Haig's book review

[PhilB]

Yet as late as 1936, long after Haig's death, the British Army was spending £400,000 a year on horse fodder. Anthony

Just as a matter of interest, Anthony, any idea how much is spent on horse fodder now? Phil B

[Guest]

When you consider that George S Patton jnr, a cavalryman who commanded the American (French manufacture) light tanks in France in 1918, and who rose to fame in WWII, went back to the cavalry after WWI, believing tanks would be a dead end branch of the service, then you can see that Haig was not alone.

And don't forget that, Panzer divisions aside, the German army in WWII remained reliant on horse transport.

[KF Kelly]

Hello,

I had a look at The Social History of the Machine Gun by John Ellis (1993 edition). Ellis quotes Haig as having made his comment in a review of a book by Liddell-Hart. The reference given by Ellis for this is a bit unclear - it is: BH Liddell-Hart, the Tanks, Cassell, London 1959 vol I p 234. Is this Liddell-Hart quoting a review of an earlier book of his by Haig?

KF Kelly

[Anthony Pigott]

Just as a matter of interest, Anthony, any idea how much is spent on horse fodder now?  Phil B

No idea, I'm afraid, except it's a lot less than they spend on petrol.

However, I gather that the Household Cavalry keeps Kew Gardens in manure.

Anthony

[Desmond7]

The use of horses for transport purposes in WW11 is entirely understandable ... but surely Haig's remarks were framed around the idea of using the horse in the purest cavalry sense .. not as logistics animals?

Des

[Guest]

The use of horses for transport purposes in WW11 is entirely understandable ... but surely Haig's remarks were framed around the idea of using the horse in the purest cavalry sense .. not as logistics animals?

Des

And so were Patton's actions.

[Desmond7]

Sorry Angie - I don't understand what you mean in your last reply. Seriously. Not looking for an argument ... just clarity. And remember, I'm in the small town research battalion ... I don't often delve into the intricacies of Haig and Horses!

Des

[Anthony Pigott]

Hello,

I had a look at The Social History of the Machine Gun by  John Ellis (1993 edition). Ellis quotes Haig as having made his comment in a review of a book by Liddell-Hart. The reference given by Ellis for this is a bit unclear  - it is: BH Liddell-Hart, the Tanks, Cassell, London 1959 vol I p 234. Is this Liddell-Hart quoting a review of an earlier book of his by Haig?

KF Kelly

Curious... Has anyone got the Liddell-Hart book?

Anthony

[Anthony Pigott]

I came across this quote from Patton in the Canadian Military Journal: Summer 2000:

http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/engraph/Vo...df/93-102_e.pdf

"Regardless of the progress made in the development

of fighting machines, cavalry will always

be necessary. It will hold its own because no

other agency can perform cavalry duties with

equal reliability and dispatch...To expect

mechanical vehicles - impotent without regular

supplies, blind and deaf to control, and restricted

by terrain - to take over these duties, is to

expect the impossible."

Haig might have been wrong, but he seems to have been in good company.

Anthony

[Guest]

Sorry Angie - I don't understand what you mean in your last reply. Seriously. Not looking for an argument ... just clarity. And remember, I'm in the small town research battalion ... I don't often delve into the intricacies of Haig and Horses!

Des

Sorry, I meant that Patton's actions were the same as Haig's remarks. Haig spoke about the cavalry. Patton went back to the cavalry when he could have stayed with the new armoured branch. Both showed that they thought there was a future for cavalry.

Actually, although staying with the armoured branch would have been the "visionary" thing for Patton to do, it was a totally neglected branch of the US army in the inter-war years and would have been a career dead end.

[PhilB]

Actually, although staying with the armoured branch would have been the "visionary" thing for Patton to do, it was a totally neglected branch of the US army in the inter-war years and would have been a career dead end.

Was this reflected in the US officers who made top rank in WW2, Angie? I can`t recall any WW2 British generals who were ex-tanks - were there any? Perhaps in the inter-war years it was still necessary to be in a fashionable regiment! (I know about Montgomery!) Phil B

[Arnie]

Cavalry in the Great War.

