the proposed use of a substitute oil extracted from sesame.

Aaron travelled via Istanbul, Berlin and Copenhagen from where he booked passage to the USA. At Kirkwall he was ‘arrested’ by the British and brought to London for interviews at the War Office. From London it was decided to send him to Egypt from where he could renew contacts with Palestine, Feinberg and the Nili spies. Alas Feinberg had misinterpreted Aaron’s cable from Copenhagen and thought that he had given-up and gone to the USA. In desperation Feinberg again set out in January 1917 to make contact with the British in Cairo, this time with his fellow Nili member Lishansky. En route Feinberg was killed and Lishansky was wounded, but nevertheless he made it to Cairo and British HQ. At last the Nili were taken seriously and Lishansky was returned to Palestine where from February to September 1917 the Nili worked ceaselessly; the British acted as the conduit for much needed financial aid to the starving peasants and in return the Nili supplied invaluable information.

The Nili organisation consisted of 23 active members and some 12 or more passive members. They were Medical Officers in the Ottoman Army, road engineers, or involved with the water supply, Recruiting Officers, Commissariat Officers etc etc. and they thus had access to precise information about Ottoman Army movements, numbers etc which was of the utmost importance to the British.

The end of the Nili came as mentioned in an earlier post with the capture of a carrier pigeon which landed at an Ottoman Turkish army camp at Caesarea. Once the code was broken all hell was let loose. Sarah Aaronsohn died as I mentioned earlier; having suffered torture, she shot herself in the mouth and survived a few short days more. Rueben Swartz hanged himself in Nazareth prison rather than cooperate with his captors. Naaman Belkind was captured and it is widely believed that he talked and thus endangered other members of the Nili. Be that as it may, both he and Yosseff Lishansky were hanged by the Ottoman Turks only weeks before the allied capture of Jerusalem; reportedly Lishansky’s last word were ‘Long live the English redeemers!’ The remainder were captured, tortured and held in Damascus or in Istanbul until the armistice. As a result of their treatment Hirsch Aaronsohn contacted epilepsy and Fishel Aaronsohn remained lame for the rest of his life.

The Aaronsohn brothers, Alex and Aaron, continued to work closely with Allenby. Alex was by now in British uniform and was later awarded the DSO. Aaron also acted as an advisor but was more of a political bent and he travelled between Cairo, London, New York and Washington. Allenby’s letter which I quoted in a previous post was occasioned by Aaron’s disappearance over the channel while flying from Britain to France to attend the peace conference in 1919.

Regards

Michael D.R.

Edited 9 October , 2004 by michaeldr

[michaeldr]

The pictures below are of, clockwise from top-right,

Sarah Aaronsohn, Alex Aaronsohn DSO, Avshalom Feinberg and Aaron Aaronsohn.

The pictures are from the Zionist Archives and Chaim Herzog’s book ‘Heroes of Israel’

[Robert Dunlop]

Yigal Sheffy provides the following perspective on the effectiveness of the Nili:

"The Nili ring is undoubtedly the most famours spy network on either side known to have operated in the Middle East during the First World War. Public knowledge of it, however, is attributable less to its intelligence achievements than to the heroic death of Sarah... who committed suicide. In addition, the fact that Aaron Aaronsohn was connected with a particular ideological movement within the Jewish community in Palestine (the Yishuv), and was occupied with political activity in addition to his intelligence work, turned the group into a symbol of daring in the post-war Yishuv. Traces of this bias are to be found in several historical assessments of Nili's work, which were determined by ideological views rather than professional intelligence criteria.

Maximal utilisation of agents everywhere was limited by two major weaknesses: the difficulty in maintaining contact with them, and the prolonged time-gaps between obtaining information and reporting it."

Basically, the information supplied by Nili was rarely useful because it was out of date. This did not reflect the capability of obtaining information. The Nili was very capable in this respect. It was the major problem of communication into/out of Palestine.

Robert

[armourersergeant]

Michael, Robert,

Thanks for that about the Nili, good info if contrasting end views. Another piece of info taken in and stored.

regards

Arm.

[Robert Dunlop]

I find myself asking that can a man change so much that he can perform below average in one area of war and yet excel in another.