Liddell Hart claimed that every nation involved in the war sooner or later found their Cavalry to be a liability

‘The power of modern musketry fire rendered the role of our cavalry very difficult’. ----Capt Serg Nidvine Cossack Regiment report into the effective of the Russian cavalry 1907

‘When the machine gun enters the field the cavalry boil rice’ – Akiyama Shinziburo Father of the Japanese cavalry 1906

It must be accepted as a principle that the rifle, effective as it is, cannot replace the effect produced by the speed of the horse, the magnetism of the charge, and the terror of cold steel----Cavalry Training Manual 1907[/u]

The Cavalry arms days were over before 1914. The Boar war and the Russo/Japan war had given even the Cavalry Generals plenty of clues. General Smith Dorrien in 1903 attempted to change the Cavalry to Mounted Infantry trained in infantry tactics and armed with a proper rifle. S-D took away their swords and lances and had a new rifle designed especially for these mounted infantry the SMLE No 1. These reforms were reversed by Haig in 1907 giving them back their swords and lances and their belief in the power of the charge and the use of cold steel. Haig was never an advocate of mounted infantry and in fact the British cavalry in France never really operated as MI only as replacement infantry, a subtle difference

In 1914 the cavalry on both sides failed in its Reconnaissance role, The Armies lost contact with the Germans on several occasions, that contact being re-established by aircraft.

‘The role of the cavalry on the battlefield will always go on increasing and that the organisation and training of cavalry must have as its basis the necessity of massed tactics’ – Haig 1912[/color]

On the advance to the Aisne in September 1914, the advance of the Cavalry was to say the least timid, the firing of one Maxim was enough for whole squadrons to dismount and wait until dark before they would move. Haig a Cavalry General moved his Corp with infantry leading, a strange tactic for an advance to contact

At this time the Germans were in disarray and would have been ripe for a cavalry pursuit. When French ordered Haig to let loose his cavalry and get over the Aisne on the 7th Sept, unfortunately the Cavalry Division could not move because its commander, Hubert Gough was away all day at a funeral of a friend. They finally got on the move at 1500 hrs. on the 9th Sept. The move was thrown into chaos when the 5th Cavalry Brigade under the future Lord Chetwode – executed a complete circle and collided with the flank of his own column. Needless to say Haig never did get over the Aisne.

[‘The machine gun is a much over rated weapon and two per battalion is more than sufficient’ – Haig minute to the war Council14th April 1915

At the battle of Loos an attack by the 21st and 24th Divisions attacked the German positions on the 26th of Sept it cost over 8,246 casualties, at no cost to the Germans; they were massacred by German MGs. In the inquiry of this disaster it turned out that the men had been on the move for 18 hours without been fed, and then had been pitched into battle for the first time without briefing. One of their complaints was that on their move forward they had often been delayed by convoys of wagons carrying fodder for the cavalry. Similar complaints were made by the artillery up to and including the battle of the Somme. The fodder problem crops up through out the war. The revisionist tries to mask this problem by mixing statistics i.e. by saying that the number of cavalry horses was such a small proportion of the total number of animals and figures of 25,000 cavalry to 450,000 totals, but that total was in 1918. In 1914 there were a total of 20,000 horses in the BEF this increased to 100,000 at the end of 1916 and 450,000 in 1918. It’s not hard to work out that up to the end of 1916 the Cavalry horses was a large proportion and a burden on supplies. Oh! by the way, the demands of the Russian Cavalry for fodder etc are thought by Russian historians, to have led indirectly to the downfall of the Russian army in 1917.

‘Officers try to inculcate such a respect for infantry fire that cavalry is taught to shirk exposure……We ought to be on our guard against false teaching of this nature... (and the) consequences of placing the weapon over the man’- Sir John French 1902

I find it difficult to believe that the cavalry’s casualties exceeded the infantry other than a percentage of those taking part. After all the KOYLI’s casualties were 10,000 killed and nearly 30,000 wounded. I do believe that their casualties when mounted were appalling. But that’s why I say their day had passed. Using their actions dismounted although very brave they were a poor substitute for good infantry. Uneconomic as well as they could only put less than 75% of their strength into the line. However I don’t think the infantry were to enamoured with the cavalries fighting record during the battle of Cambrai an infantry soldier wrote ‘When the cavalry trotted passed all smart and jingling the Infantry gave an ironic cheer, - When they galloped back in a panic the same infantry gave them knowing jeers’

‘I believe that the value of the horse and the opportunity for the horse in the future are likely to be as great as ever ….aeroplanes and tanks….are only accessories to the man and the horse, and I feel sure that as time goes on you will find just as much use for the horse—the well bred horse—as you have ever done in the passed ---- Haig - Book review 1926

The revisionist has tried to justify the position of the Cavalry on the battle field. Corrigan attempts to tell us that the cavalry could negotiate barbed wire. Perhaps the horse could jump a double dannet fence. But dealing with a double dannet then 40meteres of low wire the whole being liberally laced with that ancient enemy of cavalry ‘caltrops’ was a different kettle of fish. Cavalry could not cross fire sweep ground, simply because the horse could not take cover, nor could they negotiate the muddy conditions on the Somme and Passchendaele.

Mounted Infantry, Instead of horses I would put them in Lorries ---- Haig 1907[/color]

The aircraft had taken the role of harassing retreating troops. Again Corrigan tells us that if the Germans had cavalry at Cappereto they would have won a complete victory. The Germans had several Cavalry divisions in the East. But, apart from the fact Horses are not very good at climbing mountains. The Germans pursued the Italians in fast Lorries using swarms of Aircraft. The Italians fortunately had two great rivers between them and the Germans the Izonso and the Piave. In the 1918 battle the cavalry had one or two noted skirmishes and that's all they were. Often as not they would call for tanks or Infantry to get them out of trouble. In the end the matching the Cavalry with Tanks and that turned out to be a misuse of the tank

The cavalry were used to getting the pick of the enlisted men at a time when the infantry had to accept almost anything. This habit of grouping so many good men in the Cavalry deprived the infantry of potential NCOs and perhaps officers.

In 1902 Generals Hamilton, Hunter and Smith Dorrien were proponents of the use of Vehicles in war all were over ruled by the Cavalry block so years of development were lost. In 1914 we had the French Taxis moving men to the Marne and London Buses moving the British army a little later in the war

In conclusion if you want a simple yard stick as to the value of the Cavalry in France compare a cavalry Regiment’s battle Honours to any single Regular infantry battalion’s. Apart from the Middle East where the last horsed cavalry Regiment lasted until 1940, Cavalry regiments were amalgamating in 1922 and converting to tanks a few years later and that in spite of protest from Haig.

Arnie

[Anthony Pigott]

... General Smith Dorrien in 1903 attempted to change the Cavalry to Mounted Infantry trained in infantry tactics and armed with a proper rifle. S-D took away their swords and lances and had a new rifle designed especially for these mounted infantry the SMLE No 1. ....

... In 1902 Generals Hamilton, Hunter and Smith Dorrien were proponents of the use of Vehicles in war all were over ruled ...

I'd be interested in specific references to S.-D.'s involvement in progress in equipment and tactics. I've seen many general remarks about it, but other than 'teaching the cavalry to shoot' while in command at Aldershot, I've seen very little detail.

He certainly seems to have learned the lessons of the Boer War and the Russo-Japanese one better than most. It's interesting that he's not usually described as a 'military thinker' in the same way that others including Haig are. I hesitate to criticise those who were responsible in the later part of the war, given the unprecedented scale of operations and use of technology because I feel anyone would have struggled. However, I can't help thinking that S.-D. would have travelled up the famous 'learning curve' rather faster than most.

Anthony

[Robert Dunlop]

Cavalry in the Great War.

Liddell Hart claimed that every nation involved in the war sooner or later found their Cavalry to be a liability

Arnie

Your analysis is most pertinent to the Western Front. Megiddo illustrates what the cavalry were still capable of when used in the appropriate circumstances ie defences opened up with appropriate artillery and infantry attacks, defenders thinly spread with limited capacity to bring up reinforcements and establish a new line of defence. The Eastern Front held out these opportunities as well.