A fascinating question. One can think of it in reverse as well. Smuts comes to mind as someone who helped contribute to the victory in German South West Africa (Botha was C-in-C) but made a real hash of things in German East Africa.

Allenby, bullish and unapproachable, was an average ,if that , commander on the Western Front, yet he excelled in the desert.

It is hard to think of many British commanders who 'excelled' on the Western Front. Some contributors have attributed this to the High Command and political influence. Freed from this, Allenby came into his own. I doubt this. What made generals look ordinary on the Western Front were things like: the ability to rapidly deploy reinforcements when an attack threatened (the French rail system, with supplements, was excellent), the ability to defend in great depth, the lack of any flanks (excepting Nieuport and Switzerland), and the dominance of artillery and machine guns in defence.

If we say that he used the officers (Chavuel, Meinetzhagen etc) and conditions around him , then why did he not do so on the WF.

I don't know what the quality of his WF officers was like. Allenby had real problems controlling the Cavalry Division in the opening months of the war. In the retreat, the Cavalry Division was a bit of a shambles. This has been attributed to the independent-minded officers such as Gough. The Division more than made up for this in First Ypres.

If we say that his training and outlook was best suited to open warfare then by definition we can almost say that his performance on the WF was not really his fault as he had not had the experience and training to cope with it.

I think we can say that Allenby's cavalry background would have made him more mindful of the capabilities of the Light Horse and Yeomanry in Palestine. He still had to have the nouse to know how to release them into an environment where they could exploit their full potential. In this respect, he may have learnt from the experience of Arras. And he had to have the environment into which they could be released, which Palestine had.

The converse conclusion does not necessarily follow as true, though it may be. I would expect the mark of an excellent general to be the ability to adapt, bearing in mind the key principles.

He seems to have shown an aptitude to use others around him and subterfuge to gain what he wanted in the desert, with less resources than he had in say 1917 Arras. Why did he not use what he had, not encourage those around him, accept advice etc on the WF?

What i seem to be thinking, and saying very badly, is that is Allenbys success justification for the reasoning that most Commanders on the western front, just felt hopelessly out of their depth with the war they were forced to face and often did not cope. Yet when he was put in a war he understood he showd all the 'brians' he had to adapt his own thoughts and use the resources he had around him. thus just because he did not cope on the western front does not make him a bad commander.

Or is this just too simplified an answer?

It may be too simplified. The characteristics of the Western Front described above were made worse by other factors out of control of the generals. Here I am thinking particularly of the period up till late 1916/early 1917. The shortage of artillery ammunition and then the relative lack of experience of vast numbers of British troops and officers were significant handicaps. It could be argued that good generals would not have attacked then. But they were compelled to do so, not by Haig but by the situation in which the allies found themselves. As has been mentioned on this forum before, sitting back in front of the German occupiers was not an option.

On the other hand, Palestine offered some interesting opportunities. Firstly, the previous efforts at Gaza meant that Allenby could easily focus Turkish attention there. Second, it was hard for the Ottoman Army to move reinforcements as quickly as on the Western Front, and as quickly as the mobile infantry could exploit a gap. Third, there were flanks and both were within easy reach. Having outmanouvered the Ottoman Army on the right flank at Third Gaza, he could then use the same flank in the Jordan Valley to fix the attention of von Sanders.

So the key was to think how the mobile infantry could be used to their full potential. Here Allenby had an advantage. He knew what this potential could be, fair better I would suggest than someone who has come up through the infantry. He knew what had to be put in place to use this potential: availability of water, a weakly defended flank and surprise. It was extremely difficult to achieve any of these on the WF, irrespective of who you were.

I don't think the freedom from higher influence was a factor. Allenby's predecessors were in the same position. It always helps when you can bring a fresh pair of eyes to bear on someone else's mistakes. Allenby was even able to turn these to mistakes into strengths. I bet that Allenby did use the lessons he had learned at Arras as well.

So, in conclusion, it is possible to make the case that a general who 'failed' on the WF could succeed elsewhere. This could be due to personal/professional factors that were exposed as inadequate or had to be subjugated to the conditions on the WF. However, if a general survived for any length of time on the WF (as Allenby did) then a better performance elsewhere suggests that differences in the battlefield conditions was a more likely factor in the success.