In 1914, the reconnaisance role was very important. The biggest problem I have come across is that the reports of contact with Germans were ignored, even when supplied by aerial recon. The cavalry were helpful in plugging gaps and fighting delaying actions.

Aggressive operations in support of a break-through were almost impossible on the congested Western Front, especially given the capacity to reinforce threatened sectors.

I would suggest that the cavalry became motorised not because they did not have a role on horses but because, in the age of the petrol engine, horses did not have role (not strictly true but you know what I mean).

Robert

[Arnie]

Robert

I agree, but on the eastern front there was the space and not the 'wall to wall' trenches. Both the Russians and Germans used cavalry in WW2 mainly because of their experiences in WW1.

During the 'toing and froing' of 1914 the cavalry fought a number of actions, as you so fairly pointed out. But, if you look at the number of troops involved they were only really skirmishes, fought cavalry to cavalry. Infantry in the most elementary defensive position were not worried about cavalry, add a machine gun and the action became a massacre.

The cavalry could never defeat a British Square (only Fuzzie Wuzzies could do that !) Giving infantry a high powered magazined rifle and later a machine gun, spelt the end of cavalry.

Best wishes

Arnie

[Ste]

I'd be interested in specific references to S.-D.'s involvement in progress in equipment and tactics. I've seen many general remarks about it, but other than 'teaching the cavalry to shoot' while in command at Aldershot, I've seen very little detail.

He certainly seems to have learned the lessons of the Boer War and the Russo-Japanese one better than most. It's interesting that he's not usually described as a 'military thinker' in the same way that others including Haig are. I hesitate to criticise those who were responsible in the later part of the war, given the unprecedented scale of operations and use of technology because I feel anyone would have struggled. However, I can't help thinking that S.-D. would have travelled up the famous 'learning curve' rather faster than most.

Anthony

Ricahrd Holmes's The Little Field Marshal: A Biography of Sir John French explores Smith-Dorrien's time at Aldershot a little, comparing it to French's command there. It seems S-D upset French by making changes very quickly after arriving, as if to point out inadequacies his methods.

If I recall correctly, Holmes says that although French certainly championed cavalry as a weapon of 'schock tactics' with the sword and lance, it was he who insisted that they be armed with the SMLE rather than a carbine; apparently it was under French that the cavalry began to practice dismounted action. It was the term - with all its social implications - 'mounted infantry' that really wound him up.

Cheers,

Ste

[Robert Dunlop]

Infantry in the most elementary defensive position were not worried about cavalry, add a machine gun and the action became a massacre.

Giving infantry a high powered magazined rifle and later a machine gun, spelt the end of cavalry.

Arnie

Your point is well made if cavalry are only responsible for or capable of frontal attacks on prepared infantry. This is only one of ther roles and, as you rightly point out, this role had been rendered invalid prior to WW1. The true offensive capability required the cavalry to get behind the front line in break-out mode. Hence the success of Megiddo. It must still be borne in mind that Megiddo worked so well because of the terrain, which severely limited movement to a few key valleys and passes that could be sealed off, and because the Ottoman Army lacked adequate mobile reserves.

Nery is the best example of a larger-scale (ie not skirmish) action for British cavalry but it was against their counter-parts on the Western Front. Soudet's French cavalry corps also came up against German cavalry. In this instance, contact was actually made with the jaegers who screened the cavalry, causing Soudet to lament the fact that the German cavalry would not come out to fight in the way that he expected.

Robert

[Arnie]

Robert

Nery and Megiddo

Thanks for mentioning Nery and Meggido. I cannot agree that Nery was a pure Cavalry battle. It was the 2nd Cavalry Brigade fighting in an infantry role or to stretch a point Mounted Infantry. The real heroes of this battle were ‘L’ Battery RHA who won three VCs, and I suppose the machine guns of the Bays. The numbers involved would in the terms of this war only constitute a skirmish. I think there was something less than 1500 men involved and only about 175 casualties (please don’t quote me on the figures).

I must admit I had forgotten Meggido, but then so has most of the war historians, I must have more than a dozen books that cover this period of the war and only Liddell Hart mentions the battle to any great degree. But I’m glad to say that it has given me enough ammo to attack you from the flank!!!!!!

The battle was brilliantly conceived and carried out and although Allenby outnumbered Liman & Kemal 3 to 1. His use of all arms was first class. He used subterfuge to get his cavalry into position, Lawrence’s Arabs (using armoured cars), swarms of aircraft to attack the railway and hold the Turks attention. and his Infantry to 'force the front door open'. His Desert Mounted Corps consisted to a large degree of colonial mounted infantry (without swords or lances) trained in Smith – Dorriens methods rejected by Haig. But, also several companies of armoured cars. Allenby's force although nearly a 100,000 strong only had 12,000 all arms in the Desert Mounted Corp.

Nevertheless it was a brilliant affair

Ste

Regarding French and S-D I think there was a little more in it than S-D(going back to the Boar war) being in a hurry French was a cavalry general down to his highly polished Boots. S -D was an infantry man and all the cavalry thought he was a bit of an upstart reorganizing the cavalry. I see french does not seem to have objected when Haig reversed the reforms.

Arnie

[Anthony Pigott]

I'd be interested in specific references to S.-D.'s involvement in progress in equipment and tactics.  I've seen many general remarks about it, but other than 'teaching the cavalry to shoot' while in command at Aldershot, I've seen very little detail.

He certainly seems to have learned the lessons of the Boer War and the Russo-Japanese one better than most.  It's interesting that he's not usually described as a 'military thinker' in the same way that others including Haig are. I hesitate to criticise those who were responsible in the later part of the war, given the unprecedented scale of operations and use of technology because I feel anyone would have struggled.  However, I can't help thinking that S.-D. would have travelled up the famous 'learning curve' rather faster than most.

Anthony

Ricahrd Holmes's The Little Field Marshal: A Biography of Sir John French explores Smith-Dorrien's time at Aldershot a little, comparing it to French's command there. It seems S-D upset French by making changes very quickly after arriving, as if to point out inadequacies his methods.

If I recall correctly, Holmes says that although French certainly championed cavalry as a weapon of 'schock tactics' with the sword and lance, it was he who insisted that they be armed with the SMLE rather than a carbine; apparently it was under French that the cavalry began to practice dismounted action. It was the term - with all its social implications - 'mounted infantry' that really wound him up.

Cheers,

Ste

Here's a bit about S.-D.'s cavalry reforms from his 'Memories...'. The date referred to is well into his time at Aldershot, so not very 'hasty'.

Ballard also refers to this and says that what needled French was that many of the cavalry commanders agreed with S.-D.

Regards

Anthony

[Arnie]

Anthony

Well done! does S-D's book mention the altercation with another general in South Africa. I seem to remember I read he drew his revolver an the gentle man in question after his troops had ben let down in battle

Aenie

[Chris_Baker]

What exactly, given that you had a war to win and facing the same conditions both political and military, would you have done differently, Jimmy Knacky?

[Guest Jimmy Knacky]

Well one things for sure you would not send in cavalry against machine guns.

Even sending men over the top week after week against machine guns in the hope they would run out of ammunition eventually wasn't very clever was it.

It was the heavy artillery that won us the war eventually not the needless sacrafice of human life.

Mind you 25 years later they sent in the BEF again, against far superior armaments and we all know what nearly happened then don't we.

[Guest]

For the life of me what sort of lunatic could send mounted troops against a machine gun never mind Infantry.

Eh?

After 1914, as a general rule they didn't. they retained large numbers of cavalry to exploit the breakthrough which never came.

And in many respects, although still equipped with traditional cavalry weapons, such as sabres and lances, WWI period cavalry tended to function more like mounted infantry - they would fight dismounted where possible.

[Max]

It was the heavy artillery that won us the war eventually not the needless sacrafice of human life.

Can you please state which source or sources has led you to this assertion? In my view artillery cannot take and hold ground.

[Guest Jimmy Knacky]

Artillery can't hold and take ground eh?