Robert

[Guest bonza]

I will work something up over the weekend and get back to you a little later with a few more details.

Contender for Understatement of the Year !

Seriously, Michael, am impressed & thankful.

ooRoo

Pat

Could it possibly be Dr or Prof Michael? If not, certainly should be.

[armourersergeant]

Robert,

Once again thanks for an informative, thoughtful reply to p[arts if not all of my original question.

You have said some of what i was thinking and made me think on other points.

Another question for anyone,

How much was Allenbys success due to the ground work done by Murray in 1916/17. I dont mean fighting where he did not do well but in setting the admin back ground and the like?

regards

Arm.

[michaeldr]

Basically, the information supplied by Nili was rarely useful because it was out of date. This did not reflect the capability of obtaining information. The Nili was very capable in this respect. It was the major problem of communication into/out of Palestine.

Robert,

Sheffy may well be correct in that the communications problems meant that some of the intelligence arrived in Egypt past its sell-by date. There were problems with the trawlers, one of which was sunk by a mine. The pigeons were also known to be suspect as a delivery medium even before they started, as up to then they had only flown trips of c.45 miles.

So what was it that made Generals Macdonogh and Clayton so enthusiastic about Nili? And why was FM Allenby himself so fulsome in his praise for their work? It is difficult to imagine ‘ideological’ bias being at work in the case of these gentlemen.

Perhaps one should look at the work of Nili as a whole; that is, not only the work done by its field operatives but also the contribution of Aaron Aaronsohn back in Egypt. He was an internationally famous agronomist and in 1915 in particular he had travelled all over the country advising the Ottoman authorities on the locust plague. He had seen the movements of Turkish troops at close hand and was able to judge their efficiency. The British had always overestimated the ability of the Ottoman forces to reinforce their front; e.g. Kitchener’s instruction to Maxwell to supply extra troops to Gallipoli was ignored in Egypt as he believed that he could not spare them. Aaronsohn was able to explain form personal experience that railways only seen from aerial photography did not mean that they worked efficiently. Poor maintenance, a lack of spare parts and a shortage of fuel meant that meant that a journey of 200 miles could take 22 hours or more.

He was in Egypt from Dec 1916 until August 1917 and after some initial reluctance on the part of the British to deal with an enemy alien, he was in daily contact with them and they made full use of his wide inside knowledge of all aspects of the territory. A glance at his journal indicates the sort of subject covered in his briefings with the British.

Jan ’17: The British had very poor maps which he corrected with regard to roads and railways including pointing out weak points in the systems. Provides details on agriculture, fodder and food supplies. He provided biographical information on leading figures

Feb ’17: More work on maps correcting place names etc. Answers questions about the Jerusalem-Jericho road and the provision in that area of fodder/food for a cavalry force.

Advised on the dangers of a summer campaign, which diseases such as malaria were prevalent, where swamps were to be avoided etc.

Mar ’17: Discusses feasibility cavalry raid in vicinity of Beersheva/Hebron. Helps interpret aerial reconnaissance photographs. Advises on available mechanical and animal resources.

His advice is sought on Turkish resistance at Gaza and he suggests turning right flank/make demonstration at Beersheva. Advises on necessity of water drilling machines, filters and pipes.

The possible Turkish line of retreat from Jerusalem is discussed also the lines of retreat open to them in northern Syria

Apr ’17: Advises on railways, wharves etc…Meets Maj-Gen of RE to discuss water supply to Jerusalem and the coastal plain. Advises on drills, engines etc. etc. etc……….................................

Regards

Michael D.R.

[Robert Dunlop]

Michael

I cannot comment on the validity of Aaron Aaronsohn's journal entries. I can only refer you to Sheffy's book. Yigal comes from a background in military intelligence. He defines the criteria by which intel should be judged. His comments about the relative lack of effectiveness of the Nili are seemingly based on these criteria. I cannot say if Yigal has a political agenda behind his comments.

Robert

[Guest bonza]

Should a certain two people ever decide to meet. Can I be invited as an observer.